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Precision: A History of American Warfare by James Patton Rogers is published by Manchester University Press.
"Precision" is an intellectual history of America's pursuit of the titular objective - how to target adversaries, their militaries, and their infrastructure with pinpoint accuracy while, reducing harm to civilians and non-combatants. Author James Patton Rogers surveys the evolution of the American military's noble ambitions that often outreached its technological capacity and how that pursuit shaped the development and execution of strategy and doctrine.
Beginning with the First World War, Rogers seats the genesis of this pursuit in the horror of the First World War, which saw widespread and in many cases pointless slaughter. Morally abhorrent to American (and indeed European sensibilities), military officers sought to prevent the recurrence of such destruction by instead achieving greater accuracy. The advent of airpower began this uneven march towards a perhaps unattainable desire - to make war clean and efficient.
Military demonstrations against fixed, undefended targets with early airpower gave rise to the perhaps misguided belief that precision was indeed possible with the technology of the time.
The first test of this was the Second World War. In Europe, the United Kingdom's area bombardment stood in contrast with America's ostensible 'precision' campaign. Washington sought to target industries, military facilities, and logistics hubs as opposed to applying pressure to civilian populations. Aspirational again, the efficacy of such campaigns remains debatable given the accuracy of bombsights and the cost associated with waves upon waves of bombers pursuing well-defended targets.
In the Pacific, American military leaders managed to convince themselves and the public that the mass fire bombings of Japanese cities were somehow 'precise'. The apotheosis of this precision campaign was the use of the atomic bombs against Hiroshima and Nagasaki that helped bring the war to a close.
Whether or not the bombings were necessary is explored by Rogers, the debate over which feeds into questions of precision - a single bomb for a single target (military in nature) achieved a strategic effect for proponents of precision.
The nuclear era that followed was, and remains, Strangelovian in the extreme. Rogers' recounting of the torturous debates about nuclear strategy and doctrine is riveting, if absurd. It is hard to argue that nuclear weapons, especially thermonuclear devices are 'precision' by any measure.
Yet, that destructiveness was the source of its precision for its advocates - fewer bombs or warheads per target, an idea that was naturally undermined by the presence of 'overkill' which would only make the 'rubble bounce' in the end. The American military's efforts to develop a Single Integrated Operational Plan and its component plans for nuclear targeting sought to reduce this overkill and increase precision.
It was not until the Vietnam War that technology arguably began to catch up to the ambitions of precision with the first use of laser-guided munitions. Still in its infancy, it was, of course, overshadowed by the widespread, if ineffective, bombing campaigns such as Operation Rolling Thunder. Where precision truly shined, if at least in the public's mind, was during Operation Desert Storm and the allied efforts to eject Saddam Hussein's Iraqi army from Kuwait.
Even here precision munitions were only a fraction of the total used, yet the widespread coverage on CNN of bombs and missiles striking their intended targets created the impression that the era of precision had dawned.
Precision-strike complex
Perhaps the apotheosis of American precision strike emerged in the wake of the events of 9/11 and the Global War on Terror that followed. America's precision-strike complex saw persistent surveillance and highly accurate missiles and bombs develop an extremely tight kill chain allowing the elimination of individual target

'The Russian man is glad to see death, including his own - it reminds him of the end of everything that exists. He contemplates the ruins and fragments with pleasure…'
Walter Schubart, 1938
This author has watched thirty YouTube videos of Russian soldiers committing suicide. This has been possible thanks to the revolution that has taken place on the battlefield with the proliferation of cheap drones fitted with cameras. One slit his throat. It took him almost a minute to die. Twenty-two shot themselves.
Seven killed themselves by detonating grenades: the first held the grenade at arms-length and looked away; the second held the grenade to his chest; the third detonated two grenades against his ears (the head vanished); the fourth also blew his head off; the fifth, a corpulent individual of Asiatic appearance, detonated the grenade under his body armour; the sixth was an individual hiding behind a vehicle wreck; and the seventh held the grenade in front of his face.
How many Russian soldiers have committed similar acts unrecorded by Ukrainian drones can only be speculated.
Historically, we might associate such extreme behaviour with the Imperial Japanese Army. More recently we think of the fanaticism of terrorist organisations such as ISIS or Al Qaeda. But we would not normally frame the Russian Army in this way. This article begs the question: is the Russian Army a death cult?
Suicide in Russian culture
In Russia, suicide, or more broadly disdain for life, is modern and rooted in the revolutionary tradition. The most famous suicide is the poet Vladimir Mayakovsy (1893-1930). The cause however was a love affair, not revolution. His funeral was attended by 150,000 people, the largest public mourning event in Bolshevik Moscow after the funerals of Lenin and Stalin.
Rejection of life - as revolutionary act - finds origins in Turgenev's Fathers and Sons (1862) which popularised the phrase 'nihilism' through the character of Bazarov: 'At the present time negation is the most beneficial of all [acts] -and we deny…everything.' Nihilism mixed fanatical asceticism with self-mortification. Life mattered little or nothing.
Turgenev actually created the character as lampoon of the 'men of the sixties', but paradoxically Bazarov became an anti-hero to young Russians seeking change.
The nihilism became violent through the agency of the so-called 'new men' - Lenin's predecessors - the best known of which were Varfolomei Zaitsev (1842-1882), the archetypal nihilist but unknown in the West (and the character of Shigalev in Dostoyesvky's The Possessed); and Sergey Nechaev (1847-1882) (the character of Pyotr Verkhovensky, also in The Possessed).
The 'Nechaev affair' was the great cause célèbre in Russia of the period, but also remains completely unknown outside Russia except to Russian historians. The Tsarist authorities were so alarmed by the young man he was gaoled and deliberately starved to death, dying at the age of thirty-five.
Before he died he co-authored with Mikhail Bakunin (1814-1876) one of the most famous tracts of revolutionary literature in world history: The Revolutionary Catechism. It starts with the famous proposition 'The revolutionary is a lost man…no interests of his own, no affairs of his own, no feelings, no attachments no belongings, not even a name if his own.' It then goes on to describe a being who 'despises', who is 'hard with himself', who 'hates', and whose object is 'ruthless destruction'.
It could be a description of 'the Orcs', as Ukrainians describe the Russians they face on the other side of the trench lines.
While it is undeniable that a life-denying fanaticism coloured Russian revolutionaries (and radicals and anarchists across 19th century Europe), we must still ask, but were the revolutionaries born from a wider Russian cultural substratum that disregarded life, or were they atypical of their society.
Suicide in Russian society
Russian men die young. Roughly one quarter die before the age of 55, m

Over the past two decades, enhancing human performance capabilities for those operating in extremis contexts (i.e., Armed Forces, Emergency Services, and First Responders) has gained considerable traction in policy-making and scientific circles.
To operationalise this concept, the term Human Performance Optimisation (HPO) first emerged within the US Department of Defence (DoD) in 2006 as a conceptual framework to develop the performance capabilities of the military's most important asset - its people.1 Military tasks, by their very nature, place unique and intense physiological, psychological, and cognitive demands upon all Warfighters.
In addition, the contemporary operational environment is arguably more volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous (VUCA) than ever before2.
Indeed, the return of peer-on-peer conflict and the emergence of unconventional, asymmetric, and hybrid threats, combined with the scale and speed of technological change, has, and will, continue to make conflict a challenging and ever-evolving affair contested not only in the land, air, and maritime environments but also in the electromagnetic, cyber and space domains.3However, it is essential to note that while the character of conflict may change, its fundamental nature remains the same: it
is a human endeavour that is adversarial, dynamic, complex, and lethal.4
Given this reality, it is vital that every Warfighter, irrespective of gender, age, rank, or trade, is prepared for the demands of the contemporary operational environment. The importance of developing human performance capabilities for such demands was succinctly put by US Army Colonel (ret.) John Collins who stated that "Humans are more important than hardware, and their quality is more important than their quantities".
This point was again highlighted more recently by the British Army Chief of the General Staff, General Sir Patrick Saunders, who stated that "We need 'warfighters' - whether they are cyber specialists, drone pilots or infantry soldiers - to be stronger, faster, more intelligent and more resilient." To achieve this laudable objective, the Armed Forces must develop appropriate training strategies to enable military personnel to perform to their full potential.
Indeed, lessons learned over the past two decades have been internalised, resulting in a considerable improvement in the training, competence, motivation, and overall combat effectiveness of the Warfighter.5HPO represents part of this evolution and has been defined in the literature as "the process of applying knowledge, skills, and emerging technologies to improve and preserve the capabilities of military personnel to execute essential tasks".
Fundamentally, HPO aims to leverage evidence-based information and best practices to make the Warfighter as resilient, capable, agile, and lethal as possible.6 In addition, due to a reduced size and budget, the Armed Forces cannot afford large numbers of non-deployable personnel. Therefore, a secondary aim of HPO is to improve individual career longevity and reduce injury rates.
It is Nothing New
Preparing the Warfighter for success on the battlefield is nothing new. Indeed, numerous historical examples of military leadership emphasise the same ideas promoted within this article. However, our collective understanding of the optimal approach to achieve this aim has improved considerably, driven by developments in applied sports science, physiology, psychology, and cognitive neuroscience. To conceptualise HPO, the Warfighter should be viewed as a human platform.
This approach allows for the routine monitoring, analysis, and development of critical human performance capabilities no different from traditional military platforms (i.e., weapon systems, vehicles, or ISTAR assets). However, to adopt such an approach, it is essential to define critical aspects of human performance.
This typically is done using the Biopsychosocial model whereby human performance capabilities are split into

"I don't want to get any messages saying, 'I am holding my position.' We are not holding a Goddamned thing. Let the Germans do that. We are advancing constantly and we are not interested in holding onto anything, except the enemy's balls. We are going to twist his balls and kick the living shit out of him all of the time."
General George S Patton, June 1944
The debt owed to those who liberated Western Europe from Nazi oppression will underpin the D-Day 80 Commemorations. Although D-Day was essential to victory in Europe, it was not an end in itself. Study of the wider war to liberate Northwest Europe places D-Day in context and helps the military professional understand the link between the operational and strategic levels of war.
One method of undertaking this study is through educational wargaming which enables learning through active participation, rather than passive receipt of information. This short read, part three of three of this mini-series, will outline how this learning experience can be achieved through use of a COTS wargame.
Success on D-Day allowed the Allies to secure a firm bridgehead. The resulting campaign was a brutal attritional struggle that led to the destruction of German forces in Normandy and a dramatic breakout across France. Subsequent attempts for a quick advance into Germany failed in the face of logistical constraints and German resistance - most notably at Arnhem in September 1944. A German winter counter-offensive in the Ardennes followed and achieved surprise but was subsequently defeated.
In Spring 1945 a deliberate Allied offensive breached the German defences, crossed the Rhine and the German Army surrender in May 1945. How did the Allies win? Interactive study using the wargame 1944: D-Day To The Rhine offers the military professional the opportunity to answer this question.
The map for 1944: D-Day To The Rhine extends from the French Atlantic coast to Western Germany. Units are armies or corps and turns represent a month. Set-up shows how the Germans attempted to defend the region. The Allies are not committed to invading Normandy. Other options are available but come with commensurate variations in air support and German responsiveness.
The Allied invasion will almost certainly succeed. This illustrates the immense and wide-ranging preparatory effort the Allies devoted to ensuring success. A subsequent breakout can be more problematic and will reflect player decision making. The Allied invasion of southern France - Op DRAGOON - opens up a new area of operation to the south of the game map.
Ends, Ways and Means
Balancing "Ends, Ways and Means" are integral to success and reflect the game's strategic level focus. Allied victory is determined by the "End" chosen. These range from the swift capture of Berlin through to securing Western Germany and isolation of the industrial Rhur region. In this way the game confronts the player with the historical choices the Allies faced. Central to the representation of "Means", is the use of resource points. These provide replacements and enable movement and combat.
A fixed amount is given each turn, mirroring the capacity of the invasion beaches. German occupied ports can be captured to increase this amount. The Allied player faces a decision on whether success can be achieved with the fixed capacity available, or if resources must be invested to first liberate ports and increase resources.
The game models "Ways" through the use of resource points for movement and combat. Units can move and fight in any order and this forces the player to think about sequencing of operations.
The overall effect of these game mechanisms forces the player to confront the tensions inherent in balancing "Ends, Ways and Means." Thus the player gains some experiential insight into the historical situation, such as the prioritisation of Op MARKET-GARDEN over clearance of the Scheldt estuary, which occurred in September 1944.
Chance
The "chance" inherent in the nature of war

The rise of China and the security dilemma that it presents is viewed as inevitable by significant sections of the UK policy community. Central to this is China's strong economic base, which has generated the diplomatic, informational, military and economic levers necessary for it to challenge the US-led 'rules-based' order designed to perpetuate Western power post-World War Two.
However, while China is a formidable adversary and should not be underestimated, we should not be blind to the weaknesses in China's economic structure and risk overestimating its strengths and constraining ourselves conceptually. In particular, we should be cautious in using gross indicators to calculate relative power and economic growth, as in isolation these approaches can be misleading.
This article compares competing methods of measuring power, before examining that while China is likely to overtake the US in terms of gross real GDP, this is not an effective metric for assessing relative power when used in isolation.
Despite economic headwinds, China will still overtake the US in terms of real GDP
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is the market value of all "final goods and services produced in a specific period" in a country. Real GDP accounts for price inflation against the GDP of a chosen base year, therefore only rising output increases GDP, not inflation. This metric of real GDP benefits from being the most commonly used indicator of an economy's overall size, growth and general health, meaning that there is significantly more data available for comparative analysis.
Although China has significant demographic, capital and productivity challenges, this is unlikely to prevent China from overtaking the US in real GDP. China has capitalised upon lower relative wage costs due to its large population, a central driver of its economic growth over the last 50 years.
The 1978 economic reforms permitted private businesses while liberalising foreign trade and investment, since which China has experienced enormous economic growth, even compared to other rapidly growing "Asian Tiger" economies. From 1978 to the onset of the 2008 global financial crisis, China's real GDP grew by a factor of 17.
The 2008 crisis reduced this breakneck growth, with China's annual real GDP growth between 2015 and 2018 falling below 7% for the first time since 1991. This was compounded by further shocks from the recent Covid pandemic and the CCP's "zero Covid" policy. Chinese policy post-2008 has increasingly relied upon state investment, improving technology and expanding domestic consumption of finished products.
This transition from the previous export economic focus is assessed to be "hedging" against reduced exports due to increasing competition and international pressures such as tariffs. Nonetheless, China's real GDP should still increase 5.7% annually to 2025 and 4.7% annually until 2030, according to Centre for Economics and Business Research (CEBR) forecasts.
Although there are reasons to doubt these figures - including the provision of misleading data by the Chinese state, and upcoming shocks such as increased nearshoring of supply chains and property market debt bubbles - the overall trend is clear. Chinese real GDP is on course to overtake the US by 2030.
How can power be measured between states?
There are three main approaches to measuring power in international relations; control over actors, control over outcomes and control over resources. In the case of control over actors, power is usually defined as an actor's ability to shape world politics following its interests.
However, Nye argues that it is impossible to measure this ability systematically because it would require a comprehensive understanding of each actor's influence and interest over a potentially infinite number of events. This means that the power over outcomes approach is issue-specific, with analysis not often transferable to other situations.
Therefore, it is only useful for retrospective analy

What is the military recruitment dilemma?
Military recruitment is problematic. And a key issue is that people who get paid good money can't solve it. So after six months of analysing YouTube, Facebook, Linkedin, X, Instagram, and yes, even TikTok comments - perhaps I can. The military recruitment ideas below are not meant to be taken in isolation, and most, if not all of them can be done together.
If any Members of Parliament or the General Staff are reading this, please feel free to help yourselves, I know that your idea buckets must be completely barren now.
1. The Infant-Infantry
Very few militaries on the planet consider children to be the solution to their needs, but very few countries are mentally agile or brave enough to survive the modern world. The British military, however, knows that an SA80 in the hands of a 14-year-old Glaswegian is just as deadly as an AK-47 in the hands of any rascally Russian Vatnik.
From the trenches of Ypres, the decks of the imperial navies, the streets of Kampala and the Killing Fields of Cambodia - children have been an effective part of militaries. Some as young as nine have proven that they can carry ammunition, fit into tunnel systems and the mechanisms of aircraft, artillery and tanks, and in a pinch, they can step into any SO1 role with relative ease.
Because the minimum wage is so low for younger people, this could also be a very cost-effective measure. The UK could easily raise a battalion of these "ten-pound Privates" for about half the cost of a regular one. This solution is also popular with many overworked teachers, who pity those kids clogging up overcrowded classrooms and enduring worthless education. Their hearts desire Call of Duty, Fortnite, the open sea, sky, and glory in battle - not GCSEs!
2. The British Commonwealth Legion
The Enlistment of Foreigners Act 1854 gave the country the power it needed before, and by Jove, Parliament can honour us again. Whilst the concept may be a copy of the French Foreign Legion, just like the class system of the Normans, if it's good enough for the French, it's good enough for us.
The UK already has a long history of Commonwealth and Sepoy armies, and we used international units before to great effect (e.g. No.10 (Inter-Allied) Commando unit in WWII). This system will yield significant numbers, and such great savings, that it can't be passed up. Anyone who's served on Herrick operations knows we could've solved the whole thing in a year for a tenth of the price if only we had a Corps of Gurkhas.
Commonwealth soldiers have been fantastic, but we should open their opportunity to the whole world. Fitness and aptitude assessments, as well as English literacy testing, will be done overseas, and successful applicants will be given a one-way plane ticket and a space in basic training, after which they will fill one of the many empty bedspaces found all over the forces.
They will serve a four-year minimum contract, then with one or two lucky family members (we'll work out the details later) they'll have earned their place in the country. They can continue to serve in the forces or head into the green and pleasant land as a full UK citizen and resident.
3. National Service+
This one is a favourite of the older generation, and for good reason. Wimpy young adults won't be making cringe videos on TikTok when they are getting thrashed up and down Mt Tumbledown and sweeping pinecones outside the Commanding Officer's office.
Youths fighting outside Argos in Kilburn should be fighting international terrorists or the Americans outside the chow hall in Camp Lemonnier! And if they like choreographed dance instead, what better place than as the rear marker on the parade square of Horse Guards?
There won't be a piece of brass unpolished as everyone between the ranks of Corporal and Warrant Officer Class 2 is given a five-person work party, and every Officer rank is issued a batsman and a personal assistant. Watch as productivity doubles, triples, and quadr