Epistemically Detrimental Dissent and the Milian Argument against the Freedom of Inquiry MCMP – Epistemology

Anna Leuschner (KIT) gives a talk at the MCMP Colloquium (9 April, 2014) titled "Epistemically Detrimental Dissent and the Milian Argument against the Freedom of Inquiry". Abstract: I'll present a joint work that I have been conducting with Justin Biddle. The idea of epistemically problematic dissent is counterintuitive at first glance; as Mill argues, even misguided dissent from a consensus position can be epistemically fruitful as it can lead to a deeper understanding of consensus positions. Yet, focusing on climate science we argue that dissent can be epistemically problematic when it leads to a distortion of risk assessment in mainstream science. I'll examine the conditions under which dissent in science is epistemically detrimental, provide empirical support for this finding, and conclude with a discussion on normative consequences of these findings by considering Philip Kitcher’s "Millian argument against the freedom of inquiry".