Interpretational Logical Truth: The Problem of Admissible Interpretations MCMP – Logic

Alexandra Zinke (Konstanz) gives a talk at the MCMP Colloquium (24 January, 2013) titled "Interpretational Logical Truth: The Problem of Admissible Interpretations". Abstract: According to the interpretational definition of logical truth a sentence is logically true iff it is true under all interpretations of the non-logical terms. The most prominent problem of the interpretational definition is the problem of demarcating the logical from the non-logical terms. I argue that it does not suffice to only exclude those interpretations from the admissible ones that reinterpret the logical constants. There are further restrictions on admissible interpretations we must impose in order to secure that there are at least some logical truths. Once it is seen that we must impose non-trivial, semantical restrictions on admissible interpretations anyway, the question arises why we should not also accept even further restrictions. I formulate restrictions which would lead to the consequence that all analytical sentences come out as logically true and argue that these restrictions are of the same character as those we already subscribe to. Imposing only some of the restrictions seems arbitrary. The real challenge for proponents of the interpretational definition is thus not just the problem of demarcating the logical from the non-logical terms, but the more general problem of demarcating the admissible from the inadmissible interpretations.