Putin and the Bomb ☢️💣�‪�‬ Modlin Global Analysis Newsletter

Thank you for joining us for this edition of the Modlin Global Analysis Podcast. This week, we're going to be focusing on Vladimir Putin and the bomb. We're going to consider the national discussion and global discussion on the ramifications of Putin’s references to nuclear posture and what are perceived as nuclear threats and the war in Ukraine, and how we as a society grapple with that. But perhaps most importantly, how do we think through what Vladimir Putin as the singular actor may be considering these questions? I'm glad to be joined by Dan Modlin as always and some questions that he has on this important issue.
Dan
And obviously this is an issue that concerns a lot of people, not just in the United States but around the world, obviously one of the changes that some people have remarked on in Putin's approach to the discussion of nuclear weapons or possible use of nuclear weapons is that in the Cold War. Era. Both sides tended to take the position they didn't want to be the first to use a nuclear weapon. How has Putin's approach changed?
Kevin
Yeah, that's a great point. And that goes right into the weeds of this question. Both sides during the Cold War, after they both acquired weapons, realized that they were better off not first using them because of the retaliatory nature of the weapons, especially the threat of retaliation, was so undesirable that both sides decided not to escalate tensions and a lot of times it may have helped quell some fears throughout the Cold War. So in a sense, even though weapons are very damaging and of course, deadly to some people analyzing it, it created a degree of stability because both sides had a sense of what the other side would do and a retaliation part of that aspect was an understanding by both sides that they would not be the ones to start a war. They would not be the ones to escalate it and that helps also contribute to some semblance of stability. Again, it's kind of contrarian to think that stability comes from these terrible, destructive weapons, but many people came to that conclusion when gaming out in various scenarios. Part of that has been a position that both sides, after the end of the Cold War. Reduce their nuclear stockpiles and in fact. Even Putin was part of the range of treaties that reduced weapons, but there is an evolution in discussion on what that doctrine looks like, and there's two components on that. One is the suggestion that they may escalate by their own decisions and that they have a mindset or an argument, especially people in the US think tank community emphasizes this idea that Russia may escalate a situation in order to deescalate. So they may uilized nuclear weapons, tactical or strategic, with the goal of using that as a way to get out of a conflict. This is troubling to a lot of analysts and therefore they emphasize this aspect, but I think what's important in this is also to realize that both of those components emphasize the singular decision making of a president. So a policy that is retaliatory or says that they will not be the first one to use that actually puts less responsibility and decision. By that country, right? That would just mean that they would have to retaliate if they were attacked. So that puts less decision weight on that. But this change in policy puts greater emphasis for us to consider how Vladimir Putin thinks, and I think this is very important as it. As a conversation, as you mentioned, because I hear a lot of people ask questions about this. This is when the war started. This was what a lot of people were concerned about, and I hear people continue to be concerned. Whether it be my students or friends I run into, they ask about this question. So it's important for us to think about what Putin is thinking about. But it's also important for us to pause. And recognize all of the flawed analysis that has preceded this conversation. A lot of people have basically baked in their own assumptions of how Putin thinks. is