MCMP LudwigMaximiliansUniversität München

 Filosofia
Mathematical Philosophy  the application of logical and mathematical methods in philosophy  is about to experience a tremendous boom in various areas of philosophy. At the new Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy, which is funded mostly by the German Alexander von Humboldt Foundation, philosophical research will be carried out mathematically, that is, by means of methods that are very close to those used by the scientists.
The purpose of doing philosophy in this way is not to reduce philosophy to mathematics or to natural science in any sense; rather mathematics is applied in order to derive philosophical conclusions from philosophical assumptions, just as in physics mathematical methods are used to derive physical predictions from physical laws.
Nor is the idea of mathematical philosophy to dismiss any of the ancient questions of philosophy as irrelevant or senseless: although modern mathematical philosophy owes a lot to the heritage of the Vienna and Berlin Circles of Logical Empiricism, unlike the Logical Empiricists most mathematical philosophers today are driven by the same traditional questions about truth, knowledge, rationality, the nature of objects, morality, and the like, which were driving the classical philosophers, and no area of traditional philosophy is taken to be intrinsically misguided or confused anymore. It is just that some of the traditional questions of philosophy can be made much clearer and much more precise in logicalmathematical terms, for some of these questions answers can be given by means of mathematical proofs or models, and on this basis new and more concrete philosophical questions emerge. This may then lead to philosophical progress, and ultimately that is the goal of the Center.

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Five Years MCMP: Looking Back
Workshop on Five Years MCMP: Quo Vadis, Mathematical Philosophy?, Roland Poellinger (LMU/MCMP) gives a talk at the Workshop on Five Years MCMP: Quo Vadis, Mathematical Philosophy? (24 June, 2016) titled "Five Years MCMP: Looking Back". Abstract: In this presentation I will speak about the MCMP's outreach and line up some of the center's achievements in the last five years. I will put special emphasis on our media output since many of our activities are mirrored in our mediarelated efforts such as our video channels on iTunes U, our Coursera online courses, and our publication database on the MCMP's web portal.

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SelfReferential Probability
Workshop on Five Years MCMP: Quo Vadis, Mathematical Philosophy?, Catrin CampbellMoore (University of Cambridge/MCMP) gives a talk at the Workshop on Five Years MCMP: Quo Vadis, Mathematical Philosophy? (24 June, 2016) titled "SelfReferential Probability". Abstract: In this talk we consider situations where what someone believes can affect what happens, for example: Bettie will be able to jump across a river just if she's confident that she'll be able to do so. These situations can cause problems in formal epistemology: what beliefs are rational for such agents? Such situations bear a close relationship to sentences that say something about their own truth, such as the liar paradox, and the vast amount of work in mathematical philosophy on theories of truth can give insights into how to think about these more realistic situations too. Instead of studying typefree truth, then, we think about typefree (subjective) probability, but there are very similar considerations. This therefore provides a traditional area of mathematical philosophy a new and exciting application.

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Towards an Adequate Criterion of Structural Equivalence of Theories
Workshop on Five Years MCMP: Quo Vadis, Mathematical Philosophy?, Laurenz Hudetz (University of Salzburg) gives a talk at the Workshop on Five Years MCMP: Quo Vadis, Mathematical Philosophy? (24 June, 2016) titled "Towards an Adequate Criterion of Structural Equivalence of Theories". Abstract: My aim in this talk is to provide a general and adequate explication of structural equivalence of scientific theories. I will first give a brief overview of the recent debate about criteria for structural equivalence and highlight the main problems of the criteria proposed so far. I argue that an adequate criterion of equivalence should explicitly take into account morphisms between the models of theories. The criterion of categorical equivalence does this and has been frequently considered recently (cf. Weatherall, 2015; Barrett, Rosenstock and Weatherall, 2015; Hudetz, 2015; Halvorson, 2016; Barrett and Halvorson, 2016; Weatherall, 2016; Halvorson and Tsementzis, 2016). Yet, it is not free of problems. I show that categorial equivalence is much too wide as a criterion of structural equivalence of theories. Then I will propose a solution to this problem by specifying a strengthening of categorical equivalence, which I call 'definable categorical equivalence'. This strengthened criterion employs the modeltheoretic notion of definability. I argue that definable categorical equivalence is neither too wide nor too narrow.

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What is TruthMaker Semantics?
Workshop on Five Years MCMP: Quo Vadis, Mathematical Philosophy?, Johannes Korbmacher (LMU/MCMP) gives a talk at the Workshop on Five Years MCMP: Quo Vadis, Mathematical Philosophy? (24 June, 2016) titled "What is TruthMaker Semantics?". Abstract: The aim of this short programmatic talk is to try to clear up some fundamental concepts of truthmaker semantics. Among the questions that will be addressed are: What is special about truthmaker semantics? What is the concept of truthmaking in truthmaker semantics? What is the concept of truthmakers in truthmaker semantics? The result of the talk will be a list of questions I think proponents of truthmaker semantics should address in the future. What is Truthmaker Semantics?

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Degrees of Truth Explained Away
Workshop on Five Years MCMP: Quo Vadis, Mathematical Philosophy?, Rossella Marrano (Scuola Normale Superiore Pisa) gives a talk at the Workshop on Five Years MCMP: Quo Vadis, Mathematical Philosophy? (24 June, 2016) titled "Degrees of Truth Explained Away". Abstract: The notion of degrees of truth arising in infinitevalued logics has been the object of longstanding criticisms. In this paper I focus on the alleged intrinsic philosophical implausibility of degrees of truth, namely on objections concerning their very nature and their role, rather than on objections questioning the adequacy of degrees of truth as a model for vagueness. I suggest that interpretative problems encountered by the notion are due to a problem of formalisation. On the one hand, indeed, degrees of truth are artificial, to the extent that they are not present in the phenomenon they are meant to model, i.e. graded truth. On the other hand, however, they cannot be considered as artefacts of the standard model, contra what is sometimes argued in the literature. I thus propose an alternative formalisation for graded truth based on comparative judgements with respect to the truth. This model provides a philosophical underpinning for degrees of truth of structuralist flavour: they are possible numerical measures of a comparative notion of truth. As such, degrees of truth can be considered artefacts of the model, thus avoiding the aforementioned objections.

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Open Reading for Free Choice Permission: A Perspective in Substructural Logics
Workshop on Five Years MCMP: Quo Vadis, Mathematical Philosophy?, Huimin Dong (University of Bayreuth) gives a talk at the Workshop on Five Years MCMP: Quo Vadis, Mathematical Philosophy? (24 June, 2016) titled "Open Reading for Free Choice Permission: A Perspective in Substructural Logics". Abstract: