Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran Michelle Cohen Farber

The Mishna rules that once a contracted worker says to the owner, "Pick up the item and then pay me," the worker transitions from being responsible for the item as a paid guardian (shomer sachar) to being responsible as an unpaid guardian (shomer chinam). This situation is compared to another Mishna which states that a borrower is responsible for oness (unforeseeable) damages until the item is returned. Rav Chisda qualifies this by stating that the borrower is only liable for unforeseeable damages if the item is returned within the borrowing period; if the period has ended and the borrower is no longer using the item, the borrower is no longer responsible for unforeseeable damages. The Gemara presents three different versions of how these sources are compared. Ameimar rules that while the borrower may no longer be responsible for unforeseeable damages after the borrowing period, they are still considered a shomer sachar and are thus responsible for loss or theft. A braita is brought to support this ruling. The concept of shmira b'baalim, where one is exempt from liability for an item belonging to their employer, is brought up to question the Mishna which ruled that if one says "Watch my item and I will watch yours," both parties are considered a shomer sachar. To resolve this, it is explained that the case in the Mishna involves each person watching the other's item on different days. Two cases are brought where guardians were held responsible despite seemingly being cases of shmira b'baalim. These cases are clarified to not be instances of shmira b'baalim. Additionally, there is a discussion about the interpretation when someone says, "put it down" in response to a request to watch an item: does it mean "put it down and I will watch it" or "put it down and take care of it yourself"? This is compared to a Mishna in Bava Kamma 47 to suggest that this issue is the subject of a tannaitic debate, but the comparison is ultimately rejected. 

The Mishna continues to deal with cases where one rented an item under certain conditions and then used the item differently, resulting in damage. If the damage occurred because of the change in use, the renter is responsible. For example, what happens if the renter loaded more weight on an animal than standard, or if the renter used a different item that is lighter but results in a greater volume, such as barley instead of wheat? Abaye and Rava disagree on the details of the ruling in the latter case. The Mishna discusses various laws related to the responsibility of a worker regarding an item the worker is fixing or working on, or received as collateral, as well as other laws concerning shomrim. The implications of these discussions help clarify the extent of liability and responsibility in cases of damage under differing conditions and the specific usage of rented or borrowed items. The Gemara attempts to see if the first part of the Mishna can be attributed to Rabbi Meir, as at first glance it seems not the case.

If one rents a donkey or a boat and the animal dies or the boat sinks halfway through the journey, what is the law? What are the circumstances of the cases discussed? In the context of this discussion, a debate between Rav and Shmuel addresses whether one can sell the carcass of a rented animal in a way that the principal (the original animal) will no longer exist—specifically, whether the renter can sell it and use the money from the sale to rent a new animal. Rav's opinion is questioned by a Tosefta, which is then resolved. A case is brought regarding a boat rented to carry wine, which sinks. The Gemara examines the specifics of the rental agreement: whether the renter rented "this boat" or "a boat" and whether it was to carry "this wine" or "any wine." This distinction is crucial for determining the renter's obligations and rights. Two additional cases clarify other rights of the renter: How much can the renter load on a donkey that was rented for riding, and how much can the driver load? If the donkey was rented to a man to ride, can a woman ride instead, or vice versa? Is there a difference if the woman is pregnant or nursing? These discussions provide detailed insights into the legal nuances of rental agreements, the responsibilities of renters, and the permissible uses of rented property.

The Mishna brings cases where an individual rents an item, such as an animal, for a specific purpose and then uses it for a different purpose. The renter is held responsible if the animal dies because of this change. The first line of the Mishna states that the renter is responsible in all cases where a change was made. However, in the second line, the Mishna's ruling depends on the circumstances—specifically, how the animal died and the nature of the change made by the renter. The Gemara explores four possible answers to reconcile these two lines. The first three answers establish that the first line in the Mishna refers to a case where the animal died directly because of the change, regardless of whether the change was from mountain to valley or the reverse. The fourth answer differentiates the two lines of the Mishna as representing the opinions of different authorities. According to this view, the first line reflects Rabbi Meir's opinion, while the second line represents the rabbis' stance. Rabbi Meir holds a stringent view that anyone who goes against the owner's wishes is considered a thief, thus making them automatically liable for any resulting damage or death. The Gemara then seeks to find tannaitic sources to substantiate that this is indeed Rabbi Meir's position. The first two sources examined are rejected, but the third source is accepted, affirming that Rabbi Meir considers any deviation from the owner’s instructions to be considered theft. A case referred to as 'hivrika,' has two different interpretations. The Mishna describes a scenario where a donkey rented by an individual is seized by the king's men (angaria). In such a case, the renter is left without the animal, and the owner is not required to provide a replacement. Rav and Shmuel disagree about the specifics of this case. A Tosefta is brought to challenge Shmuel's interpretation, and two explanations are offered to resolve this difficulty.

If a worker is hired to do a job, such as irrigating a field, but circumstances change, like rainfall, rendering the job unnecessary, where does the responsibility rest, and what factors influence it? Rabbi Dosa and the rabbis hold differing views on whether a worker who backs out midway should receive full compensation for work already performed, or if the worker must reimburse the employer if the employer now incurs higher costs to complete the remaining task. Rav aligns with Rabbi Dosa's stance, although this contradicts another statement attributed to him. The Gemara proposes a solution to this contradiction but identifies two challenges with the proposed resolution, both of which are resolved. Within this discourse, a braita is cited regarding a seller or buyer reneging after the buyer has made a partial payment. Various segments of this braita are elucidated further.

Study Guide Bava Metzia 76
Our learning today is in honor of the State of Israel celebrating 76 years of independence. We also continue to pray for the swift and safe return of the hostages, and for the safety and success of our soldiers. 
What are the rules surrounding a worker or employer retracting from an agreement? When the Mishna mentions one party "deceiving" the other, what does this mean? Is it referring to a worker canceling on the employer, the reverse scenario, or does it involve an instance where an employer directs an agent to hire workers, but the agent communicates a wage different from what the employer had stipulated? While seven potential scenarios of the latter circumstance are delineated, only certain ones conform to the legal principles expounded in the Mishna.