Ancient Greek History - Audio Donald Kagan

In this lecture, Professor Kagan tells the story of the rise of Philip and describes his early actions: unifying Macedon, defeating barbarian armies, and creating a new, professional, national army. According to Professor Kagan, through these actions, Philip was able to make inroads into the Greek world. What made these inroads more effective was Philip's uncanny talent for diplomacy and the fighting between the various poleis. Eventually, the Greeks under the efforts of Athens and Demosthenes decided to face Philip in the battle of Chaeronea. The battle, though close, was won by Philip and his Macedonian forces. Finally, Professor Kagan evaluates the actions of Demosthenes and concludes that his actions should be judged as a noble endeavor of one who loved freedom.

In this lecture, Professor Kagan describes the growth of a new power: Thebes. Under the leadership of Epaminondas and Pelopidas, Thebes grows into a major power among the Greek cities. In fact, the Thebans even rout the Spartans in a standard hoplite battle in the battle of Leuctra. Finally, Professor Kagan points out that by the time of Theban hegemony, the Greek world had experienced so many wars and conflicts that it opened the door to a powerful leader: Philip of Macedon.

In this lecture, Professor Kagan examines the continuation of Spartan tyranny over the Greek poleis and the response of the Greek world. According to Professor Kagan, it became clear that the Greek poleis needed to do something to check the power of Sparta. So, Thebes, Argos, Corinth, and Athens along with some of the smaller poleis joined together to fight Sparta in the Corinthian War. The war ended in a stalemate, but now the Persians were afraid of the growth of Athenian naval power. So, the king made an alliance with Sparta to bring about the King's Peace, which emphasized Greek autonomy and which had the effect of breaking up all alliances, except the Peloponnesian League. After this fact, Sparta continued in its tyrannical behavior.

In this lecture, Professor Kagan describes the aftermath of the Peloponnesian War and how the Spartans began to dominate other Greek poleis, instead of liberating them. The Spartan general Lysander at this point not only grows in influence and power, but also follows an aggressive plan to establish pro-Spartan, oligarchical governments. However, according to Professor Kagan, this fact angered many cities. Therefore, Thrasybulus, along with the help of other poleis, resisted Spartan rule. Eventually he opposed Sparta at Phyle and in time reestablished the democracy of Athens.

In this lecture, Professor Kagan examines Pericles as a general. First, he describes Pericles' strategy of war and then he evaluates this strategy. According to Professor Kagan, Pericles' strategy was characterized by being both defensive and rational. It was defensive, because the Athenians did not engage the Spartans in a traditional hoplite battle, and it was rational, because Pericles assumed that the Spartans would cease fighting when they realized that the Athenians did not have to fight a land battle, since they had a walled city and a navy. On its surface, this strategy seems reasonable, but Professor Kagan points out that there were two flaws. First, the Athenians did not have an offensive plan: that is, a plan to deter the Spartans from quitting the war. Second, Pericles failed to realize that war is not always rational.

In this lecture, Professor Kagan focuses on the causes of the Peloponnesian War and the possible motivations for Thucydides' book, The History of the Peloponnesian War. Concerning the first point, Professor Kagan parts ways with Thucydides and argues that the war was not inevitable and that the Athenians under Pericles followed a policy of deterrence, which was aimed at peace. Similarly, he points out that there were a number of Spartans who did not want war as well. Therefore, according to this line of reasoning, war broke out due to a number of factors that were avoidable. Concerning the second point, Professor Kagan argues that Thucydides was a revisionist historian. In other words, Thucydides was writing not as a disinterested historian, but as a historian with a point to make, namely, that the war was inevitable and that Athens was only a democracy in name under Pericles. Finally, Professor Kagan acknowledges that his two points are debatable.