Indefensible New Zealand Simon Ewing-Jarvie

This episode was produced in the run-up to the new government’s first budget later in May. There is an expectation of increased spending on Defence. That remains to be seen but if there is, what should it be on?
A lot of discussion takes place around what sort of hardware and how many people the New Zealand Defence Force needs to have in order to achieve its mission.
Considerably less discussion focuses on what the Government and people of New Zealand need to do to allow the NZDF to achieve that same mission.
I talk about some of the elements of that in this episode – what is National Power and how do we optimize it?

Tactical effectiveness is essentially the capacity to bring together training, equipment, leadership, and other military endeavours to win battles and keep winning them in a changing battlefield environment. That is the primary job of the NZDF.
That can’t be done without several other elements being in place including good policy and strategy at the political level.
This has been poorly done for years with successive governments adopting a satisficing approach best summarised as ‘how little can we get away with?’ A strategy doesn’t cost any money. Execution of it does. Last year’s announcement that claimed to be a Defence Policy and Strategy was little more than a meta-policy sitting above many other existing policies. And now we wait for the next Defence Capability Framework.
Success for New Zealand requires the effective wielding of all elements of national power – people, ideas, industry, information, alliances, etc.
I am not suggesting we put our economy on a war footing. But we should know how to and we need to move closer to it now if we truly believe the deteriorating international security situation reports. That means trying to generate optimum rather than maximum national power.
Traditional views of generating national power have focused on population size, wealth and abundance of natural resources, industrial base and productivity. But these measures fall short when you consider the massive military effectiveness generated by relatively small countries such as those of the Baltic states, Israel and the countries of Scandinavia.
What is different is that these countries have cultures, social structures, and political institutions that emphasise and strengthen national power. All these countries have some form of national service.

This episode traverses goverenment policy, voluntary national service, defence industry, business continuity planning and individual preparedness for disruption.

The New Zealand Defence Force has a number of well documented problems. Even at full strength, it lacks the mass, firepower and sustainability to engage in medium to high intensity conflict. However, at the moment it also has significant recruitment, retention, morale and mental health problems. The latter extends to the veteran community as well.

All service chiefs are due for replacement in the next few weeks and months. With a new defence (Hon Judith Collins) and associate defence minister (Hon Chris Penk), the time is right to consider the best trajectory for rebuilding the NZDF for the future. Trying to rebuild it in its current form is a mistake.

However, the hardest part of  implementing  new ideas  in Defence is getting the old ways out. Organisational disobedience is a strong part of the NZDF culture. This longer than usual podcast looks at some of the sacred cows that need to go in order for the NZDF culture to position itself for the strategic environment it will next fight in.

Simon discusses rank modernisation, reduction in the number of headquarters, independent sub units, private military companies, the defence estate, accrual accounting and legislative changes amongst other topics

It is not a comprehensive lists of changes. There will be other episodes on change required.

Recorded on 6 February 2024 which is Waitangi Day in New Zealand. Simon discusses the lack of meaning of the national day for most New Zealanders. The discussion then travels to thinking about how the NZ Defence Force epitomises an effective multi-cultural example of unity for the country and how this could be enhanced while simultaneously dealing with current personnel shortages.

The episode ends with a call to make the day less about grievance and appeasement and more about a national celebration of our shared history and future.

There has been a lot of speculation about defence since the announcement of the new Cabinet. I would classify much of this as “breathless longing” in that many are joining the dots between last year’s documentary assessments, a deteriorating international security situation, a hollow defence force and a strong national security related ministerial line-up in a new government to incorrectly conclude that Defence is in for a financial sugar rush.
That is simply not going to happen for reasons I outlined in the previous episode of Indefensible New Zealand.
At this point, I wish to shamelessly award myself the Chocolate Fish of Honour Award for correctly picking three defence ministers in a row. Hop over to my other podcast, VoterTorque, where Heather Roy and I discuss politics in plain english for verification.
If you want a stronger, more capable defence force for New Zealand then lobbying is an essential and largely missing element of pursuing that.
 Most people’s idea of lobbying (apart from hiring a professional lobbyist) is getting a meeting with a minister. If you manage to, you’ll be lucky to get 10-15 minutes in their schedule.
You will be competing with their external party demands, electorate needs, caucus activities, Cabinet meetings, portfolio requirements and a host of other duties and events.
Get the picture?
I’m not saying don’t see the minister. Just don’t base your plan solely on that. Politicians like to be offered solutions. To do that you might need to first point out the problem including the risk it poses to the minister or government.
So clearly define the problem. Develop courses of action. Select a recommended course for the government based on specific criteria. Do your best to cost your solution. Then personalise it to all the stakeholders.
And believe me, there are a lot of stakeholders you must get into your tent!

Listen as Simon Ewing-Jarvie takes you through the list of politicians, officials and staff that you need to consider if you're serious about lobbying defence.

 Welcome to Season 2 of Indefensible New Zealand - the podcast all about New Zealand's national security. In this episode, Dr Simon Ewing-Jarvie discusses the post-election situation for defence. At the time of recording, the new coalition government parties are still negotiating and it is not yet known who will be the Minister of Defence and Veterans. 

Welcome to the final episode of season 1. This is the third part of our discussion about defending New Zealand against an invading force that is intent on occupying our land. In episode 8, I took a red team view of how New Zealand might be attacked. That was followed in the next two episodes with a long-range defence without the involvement of allies and a discussion about how New Zealand could be made ‘not worth the cost’ of coming too close. Now it’s time to consider the worst case, that our arch enemy, Buranda, has landed forces on our shores.
The reasons why New Zealand might be directly and conventionally attacked are many including resources, access to Antarctica and regime change to undermine western alliances. Traditionally, the writers of defence assessments include something in their analysis stating that ‘New Zealand is unlikely to face direct attack.’ This is a very convenient and, quite frankly, lazy way of putting tough decisions in the ‘nothing to see here basket.’
There are a range of possible scenarios but I’ve selected one for the purpose of the podcast.
Buranda has established a forward operating base on the Chatham Islands. This began with a commercial joint fishing venture with locals. The development of wharves and airfield was welcomed by Chatham Islanders who had seen little infrastructure investment from New Zealand. The Burandan Investment and Development Bank also built a new school, hotel, fire and police station. It also took a majority shareholding in Air Chathams which saw a fleet of modern mid-sized aircraft and several medium utility helicopters enter service.
While there were critics, Buranda had done nothing illegal. They claimed that they were just there to trade. The Burandan Blue Pacific Fishing Company openly supported a range of candidates in the 2025 local body elections. They were all successful. To celebrate the victory, the Republic of Buranda Navy proposed to send a warship to the Chathams to host a party for the Mayor and Council. The New Zealand government declined but the guided missile destroyer RBS Juu Wewe sailed there anyway together with the replenishment ship RBS Siku Za Furaha.  There was little that New Zealand could do as the country lacked the capability to even approach the Chathams. Allies encouraged a diplomatic solution. Meanwhile, the Chatham Islands seceded to become an independent administration zone under the Republic of Buranda. A rapid build-up of Burandan military assets quickly followed. When conflict flared soon after in the South China Sea, Buranda made its move.

Would New Zealanders really put up a fight or would they allow themselves to be occupied?
Hopefully we will never know but it is useful to consider in advance what sort of resistance could realistically be offered.
This episode is published on 28 October which is the national commemoration day for the New Zealand Wars. These clashes between Maori and British troops took place in various parts of NZ from the early 1840s to mid 1870s. Right now, most Kiwis know more about overseas wars than those that took place in their own country. There is much to learn in studying them. Just google “New Zealand Wars” to find plenty of resources.