20 episodes

Bioethics New York University

    • Social Sciences
    • 3.5, 2 Ratings

    Gene Therapy, Cognitive Disability, and Abortion

    Gene Therapy, Cognitive Disability, and Abortion

    • 48 min
    Bioethics Colloquim with Doug Husak

    Bioethics Colloquim with Doug Husak

    Illicit drug use is thought to pose a public health problem for several possible reasons. Here I discuss one such reason: the supposed causal relation between illicit drug use (especially so-called "hard" illicit drugs) and violent crime.  The hypothesis that drugs are causally connected to crime is also a favorite basis on which to argue that drug use should be criminalized.  This hypothesis is difficult to test empirically.  I build on some resent criminological findings of Frank Zimring fron New York City to suggest that many theorists have tended to overstate the drugs-crime connection.  In New York City, violent crime has decreased greatly while "hard" illicit drug use has remained constant.  As Zimring concludes, it is possible to make enormous progress in the war on crime without making any headway in the war on drugs.  I examine the implications of these recent findings for debates about drug criminalization.

    • 1 hr 39 min
    Moral Entanglements: The Example of Medical Researchers' Ancillary-Care Obligations

    Moral Entanglements: The Example of Medical Researchers' Ancillary-Care Obligations

    Medical research ethics, with its focus on preventing participants from being exploited or exposed to undue risk, has almost entirely neglected researchers' ancillary-care obligations-their obligations to provide participants with medical care that they need but that is not required in order to carry out the researchers' scientific plans safely. To begin to develop a theoretical account of researchers' ancillary-care obligations, this paper develops and explores the more general idea of moral entanglements. Of interest in its own right, this category comprises the ways in which, through innocent transactions with others, we can unintendedly accrue special obligations to them. More particularly, the paper explains intimacy-based more entanglements, to which we become liable by accepting another's waiver of privacy rights. Sometimes, having entered into other's private affairs for innocent or even helpful reasons, one discovers needs of theirs that then become the focus of special duties of care. The general duty to warn them of their need cannot directly account for the full extent of these duties, but does indicate why a silent retreat is impermissible. The special duties of care importantly rest on a transfer of responsibilities that accompanies the privacy waivers. The result is a special obligation of beneficence that, like researchers' ancillary-care obligations, is grounded in a voluntary transaction despite not having been voluntarily undertaken.

    • 1 hr 53 min
    • video
    Welcoming: The Significance of Neuroscience for Morality: Lessons from a Decade of Research

    Welcoming: The Significance of Neuroscience for Morality: Lessons from a Decade of Research

    Organized by the NYU Center for Bioethics in collaboration with the Duke Kenan Institute for Ethics with generous support from the NYU Graduate School for Arts & Science and the NYU Humanities Initiative.
    It has been a decade since the first brain imaging studies of moral judgments by Joshua Greene, Jorge Moll and their colleagues were reported. During this time, there have been rich philosophical and scientific discussions regarding a) whether brain imaging data can tell us anything about moral judgments, and b) what they do tell us if they can tell us something about moral judgments. In this workshop, we aim to bring leading philosophers, neuroscientists, and psychologists in this area together to examine these issues and to explore the future directions of this research.

    • 7 min
    • video
    When the Mind Matters for Morality

    When the Mind Matters for Morality

    Mental state reasoning is critical for moral cognition, allowing us to distinguish, for
    example, murder from manslaughter. I will present neural evidence for distinct cognitive
    components of mental state reasoning for moral judgment, and investigate differences in mental
    state reasoning for distinct moral domains, i.e. harm versus purity, for self versus other, and for
    groups versus individuals. I will discuss these findings in the context of the broader question of why
    the mind matters for morality.

    • 1 hr 5 min
    • video
    Is There One Moral Brain?

    Is There One Moral Brain?

    Different kinds of moral dilemmas produce activity in different parts of the brain, so there
    is no single neural network behind all moral judgments. This paper will survey the growing
    evidence for this claim and its implications for philosophy and for method in moral neuroscience.

    • 1 hr 1 min

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