250 Folgen

Die Universitätsbibliothek (UB) verfügt über ein umfangreiches Archiv an elektronischen Medien, das von Volltextsammlungen über Zeitungsarchive, Wörterbücher und Enzyklopädien bis hin zu ausführlichen Bibliographien und mehr als 1000 Datenbanken reicht. Auf iTunes U stellt die UB unter anderem eine Auswahl an elektronischen Publikationen der Wissenschaftlerinnen und Wissenschaftler an der LMU bereit. (Dies ist der 2. von 3 Teilen der Sammlung 'Volkswirtschaft - Open Access LMU'.)

Volkswirtschaft - Open Access LMU - Teil 02/03 Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München

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Die Universitätsbibliothek (UB) verfügt über ein umfangreiches Archiv an elektronischen Medien, das von Volltextsammlungen über Zeitungsarchive, Wörterbücher und Enzyklopädien bis hin zu ausführlichen Bibliographien und mehr als 1000 Datenbanken reicht. Auf iTunes U stellt die UB unter anderem eine Auswahl an elektronischen Publikationen der Wissenschaftlerinnen und Wissenschaftler an der LMU bereit. (Dies ist der 2. von 3 Teilen der Sammlung 'Volkswirtschaft - Open Access LMU'.)

    Can Naked Exclusion Be Procompetitive?

    Can Naked Exclusion Be Procompetitive?

    Antitrust scholars have argued that exclusive contracts have anticompetitive, or at best neutral effects, if no efficiencies are generated. In contrast, this paper shows that exclusive contracts can have procompetitive effects, provided buyers are imperfect downstream competitors and contract breach is feasible. In that case an efficient entrant is not necessarily foreclosed through exclusive contracting but induces buyers to breach. Because breaching buyers have to pay expectation damages to the incumbent, the downstream profits they obtain when breaching must be large enough. Therefore, the entrant needs to set a lower wholesale price than absent exclusive contracting, leading to lower final consumer prices and higher welfare.

    Economic Analysis of Pay-for-delay Settlements and Their Legal Ruling

    Economic Analysis of Pay-for-delay Settlements and Their Legal Ruling

    In this paper, we ask whether courts should continue to rule settlements in the context of pharmaceutical claims per se legal, when these settlements comprise payments from originator to generic companies, potentially delaying generic entry compared to the underlying litigation. Within a theoretical framework we compare consumer welfare under the rule of per se legality with that under alternative
    standards. We find that the rule of per se legality induces maximal collusion among settling companies. In comparison, the rule of per se illegality entirely prevents collusion and the rule of reason induces limited collusion when
    antitrust enforcement is subject to error. Contrary to intuition, limited collusion can be welfare enhancing as it increases companies' expected settlement profits and thus fosters generic entry. Generic companies obtain additional incentives to challenge probabilistic patents, which potentially leads to overall increased competition. We further show that generic entry is fostered more effectively by inducing limited collusion than by rewarding first generic entrants with an exclusivity right.

    Price Discrimination and Fairness Concerns

    Price Discrimination and Fairness Concerns

    We analyze the profitability of third degree price discrimination under consideration of consumers' fairness concerns within an experiment and explain the results
    within a theoretical framework. We find that with an increase in the price differential negative reciprocal reactions by disadvantaged consumers become stronger compared to positive reciprocal reactions by advantaged consumers.
    Consequently, the profit maximizing price differential lies below the one predicted to be optimal by standard theory. Further, profitability increases when consumers who are regarded as poorer are charged lower prices compared to
    when the wealth of the different consumer groups is unknown.

    Risk attitudes and Medicare Part D enrollment decisions

    Risk attitudes and Medicare Part D enrollment decisions

    The new Medicare Part D program provides prescription drug coverage for older Americans through highly subsidized and tightly regulated plans offered by private insurance firms. For most eligible individuals without coverage from other sources, obtaining Part D coverage would be rational, but it requires active enrollment and plan choice decisions. We investigate if non-enrollment in Medicare Part D can partly be explained by risk aversion. Data are taken from a national online survey conducted just after the introduction Part D. The survey included a context-free and a context-related hypothetical lottery to measure an individual’s attitude towards risk. Respondents who are risk tolerant according to these measures were significantly less likely to enroll in Part D. We also illustrate that hypothetical choice questions designed to elicit risk attitudes are subject to reference-point effects. Even minor differences in the priming of respondents can result in potentially misleading conclusions about the role of risk aversion in the insurance decisions.

    Standards and Incentives under Moral Hazard with Limited Liability

    Standards and Incentives under Moral Hazard with Limited Liability

    We consider a model of moral hazard with limited liability of the agent and effort that is two-dimensional. One dimension of the agent’s effort is observable and the other is not. The principal can thusmake the contract conditional not only on outcome but also on observable effort. The principal’s optimal contract gives the agent no rent and – in contrast to the first-best allocation – uses toomuch observable effort and too little unobservable effort. This distortion in the relative use of the two kinds of effort increases if the agent’s liability becomes more limited.

    The Theory of the Firm goes Global

    The Theory of the Firm goes Global

    What insights can be gained from bringing the theory of the firm to the global economy? I discuss several new features of the world economy that can be explained by incorporating the theory of the firm into the theory of international trade. Among the new features I discuss are the move to flatter
    corporate hierarchies and the decentralization of authority in firms, the “war for talent”, the rise of CEO pay in rich countries, organizational convergence across countries, and firm heterogeneity.

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