Voice for CHOICE (China Observers in Central and Eastern Europe‪)‬ Filip Sebok

In October 2023, The European Commission launched an anti-subsidy investigation into the imports of Chinese battery electric vehicles. Furthermore, the commission has instructed customs authorities to start registering the import of electric vehicles from China so that the EU could impose retroactive tariffs. As the decision day on whether to impose definitive duties approaches, Beijing becomes increasingly agitated. Meanwhile, Chinese carmakers BYD and Geely-owned Volvo are ramping up investments in electric vehicle (EV) production across Central Europe, with other companies likely to follow suit. While these investments are generally welcomed by local governments, they are viewed by some as posing additional risks to the European automotive industry.

This month’s guest


Gregor Sebastian, Senior Analyst at Rhodium Group.

Show notes


Ain’t No Duty High Enough
Pole Position: Chinese EV Investments Boom Amid Growing Political Backlash
Tipping Point? Germany and China in an Era of Zero-Sum Competition

In early May, Chinese President Xi Jinping made a state visit to France to celebrate the 60th anniversary of diplomatic relations between China and France. This visit, his first to Europe since the pandemic began, occurred against the backdrop of the EU investigation into Chinese electric vehicle exports and Beijing’s retaliatory probe into imports of French-made brandy. Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission, participated in the tripartite meeting, adding a European dimension to the discussions. The leaders jointly urged Xi to tackle issues related to China’s overcapacity in electric vehicles and green technologies and addressed the issue of China’s export of dual-use technologies to Russia. Despite raising these concerns, the two sides concluded 32 agreements during the visit. Xi then continued his European tour to Serbia and Hungary, where he sought to strengthen ties, a move perceived by some as an attempt to create divisions within Europe.

This month’s guest


Abigaël Vasselier, Director Policy & European Affairs/Head of Program Foreign Relations at Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS).

Show notes


⁠China’s Missing Offer to Europe ahead of the EU-China Summit
“Sur la Russie, le message de Xi Jinping à l’Occident est très clair”

While it is true that China has served as a crucial economic support for Russia during the war in Ukraine, it has not fully compensated for the decline in Russian export revenue from the EU. Beijing has supplied Moscow with dual-use goods and technology but there has been no direct provision of lethal military equipment from China to Russia, as the Chinese government and businesses are wary of triggering Western secondary sanctions and losing access to the European market. Thus, It is unlikely that the Chinese government and defense companies will substantially support Russia with heavy weaponry and ammunition in its ongoing conflict against Ukraine. One reason for China holding back is the nuanced and cautious attitude of its foreign policy elites on Russia’s war.

This month’s guest


Dr Thomas Eder, Visiting Fellow at China Observers in Central and Eastern Europe (CHOICE), Post-Doc Researcher at the Austrian Institute for International Affairs (oiip).

Show notes


⁠Will China Save Russia’s Military in 2023? – Chinese Expert Debates on China-Russia Relations and the Long War in Ukraine⁠
⁠Chinese Approaches to the Eastern Neighborhood⁠
⁠Moscow’s Failed Pivot to China⁠
⁠China-Russia Relations in Central Asia

In the past few years, Hungary has seen a surge in new investments from Chinese companies in the EV industry. Chinese battery and EV makers have been attracted by the favorable political climate and generous state support. Additionally, Hungary and China have been working towards closer collaboration in the areas of policing and security. During a recent visit by China's Minister of Public Security, Wang Xiaohong, the two countries signed a series of agreements aimed at improving cooperation in these areas. This will allow Chinese police to patrol alongside Hungarian police on Hungarian soil. As a result of these developments, Hungary is increasingly becoming a hub of Chinese influence in the region. In the past, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has been accused of acting as a trojan horse for China within the EU, as he has opposed measures aimed at China. With Hungary's growing dependency on China, this trend is likely to continue.

This month’s guest

Szabolcs Panyi, Investigative Editor at the VSquare Project.

Show notes


Goulas: Tales of Spying, Smuggling, and Chinese Influence
Hungary Could Turn into China's Trojan Horse in Europe


The Fight Over Fudan: A Chinese University in Budapest Sparks Reckoning for Sino-Hungarian Relations

In January 2024, the European Commission revealed five new initiatives aimed at advancing the implementation of its Economic Security Strategy, which was formally introduced in the summer of the previous year. The proposal seeks to tighten inbound investment screening rules and create greater export control conformity within the EU. With regard to outbound investment screening, which is the most controversial issue of the package, the Commission remains relatively sober. The strategy calls for a risk assessment of outbound investment and related security issues through a public consultation process. The package puts a strong focus on research security. However, there is little that can be done at the EU level since the competencies are mainly spread among national, sub-national, and institutional levels in the Member States. While the package aims to scale up dual-use and advanced research, it lacks a financial strategy to strengthen the bloc’s technological and industrial capabilities.

This month’s guest

Tobias Gehrke, Senior Policy Fellow at the Global European Council on Foreign Relations.

Show notes


A maker, not a taker: Why Europe needs an economic security mechanism


The power of control: How the EU can shape the new era of strategic export restrictions
High-voltage trade: How Europe should fight the electric vehicle wars
Missing money: Why Europe’s economic security requires a critical technology investment plan
Strategy and risk: How to make the Green Deal Industrial Plan a geoeconomic success

Despite Beijing’s attempts to influence the elections, Taiwan’s commitment to democracy has prevailed, and the people of Taiwan elected their new leader last week. William Lai, from the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), emerged victorious in the recent presidential race. This result is likely to sustain the status quo in cross-strait relations, characterized by continued tensions and limited dialogue. Beijing’s reaction to the elections has been relatively muted compared to the massive incursions following US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in 2022. However, Nauru’s announcement to sever ties with Taiwan and establish relations with Beijing came as a surprise to many. Taiwan is grappling with diminishing international recognition, struggling to keep pace with China’s dollar diplomacy. The question now is whether Taiwan can offset these losses by expanding unofficial relations with like-minded countries.

This month’s guest

Michael Mazza, Senior Director at the Project 2049 Institute and Senior Non-resident Fellow at the Global Taiwan Institute.

Show notes


Taiwan keeps choosing democracy — and rejecting China
The Axis of Disorder: How Russia, Iran, and China Want to Remake the World
The Wrong Way to Lower Tensions in the Taiwan Strait