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What is the military recruitment dilemma?
Military recruitment is problematic. And a key issue is that people who get paid good money can't solve it. So after six months of analysing YouTube, Facebook, Linkedin, X, Instagram, and yes, even TikTok comments - perhaps I can. The military recruitment ideas below are not meant to be taken in isolation, and most, if not all of them can be done together.
If any Members of Parliament or the General Staff are reading this, please feel free to help yourselves, I know that your idea buckets must be completely barren now.
1. The Infant-Infantry
Very few militaries on the planet consider children to be the solution to their needs, but very few countries are mentally agile or brave enough to survive the modern world. The British military, however, knows that an SA80 in the hands of a 14-year-old Glaswegian is just as deadly as an AK-47 in the hands of any rascally Russian Vatnik.
From the trenches of Ypres, the decks of the imperial navies, the streets of Kampala and the Killing Fields of Cambodia - children have been an effective part of militaries. Some as young as nine have proven that they can carry ammunition, fit into tunnel systems and the mechanisms of aircraft, artillery and tanks, and in a pinch, they can step into any SO1 role with relative ease.
Because the minimum wage is so low for younger people, this could also be a very cost-effective measure. The UK could easily raise a battalion of these "ten-pound Privates" for about half the cost of a regular one. This solution is also popular with many overworked teachers, who pity those kids clogging up overcrowded classrooms and enduring worthless education. Their hearts desire Call of Duty, Fortnite, the open sea, sky, and glory in battle - not GCSEs!
2. The British Commonwealth Legion
The Enlistment of Foreigners Act 1854 gave the country the power it needed before, and by Jove, Parliament can honour us again. Whilst the concept may be a copy of the French Foreign Legion, just like the class system of the Normans, if it's good enough for the French, it's good enough for us.
The UK already has a long history of Commonwealth and Sepoy armies, and we used international units before to great effect (e.g. No.10 (Inter-Allied) Commando unit in WWII). This system will yield significant numbers, and such great savings, that it can't be passed up. Anyone who's served on Herrick operations knows we could've solved the whole thing in a year for a tenth of the price if only we had a Corps of Gurkhas.
Commonwealth soldiers have been fantastic, but we should open their opportunity to the whole world. Fitness and aptitude assessments, as well as English literacy testing, will be done overseas, and successful applicants will be given a one-way plane ticket and a space in basic training, after which they will fill one of the many empty bedspaces found all over the forces.
They will serve a four-year minimum contract, then with one or two lucky family members (we'll work out the details later) they'll have earned their place in the country. They can continue to serve in the forces or head into the green and pleasant land as a full UK citizen and resident.
3. National Service+
This one is a favourite of the older generation, and for good reason. Wimpy young adults won't be making cringe videos on TikTok when they are getting thrashed up and down Mt Tumbledown and sweeping pinecones outside the Commanding Officer's office.
Youths fighting outside Argos in Kilburn should be fighting international terrorists or the Americans outside the chow hall in Camp Lemonnier! And if they like choreographed dance instead, what better place than as the rear marker on the parade square of Horse Guards?
There won't be a piece of brass unpolished as everyone between the ranks of Corporal and Warrant Officer Class 2 is given a five-person work party, and every Officer rank is issued a batsman and a personal assistant. Watch as productivity doubles, triples, and quadr

There are not more than five primary colors…
yet in combination they produce more hues than can ever be seen.
~ Sun Tzu
With the first week of April 2024 being Autism Acceptance Week, this article aims to highlight the presence of autistic soldiers in the army and the benefits of-and challenges in-embracing neuroinclusivity.
There was a whopping 787% rise1 in the number of Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) diagnoses in the UK between 1998 and 2018. The condition itself is not on the rise. It is, instead, increasingly understood, recognised, and then diagnosed. A key contributor to identifying autism is that every one of the 570,000 educators2 across the 29,000 schools in the country have been asked to take on a mindset that all teachers are a teacher of Special Educational Needs and Disability (SEND).3
Because of the wholesale uptick of knowledge around autism, an awakening has been unfolding. A highly common theme begins as a parent's quest to understand their child's atypical behaviours soon reveals a startling revelation: many of these parents share a unique bond with said child. Prompted by the child's seemingly inexplicable behaviours in their early years, and flagged by attentive educators, families embark on an exploration of the condition and onto a seismic path of self-discovery.
This sheds light on thousands of individuals who had long-grappled with unexplained nuances in their own lives; huge numbers4 of UK adults are realising that they, too, are autistic.
Evolving diagnostic criteria, increased awareness, and improved access to diagnostic services have resulted in a late-diagnosis phenomenon and a sweeping tide of awareness cascading across the country, and indeed around the world. As individuals grapple with this newfound understanding, society is witnessing a profound shift in perception, empathy, and solidarity among people navigating the complexities of being neurodivergent.
Soldiers on the Spectrum
While this article focuses specifically on autism for Autism Acceptance Week, there are a plethora of other conditions placing neurominorities among our ranks.5
The next time your Unit is on a CO's parade, three ranks in a hollow square, look left and right. It is likely that you will be stood amongst neurominorities, and a small number of those will be diagnosed or undiagnosed autistic soldiers. Autistic soldiers are serving throughout the organisation and scattered across the ranks. I know this because I am one.
A request for information under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 also shows us that, as at February 2023, over four hundred MOD personnel were autistic.6 And since researchers estimate that there are more undiagnosed autistic people in the UK than there are diagnosed,7 it goes then that there are many serving soldiers out there grappling with the condition unbeknownst to them. I write with much conviction: the number of already serving late-diagnosed autistic personnel is certain to rise.
Recognising this inevitable trend, it is important for leaders to:
Gain an understanding of the unique experiences and perspectives that autism brings,
be sensitive to the challenges that autistic people face,
and foster a culture of complete acceptance in your workplace for people who think and experience the world differently.
With a wealth of emerging content out there on what autism is, I highly recommend grabbing a brew and doing an online search or AI GPT prompt on common autism myths. This is a valuable way of encouraging meaningful and progressive discourse in your workplace since myths around autism range from dismissive to dangerous. For instance, you might like to have a go at starting a conversation around whether or not 'everybody is somewhere on the spectrum'. Ask if there is truth in this statement.
Ask why people so readily believe it. Ask what the real-life implications may be for autistic people if this belief remains as pervasive as it is now. If you read that statement and instantly dismissed it

In light of a number of somewhat braying articles1 in the mainstream media suggesting excessive 'wokeism' is rife within the military, it seemed an opportune moment to investigate many of the claims of Defence surrounding the topic of Diversity and Inclusion.
By and large, there are now two common uses of the term 'diversity':
The first, more traditional usage is an indication of variety, used such as when highlighting the unrivalled diversity of life within the Amazon rainforest, or the splendid diversity of Heinz' current soup range.
The second, social definition, employed more formally by Defence within this context, refers to an action, being "the recognition of differences between individuals or groups".
In relation to this latter definition, a second element is attached, that of 'inclusion', which the organisation characterises as "the effect of good diversity management ensuring that all individuals, no matter what their unique differences feel they belong [and are therein able to contribute effectively] to the wider team." A prudent step, given that recognition alone without action would amount to no change.
Combined, Diversity and Inclusion within this context therefore seek to optimise the relationships (through inclusion) between all the members of the force, based off understanding and acknowledgement of each individual's identified differences (Diversity). In this sense, diversity is seen as a start state, and inclusion a vehicle of action by which to optimise it.
Challenges?
This dual meaning of the word presents challenges when discussing diversity, as the two meanings are frequently conflated, or employed as if synonymous, which they are clearly not. For the sake of clarity this article almost exclusively refers to diversity in the traditional sense, referring to the prevalence of numerous assorted entities.
The 'Defence Diversity & Inclusion Vision' sees "Defence harness[ing] the power of difference to deliver capability that safeguards our nation…". In so doing Defence relies upon variation to exploit a fundamental assumption: that 'difference' (traditional diversity) is 'powerful' (beneficial).
This assumption is frequently rolled out within the often-used sentiment, or indeed statement, that 'diverse teams produce better results', that 'diversity and Inclusion are operationally essential', or any of the other combinations of similar words to the same effect.
The benefits of diversity
This article investigates the veracity of that assumption, finding, as one might expect, that 'it's a bit more complicated than that', and that actually, poorly managed diversity can be a net negative. In so doing, a large number of academic studies have been interrogated to form this image, spanning numerous categories of diversity, including race, sex, ability, age, culture, cognition, education and nationality.
In making a generalised and reductive summary the author acknowledges that some nuance between specific groups will inevitably be lost, however has endeavoured to summarise the literature fairly thus:
There are many, many benefits of diversity within teams, but also numerous downsides that should not be ignored.2 Most significantly, diverse teams typically3 outperform homogenous groups in finding optimal solutions to complex problems, especially those that require creative or innovative solutions.4 Whilst this sounds ideal, you still have to pay the piper somewhere, and the compromise is that the more diverse a team, the less effectively it communicates.
Finding the 'sweet spot' can be challenging.5 Extremely diverse teams, being less cohesive and less coherent, are harder to control, and often take longer conducting both complex and simple tasks as a result. This all makes pretty logical sense, as people with increasingly different perspectives may proportionally struggle to understand each other.
By contrast, homogenous teams are generally much more effective at completing simple tasks or those with a clear, di

With defence in an unheralded period of uncertainty it is always pleasant to find some firm ground. To that end the notion that the use of simulation in military training will increase dramatically over the next 5 years will not cause much disagreement.
Against a training burden that has never been so intensive the MoD is faced with equipment costs increasing, availability of ammunition 1 decreasing and the complexity of training clashing with emerging restrictions. Simulation is a critical tool in tackling these problems.
Given the scale of this challenge, coupled with the breadth (more on this later) of the UK defence industry, integrating multiple systems into a single virtual2 battlefield (or Single Synthetic Environment) demands simple, understandable, interoperable and effective standards. We are not there.
Where are we?
The world of defence simulation is sufficiently opaque. This piece does not intend to add to that technical layer of fog. Rather it intends to explain the current issues as simply as possible, before offering three potential solutions.
In 2024 we are collectively spoiled. We are accustomed to the concept of "plug in and play" across our lives with HDMI cables, USB plugs, QI charging among others. So much so that one might casually assume that the same level of standardisation would be found in defence simulation hardware.
DIS3 (or the Distributed Interactive Simulation standard) was created in 1992 from work done with SimNet (created in 1987). Despite cancellation by NATO in 2010 it is still in use within the MoD. DIS's successor HLA4 (High Level Architecture), formed from a blend of DIS and ALSP (Aggregate Level Simulation Protocol) in 1996, is still 1 year older than the Nintendo64 game Goldeneye, at 28.
Despite iteration, both standards are outdated and limiting. This limitation is exacerbated by the number of adaptations being made with lenient, or in some cases no, centralised oversight (despite the valiant efforts of some in the UK through the Defence Policy for Modelling and Simulation - DMASC). Experimental Protocol Data Units (PDUs for short)5are network messages created by all parties to overcome the standard's shortfalls.
Their variance, lack of regulation and lack of standardisation have created a situation akin to the simulation Tower of Babel.
An unwillingness to conduct wholesale change, combined with a broader lack of understanding is now leading to the creation of an entirely unexpected problem - the launch of new products to overcome the shortfalls of DIS and HLA. Far from solving the problem by filling the gaps, this is adding to both the complexity and now the cost of new capabilities. Imagine the entire country having to use plug adaptors, just because manufacturers were unwilling to adhere to the Type G standard.
Nobody would tolerate it there: so why do we tolerate it in defence?
Solution 1: Unilateral not collaborative development.
There are 3 potential solutions to this issue and these will be looked at in increasing order of feasibility.
The MoD likes collaboration and partnerships and with the technological breadth and challenges on the global stage this has it's place. That being said, some of the biggest technological leaps of the last 20 years have been made by singular organisations headed up by empowered and focused leaders.
Nowhere would this difference in approach be more apparent than when comparing Project Purple (the 2005-2007 £120M development of the first generation iPhone) and Morpheus (the now cancelled 2017-2024 £690M component of the development of the next generation of tactical communications)6
Collaboration is critical to development but when that approach drifts into "design by committee", both from MoD and industry, things go wrong.
Especially when said collaboration is not being done to ensure best in class but to prop up a British defence industry landscape that is overburdened 7, when adjusted to a like for like comparison with the US DoD.
One way t

At the end of January 2024 a Russian company from 33rd Motor Rifle Regiment 1 set off to attack in the area of Novomikhailovka, South-West of Donetsk City. The company comprised three T-72s leading one BMP-1 and seven MT-LBs (catastrophic attrition means the Russian Army now uses the MT-LB utility tracked vehicle as an APC). After leaving a hard-topped road the sub-unit fanned out to attack from the line of march across open fields. It didn't get too far.
The company was not stopped by mines or other engineering obstacles. Nor was it stopped by artillery or rocket fire. There were no anti-tank engagements and no Ukrainian tanks deployed to counter-attack. In fact, none of the elements of a defensive battle studied by a British Army cadet at Sandhurst, or student at the Defence College at Shrivenham, were present. The company was stopped by $500 FPV drones loaded with explosive charges.
All but one vehicle were damaged or destroyed and the survivors fled on foot.
'The price of such inability to learn is the death of people,' lamented the prominent Russian military blogger 'Rybar', 'the loss out of the blue of a heap of equipment for which industry works in three shifts, as well as landscapes of burning columns.' This article is about the developing story of 'the most important component of the battlefield' - the first person view (FPV) drone.
Intensity of attacks
In 2022, only a handful of FPV-drone attacks were recorded. The Ukrainian Army was the first to appreciate the potential of FPV drones (as opposed to the Mavik-style drones that were becoming ubiquitous). By the summer of 2023, the Russian Army began to use FPV drones in greater numbers. Since that period, attacks have grown exponentially on both sides.
In total, there have been 3,917 Russian attacks (with video evidence) as at 8 February. About half hit. Roughly 12% result in destruction of the target (479 targets) and 15% in damage (594 targets). Around 20% miss or are inconclusive. Ukrainian use is ahead but the Russian Army is catching up.
Setting aside the attrition - tactical drones of all types, with artillery, have become the biggest battlefield killers - their presence has radically altered the close battle. Both sides are now locked in a stalemate where any movement is quickly detected and threats neutralised by drones.
What is being targeted?
Analysis of what is being attacked shows clear differences in the targeting strategies of Ukrainian and Russian drone pilots. The Ukrainians mainly attack high-value target platforms, such as tanks, SP guns, EW systems, air defence systems, and logistic stores. The Russians overwhelmingly use FPV drones to support attacks on Ukrainian 'positions' - the trench lines and strong points.
Both sides have actually been attacking trenches regularly, with important implications for the design of trenches. Building overhead cover is no longer sufficient; a trench must be at least L-shaped because skilful drone pilots are flying the drones into the trenches.
Where are the attacks taking place?
With geo-location, open-source monitoring of drone attacks offers insights into where the fighting occurs (much as NASA FIRMS data unintentionally but usefully records heavy artillery or rocket fire as 'heat anomalies'). Tocnhyi.info January 2024 heat maps (shown below) reveal how the most active areas for drone attacks were the Krynky bridgehead in the west and the Avdiivka-Marinka sectors in the east.
At the former, Ukrainian defenders on the Dnipro right bank (at a higher elevation than the left bank) are using drones and artillery to keep a much larger Russian force at bay at the 36th Separate Marine Brigade bridgehead.
Innovation and democratisation
Over 200 firms are involved in drone production in Ukraine. More than 60 drone types have been developed and fielded, which is, in some respects, an unhelpful 'menagerie of drones'. Commercial training providers have sprung up, and drone 'shock companies' have been raised. Crowd-funding

In an era of drones, loitering munitions, precision strikes, and manoeuvre warfare; discussing fortification seems almost quaint. Surely the revolution in military affairs and its successors have rendered bunkers and fixed positions irrelevant. If the future battlefield is transparent and the kill chain is as swift as proponents anticipate, staying still is a death sentence.
That is, of course, a trite assessment, but it reflects that very little consideration is given to hardened positions in the modern era. King's College London professor David Betz offers an interesting corrective to this misguided notion in his new book "The Guarded Age" (a copy of which was kindly provided for review by the publisher).
In the interests of full disclosure, Betz was one of my tutors at King's whilst I pursued my MA in War Studies. Readers will now undoubtedly attempt to divine how fairly he marked my papers based on the outcome of this review.
Fortifications are not just castles and bunkers, as Betz shrewdly shows. The process of fortification is, ultimately, about controlling and channelling the movement of forces and people (and data, too). Sensibly broadening the definition without losing fidelity allows for a more nuanced consideration. Fortifications are all around us when we stop and look. Indeed, much of urban design and planning incorporates fortification at a base level.
As the war in Gaza illustrates, cities themselves, both before and after destruction, are perhaps the ultimate fortified position. Designed to channel the flow of people when intact, they serve as superb hardened positions when destroyed - deadly for offensive forces but ideal for defenders, enabling them to hold key positions and tie down attackers with minimal resources.
Whether Haussman's redesign of Parisian streets to prevent the creation of barricades or the redesign of the Strand outside of King's College London and across from Bush House, city planning is about restricting movement and creating safety and security. From personal experience, the space outside King's was hazardous to students' health as lorries, cars, and cyclists competed for space.
After considerable renovation and redesign, the space outside the Strand Campus is a delightful haven for students.
There is a palpable sense of enthusiasm, tempered by shrewd professionalism, that suffuses Betz' writing and elevates his final product. "The Guarded Age" is a book that runs counter to the zeitgeist of defence and security writing, where everything is about mobility, manoeuvre, autonomy, and precision. In an era when everything seems fluid, writing about something that is fixed seems odd.
In less enthusiastic hands, the case for discussing and considering what fortifications are and could be would be harder to make. Writing about fortifications of the past? Decidedly easier. Writing about fixed positions and emplacements when everything is about drones and hypersonic munitions? Vastly more difficult.
Fortifications have a "strategic stratigraphy" to them, Betz writes. In essence, successive cultures, countries, or armed forces build upon the fortifications and embattlements of the past - a palimpsest approach to digging in and hardening positions. This, on reflection, is rather self-evidence but a novel way of looking at the bastions of the past and today. As others like Tim Marshall have eloquently written, geography still matters.
While it does certainly change due to geological, meteorological, and cartographic developments, high ground remains high ground, channels remain channels, and the desire for strategic advantage endures. Yet beyond the positioning of fortresses, their design remains strikingly consistent - stone walls are succeeded by Hesco barriers and moats are replaced by concrete bollards. Even the designs of the past are found in use today, with medieval star forts being replicated in the Sahel.
A good idea remains a good idea.
Perhaps the sole exception to this rule is in the r