Stephen Zunes Podcast

Stephen Zunes
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I am Professor of Politics, University of San Francisco. I write on US politics and the Middle East. stephenzunes962006.substack.com

  1. On Iran, Trump Has Backed Himself — and Much of the World — Into a Corner

    May 8

    On Iran, Trump Has Backed Himself — and Much of the World — Into a Corner

    First published in Truthout, May 5, 2026 U.S. efforts to force an end to the stalemate in the Strait of Hormuz by attempting to escort a few U.S.-flagged ships through the Iranian closure will not only fail to relieve the worsening global fuel crisis and disruption of supply chains, it risks a resumption of full-scale war. The Trump administration has rejected Iran’s suggestion for negotiating an end to the blockade followed by a resumption of talks on other outstanding issues, insisting that Iran first agree to eliminate its nuclear program. In February 2019, I sat in the Iranian Foreign Ministry, along with a small delegation of American peace activists, with Javad Zarif, the U.S.-educated foreign minister. He described how the 2015 Iran nuclear deal was a result of many months of intense direct negotiations, during which he met with then-Secretary of State John Kerry no less than 50 times, going over the agreement line by line. Indeed, the talks took nearly two years, and involved five other nations (the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Russia, and China) as well as the support of the European Union and the United Nations, before finally reaching the agreement formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Those negotiations took the best efforts of scores of veteran diplomats, skilled mediators, and technical experts. The result was a deal which, in return for the lifting of sanctions, made it physically impossible for Iran to build even a single nuclear weapon and included a rigorous inspections regime to ensure Iran’s compliance. During his first administration, Donald Trump famously tossed that deal, insisting he could negotiate a better one. And now, instead of mobilizing the human and material resources to negotiate a political agreement with staying power to end the war, Trump is insisting that his son-in-law Jared Kushner, his real estate buddy Steve Witkoff, and his novice vice president JD Vance — none of whom have significant diplomatic experience or technical expertise regarding nuclear issues — could simply fly into Pakistan and, after no more than a few days, force Iran to capitulate. Indeed, it was Kushner and Witkoff’s lack of understanding of how nuclear enrichment and related issues work that prevented them from appreciating Iran’s major concessions in talks early this year. Such ignorance likely contributed to Witkoff’s misleading assessments regarding the progress in negotiations which may have prompted Trump’s decision to go to war. Trump has continued claiming the JCPOA was a one-sided deal favoring Iran, when in fact it was just the opposite. Iran had agreed to strictly limit its nuclear program without any reciprocity from nuclear-armed states nearby — Israel, Pakistan, and India — even though all three have also been in violation of UN Security Council resolutions regarding their nuclear programs which, unlike Iran, have actually produced nuclear weapons. And none of the other nuclear powers, including the United States, were required to reduce their arsenals, either. Despite this, Trump abrogated the agreement, stating it did not go far enough to force Iran to stop supporting its regional allies, eliminate its missiles, and make internal political reforms. This has always been a pipe dream, however. It is hard to imagine any country not defeated in war making such concessions unilaterally. Indeed, Witkoff made a whole series of absurd demands, including that Iran unilaterally give up its navy. During the Cold War, in nuclear arms talks with the Soviet Union, despite the plethora of geopolitical issues dividing Washington and Moscow, even the extreme anti-communist Nixon and Reagan administrations recognized that nuclear arms needed to be addressed separately, both as a result of their singular importance and the fact that bringing up other issues would needlessly prolong the talks and likely make any agreement impossible. In my 2019 meeting with Zarif in Tehran, he noted how he had to fight elements within the Iranian government who opposed the treaty. The JCPOA required Iran to destroy billions of dollars’ worth of nuclear facilities and material in return for the lifting of debilitating sanctions. These political factions argued that the United States could renege on the agreement and reimpose sanctions at any time. Zarif and other political reformists expended enormous political capital by insisting that Washington could be trusted. Trump proved Zarif and his fellow reformers wrong. The reimposition of sanctions was not just in regard to Iran’s own direct trade with the United States. The Trump administration insisted on imposing secondary sanctions on companies in any country that continued economic relations with Iran, forcing many to comply against their wishes. For example, the French conglomerate TotalEnergies decided to pull out of a major project in Iran rather than lose its larger investments in the United States. In part as a reaction to the reimposition of sanctions and the seeming vindication of hardliners, Iranians elected conservative Ebrahim Raisi president in the lowest turnout since 1979, and the clerical military leadership hardened their own political positions against further diplomacy with the U.S. Up until that point, Iran had been strictly following the JCPOA limits on its nuclear program, despite the U.S. abrogation and the imposition of new sanctions. But with the international community no longer willing to honor its end of the deal with sanctions relief, Iran determined that it was no longer bound by restrictions to its nuclear program and began enriching uranium well beyond the 3.67 percent allowed by the agreement. It is believed that Iran is now up to 60 percent enrichment capability, far closer to the 90 percent necessary to build a nuclear weapon. This further enrichment then led, with the support of European nations, to a resumption last year of the more comprehensive UN sanctions that had been lifted in 2015, worsening the economic situation still further. Those sanctions exacerbated the problems inherent in the Iranian state’s crony capitalism, corruption, and economic mismanagement to further strangle the Iranian economy. While Trump certainly deserves most of the blame, the failure of European countries to more forcefully challenge U.S. duplicity or even ensure desperately needed humanitarian aid makes it into Iran has further weakened Iranian officials seeking greater openness to the West and increased the power of political factions that insist on turning inward and imposing their will on a restless population. In periods when the West appeared more willing to engage in serious diplomacy and economic relations, more political space has opened within Iran for both reformers within the system and pro-democracy activists seeking to change the system. By contrast, punitive sanctions, war, and the threat of war have helped elevate more reactionary clerical leadership as well as enrich elites and bolster the control of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, which has in many respects already turned Iran from simply a conservative theocracy into a brutal military dictatorship. Trump does not appreciate the importance of real diplomacy, however. He is used to getting his way by making demands, issuing threats, and using whatever means of force are at his disposal, whether it be with business associates, regulators, women, or nations. He is under the false impression that Iran will blink first — that by denying Iran critically important revenue from its oil exports, it would effectively surrender. More likely, the Islamic Republic, which has dealt with major economic sanctions for much of its existence, is quite willing to let its economy suffer rather than submit in a war over its own existence. And the Iranian people are less likely to push for more democratic space in the domestic political sphere while they are struggling to survive day to day, and their nation is under constant threat of war. While negotiating an interim agreement which would allow for at least a partial reopening the Strait of Hormuz and postponing nuclear talks until later seems like the logical course of action, Trump may see such a compromise as making him appear to be a loser since, despite all the human and financial costs of his war on Iran, it would at best be a return to the status quo ante. His dramatic reaction to comments by German Chancellor Friedrich Merz — traditionally one of the more hawkish European leaders in regard to Iran, publicly recognizing Washington’s lack of an exit strategy — illustrates how he has backed himself into a corner, and much of the world with him. If the domestic and international pressure for a reopening of the strait gets to be too much, Trump might borrow from Henry Kissinger’s response to another negotiation impasse in December 1972: Despite progress in peace talks between the United States and North Vietnam, the U.S. launched a devastating 11-day bombing campaign over Christmas, dropping 20,000 tons of ordnance on North Vietnamese cities and killing more than 1,600 civilians. Four weeks later, a peace agreement was signed on essentially the same terms North Vietnam had offered before. The Nixon administration, however, contended that it was the bombing that led the North Vietnamese to agree to U.S. terms. The Trump administration may use the escalating conflict over the strait as an excuse to launch a similar short-term intensive bombing campaign on Iran and, regardless of whether it leads to further Iranian concessions, essentially declare victory if the Strait of Hormuz reopens, even with tolls. Whatever the outcome, the same kind of hubris out of Washington that led to the tragic wars in Vietnam and Iraq is manifesting itself with Iran today. This time, however, it is impacting the entire world. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subs

    11 min
  2. This Isn’t Just Trump’s War on Iran. Both Parties Paved the Way for Disaster.

    Apr 18

    This Isn’t Just Trump’s War on Iran. Both Parties Paved the Way for Disaster.

    First published in Truthout, April 17, 2026. Read by Greg Bates Unlike the invasion of Iraq, which received the support of a sizable minority of congressional Democrats, Donald Trump’s war on Iran has received near-universal criticism. Still, the party has focused primarily on process-style critiques — such as the legality of declaring the war under the Constitution and the war’s economic impact — rather than the humanitarian consequences and flagrant violations of international law. That should not come as a surprise to anyone familiar with the U.S. bipartisan consensus on Iran: For over 20 years, a number of prominent Democratic leaders — and in some cases, large majorities of congressional Democrats overall — have helped paved the groundwork for Trump’s war by issuing exaggerated and alarmist statements about Iran’s supposed danger to the region, threatening the use of military force, and undermining diplomatic initiatives, sometimes even criticizing Republicans from the right. In 2024, the Democratic Party platform criticized “Trump’s fecklessness and weakness in the face of Iranian aggression during his presidency” by not responding militarily to attacks by Iran and groups in Iraq and elsewhere that share Iran’s strategic objectives. The platform cited four separate incidents that took place under his first administration, failing to acknowledge that each was a direct result of Trump’s aggressive policies against Iran, including the assassination of Qassim Suleimani, a top Iranian general. By contrast, the party’s platform praised President Joe Biden for having “authorized precision airstrikes on key Iranian-linked targets,” which it claimed would “deter further aggression by Iran.” It praised “America’s ironclad commitment to the security of Israel and our unrivaled ability to leverage growing regional integration among U.S. partners to counter Iranian aggression.” Though eager to stress military means to counter Iran, the platform failed to directly call for a return to the Iran nuclear deal under the Obama administration, which considerably reduced regional tensions — a deal that Biden campaigned on reinstating but failed to do. The month after the release of the party platform, Democratic nominee Kamala Harris attacked Trump in a presidential debate, declaring that her administration “will always give Israel the ability to defend itself, in particular as it relates to Iran and any threat that Iran and its proxies pose to Israel.” In an interview with CBS, when she was asked who she considered to be the greatest enemy of the United States, Harris said it was “obvious” that Iran — not nuclear-armed states such as Russia, China, or North Korea — was the “greatest adversary.” She explicitly said that she would not rule out going to war against that country. This framing from the right continued into Trump’s presidency, even as the president began pushing more toward sustained military conflict. During Israel’s unprovoked bombing of Iran in June 2025, Senate Democratic leader Chuck Schumer insisted that “Israel has a right to defend itself,” despite the fact that Israel had started the war. Just over a week before, he criticized Trump for even engaging in negotiations with Iran — negotiations that provided cover for the U.S.’s own bombing of multiple Iranian nuclear sites. Just prior to the U.S. bombing of Iranian nuclear sites during Israel’s war, Schumer posted a video to social media accusing Trump of “folding on Iran” by attempting to negotiate a deal, bemoaning about how “Trump always chickens out” regarding the use of military force. Similarly, House Democratic leader Hakeem Jeffries refused to criticize the Israeli attack or call for a return to the Iran nuclear deal. Although Iran has no capability of striking anywhere outside of the Middle East, Jeffries claimed “the Iranian regime poses a grave threat to the entire free world.” Such hyperbole is not new. As far back as 20 years ago, Democratic leaders like then-Sen. Evan Bayh were claiming that Iran “may be only months away from having the capacity to build a nuclear bomb” and insisting military options should be considered. Similarly, then-Sen. Hillary Clinton argued during the Bush years that his administration was not taking the threat of a nuclear Iran seriously enough, criticizing it for allowing European nations to take the lead in pursuing a diplomatic solution, and insisting that the administration should make it clear that military options were being actively considered. These proclamations came even as the U.S. was struggling to maintain control of Iraq at the height of its occupation. During the 2008 Democratic primaries, Clinton accused Barack Obama of being “naive” and “irresponsible” for wanting to diplomatically engage with Iran and other nations that U.S. policy has often antagonized. Despite these accusations, Obama selected her as his secretary of state, through which, according to a story in Time magazine, Obama administration officials noted she was “skeptical of diplomacy with Iran, and firmly opposed to talk of a ‘containment’ policy that would be an alternative to military action should negotiations with Tehran fail.” Clinton was far from the only Democrat pushing back against the Obama administration’s diplomatic efforts. In 2011, in an effort to sabotage any potential diplomatic contact with Iran, an overwhelming majority of House Democrats voted for a Republican bill declaring “No person employed with the United States Government may contact in an official or unofficial capacity any person that … is an agent, instrumentality, or official of, is affiliated with, or is serving as a representative of the Government of Iran.” Administration pressure and constitutional questions prevented the bill from passing the Senate, but it underscored that over 90 percent of House Democrats were intent on undermining Obama’s efforts for a non-military resolution to the conflict with Iran.The following year, a similarly large majority of House Democrats voted for a resolution urging the president to oppose any policy toward Iran “that would rely on containment as an option in response to the Iranian nuclear threat.” While Obama had already stated a willingness to consider taking military action against Iran if the regime procured nuclear weapons, this resolution significantly lowered the bar for war by declaring it unacceptable for Iran simply to have “nuclear weapons capability” — not necessarily any actual weapons or an active nuclear weapons program. In 2013, after Clinton was replaced by the more liberal John Kerry as secretary of state and Iranians elected the reformist President Hassan Rouhani, yet another overwhelming majority of House Democrats joined Republicans in voting, over the objections of the White House, to impose punitive new sanctions on Iran. It was widely interpreted as a bipartisan rejection of the new Iranian president’s offer to enhance nuclear transparency and pursue “peace and reconciliation” with the West. Additionally, in an apparent effort to poison the atmosphere on the eve of Rouhani’s inauguration, over two dozen Democratic senators signed a letter to President Obama demanding a “toughening of sanctions” and “a convincing threat of the use of force.” In May of that year, every Democratic senator joined their Republican colleagues in supporting a resolution which “urges that, if the Government of Israel is compelled to take military action in self-defense, the United States Government should stand with Israel and provide diplomatic, military, and economic support to the Government of Israel.” The wording is significant in that it put Senate Democrats on record that the United States should support an Israeli war on Iran not only if Israel was attacked, but even if Israel attacked first. By giving Benjamin Netanyahu the authority to determine what might “compel” Israel to act in “self-defense,” this near-unanimous decision helped pave the way for Israel to make such claims in its U.S.-backed war in June 2025 and the joint U.S.-Israeli war this year. Fortunately, by 2015, the Obama administration — along with Great Britain, France, Germany, Russia, and China, and with the backing of the European Union and the United Nations — was able to negotiate an agreement whereby, in return for sanctions relief, Iran drastically curtailed its nuclear program to the degree that it was physically impossible to build a nuclear weapon, while also agreeing to strict monitoring to ensure compliance. It took perhaps the most intense lobbying efforts of the Obama presidency to get congressional Democrats on board. In the end, only two Democratic senators, Robert Menendez and Chuck Schumer, opposed the agreement, but their colleagues nevertheless elected them to senior positions — Menendez as chair of the Foreign Relations Committee and Schumer as their Senate leader. The 2016 Democratic platform endorsed the nuclear deal — but declared that, if Iran violated the agreement, rather than allow for the automatic reimposition of strict international sanctions to pressure Iran to come back into compliance as the deal outlined, a Democratic president “will not hesitate to take military action.” Since it would take Iranians at least a few years to rebuild their dramatically circumscribed nuclear program to the point where they could develop even a single nuclear weapon, there would be plenty of time, as well as serious punitive economic mechanisms, to push Iran to resume its compliance. Immediately launching a war, as the platform called for, would therefore not only be a direct violation of the United Nations Charter, it would be completely unnecessary. This is only a partial list of ways in which Democrats have pushed for a military confrontation with Iran over the pa

    12 min
  3. Trump’s Disastrous War of Choice in Iran

    Apr 12

    Trump’s Disastrous War of Choice in Iran

    First published in The Progressive, April 10, 2026. Read by Greg Bates. t is difficult, as of this writing, to speculate as to whether a genuine ceasefire in the war with Iran will take hold, even temporarily. Under previous U.S. presidential administrations, it was easier to make predictions, even when foreign policy decisions were based on faulty assumptions, since there was at least some sense that decision making would be based on strategic thinking. Not so under President Donald Trump, who has consistently sidelined or overruled knowledgeable advisors, including those in top military and intelligence positions, in order to pursue policies that appear to be motivated more by emotion than rational thinking. Indeed, even if the two-week ceasefire holds, the United States may simply use it to rearm and resupply its depleted stocks in order to resume its war on Iran. If the ceasefire does mean the end of hostilities for the foreseeable future, it will be hard for the Trump Administration to portray it as any sort of victory. Despite killing prominent Iranian leaders and inflicting enormous damage on Iran’s military and civilian infrastructure, the U.S. and Israeli bombardment of Iran appears to have left the critical components of its nuclear facilities and its supply of partially enriched uranium intact. Iran is still able to launch drones and missiles, and the regime’s grip on power is as strong as ever, and all of Trump’s stated goals for the war remain unfulfilled. Indeed, with the killing of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and ascension of his son, Mojtaba Khamenei, as Iran’s new Supreme Leader, the Iranian people and the entire region are now dealing with a regime which Ravi Agrawal, editor of Foreign Policy, correctly observes is “emboldened, vengeful, more militaristic, and more hardline.” And, if Iran allows ships to resume transiting the Strait of Hormuz, it will have unprecedented control over shipping, including the ability to charge fees to help rebuild the country’s damaged infrastructure. With the Strait acting as a chokehold for the transit of 20 percent of the world’s oil supply—as well as a great deal of the world’s fertilizer, liquid helium, and other important commodities—this control is a valuable asset for Iran, and one they did not possess before the current war began. More critically, as Trita Parsi, executive vice president of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft notes, “The United States is no longer in a position to dictate terms; any agreement will have to rest on genuine compromise. That, in turn, demands real diplomacy—patience, discipline, and a tolerance for ambiguity—qualities not typically associated with Trump.” At the same time, the United States may not have much of a choice. Trump’s genocidal threats about destroying Iranian civilization on April 7—an act that in itself can be considered a war crime—may have come from the knowledge that a ceasefire was imminent so he could pretend that it was he that forced the Iranians to give in, not the other way around. In spite of the apparent willingness of the Trump Administration to accept the enormous financial costs of the war, the physical damage inflicted on U.S. assets in the region and allied Middle Eastern states, the harm done to America’s international standing, and the impact on the global economy, it became apparent that the war had simply become unwinnable. Trump has found himself under enormous pressure, not just from the American public and U.S. allies (which he appears quite willing to ignore), but international business and finance, which are reeling from the economic consequences of the war and fearful of far greater damage to come if the war resumes. As a result, Trump’s new priority became to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, which had been operating normally until the United States and Israel launched their war on February 28. However, as long as the Strait of Hormuz remains effectively closed, the war could resume at any moment. And it is unlikely to re-open as long as Israel continues its horrific assault on Lebanon. Despite U.S. and Israeli claims to the contrary, Pakistani mediators and others have confirmed that the agreement for a two-week halt to the fighting and the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz was contingent on a ceasefire in Lebanon. European leaders and other U.S. allies have underscored the importance of the ceasefire applying to Lebanon as well. In actuality, Israel’s U.S.-backed air strikes in Lebanon have gone well beyond Hezbollah military targets to include the heavy bombing of crowded urban neighborhoods. Israeli bombing on April 9, the day following the cessation of hostilities in the Gulf, killed more than 300 people, the vast majority of them civilians. This comes on top of Israel’s occupation and ethnic cleansing of a large swath of southern Lebanon and the systematic destruction of entire villages. The United States is therefore faced with a decision to either force Israel to cease its attacks on Lebanon or to accept the continued closure of the Strait of Hormuz and the likelihood of the resumption of the war. Meanwhile, Democratic leaders in Congress are being forced to explain how they can both oppose a resumption of the Iran war while refusing to call for an end to offensive U.S. military aid to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu as Israeli leaders continue to sabotage the prospects of maintaining a ceasefire. At the Democratic National Committee’s annual meeting this past week, party leadership blocked a resolution calling for conditioning future military aid to Israel on that government’s compliance with international law in relation to the U.S.-Israel war on Iran. Even in a best-case scenario in which the worst of the killing and destruction is over, some semblance of normal commerce can resume, and the reconstruction of war-damaged homes and infrastructure can begin, the main challenge for those of us in the United States is to create measures to ensure that never again can a single man unleash such chaos and destruction. To do so will require a long-overdue assertion of Congressional authority, including a willingness by Congressional Democrats to block funding for Netanyahu’s war machine and Trump’s Pentagon until they come into compliance with international law and categorically renounce wars of aggression. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit stephenzunes962006.substack.com/subscribe

    7 min
  4. The United States Cannot ‘Win’ a War on Iran

    Apr 5

    The United States Cannot ‘Win’ a War on Iran

    First published in The Progressive Magazine, April 3, 2026. Written by Stephen Zunes, Read by Greg Bates. Iran certainly cannot win a war in the face of the massive U.S. and Israeli onslaught. As recent weeks have shown, however, it can still prevent the United States from winning. In a new form of asymmetrical warfare, Iran has proven itself capable of wreaking havoc on the global economy to punish the United States and Israel for its aggression. President Donald Trump is a bully. Whether with women or with nations, he is willing to cross any moral or legal boundaries in order to dominate and control. He thinks he has the right to impose his will, whatever the consequences and however unpopular it may be with the international community and the American public. His insistence that he should have had a say in picking Iran’s leadership underscores that this war is ultimately about control. This is not something the Iranian regime will accept, however much destruction will be rained down upon the country. The Tehran regime appears uninterested in a ceasefire. According to Trita Parsi of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, there is a sense that the decision to accept a ceasefire in the twelve-day war last June “only enabled the United States and Israel to restock and remobilize to launch war again. If they agree to a ceasefire now, they will only be attacked again in a few months.” There appears to have been a mistaken belief in Washington, D.C., that the regime would implode upon the assassination of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and other leaders, failing to recognize that the Islamic Republic of Iran is a complex network of overlapping interests with a stake in the status quo, not a regime that can be toppled by killing a few leaders. That failure has resulted in increasingly heavy bombardment of an ever-widening range of targets, along with the possibility of arming Kurdish rebels and other restive minorities and introducing U.S. ground troops. The Trump Administration has been unwilling to recognize that the Iranian regime could endure a long, incredibly one-sided, and utterly devastating war in the face of massive casualties. However, with Trump calling for Iran’s “unconditional surrender,” it has become an existential war for the Iranian regime. Given how the Islamic Republic was willing to slaughter thousands of Iranians during the pro-democracy protests before the war, it is not likely to have much compunction about many thousands more being killed at the hands of foreign powers, particularly since many in leadership see their mandate as coming from God. Few authoritarian regimes in the post-World War II era have been toppled through foreign military intervention, and none through bombing alone. Hardly any have turned into stable democracies as a result. Indeed, Trump has said he does not care if Iran does not become a democracy as long as it is compliant with American interests. In the face of the horrific massacres of demonstrators earlier this year, there was some hope that the regular Iranian army might move in to depose the clerics and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the two foundations of the regime’s power. While less politically and economically influential than the IRGC, the regular army is much larger and is composed largely of conscripts not necessarily allied with the regime. With them now under constant barrage and fighting to defend themselves from foreign attackers, however, this scenario seems far less likely. The most common and successful method of toppling autocrats has been through unarmed civil resistance, of which Iran has a rich history. Despite Trump’s call on the Iranian people to rise up, most Iranians at this point are just desperately trying to survive. It was not surprising, then, that the initial celebrations over the killing of the hated “Supreme Leader,” and others in his circle, failed to turn into a movement. And no popular struggle is helped by vocal support from a nation’s sworn enemies, particularly if they are currently killing thousands of your people. People tend to rally around the flag if their country is being bombed, particularly as civilian casualties grow. During my time in Iran in 2019, while the popular anger and frustration at the regime was palpable, and there was a clear desire to bring it down, I found no one advocating for war. Comments by Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth and White House Deputy Chief of Staff Stephen Miller that the United States is no longer bound by international humanitarian law and other rules of engagement have already led U.S. and Israeli forces to target schools, hospitals, city parks, and cultural sites along with military and governmental facilities. This will likely lead to only greater resistance. The big mistake the United States made in Vietnam was seeing the struggle as one of fighting communism which, as an expansionist totalitarian ideology, it felt, had to be confronted with massive military force as was done against the fascists in Germany, Italy, and Japan during World War II. It failed to recognize that the National Liberation Front (the NLF or “Viet Cong”), while communist-led, was first and foremost a nationalist movement. So policymakers didn’t understand why the more troops they sent and the more they bombed, the stronger the resistance became. Similarly, in Iran, the regime is seen in Washington, D.C., through its Islamist identity and its efforts to spread a reactionary version of Shia Islam in the region. What the U.S. government fails to understand is that the regime’s hold on power comes in large part from taking advantage of its people’s strong embrace of nationalism and anti-imperialism. (During my time in Iran, I noticed that nationalist symbols were far more common in government propaganda than Islamist ones.) As a result, the terror bombing and calls to surrender to U.S. and Israeli demands is breeding its own resistance. Iran is an industrialized nation of more than ninety million people that has been a major regional power for much of the past 2,500 years and will not easily yield to foreign aggression. So, if the regime cannot be replaced, the ultimate goal may become to subject the country to such massive destruction it can no longer serve as a deterrent to U.S. hegemony in this important oil-rich region, and to send a message to any governments that dare to defy U.S. objectives that they either do what the U.S. President says or suffer utterly devastating consequences. Even some of the current Iranian government’s harshest opponents fear “regime collapse.” They have seen the aftermath of foreign intervention in Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Afghanistan. Despite promises of freedom, each of these countries descended into chaos and civil war and/or were forced to endure a foreign occupation. As British Pakistani journalist Saima Mohsin noted, “We know how imperial powers treat ‘liberated’ nations in the Middle East.” With the unlikelihood of an effective Iranian surrender, the only realistic way to end the carnage is to get the United States to end the war. The war is already unpopular with the American public. Even controversial wars like the invasion of Iraq had majority popular support once they were underway due to initial successes and a perceived obligation to back the government in wartime and to “support our troops” who were in harm’s way. Though initial support for the war with Iran nearly doubled from pre-war polls, this is still the first American war to have only minority support at its outset. There are growing concerns among American military and intelligence officials that they will not be able to bring down the regime through air power alone. There are also limits to U.S. weapons stockpiles, raising questions as to how long the war can be sustained. The best hope in ending the carnage may be some kind of hurting stalemate resulting in a ceasefire where both sides could claim victory—the U.S. government claiming it has sufficiently damaged Iran’s military capabilities and the Iranian government noting that it survived. This is not likely to happen, however, until the physical destruction in Iran and, to a much lesser but not insignificant extent, other countries mounts. And, as evidenced by the current so-called ceasefire in Gaza, a humanitarian crisis and intermittent bombing will likely continue amid the rubble and the conflict will remain unresolved. Editor’s note: This article was written for the magazine on the eighth day of an ongoing war on the nation of Iran. It has been updated slightly to reflect events as they continue to unfold. At least fourteen countries have so far been drawn into the conflict, and in early March, the estimated cost to the U.S. taxpayer was estimated to be about $1 billion per day. Since its founding in 1909, The Progressive has always opposed the use of military force to resolve conflicts. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit stephenzunes962006.substack.com/subscribe

    10 min
  5. What Are the Trump Administration’s True Objectives in Iran?

    Mar 5

    What Are the Trump Administration’s True Objectives in Iran?

    First published in Truthout, March 4, 2026. The ramifications of the escalating U.S.-Israeli war on Iran remain to be seen, but they will not be good. Indeed, as with the U.S.-led war on Iraq, the war on Iran could prove disastrous. It is important to understand, therefore, what would motivate the United States to launch such a reckless, illegal, and destructive action. Not surprisingly, most of President Donald Trump’s justifications for the war are demonstrably false: First of all, there is no evidence that Iran was planning a pre-emptive attack or constituted an imminent threat, as Secretary of State Marco Rubio and others have claimed. Secondly, given that Iran’s missiles have a maximum range of 1800 miles, and that Iran is estimated to be a decade away from developing intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of reaching North America, Trump’s claim that Iran was on the verge of being able to attack the United States is absurd. Trump also repeated the long-debunked claim that thousands of Americans and millions of others were killed and wounded by improvised explosive devices (IEDs) made by Iran. Not only are these numbers gross exaggerations, but the vast majority of IEDs targeting U.S. forces were manufactured by Iraqi guerrillas (most of whom were anti-Iranian Salafists, Baathists, and others), not by Iran. And the 2000 attack on the USS Cole in Yemen’s Aden Harbor, which Trump has also mentioned, was done by Al-Qaeda, a bitter rival of Iran, not by anyone from Iran. Iran’s brutal repression of its own people is well-documented, but U.S. support for regimes that have engaged in either severe repression against pro-democracy protesters or mass killings of civilians — including Israel, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Turkey, Egypt, and others — belies any genuine concern about promoting human rights and democracy. In this moment, Trump has made calls for the Iranian people to again rise up, but that cannot realistically take place while the country in being bombed. Indeed, being attacked by a foreign power generally leads people to rally around the flag. For example, while eventually successful, the Serbian democratic movement against the Milosevic regime was set back by the 1999 NATO bombing of their country. Indeed, a truly democratic Iran would likely reflect the anti-imperialist and anti-Zionist sentiments of the majority of Iranians and have more credibility than the corrupt, reactionary government currently in power, something the United States would presumably want to avoid. Trump falsely stated that Iran had never pledged not to build a nuclear weapon, when its leaders have in fact pledged not to repeatedly. Meanwhile, the Trump administration has also tried push the contradictory claim that the United States “obliterated” Iran’s nuclear program during its strikes last June, while simultaneously insisting Iran is “probably a week away from having industrial grade bomb making material.” Neither is true. Meanwhile, there is no credible means by which the Trump administration can use Iran’s nuclear program to justify the war. The talks to revive the nuclear agreement were ongoing. On February 27, the Omani mediator said there had been significant progress in U.S.-Iranian talks and a deal was “within reach.” Furthermore, Iran’s nuclear program would not have even been an issue had Trump not unilaterally pulled out of the 2015 nuclear deal, which would have put very strict limits on Iran’s nuclear capabilities which, combined with its rigorous enforcement mechanisms, would have made it physically impossible for Iran to build a bomb. It was doubtful that Trump even wanted a nuclear agreement, however. Given the scale of the ongoing military operations, it’s clear that these attacks had been planned for some time. Indeed, Trump’s insistence that he would not lift sanctions even if Iran gave into his demands provided Iranian negotiators little incentive to compromise. Furthermore, the Trump administration’s insistence that any deal with Iran also include agreements on other issues — such as eliminating Iran’s missile program, its support for regional allies, and internal repression — likely would have doomed the negotiations to failure. Even Presidents Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan, despite their extreme anti-Soviet views, recognized that their nuclear agreements with Moscow would not have been possible if they insisted on including other contentious issues between the two countries in those deals. It is striking, though — in contrast to every other modern president who has taken the United States to war — how little effort Trump put into convincing Congress or the U.S. public that it was necessary. In 2003, George W. Bush devoted much of his State of the Union address just prior to the invasion of Iraq to making his case — albeit inaccurate and misleading — for why the U.S. should go to war. By contrast, Trump spoke about Iran for less than three minutes of his one hour-48-minute State of the Union address, underscoring how he really didn’t care that much about convincing Congress or the U.S. public of the necessity to launch a major war in the Middle East. So, why has the United States gone to war against Iran? Much of it has to do with what was perceived as an opportunity. The Iranian regime has never been more isolated, both internationally and domestically. Its violent repression of pro-democracy protesters in January and its status as a pariah state has resulted in a somewhat muted response in the international community to the U.S.-Israeli attacks, despite their clear illegality. Meanwhile, Syria’s Assad regime, the only state in the region that the Iranian government considered an ally, was toppled in late 2024 in a popular uprising, and its Houthi and Hezbollah allies have been dramatically weakened by devastating air strikes in recent years. Domestically, the anger at the regime has never been higher, particularly after its recent massacre of thousands of anti-government demonstrators. However, such setbacks do not mean the regime is on the verge of collapse, even with the assassination of Ayatollah Khamenei. Iran’s supreme leader was 86 years old and in declining health. His death will not likely change much except that this widely reviled cleric has now been made a martyr. More salient is the fact that Iran was already as much a militarized authoritarian state as a theocracy, with the Revolutionary Guard exerting at least as much power as the clergy. Even killing a few of their commanders as well will not weaken their control over the country. The authoritarian regime in Iran is not a typical one-man dictatorship in which the government can be toppled by a single leader’s elimination. Rather, the Iranian regime comprises a complex system of powerful overlapping institutions that have a stake in maintaining the system. As a result, the killing of leaders, while a serious setback in some cases, will not likely constitute a fatal blow. Among those wishing to take advantage of Iran’s weakened state has been Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who has been pushing for a major war against Iran for decades. However, while Israel has joined the United States in its war on Iran in pursuit of their common objectives, there is little indication that the Trump administration is doing this to protect Israel. Israel has more than adequate defenses from any possible Iranian aggression, including a nuclear deterrent. U.S. hostility toward an independent-minded Iran has been a major component of U.S. foreign policy for decades, regardless of Israel. The United States overthrew its democratically elected prime minister in 1953. The United States repeatedly attacked Iran’s navy, coastal installations, and even a civilian airliner in the so-called 1987-88 “tanker war” toward the end of the Iran-Iraq War. The United States armed Kurdish and Baluchi separatists in the 2000s. Over the decades, the United States has supported the Gulf Arab monarchies, Israel, and even Saddam’s Iraq in targeting Iran. I’ve never seen any evidence that Israel was behind any of those policies and, despite Netanyahu’s encouragement, there is little evidence that he or the pro-Israel lobby were a decisive factor in Trump’s decision to go to war. Trump is nobody’s puppet. Failing any direct evidence that this war would not have taken place were it not for the Israeli government and its backers, there should be caution about claiming that it was — both for the sake of accuracy as well as the importance of not reinforcing old antisemitic canards about Jews manipulating non-Jewish political leaders into pursuing destructive policies they would not have otherwise taken. Ultimately what this war is about is going after the one major power left in the region that has dared to challenge U.S. hegemony. It’s about the “full spectrum dominance” originally articulated in the 2002 National Security Strategy during the Bush administration. Since even weeks of heavy bombing are not likely to bring down the Iranian government, the goal may be to inflict as much damage as possible, making Iran an example to any other country that dares defy the United States. What the United States and Israel want, therefore, is a weakened Iran, one with a severely damaged infrastructure that is incapable of meeting the needs of its own people, much less serving as a counterweight to U.S. hegemony. The U.S. and Israel appear to be angling to create a situation where ethnic minorities (which constitute close to half the nation’s population), leftists, monarchists, religious factions, and others will struggle against each other amid the ruins, leaving the nation weak and divided. In effect, if the United States cannot impose a government of its choosing, it is seeking to turn Iran into a failed state. Indeed, it appears the United States and Israel are

    13 min
  6. THE IRANIAN PROTESTS EXPLAINED

    Feb 7

    THE IRANIAN PROTESTS EXPLAINED

    By Daniel Falcone First published in Foreign Piolicy in Focus, January 28, 2026 In this interview, international relations scholar Stephen Zunes and Middle East historian Lawrence Davidson help to unpack the Iranian protests and explain their relevance within the context of U.S. and Israeli national interests. Daniel Falcone: Jeffrey St. Clair of CounterPunch, recently cited filmmaker Jafar Panahi’s insistence that change in Iran must come from the will of the people, not from outside intervention. As U.S. and Israeli involvement tends to strengthen hardliners, how do you explain the balance between international solidarity and the risk of external actors undermining Iran’s sovereignty and social movement? Lawrence Davidson: One has to ask what these terms, international solidarity, and risk from external actors, mean in today’s international environment. If international solidarity means, for instance, the solidarity of reactionary countries that have somehow made an alliance to change the internal behavior of a third nation, that is obviously problematic. In this case, international solidarity is the manifestation of just these external actors. If the United States intervenes in Iran at this time, it would not be to the benefit of the Iranian people, it would be for the suppression of anti-Zionist sentiment in the country through the introduction of the Shah’s adult son. This would probably lead to something like a civil war in Iran. If, however, international solidarity means the sentiment of people rather than governments, this has not proved very effective, as we can see in the case of Gaza. The Arab and Muslim peoples have either chosen not to or could not in any practical way act to support the Palestinians. I’m afraid that the conclusion here is that in the present circumstances, there is no balance between international solidarity and external actors. The power of institutionalized external actors overwhelms practical terms, the power of popular solidarity. Stephen Zunes: While the United States and Israel have tried to take advantage of the unrest, the protests this round, as well as previously, have been homegrown and not the result of imperialist machinations. Iran has had a long history of widespread civil resistance going back to the late nineteenth century with the tobacco strike against imperialist economic domination, through the Constitutional Revolution the following decade, through the revolution in the late 1970s that brought down the U.S.-backed Shah. The outspoken support for the protests by the U.S. and Israeli governments have probably been counter-productive, feeding the regime’s false narrative that they are a result of foreign backing. Israel and the United States have a lot of power in terms of blowing things up and killing people. They do not have the power to get hundreds of thousands of angry Iranians into the streets or even to steer the direction of their protests. The people who have given their lives on the streets were fighting for their freedom, not for foreign powers. Threats of military action by the United States and Israel have also likely strengthened the regime, since people tend to rally around the flag in case of outside threats and most Iranians across the political spectrum do not trust either country. Given the U.S. support for even more repressive regimes in the Middle East, don’t think the Trump administration cares about the Iranian people. Bombing Iran to ostensibly support the uprising would be a tragedy. People would certainly be reluctant to go out onto the streets while they are being bombed. Most of those calling for U.S. military intervention appear to have been from the Iranian diaspora, not those on the streets. Although some Iranians within the country may have been desperate enough to want to risk it as well, let’s remember that it was not the eleven weeks of NATO bombing that brought down Milosevic in Serbia. It was the massive nonviolent resistance of the Serbian people that took place more than a year later. It is possible that the United States and Israel might prefer the current reactionary, autocratic Iranian regime to a democratic one, which would still be anti-hegemonic and anti-Zionist but have a lot more credibility. A democratic Iran would still be nationalistic and sympathetic to the Palestinian cause, but less likely to engage in the kinds of repression and provocative foreign policies that would give the United States and Israel an excuse for some of their militarism. Solidarity from global civil society, by contrast, is important and appropriate. Despite claims by some to the contrary, many prominent pro-Palestinian voices from Bernie Sanders to Peter Beinart to Greta Thunberg have been outspoken in their support for the Iranian popular struggle as well. People will certainly tend to protest more when their own governments are actively supporting repression and mass killing, as with Israeli violence in Gaza and the West Bank, than when their governments are opposing the repression and mass killing. Same as during the Cold War—it is quite natural for Americans to be less involved in protesting Communist repression we could do little about than repressive rightwing governments backed by Washington, where we might have more impact. As a result, this line about “where are all the protests on U.S. campuses?” has been unfair (particularly since most were still on winter break). And although some sectarian leftists really have become apologists for the reactionary Iranian regime or have exaggerated the Israeli role in the uprising, they are fortunately a small minority. Ultimately, international solidarity is important, but it must be from sources that genuinely support the principles for which a popular movement is struggling. The movement in Iran, as with similar movements against autocratic regimes elsewhere, is fighting for freedom, democracy, and social and economic justice. Since neither the U.S. nor the Israeli government supports those principles, the Iranian regime—quite accurately in this case—can observe that U.S. and Israeli backing of the resistance is about advancing U.S. and Israeli strategic objectives, since these right-wing governments support regimes with even worse human rights records and they themselves are undermining democratic principles in their own countries. Indeed, some statements of support have played right into the regime’s hands. Daniel Falcone: It seems that the participation of bazaaris and the poor and working class makes these protests distinct from earlier movements dominated by students and the middle class. How does this class composition alter legitimacy and the political stakes for the regime? Lawrence Davidson: Their participation reflects the economic circumstances now. Those circumstances are, in turn, the product of externally imposed economic sanctions and incompetent internal management. Certainly, the participation of the bazaar keepers and the poor and working class in the protests is significant. No matter who comes out on top here, you’re going to see some sort of reform take place. The probability that it is the government that comes out on top is a function of the remaining loyalty of various contingents of the military. And a lot of this has to do with the economic stake of the Revolutionary Guard Corps in the status quo. As long as the military components of the regime stay loyal, the addition of bazaar keepers and the lower classes in the demonstrations cannot change the government. Stephen Zunes: I find it rather significant that the bazaaris, traditionally a backbone of support for the regime, have been in the leadership of the resistance, as is the fact that there has been significant poor and working-class participation in the protests, unlike some previous movements, which have been disproportionately students and those from the educated middle class. The Iranian military, like the military in Egypt and some other autocratic systems, has their fingers in all sorts of economic enterprises at the expense of the common people. As a result, their brutal response to the protests was not just ideological, but from a desire to protect their vested interests. It is also striking how quickly the protests went beyond economic issues. Most Iranians want at minimum much greater democratization/accountability within the current system and an increasing number clearly want regime change, not just because of economic hardship, but because they are simply tired of the repression. Daniel Falcone: Although U.S. led sanctions have crippled Iran, there are also problems of systemic corruption and mismanagement by the Iranian state. Protesters increasingly reject both. Do you see this moment as one in which economic grievances lead to demands for democratization? Lawrence Davidson: The economic problems come from both factors you mention. The Iranian theologians did not understand the intricacies of modern economic institutions or the importance of international trade. Thus, they could not manage a national economy, particularly one under outside stress. At the same time, American sanctions were designed to destroy that economy and impoverish the Iranian people. The two factors, working simultaneously, opened the way for corruption. And then there is the Revolutionary Guard capturing control of important parts of the economy. It is a mess. Democracy? I think we are a long way from that. We are probably closer to a military coup with the mullahs kept as front men. Stephen Zunes: U.S.-led sanctions are unjustifiable (since Iran was honoring the nuclear agreement when Trump reimposed them) and they are hurting the economy. But my sense is that both the regime and Washington, for different reasons, are exaggerating the importance of the sanctions in sparking the rebellion. It is the regime’s corruption, mismanagement, and lack of accountability that are the bigger pro

    16 min
  7. BBC Interview on Trump's "Board of Peace" for Gaza

    Jan 20

    BBC Interview on Trump's "Board of Peace" for Gaza

    This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit stephenzunes962006.substack.com/subscribe

    5 min
  8. The Real Reason Trump Invaded Venezuela

    Jan 11

    The Real Reason Trump Invaded Venezuela

    First published in The Progressive, Janury 6, 2026. Read by Greg Bates. The U.S. attack on Venezuela resulted from having an incredibly corrupt and autocratic-minded President using his office to enrich himself and his supporters, deploying the country’s armed forces against his own citizens, abusing the justice system to punish political opponents, and manipulating the electoral process to try to stay in power. Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro has engaged in similar behavior as well. While there is no denying Maduro’s authoritarian rule, mismanagement, and corruption, that is not why the United States invaded. President Donald Trump acknowledged that a key American goal was to regain control of Venezuelan oil, the largest known reserves in the world, saying, “We’re going to rebuild the oil infrastructure.” While acknowledging that it would require billions of dollars in investment by U.S. oil companies to do so, he promised, “They will be reimbursed for what they’re doing.” As with many previous U.S. military interventions, it is based on lies. First of all, Maduro did not steal “our” oil, as Trump and other U.S. officials have alleged. Even putting aside the question as to whether the United States somehow has the right to another country’s natural resources, Venezuela nationalized its oil industry back in the 1970s under the leadership of a pro-U.S. centrist government at a time when dozens of other oil-producing nations were nationalizing their oil companies. Rather than confiscating the companies without compensation, Venezuela agreed to international arbitration and paid billions of dollars to ExxonMobil, ConocoPhillips, and other U.S. oil companies. Nor is it because of Maduro’s authoritarianism. The United States remains the world’s biggest diplomatic supporter and arms supplier of dictatorial regimes around the world, many of which are even worse than Venezuela, including Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Azerbaijan. Trump’s alleged concern about drug trafficking is also nonsense, particularly in light of his pardon of former Honduran president Juan Orlando Hernández, who was found guilty by a U.S. jury of being responsible for supporting the shipment of 400 tons of cocaine into the United States. Hernández, like Maduro, was notoriously corrupt, suppressed pro-democracy protesters, and stole elections, yet the rightwing Central American leader received support from both Republican and Democratic administrations, which have criticized Maduro for similar behavior. Trump has also pardoned and released a significant number of other figures involved in drug trafficking while reducing support for public health responses to drug abuse. Ironically, Venezuela is not a major player in drug trafficking. Despite administration claims to the contrary, Venezuela plays virtually no role in the manufacturing and smuggling of fentanyl, which largely comes through Mexico. Venezuela ranks well behind other Latin American countries in cocaine production and is not a major transshipment point of the drug to the United States. Even if the indictment for drug trafficking against Maduro is legitimate, international law does not permit any nation to attack a foreign country and kidnap a criminal suspect. It also raises questions as to why it is that federal courts cannot hold a U.S. President accountable for alleged crimes, but they somehow have the authority to hold foreign presidents accountable for theirs. Indeed, Maduro’s alleged criminal activities are not really what the U.S. attacks on Venezuela are about: The Trump Administration plans to take control of Venezuela, with Trump insisting “We’re going to stay until such time as a proper transition can take place.” He announced that the United States would “run the country,” that “we’re designating various people” to do so and “we’re going to make sure it’s run properly.” When asked in a press conference exactly who would be running Venezuela, Trump said the “people that are standing right behind me, we’re going to be running it,” pointing at Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, and General Dan “Raizin” Caine, the chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. But Venezuela still has a functioning government, with its vice president Delcy Rodríguez, who is seen to be more pragmatic and less authoritarian-minded than Maduro but is still a committed socialist and nationalist serving as acting president and apparently unwilling to cave to Trump’s demands. Trump explicitly declared that she could remain in power as long as she “does what we want.” Otherwise, Trump has threatened her and other government ministers, saying that if they defy his demands, “the United States retains all military options . . . . All political and military figures in Venezuela must understand: What happened to Maduro will happen to them.” Referring specifically to Rodríguez, Trump said, “If she doesn’t do what’s right, she is going to pay a very big price, probably bigger than Maduro.” And he was clear his demands would be enforced militarily, warning there would be a “second wave” of military action by the United States if Venezuelan government officials did not comply, saying, “We’re not afraid of boots on the ground.” Rubio added, “We’re going to make decisions based on their actions and their deeds in the days and weeks to come.” Maduro made a lot of enemies in the international community during his twelve years in power, which helps explain why, despite few outright endorsements of the U.S. intervention, opposition by some leaders in Europe and elsewhere has been somewhat muted. However, such flagrant violations of international law will inevitably harm the position of the United States internationally, particularly in Latin America, where many will view this as a return to the gunboat diplomacy that was the hallmark of U.S. policy for much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Indeed Trump’s new National Security Strategy, released last month, calls for a revived Monroe Doctrine in which the United States would increase military deployments in the region to ensure that the United States will be able to control “critical supply chains” and to guarantee “continued access to key strategic locations” throughout the hemisphere. Trump himself has called it the “Don-roe Doctrine” and declared, “American dominance in the Western Hemisphere will never be questioned again.” The United States currently maintains a large armada of about 15,000 military personnel in the Caribbean Sea, not only threatening Venezuela, but other countries as well. Trump has warned the democratically elected leftwing president of Colombia, Gustavo Petro, that he has to “watch his ass” and told Fox News that “something’s going to have to be done with Mexico,” also now under the leadership of a left-leaning president, Claudia Scheinbaum. Trump also said that “Cuba is going to be something we’ll end up talking about,” with Rubio adding, “If I lived in Havana, and I was in the government, I’d be concerned—at least a little bit.” Meanwhile, the Trump Administration has been unable to explain how it will be able to control a country of nearly thirty million people, directly or indirectly. While many Venezuelans may be glad the unpopular autocratic leader is gone, like their counterparts in Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003, it does not mean they support U.S. control of their country and its natural resources. Unlike the U.S.-made war on Iraq, another oil-rich country, there is not a sizable minority of Congressional Democrats on record supporting war in Venezuela. Indeed, most who have spoken publicly have been in opposition. However, the response to last week’s attack on Caracas and the seizure of Maduro has been disappointingly tepid. For example, instead of demanding that threats against Venezuela cease immediately and holding the Trump Administration accountable for the illegal intervention, the most House Democratic Minority Leader Hakeem Jeffries could muster was that “the House and Senate must be briefed immediately and compelling evidence to explain and justify this unauthorized use of military force should be presented forthwith.” There is indeed the very serious issue regarding the illegality of the United States attacking a foreign state without Congressional authorization or even notification, particularly with the threat of further war. However, the primary focus of Congressional Democrats appears to be more with Trump’s failure to follow proper Constitutional procedures than his flagrant violation of the U.N. Charter and the brazenly imperialistic nature of the attacks and subsequent threats. Unless that is also challenged, the threat of further war in Venezuela and beyond will grow. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit stephenzunes962006.substack.com/subscribe

    9 min
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I am Professor of Politics, University of San Francisco. I write on US politics and the Middle East. stephenzunes962006.substack.com

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