Brown's Bottom: 25 Years On The Flying Frisby - money, markets and more

Good morning,
As an experiment, today’s Sunday morning thought piece is in video. If you prefer, you can also read it below. You should also be able to read and listen, as many like to do.
Let me know what you think.
This week, May 7th, marks the 25th anniversary of one the UK’s greatest ever financial blunders. There is no shortage of them, but this one really stands out: that is Gordon Brown’s decision to sell more than half of Britain’s gold. 
The decision and then its implementation were both of such cack-handed incompetence that for many the only possible explanation is conspiracy. We will come to that in a moment.
Every now and then the government does something that makes your ears prick up and think, “Well what are they doing that for?” This was one of those times. I knew nothing about gold or investing back then, but, even I, could see it was a dumb and needless thing to do. That’s the most amazing thing: Brown was under no pressure to sell. He was under no pressure to do anything. Even non-libertarians will struggle to explain why we need government when they are this incompetent.
It wasn’t just me. The tabloids said the decision was, “catastrophic.” Gold traders called it, “appalling”. Parliament was outraged. Foreign central banks were too. What was Gordon Brown thinking?
It was two years into Brown’s new job as Chancellor of the Exchequer. At the time, the UK held approximately 715 tonnes of gold, worth around $6.5 billion. The value of the country’s gold amounted to about half of its US$13 billion foreign currency reserves and the Treasury wanted to “achieve a better balance in the portfolio”. There was, it said, too much exposure to a single asset, which paid no interest and its price was volatile. Via a written question in the House of Commons the Government suddenly announced that it would be holding a series of auctions for its gold reserves, starting in six weeks, with an eventual plan to sell 415 tonnes by 2002. 
Eddie George, the Governor of the Bank of England, raised “strong objections” as he and Gordon Brown clashed, but he was “outgunned by a coalition of the treasury and some of his own senior officials”. "The sale of the gold was not something that we recommended at the Bank,” George later said. “We did not think it was a good idea to sell such a large amount of gold at once. However, the decision was taken by the Chancellor and his advisors, and we respected their right to make that decision."
London was still (just) at the epicentre of the gold market and its numerous gold traders thought the decision was nuts. Gold prices move in decades-long cycles, they told Bank of England officials, and the price was likely a lot nearer the bottom than the top.  “The timing of the decision was ludicrous. We told them, ‘You are going to push the gold price down before you sell’,” said Peter Fava, then head of precious metal dealing at HSBC. “We thought it was a disastrous decision; we couldn’t understand it.” Revealing the timings and amounts for sale so far in advance would cause traders to short the asset, and that would drive the gold price lower.
Not only did Brown give a six-week advance notice to the market that the UK would be selling, driving away any potential buyers and sending speculators short in advance of the sale, the UK had even lent one fifth of its gold out, which speculators borrowed and sold in order to front run the UK’s sale. Sure enough, the price fell 10% by the time of the first auction in July to lows not seen since shortly after the US abandoned the gold standard in 1971. No wonder so many see this as the worst decision in British financial history.
Here is the timing of that first sale illustrated. £150/oz. Today we are at £1,900/oz. What a bunch of clowns. 
As soon as the commitment was made, a consortium of central banks - including the European Central Bank and the Bank of England - signed the Washington Agreemen