Supreme Court of Canada Hearings (English Audio‪)‬ SCC Hearings

In 2018, the Province of British Columbia (hereafter, “BC”) enacted the Opioid Damages and Health Care Costs Recovery Act (the “ORA”). The ORA allows BC to recover health care costs caused or contributed to by “opioid-related wrongs” committed by manufacturers and distributors of opioid drugs.Section 11 of the ORA applies to proceedings relating to opioid-related wrongs that were ongoing as of the date that it came into force; such proceedings are continued in accordance with the ORA. Section 11(1)(b) states that for the purposes of s. 4 of the Class Proceedings Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 50 (the “CPA”), BC may “bring an action” on behalf of a class consisting of one or more of the governments of Canada and the provinces or territories of Canada (a so-called “multi-Crown” proceeding). Section 11(2) preserves the right of those governments to opt out of the proceeding in accordance with s. 16 of the CPA.Appellants Sanis Health Inc., Shoppers Drug Mart Inc., Sandoz Canada Inc., and McKesson Canada Corporation (collectively, “Sanis”), are named as defendants in the proposed “multi-Crown” class proceeding which underlies this appeal. The underlying proceeding was commenced before s. 11 of the ORA came into force, and it is the only proceeding to which s. 11 applies.Sanis sought, by way of summary trial, an order striking s. 11 as ultra vires the Legislative Assembly of British Columbia and therefore of no force or effect pursuant to s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982.The summary trial judge held that the s. 11 was within the legislature’s authority, and dismissed Sanis’ applications for a declaration of constitutional invalidity. A unanimous Court of Appeal held that the summary trial judge did not err in upholding the constitutional validity of s. 11 of the ORA, and dismissed Sanis’ appeal. Argued Date 2024-05-24 Keywords Constitutional law — Division of powers — Civil procedure — Class actions — Multi-Crown proceedings — Provincial legislation providing province may bring an action on behalf of a class consisting of governments of Canada and the provinces and territories of Canada — Whether s. 11 of the Opioid Damages and Health Care Costs Recovery Act, S.B.C. 2018, c. 35 is ultra vires the Legislative Assembly of British Columbia and of no force or effect pursuant to s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982 — Opioid Damages and Health Care Costs Recovery Act, S.B.C. 2018, c. 35, s. 11 Notes (British Columbia) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

In 2018, the Province of British Columbia (hereafter, “BC”) enacted the Opioid Damages and Health Care Costs Recovery Act (the “ORA”). The ORA allows BC to recover health care costs caused or contributed to by “opioid-related wrongs” committed by manufacturers and distributors of opioid drugs.Section 11 of the ORA applies to proceedings relating to opioid-related wrongs that were ongoing as of the date that it came into force; such proceedings are continued in accordance with the ORA. Section 11(1)(b) states that for the purposes of s. 4 of the Class Proceedings Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 50 (the “CPA”), BC may “bring an action” on behalf of a class consisting of one or more of the governments of Canada and the provinces or territories of Canada (a so-called “multi-Crown” proceeding). Section 11(2) preserves the right of those governments to opt out of the proceeding in accordance with s. 16 of the CPA.Appellants Sanis Health Inc., Shoppers Drug Mart Inc., Sandoz Canada Inc., and McKesson Canada Corporation (collectively, “Sanis”), are named as defendants in the proposed “multi-Crown” class proceeding which underlies this appeal. The underlying proceeding was commenced before s. 11 of the ORA came into force, and it is the only proceeding to which s. 11 applies.Sanis sought, by way of summary trial, an order striking s. 11 as ultra vires the Legislative Assembly of British Columbia and therefore of no force or effect pursuant to s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982.The summary trial judge held that the s. 11 was within the legislature’s authority, and dismissed Sanis’ applications for a declaration of constitutional invalidity. A unanimous Court of Appeal held that the summary trial judge did not err in upholding the constitutional validity of s. 11 of the ORA, and dismissed Sanis’ appeal. Argued Date 2024-05-23 Keywords Constitutional law — Division of powers — Civil procedure — Class actions — Multi-Crown proceedings — Provincial legislation providing province may bring an action on behalf of a class consisting of governments of Canada and the provinces and territories of Canada — Whether s. 11 of the Opioid Damages and Health Care Costs Recovery Act, S.B.C. 2018, c. 35 is ultra vires the Legislative Assembly of British Columbia and of no force or effect pursuant to s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982 — Opioid Damages and Health Care Costs Recovery Act, S.B.C. 2018, c. 35, s. 11 Notes (British Columbia) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

This case concerns the third party spending limits most recently added to the Election Finances Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E.7 (“EFA”), in 2021, and whether they infringe the informational component of the right to vote (i.e., a citizen’s right to exercise their vote in an informed manner), which is protected by s. 3 of the Charter.The amendments to the EFA sparked constitutional challenges. The application judge heard and decided two sequential proceedings.In the first proceedings: Working Families Ontario v. Ontario, 2021 ONSC 4076, 155 O.R. (3d) 545 (“Working Families 1”), the application judge concluded that the extension of a 6-month pre-writ restricted period to one that was doubly restrictive was unjustifiable as it did not minimally impair the free expression rights of third party advertisers.In response to that ruling, the Ontario government announced its intention to invoke the notwithstanding clause in s. 33 of the Charter, and introduced Bill 307, which received Royal Assent five days later as the Protecting Elections and Defending Democracy Act, 2021, S.O. 2021, c. 31 (“PEDDA”). Other than the addition of the notwithstanding clause, the PEDDA amendments to the EFA are identical to the amendments that were invalidated in Working Families 1.In the second proceedings, which give rise to these appeals, the legislation was challenged as a violation of s. 3 of the Charter, and as an improper use of s. 33 of the Charter. The application judge concluded that the use of the notwithstanding clause in enacting PEDDA was not improper, and that the re-enacted spending limits on third party advertising during the pre-writ period did not infringe the right to vote under s. 3.The majority of the Court of Appeal agreed that the notwithstanding clause was properly invoked. However, it concluded that the appeals should be allowed and declared the challenged spending restrictions invalid, but would suspend the effect of the declaration for 12 months. Argued Date 2024-05-22 Keywords Charter of rights — Constitutional law — Elections — Right to vote — Third party election spending limits — Constitutionality of limits imposed by Ontario Election Finances Act, on third party political advertising expenditures in Ontario during 12-month pre-writ period before a fixed date provincial election — Whether s. 37.10.1(2) of Election Finances Act, unjustifiably infringes s. 3 of Charter — What is appropriate standard of review — Whether majority of Court of Appeal erred by reformulating test in Harper v. Canada (Attorney General), 2004 SCC 33, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 827, to turn on two “proxies”, namely whether restrictions are “carefully tailored” and whether they permit a “modest information campaign”, and thereby conflating s. 2(b) and s. 3 analyses — Whether majority erred in importing justificatory analysis to s. 3, and in scrutinizing government’s rationale for where lines had been drawn for amount and duration of spending limits — Whether majority erred by failing to give deference to application judge’s factual findings — Whether majority erred by focusing on “change” in impugned spending restrictions as compared with earlier iterations of legislation — In alternative, is any breach of s. 3 justified under s. 1 — Election Finances Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E.7. Notes (Ontario) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

This case concerns the third party spending limits most recently added to the Election Finances Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E.7 (“EFA”), in 2021, and whether they infringe the informational component of the right to vote (i.e., a citizen’s right to exercise their vote in an informed manner), which is protected by s. 3 of the Charter.The amendments to the EFA sparked constitutional challenges. The application judge heard and decided two sequential proceedings.In the first proceedings: Working Families Ontario v. Ontario, 2021 ONSC 4076, 155 O.R. (3d) 545 (“Working Families 1”), the application judge concluded that the extension of a 6-month pre-writ restricted period to one that was doubly restrictive was unjustifiable as it did not minimally impair the free expression rights of third party advertisers.In response to that ruling, the Ontario government announced its intention to invoke the notwithstanding clause in s. 33 of the Charter, and introduced Bill 307, which received Royal Assent five days later as the Protecting Elections and Defending Democracy Act, 2021, S.O. 2021, c. 31 (“PEDDA”). Other than the addition of the notwithstanding clause, the PEDDA amendments to the EFA are identical to the amendments that were invalidated in Working Families 1.In the second proceedings, which give rise to these appeals, the legislation was challenged as a violation of s. 3 of the Charter, and as an improper use of s. 33 of the Charter. The application judge concluded that the use of the notwithstanding clause in enacting PEDDA was not improper, and that the re-enacted spending limits on third party advertising during the pre-writ period did not infringe the right to vote under s. 3.The majority of the Court of Appeal agreed that the notwithstanding clause was properly invoked. However, it concluded that the appeals should be allowed and declared the challenged spending restrictions invalid, but would suspend the effect of the declaration for 12 months. Argued Date 2024-05-21 Keywords Charter of rights — Constitutional law — Elections — Right to vote — Third party election spending limits — Constitutionality of limits imposed by Ontario Election Finances Act, on third party political advertising expenditures in Ontario during 12-month pre-writ period before a fixed date provincial election — Whether s. 37.10.1(2) of Election Finances Act, unjustifiably infringes s. 3 of Charter — What is appropriate standard of review — Whether majority of Court of Appeal erred by reformulating test in Harper v. Canada (Attorney General), 2004 SCC 33, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 827, to turn on two “proxies”, namely whether restrictions are “carefully tailored” and whether they permit a “modest information campaign”, and thereby conflating s. 2(b) and s. 3 analyses — Whether majority erred in importing justificatory analysis to s. 3, and in scrutinizing government’s rationale for where lines had been drawn for amount and duration of spending limits — Whether majority erred by failing to give deference to application judge’s factual findings — Whether majority erred by focusing on “change” in impugned spending restrictions as compared with earlier iterations of legislation — In alternative, is any breach of s. 3 justified under s. 1 — Election Finances Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E.7. Notes (Ontario) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Appellants TransAlta Generation Partnership and TransAlta Generation (Keephills 3) (collectively, “TransAlta”) own coal-fired electrical power generation facilities in Alberta. The value of those properties is assessed as “linear property” for municipal taxation purposes. The Municipal Government Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. M-26, defines the term “linear property” and authorizes the Minister of Municipal Affairs to establish guidelines for assessing its value.In 2016, TransAlta entered into off-coal agreements with the province pursuant to which they agreed to cease coal-fired emissions by December 31, 2030; in exchange, the province agreed to pay TransAlta substantial sums annually for 14 years.On December 19, 2017, the Minister established the 2017 Alberta Linear Property Assessment Minister’s Guidelines (the “Linear Guidelines”), which set out the procedure for calculating all linear property assessments. The Linear Guidelines do not allow for off-coal agreements to be considered in assessing depreciation. TransAlta applied for judicial review which, among other things, challenged provisions of the Linear Guidelines that prevented the off-coal agreements from being considered in the assessment of depreciation as being ultra vires.The application judge found that the Linear Guidelines, including the impugned provisions, were within the Minister’s authority and lawfully enacted. She dismissed the application for judicial review. The Court of Appeal dismissed TransAlta’s appeal. Argued Date 2024-04-25 Keywords Administrative law — Judicial review — Whether 2017 Alberta Linear Property Assessment Minister’s Guidelines discriminate without statutory authority — Either way, whether they are consistent with intent of Municipal Government Act, as required by s. 322(1)(i) — What standard of review applies — Municipal Government Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. M-26, ss. 322, 322.1. Notes (Alberta) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The respondent, Pekuakamiulnuatsh Takuhikan, is a band council within the meaning of the Indian Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-5. It represents the Pekuakamiulnuatsh Innu First Nation, whose community is located in Mashteuiatsh on the western shore of Lac Saint-Jean near Roberval. Under tripartite agreements signed over the years with the Government of Canada and the Government of Quebec since 1996, the respondent is responsible for policing in the community of Mashteuiatsh. The tripartite agreements resulted from the adoption by the Government of Canada in 1991 of the First Nations Policing Policy and the First Nations Policing Program, which allowed it and the provinces, territories and First Nations to negotiate tripartite funding agreements in order to establish professional police services responsive to the needs and culture of each Indigenous community. The respondent brought an action against the Government of Canada, represented by the intervener, the Attorney General of Canada, and the Government of Quebec, represented by the appellant, the Attorney General of Quebec, claiming [translation] “reimbursement of the accumulated deficits of Public Security in the community of Mashteuiatsh for the services provided under the agreements on policing in the community of Mashteuiatsh in force for the period of April 1, 2013, to the present date”. It seems that the governments continued renewing the tripartite agreements without increasing the money allotted, despite the fact that the respondent had to pay significant amounts retroactively to the members of its police force as a result of an arbitration award, related to the renewal of the collective agreement, that ordered catch-up wage increases for the period of 2009 to 2014. In support of its application, the respondent alleged that the Government of Quebec and the Government of Canada had breached their obligations to negotiate in good faith, to act with honour and to fulfill their fiduciary duties toward it with respect to the funding of its police force. Argued Date 2024-04-24 Keywords Aboriginal law — Self-government — Contracts — Honour of the Crown — Tripartite agreement between federal government, Government of Quebec and band council of Pekuakamiulnuatsh Innu First Nation concerning funding for Indigenous police force — Whether constitutional principle of honour of Crown applies in relation to agreements entered into under s. 90 of Police Act, CQLR, c. P-13.1 — In alternative, whether Quebec breached its duty to act honourably — In alternative, how principle of honour of Crown fits into general law rules of civil liability in Quebec, and whether, in this case, it can ground finding of abuse of rights as made by Court of Appeal — Police Act, CQLR, c. P-13.1, ss. 48, 90, 91 and 93 — Civil Code of Québec, arts. 6, 7, 1372, 1375, 1376, 1377, 1378, 1433, 1434 and 1458. Notes (Quebec) (Civil) (By Leave) Language English Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).