Navigating the Vortex

Lucy P. Marcus & Stefan Wolff
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  • POLITICS
  • UPDATED WEEKLY

We live in a complex and ever-changing world. To navigate the vortex we must adapt to change quickly, think critically, and make sound decisions. Lucy Marcus & Stefan Wolff talk about business, politics, society, culture, and what it all means. www.navigatingthevortex.com

  1. 1 DAY AGO

    The five problems with Trump's latest Ukraine peace plan that will only prolong the war

    In a surprise announcement on February 10, Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky, said that his administration was preparing to hold presidential elections in Ukraine before the middle of May. Alongside the elections, a referendum on a peace deal with Russia is also likely to be held. This is a dramatic shift in Zelensky’s stance: the president had long resisted elections under conditions of war despite the fact that his mandate ran out in 2024. One possible explanation for the turn-around is that US pressure on Ukraine is having some real effects now. A few days ago, Zelensky himself indicated as much, saying that his US counterpart, Donald Trump, was pushing for a negotiated end to the war by June. Trump’s timeline — probably with an eye towards mid-term elections in the US where the White House would like to present a Ukraine deal as another major foreign-policy success — is one thing. The feasibility of elections and even more so of a peace deal between Russia and Ukraine is quite another one. In fact, there are so many uncertainties about both that whatever plan Trump’s team around Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner has dreamed up will very likely unravel very quickly. The first problem is all about the logistics of the elections. Who will be eligible to vote and where, and who might monitor the elections to ensure that they are free and fair? Apart from the hundreds of thousands serving in the trenches defending Ukraine against Russia’s aggression, there are also 3.7 million internally displaced Ukrainians and almost 6 million refugees abroad. And then there are the approximately 5 million Ukrainians currently living under Russian occupation. Add to this the uncertainty over a Russian ceasefire to facilitate not only the conduct of the elections themselves but also of a free and fair election campaign, and the prospects of organising any vote, let alone one of such consequence for the country and its people, look worse than daunting. In addition, there is the near-certainty of large-scale Russian election interference, similar to what Moldova experienced during its presidential elections and European integration referendum in 2024, and again during parliamentary elections in 2025. Russian attempts to influence the outcomes of all of these votes in Moldova were shown to have clear limitations, but this will not deter Russia from trying again, and harder, in Ukraine. A second problem is the feasibility of any peace deal between Russia and Ukraine. At present, it is hard to imagine that the gaps between Russia and Ukraine can be bridged in a meaningful way that does not cross either side’s red lines — especially on territory and on security guarantees. And even if it were possible to find a form of words to which the Russian and Ukrainian presidents could both sign up, the third problem is the approval of any such deal in a referendum in Ukraine. Likely to be held on the same day as the presidential elections, a referendum would face all the same logistical pressures. What is more, the question of who would be eligible to cast their vote would be even more acute. How legal and legitimate would the result be if large numbers of eligible people were not able to participate? This will be a particularly challenging question for those Ukrainians who currently live under Russian occupation. Their fate would most likely be determined in a referendum in which they had no say. Nor is it clear what would happen if a majority of Ukrainians rejected the settlement put to them in the referendum. Would it mean a return to negotiations? Possibly. Or an immediate resumption of the war? Probably. A third option would be the continuation of a shaky ceasefire and the implementation of parts of any settlement beneficial to both sides, such as prisoner exchanges. As was the case with the ill-fated Minsk agreements of 2014 and 2015, a return to all-out war, however, would remain firmly in the cards. So far, Ukraine’s European partners have mostly been on the sidelines of negotiations. They may not be a direct party to the war, but they clearly have a stake in the peace terms that might now be hammered out between Moscow, Kyiv and Washington. The mostly European coalition of the willing is expected to play a key role in the implementation of American-backed security guarantees and to do the heavy lifting on Ukraine’s post-war reconstruction. After more than 12 months of hostility from Washington towards Brussels, there is little trust left in the dependability of US backing for Ukraine. The fourth problem, therefore, is that European acquiescence to a US-imposed peace deal cannot anymore be taken for granted. This does not necessarily mean that a deal is impossible, but it will almost certainly be so without Europe having played a part in its negotiation. The French president, Emmanuel Macron, recently dispatched a senior diplomat to Moscow for talks in the Kremlin. And the country’s former permanent representative on the UN Security Council, Nicolas de Rivière, has been appointed as the new French ambassador to Moscow. This clearly signals the importance that Paris assigns to direct contacts with Russia. The EU, according to its foreign policy chief, Kaja Kallas, might also appoint a special representative for contacts with Moscow — but of course only after the bloc has agreed on the messages it wants to send, which could take some time. But despite the fact that Brussels holds some powerful cards, including frozen Russian assets and a wide range of sanctions, there is no indication for now that either Washington or Moscow are willing to grant the EU a seat at the table. The fifth and final problem is whether Russia will accept even the best possible terms in a peace agreement and stick to it. The US push to seal a deal in the coming months suggests that there is some confidence in the White House that a deal acceptable to the Kremlin can be forged and that Ukraine and its allies can be coerced into going along with it. There is a lot in what has transpired over the last few days that will be much to the liking of Russia’s president, Vladimir Putin: the promise of presidential elections in Ukraine, the US using its support for security guarantees as leverage to push Kyiv towards accepting more and more compromises, and the parallel US-Russia negotiations on an economic deal. Putin has got to this situation without making any concessions. He has played his US counterpart perfectly so far, and there is no indication that he is done playing him. Trump is almost certain to continue to do Putin’s bidding. If and when his grandiose plan unravels, he is more likely to walk away than to put pressure on the Russian president. It is not clear what the back-up plan is for Zelensky and his European allies. Given that there is little to suggest that the current American plan and timeline for a deal will lead to a happy ending, they need to come up with, and act on, credible contingencies very soon. Offering logistically almost impossible elections and a referendum with a highly uncertain outcome would be a smart way for the Ukrainian president and his European allies to buy themselves the time they need for a new strategy. Putin may think that he has successfully tricked Trump into doing his bidding. But on this occasion, Zelensky may have outsmarted them both, albeit at the price of the war against his country continuing. An earlier version of this analysis was published by The Conversation on February 12, 2026. We hope you’ll share Navigating the Vortex with anyone you think might find it of interest. Also, you can listen to our podcast editions via the website and on all major podcast platforms, including: Apple Podcasts Spotify Amazon/Audible This Substack is reader-supported. To receive new posts and support our work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. Get full access to Navigating the Vortex at www.navigatingthevortex.com/subscribe

    8 min

  2. 5 FEB

    Farcical peace talks continue in Abu Dhabi as Russia tries to bomb and freeze Ukraine into submission

    Russia, Ukraine and the US have met for a second time in as many weeks to discuss a possible cessation of hostilities. The meeting got off to the same familiar and depressing start as the first one: on February 3, the night before the three sides gathered in Abu Dhabi, Russia launched a massive barrage of 521 drones and cruise missiles, once again targeting critical civilian infrastructure in Ukrainian cities, including the capital, Kyiv. And while the talks were in full swing, Russia followed up on its nighttime strikes by deploying cluster munitions against a market in Druzhkivka, one of the embattled cities in what remains of Ukraine’s fortress belt in the Donetsk region. This was clearly not the most auspicious start to talks aimed at stopping the fighting that has now lasted almost four years. Add to that the fact that the basic negotiating positions of Moscow and Kyiv remain as far apart as ever, and any hopes for an imminent breakthrough to peace in Ukraine quickly evaporate. The more technical discussions on military issues, including specifics of a ceasefire and how it would be monitored, appear to be generally more constructive. Apart from a prisoner exchange, however, no further agreement was reached. But even such small confidence-building steps are useful. And even where no deal is feasible for now, identifying likely issues and mapping solutions that are potentially acceptable to both Moscow and Kyiv is important preparatory work for a future settlement. Without a breakthrough on political issues, however, it does not get the conflict parties closer to a peace deal. These political issues remain centred on the question of territory. The Kremlin insists on the so-called “Anchorage formula” according to which Ukraine withdraws from those areas of Donetsk it still controls and Russia agrees to freezing the frontlines elsewhere. Kyiv has repeatedly made clear that this is unacceptable. US mediation efforts, to date, have been unable to break the resulting deadlock. The political impasse, however, clearly extends beyond territory. Without naming any specific blockages to a deal, Yury Ushakov, a key advisor to the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, recently noted that there were other contested issues holding up agreement. Very likely among them are the security guarantees that Ukraine has been demanding to make sure that Russia will not renege on a settlement. These future security guarantees appear to have been agreed between Kyiv and its European and American partners. They involve a gradually escalating response to Russian ceasefire violations, ultimately leading to direct European and US military involvement. The Kremlin’s opposition to such an arrangement is hardly surprising. But it casts further doubt on how sincere Putin is about a durable peace agreement with Ukraine. In turn, it explains Kyiv’s reluctance to make any concessions, let alone those on the current scale of Russian demands. What complicates these discussions further is the fact that the US is linking the provision of security guarantees for Kyiv to Ukrainian concessions on territory along the lines of the Moscow-endorsed Anchorage formula. This might seem a sensible and fair compromise, but there are some obvious problems with it. First, it relies on the dependability of the US as an ultimate security backstop. But confidence, especially in Kyiv and other European capitals, in how dependable US pledges actually are, has been severely eroded during the first 12 months of Donald Trump’s second term in the White House. Second, Europe is moving painfully slowly to fill this confidence gap and the additional void left by the US decision to halt funding to Ukraine. The details of a €90 billion loan agreed in principle by EU leaders in December, have only just been finalised. It will take yet more time for money to be available and to be used, including for essential arms purchases for Kyiv. Doubts — as voiced by Nato secretary-general, Mark Rutte — also persist about whether, even in the long term, Europe will be able to develop sufficient and sufficiently independent military capabilities outside the transatlantic alliance. As a result, there are few incentives for Kyiv to bow to US pressure and give up more territory to Russia in exchange for security guarantees that may not be as ironclad in reality as they appear on paper. Likewise, it makes little sense for Moscow to agree even to a hypothetical western security guarantee for Ukraine, which could thwart future Russian expansionism, in exchange for territory that the Kremlin remains confident it can take by force if necessary. Russia will feel further reassured in its assumption that it can outlast Ukraine on the battlefield and at the negotiation table by developments in both Washington and Beijing. In the US capital, there is still no progress on a new sanctions bill which has been languishing in the US senate since last spring, and which was allegedly “greenlit” by the White House four weeks ago. In addition, Trump’s top Ukraine negotiators — Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner — are now also engaged in negotiations with Iran. This further diminishes already sparse American diplomatic capacity and the ability to devote the time, resources and dogged determination likely required to pull off a deal between Russia and Ukraine. Following Xi Jinping’s public affirmation of Chinese support for Russia in a video call between the two countries’ presidents on the anniversary of the declaration of their “no-limits partnership” in February 2022, Putin is unlikely to feel any real pressure to change his position from Beijing either. With Russia’s intransigence thus reinforced and Ukrainian fears to be sold down the river by one of its key allies further entrenched, any claims of progress in the negotiations in Abu Dhabi are therefore at best over-optimistic and at worst self-deluding. Given that such claims currently come prominently from Putin’s envoy Kirill Dmitriev, this once more underscores that US mediation between Russia and Ukraine serves the primary purpose of restoring economic relations between Moscow and Washington. Like Kushner and Witkoff, and ultimately Trump himself, Dmitriev is first and foremost a businessman. This parallel track of Russia-US economic talks explains Trump’s reluctance to put any meaningful pressure on Moscow. More importantly, however, it also betrays the deep irony of the US approach to ending the war. As Europe painfully learned over more than two decades of engagement with Putin’s Russia, economic integration does not curb the Kremlin’s expansionism. It enables it. An earlier version of this analysis was published by The Conversation on February 5, 2026. We hope you’ll share Navigating the Vortex with anyone you think might find it of interest. Also, you can listen to our podcast editions via the website and on all major podcast platforms, including: Apple Podcasts Spotify Amazon/Audible This Substack is reader-supported. To receive new posts and support our work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. Get full access to Navigating the Vortex at www.navigatingthevortex.com/subscribe

    7 min

  3. 27 JAN

    Talks to end the Ukraine war keep hitting the same wall

    The first official and direct three-way talks between the United States, Russia and Ukraine since the beginning of Moscow’s full-scale invasion in February 2022 had been a rare sign of progress in an otherwise bleak start to the new year. But they ended without a breakthrough on January 24, with follow-up discussions before too long likely, but not certain. It is hardly surprising that a peace agreement continues to elude the negotiators and mediators. The fundamental disagreement between Moscow and Kyiv over the status of territory remains. Russia formally annexed four regions of Ukraine in September 2022 — in addition to the Crimean peninsula which it has occupied illegally since 2014 — but still does not fully control them after nearly four years of fighting. Russian President Vladimir Putin appears convinced that his troops will eventually be able to capture the remaining Kyiv-controlled parts of the Donetsk region — some 5,000 square kilometres — just as they have done with almost all of the neighbouring region of Luhansk. At the current rate of Russia’s military progress, this could easily take another year; so Mr Putin would likely prefer to get his Ukrainian counterpart, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, to withdraw his forces. Mr Zelenskyy rejects the idea of giving up any territory that Russia has not been able to take by force — not least because there is no guarantee that the Kremlin would stop there. Ukrainian public opinion is largely behind him on this. In addition, the Ukrainian president cannot simply give away territory on his own. The Ukrainian constitution requires that any such deal be approved in a referendum. More important still are strategic considerations. Those areas in the Donbas that Ukrainian forces still hold are part of the country’s best developed defensive lines, including several so-called fortress cities. Handing these over would leave Kyiv much more exposed in the future and give Moscow an improved staging ground for renewed offensives. This makes an agreement on post-war security guarantees all the more crucial for Ukraine. After meeting with his American counterpart, Donald Trump, at the World Economic Forum in Davos just a day before the talks in Abu Dhabi, Mr Zelenskyy said that an agreement on security guarantees from the United States had been finalised. That may be so, but it has not been officially signed as yet, making any Ukrainian concessions even more risky. As a result of their respective calculations, neither side appears to be willing to budge. All of this should be fairly obvious to any mediator, and it is hard to see how the American team, led by Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, can be blind to these facts. If they were hoping to apply pressure on either or both sides to make concessions, their strategy has not, for now, worked. Even in the chaotic foreign policy process of the current administration in the White House, it seems clear that American pressure on Russia is unlikely to be forthcoming in any meaningful way — and the Kremlin appears acutely aware of this. Mr Putin’s spokesman, Dmitry Peskov, made it very plain before the start of the trilateral discussions in Abu Dhabi on Friday that Russia’s demand for full control of the Donbas remained in place. Overnight, Russia then carried out another devastating strike against Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, which is already teetering on the brink of collapse. In addition, Russia continues to frame its current ‘offer’ to freeze the frontlines in Kherson and Zaporizhzhia in exchange for full control of Donetsk as the “Anchorage formula”, a term the Kremlin uses to refer to the agreement that Mr Putin and Mr Trump apparently struck at their summit in Alaska last August. By couching its territorial demands in terms of the “Anchorage formula”, Moscow tries to establish a fait accompli that gives the impression of a properly negotiated deal, and crucially one agreed by the American president. It flatters the dealmaker in Mr Trump, presents a potentially significant win for Mr Putin, and casts Mr Zelenskyy in the light of the unreasonable spoiler if he rejects an ‘agreement’ he had no part in negotiating. These are not the signals of good-faith negotiations. After more than a year of so far fruitless efforts, Mr Trump’s team also still does not seem to understand that pressure on Kyiv alone is not going to get them, or anyone else, closer to a deal. US support remains important for Ukraine and gives Washington leverage over Mr Zelenskyy, but it is no longer the only game in town. Mr Zelenskyy’s European partners remain steadfast in their backing and are picking up their game, albeit only slowly. The fact that Europe stayed united and faced Mr Trump down over his threats to annex Greenland — if need be, by force — will also weigh positively in Mr Zelenskyy’s calculations. With an even deeper rupture in the transatlantic alliance avoided for now, Europe will be both less distracted by threats from America and more focused on becoming strategically independent from its erstwhile senior partner in Washington. It is also not entirely clear that American mediators would be ready for an actual deal between Russia and Ukraine. The agreement on American security guarantees Mr Zelenskyy spoke of after meeting Mr Trump in Davos still requires the leaders to sign on the dotted line. Given the way in which Mr Trump has treated America’s hitherto closest allies just over the past few weeks, one might wonder how much American security guarantees can really still be relied upon. A deal on rebuilding Ukraine in the event of a peace agreement is also nowhere near in sight. Moscow balks at the idea of paying reparations to Kyiv and instead suggested that some US$5 billion worth of its assets that are currently frozen in the United States should be used for the reconstruction of the Ukrainian territories that the Kremlin has illegally occupied. This is clearly a non-starter for Kyiv and Brussels alike. The fact that all sides agreed in Abu Dhabi that they will continue their discussions is undoubtedly positive. But whether this implies that an actual negotiation process will now get under way and what its format and direction will be, no one knows. And thus, as Ukrainians continue to suffer through a very harsh winter, a ceasefire, let alone a peace agreement, seem as out of reach as ever. An earlier version of this analysis was published by Channel News Asia on January 27, 2026. We hope you’ll share Navigating the Vortex with anyone you think might find it of interest. Also, you can listen to our podcast editions via the website and on all major podcast platforms, including: Apple Podcasts Spotify Amazon/Audible This Substack is reader-supported. To receive new posts and support our work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. Get full access to Navigating the Vortex at www.navigatingthevortex.com/subscribe

    7 min

  4. 26 JAN

    Trump's performance at Davos underscored America's diminishing trustworthiness and dependability

    The week that marked the first anniversary of Donald Trump’s return to the White House for a second term as US president was particularly turbulent, even by his standards and especially for the transatlantic alliance. If there was even a hint of Trump being capable of self-reflection, one could add that it was a rather embarrassing week for him — on at least three counts. First, after much bluster about Greenland, including hints that if push came to shove he would authorise a military operation to get his hands on territory of long-standing Nato ally Denmark, Trump made a first climb-down and ruled out the use of force in his speech at the World Economic Forum in Davos on Wednesday. He also dropped the threat of imposing tariffs on the eight European Nato members who dispatched a small number of military personnel to Greenland in a highly symbolic show of support. Second, and contrary to earlier pronouncements that the American security guarantee for Europe was conditional on allies’ financial contributions to Nato, he insisted that the US would always be there for its Nato allies. But, as is usually the case with Trump, it was one step forward, two steps back as he cast doubt on them reciprocating in an American hour of need. Worse still, in a subsequent interview with Fox News, he denigrated the sacrifices of allied servicemen and women in Afghanistan, prompting a chorus of justified outrage from across the alliance. After a phone call with the British prime minister, Keir Starmer, on Saturday, and an expression of concern in a message conveyed “through backchannels” from King Charles III, Trump changed his tune. He did not exactly apologise, but he used his TruthSocial platform to praise the bravery and sacrifices of British soldiers in Afghanistan. No other Nato ally has received even that acknowledgement yet. Third, by the end of the week we were also reminded that progress on one of Trump’s flagship projects — making peace between Russia and Ukraine — is as elusive as ever. The US president appeared to have had a constructive meeting with his Ukrainian counterpart, Volodymyr Zelensky, in Davos. But a much-touted agreement on US security guarantees has not been officially signed yet. And no progress has been made either on a deal for Ukraine’s post-war reconstruction. Two rounds of talks between Russian and Ukrainian negotiators in Abu Dhabi over the weekend failed to produce any concrete results apart from an agreement to meet again the following weekend. While Trump’s mediators tried, unsuccessfully, to push Moscow and Kyiv to compromise over the future of Ukrainian territory claimed but not controlled by Russia, the Kremlin’s relentless air and ground campaigns continued unabated — to bomb Ukraine into submission now and increase the costs for its post-war reconstruction later. Contrary to how swiftly he threatened the imposition of tariffs on supposed allies for sending a few dozen soldiers to Greenland, Trump failed, yet again, to get tough on Putin. There is still no sign of a vote on a bipartisan sanctions bill which Trump allegedly greenlit in early January. The bill, in the making since the spring, aims to cripple Russia’s ability to finance its war against Ukraine and “to provide sustainable levels of security assistance to Ukraine to provide a credible defensive and deterrent capability.” One could, therefore, argue that it was a bad week for Trump and a much better week for the rest of the western alliance. After all, Nato is still intact. Europe seems to have discovered more of a backbone and, perhaps more importantly, that pushing back against Trump is not futile. The US president has neither abandoned Zelensky nor walked away from mediating between Russia and Ukraine. And Trump might soon get distracted by plans for regime change in Cuba or Iran, preventing him from wreaking any more havoc in Europe. But such a view underestimates both the damage already done to relations with the US and that yet to come. Consider the issue of Greenland. Trump’s concession to renounce the use of force was, at best, only a partial climb-down. Throughout his speech, Trump reiterated several times that he still wants “right, title and ownership” of Greenland. And as it’s not at all clear what his framework deal actually entails, his closing comments on Greenland included an unambiguous warning to other Nato members that they can “say ‘yes‘ and we will be very appreciative, or ... ‘no’ and we will remember.” There is already, it seems, some advance remembering happening in Trump’s renamed Department of War, which released its new national defence strategy on Friday night. According to the document, the Pentagon will provide Trump “with credible options to guarantee U.S. military and commercial access to key terrain from the Arctic to South America, especially Greenland, the Gulf of America, and the Panama Canal.” On Nato, Trump’s ambivalence towards the alliance goes deeper than his most recent comments. Critically, it is the casual nature with which Trump treats this core pillar of international security that has fundamentally undermined the trustworthiness of the US as a dependable partner. Combined with the efforts to set up his board of peace as an alternative to the UN, there can be little doubt left that the US president has his sights trained on the very institutions that Washington spent decades building. When it comes to Ukraine, meanwhile, it seems that Trump uses the promise of signing the agreement on security guarantees to get Zelensky to make concessions on territory that Russia’s president Putin can bank — before balking at any security guarantees. Trump, judging by past performance, is then likely to water down what he apparently agreed now in order not to jeopardise a deal with Putin and Zelensky is, yet again, left in the cold. For Trump, ending the war more and more seems primarily as a way to enable future business deals with Russia, even if it means sacrificing 20% of Ukrainian territory and the long-term security of European allies in the process. The conclusion for European capitals to draw from a week high drama should not be that Trump and the relationship with the US can be managed with a new approach that adds a dose of push-back to the usual flattery and supplication. After one year of Trump 2.0, America-first has become America-only, and Europe and its few scattered allies elsewhere need to start acting as if they were alone in a hostile world. Because they are. An earlier version of this analysis was published by The Conversation on January 26, 2026. We hope you’ll share Navigating the Vortex with anyone you think might find it of interest. Also, you can listen to our podcast editions via the website and on all major podcast platforms, including: Apple Podcasts Spotify Amazon/Audible This Substack is reader-supported. To receive new posts and support our work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. Get full access to Navigating the Vortex at www.navigatingthevortex.com/subscribe

    7 min

  5. 25 JAN

    Europe's push-back over Greenland forced a Trump climb-down — for now.

    Even before marking the first anniversary of his return to the White House, United States President Donald Trump doubled down on his controversial and highly damaging bid to take over Greenland, warning on January 19 that being snubbed for the Nobel peace prize last year has made him no longer obliged to think “purely of peace”. Three days later, during a speech at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Mr Trump backed down — somewhat — and ruled out the use of force in his pursuit of the world’s largest island. It was a climbdown of sorts, even perhaps mildly embarrassing for the US president, and not the first time that a combination of push-back from Congress and NATO allies together with an adverse market reaction made him change course. So, how did we get there and is this the end of the Greenland saga? Buoyed by what he clearly saw as a successful military operation in Venezuela and the subsequent apprehension of a Russian-flagged oil tanker in the North Atlantic, the US president seemed determined to annex Greenland — a move he has claimed is essential to US national security — no matter the consequences. And these consequences were beginning to look more serious than ever. A meeting of officials from the US, Denmark and Greenland on January 14 had failed to reach any breakthrough. The following day, several European countries deployed small contingents of their armed forces to Greenland, an autonomous territory of NATO and EU member Denmark. The public message attached to this was that the Europeans were serious about their commitment to Arctic security — allegedly one of Mr Trump’s key concerns. But combined with combative rhetoric about Danish sovereignty and Greenlandic self-determination, Europe also sent a message to Mr Trump that he had crossed a line that could and would no longer be ignored. Europe’s tougher stance on Greenland’s future did not mean that war between the US and its erstwhile European NATO allies was imminent or that the end of the transatlantic alliance was nearing, although the latter suddenly seemed a much more realistic possibility. Trump’s initial response to this European escalation — as he must have perceived it —was threatening to impose an additional 10 per cent levy on all goods imported from the eight European countries that he saw as the main obstacle between him and his ambitions in Greenland. These new tariffs were to take effect on February 1, before an increase to 25 per cent in June. The European response, at least rhetorically, was swift and clear: Europe will not be blackmailed. Even Italy’s leader, Giorgia Meloni, who is relatively close to Mr Trump, said the tariffs “would be a mistake”. What it lacks in military heft, the European Union makes up in economic leverage, and in a potential trade war, the EU would definitely be a more formidable opponent for Mr Trump. It still has some €93 billion worth of tariffs on US goods at the ready which Brussels drew up in response to Mr Trump’s so-called “Liberation Day” tariffs last April. The EU took a pause on the implementation of these retaliatory tariffs when it managed to iron out a trade deal with the US last August. That six-month pause is running out on February 7. Unless there is a vote to extend the moratorium on their implementation, they will automatically come into force. This is an important consideration for both Brussels and Washington: it removes the threat of Mr Trump’s European allies, like Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orban, blocking their extension. An EU retaliation could quickly lead to an escalating tariff war. Given European dependence on the US for exports and imports of US-made weapons, Mr Trump, in all likelihood, has escalation dominance in a transatlantic trade war. This could then force the EU to deploy its ultimate trade weapon or the “big bazooka” — the so-called anti-coercion instrument. Initially devised to deal with China, the powerful but never-before-used instrument gives the European Commission powers in various areas, including restricting US access to EU public contracts, investment and even trade in services, one of the few areas where the US runs a surplus. Brussels might have had stronger cards in an economic war with the US, but if push came to shove, it would probably still have lost. But a win for Washington would also have come at a high cost for the US, never mind the irreparable damage to the West as we know it. So, given these likely and unpleasant outcomes, why was Europe pushing back so hard, and why now? First, it seemed clear that the strategy of flattering and placating Mr Trump had reached its use-by date. Europe is unlikely to be able to prevent a determined American president from taking Greenland, but it clearly also no longer wanted to pretend that these were just cultural misunderstandings among friends that could be magically fixed. Second, part of the European strategy was playing for time. Mr Trump is keen on Greenland now, but who is to say that he might not think of an easier win elsewhere that would be less controversial domestically, say taking on cartels in Colombia or Mexico, or pushing for regime change in Cuba or Iran? The closer the US gets to the mid-term elections in November, the more Mr Trump, and key parts of the MAGA establishment, will want to avoid debates that are difficult to sell as “America First”. Third, still with at least half an eye on the US mid-term elections, the thinking in Brussels very likely also was that time that Europe buys itself and Greenland now is also time that will help already obvious bipartisan opposition to Mr Trump’s annexation plans in the US Congress to become more effective. Ultimately, it seemed likely that a case could be made that any security concerns regarding Greenland are best dealt with through NATO, while the consequences for the US for going it alone — including paralysis, if not the outright dismantling of the transatlantic alliance — would harm America in its competition with China and severely limit its ability to project power outside the Western Hemisphere. These calculations appear to have borne fruit. By the end of Mr Trump’s anniversary week, the threat of a military operation to take over Greenland was off the table and the idea of imposing tariffs on European NATO allies had been abandoned. But what has crucially not been abandoned is Mr Trump’s desire to get his way on Greenland. He still wants “right, title and ownership” of Greenland, warning NATO members in his speech at the World Economic Forum in Davos that they can “say ‘yes‘ and we will be very appreciative, or ... ‘no’ and we will remember.” Europeans should also take note that the new national defence strategy of the US, released late on Friday night, commits the Pentagon to provide Mr Trump “with credible options to guarantee U.S. military and commercial access to key terrain from the Arctic to South America, especially Greenland, the Gulf of America, and the Panama Canal.” European pushback against Mr Trump’s obsession with Greenland has produced some positive results for now. It is not clear how long they will last, let alone whether Europe has done enough to persuade Mr Trump to change course permanently and look for other ways to deal with a shared north Atlantic security concern. If nothing else, having discovered some spine in dealing with Mr Trump pushes Europe further down the line of learning to stand — and walk — on its own feet. And a more formidable European ally might suddenly look more alluring again to Mr Trump or whoever succeeds him in the White House in 2029. An earlier version of this analysis was published by Channel News Asia on January 21, 2026. We hope you’ll share Navigating the Vortex with anyone you think might find it of interest. Also, you can listen to our podcast editions via the website and on all major podcast platforms, including: Apple Podcasts Spotify Amazon/Audible This Substack is reader-supported. To receive new posts and support our work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. Get full access to Navigating the Vortex at www.navigatingthevortex.com/subscribe

    8 min

  6. 21 JAN

    A privatised United Nations with a single shareholder

    It is hard to believe that Donald Trump has only been back in the White House for a year. His accomplishments are many — but most of them are of questionable durability or benefit, including for the United States. Even his UN-endorsed 20-point ceasefire and transition plan for Gaza released on September 29, 2025, is now in danger of being subsumed in yet another grandiose fantasy of the American president: the so-called “board of peace” to be chaired by Trump. This group of international dignitaries was originally intended to oversee the work of a more technical committee, comprising technocrats responsible for the day-to-day recovery and rebuilding of Gaza. But the board of peace’s charter makes no mention of Gaza at all. Instead, its opening sentence declares that “durable peace requires pragmatic judgment, common-sense solutions, and the courage to depart from approaches and institutions that have too often failed”. To make this break with such an unseemly past, the board of peace proclaims itself to be “an international organization” to “secure enduring peace in areas affected or threatened by conflict” and commits to conducting its operations “in accordance with international law”. To which the immediate reaction is that unilateralism is increasingly the hallmark of Trump’s second administration. Settling conflicts is the prerogative of the UN. And, over the past year, the US has shown itself to be unconcerned about international law. Membership of the board is by invitation from the chairman: Donald Trump — who has broad and flexible discretion on how long he will serve for and who will replace him when he does decide to go. Those invited can join for free for three years and buy themselves a permanent seat at the table for US$1 billion (£740 million) — in cash, payable in the first year. With Trump retaining significant power over the direction of the board and many of its decisions it is not clear what US$1 billion would exactly buy the permanent members of the board — except perhaps a chance to ingratiate themselves with Trump. There is no question that established institutions have often failed to achieve durable peace. Among such institutions, the UN has been a favourite target for Trump’s criticism and disdain, as evident in a recent directive to cease participating in and funding 31 UN organisations. Among them were the peace-building commission and the peace-building fund, as well as the office of the special representative for children in armed conflict. The deeper and more tragic irony in this is threefold. First, there is strong evidence that the UN is effective as peace builder, especially after civil war, and that UN peacekeeping does work to keep the peace. Second, there is no question that the UN does not always succeed in its efforts to achieve peace. But this is as much, if not more often, the fault of its member states. There’s a long history of UN member states blocking security council resolutions, providing only weak mandates or cutting short the duration of UN missions. They have also obstructed operations on the ground, as is evident in the protracted crisis in Sudan, where the UN endlessly debates human suffering but lacks most of the funds to alleviate it. Third, even though he is unlikely to ever admit it publicly, Trump by now has surely found out for himself that making peace is neither easy nor straightforward despite his claim to have solved eight conflicts. And the more so if the “pragmatic judgement” and “common-sense solutions” that the charter to his board of peace subscribe to end up being, as seems likely, little more than a thin disguise for highly transactional deals designed to prioritise profitable returns for an America-first agenda. Part of the reason why the UN has success as a peacemaker and peacebuilder is the fact that it is still seen as relatively legitimate. This is something that is unlikely to be immediately associated with Trump or his board of peace if it ever takes off. Such scepticism appears well founded, particularly considering that among the invitees to join the board is the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, who is not particularly well known for his love of peace. Even Trump, on rare occasions, admittedly, seems to have come to this realisation. But it did not stop him from inviting Putin to join the board of peace. So, what to make of it all? Is it just another of Trump’s controversial initiatives that he hopes might eventually earn him the Nobel peace prize after all? Is it merely a money-making opportunity for Trump personally? Or is it designed for his political and corporate allies, who might benefit from projects implemented by his board of peace? Ultimately, it might be any of these. The real question needs to be about the consequences for the current system. What Trump is effectively proposing is to set up a corporate version of the UN, controlled and run by him. That he is capable of such a proposal should not come as a shock after 12 months of Trump 2.0. More surprising is the notion that other political leaders will support it. This is one of the few opportunities they have to stop him in his tracks. It would not be a cost-free response, as the French president, Emmanuel Macron, has found when he did not appear sufficiently enthusiastic and Trump threatened the immediate imposition of 200% tariffs on French wine. But more leaders should consider whether they really want to be Trump’s willing executioners when it comes to the UN and instead imagine, to paraphrase a well-known anti-war slogan, what would happen if Trump “gave a board of peace and no one came?” An earlier version of this analysis was published by The Conversation on January 21, 2026. We hope you’ll share Navigating the Vortex with anyone you think might find it of interest. Also, you can listen to our podcast editions via the website and on all major podcast platforms, including: Apple Podcasts Spotify Amazon/Audible This Substack is reader-supported. To receive new posts and support our work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. Get full access to Navigating the Vortex at www.navigatingthevortex.com/subscribe

    7 min
  7. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine now outlasts the Soviet fight against Nazi Germany

    15 JAN

    Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine now outlasts the Soviet fight against Nazi Germany

    Russia’s so-called “special military operation” in Ukraine passed a significant milestone on January 13. It has now outlasted the 1,418 days it took Vladimir Putin’s notorious predecessor, the Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin, to bring his war against Nazi Germany to a successful conclusion. The two wars are hard to compare in any reasonable way. But there are nonetheless some important parallels worth pointing out. The most wishful parallel is that aggression never pays. After some initial setbacks, Stalin’s Soviet Union turned things around on the battlefield and drove the German aggressors and their allies out of the country. This was possible because of the heroism of many ordinary Soviet citizens and because of the massive support the US gave to the Soviet war effort. Ukrainian heroism is unquestionably key to understanding why Russia has not prevailed in its aggression against Ukraine. Support from western allies is, of course, also part of this explanation. But the inconsistent, often hesitant and at times lacklustre nature of this support also explains why Kyiv is increasingly on the back foot. It would be easy to put most of the blame for recent Ukrainian setbacks on the US president, Donald Trump, and his approach to ending the war. Back in the second world war, there were several German attempts to cut a deal with the western allies in order to be able to focus the entire war effort against the Soviet Union. Such efforts were consistently rebuffed and the anti-Nazi coalition remained intact until Germany’s surrender. Now, by contrast, a deal is more likely than not to be made between Trump and Putin. Emboldening rather than weakening Russia, such a deal would come at the steep price of Ukrainian territorial concessions and the continuing threat of further Russian adventurism in Europe. But it is also important to remember that Trump has only been back in the White House for a year, and that Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine started almost four years ago. During the first three of these years, the western coalition supporting Ukraine firmly stood its ground against any concessions to Russia in the same way as the allies of the second world war rejected a deal with Germany. What they did not do, however, is offer the unconditional and unlimited support that would have put Ukraine in a position to defeat the aggressor. Endless debates over what weapons systems should be delivered, in which quantities, how fast and with what conditions attached have rightly frustrated Ukrainians and their war effort. This may have become worse under Trump, but it did not start with him. Nor can all the blame for the dire situation in which Ukraine now finds itself be attributed only to the imperfections of the support it received. Lest we forget, Russia committed the unprovoked crime of aggression against its neighbour and is violating key norms of international humanitarian law on a daily basis with its relentless campaign against Ukraine’s critical infrastructure. Yet several major corruption scandals in Ukraine, including one that left key energy installations insufficiently protected against Russian air raids, have hampered Kyiv’s overall war effort as well. They have undermined the country’s resilience, weakened public and military morale and have made it easier for Ukraine’s detractors in the west to question whether defending the country is worth taxpayers’ money. The parallel to the second world war is again interesting here. There is now much hand wringing in the west over corruption in Ukraine – a problem as old as the country has been independent – and the democratic legitimacy of its president, government and parliament. Volodymyr Zelensky, the democratically elected, and still widely supported, leader of a country defending itself against an existential threat, has to justify constantly why he will not violate his country’s constitution and sign over territory to its aggressive neighbour. Back in the 1940s, western allies had few qualms to back Stalin in the fight against Hitler. They supported Stalin despite him being a murderous dictator who had used starvation as a tactic to commit acts of genocide against Ukrainian farmers, killed almost the entire officer corps of the Polish army in a series of mass executions and was about to carry out brutal mass deportations of tens of millions of people. The choices the western allies made in the 1940s when they threw their support behind Stalin may have been morally questionable. But they were driven by a keen sense of priorities and a singular focus on defeating what was at the time the gravest threat. That too is missing today, especially in Trump’s White House. Not only does Trump seem to find it hard to make up his mind whether it is Putin or Zelensky who is to blame for the war and the lack of a peace deal, he also lacks the sense of urgency to give this war his undivided attention. Worse than that, some of the distractions Trump is pursuing are actively undermining efforts to achieve peace. Threatening to take over Greenland, an autonomous part of staunch US and Nato ally Denmark, hardly sends the message of western unity that Putin needs to hear to bring him to the negotiating table. Other distractions, like the military operation against Venezuela and the threats of renewed strikes against Iran, create yet more uncertainty and instability in an already volatile world. They stretch American resources and highlight the hypocrisy and double standards that underpin Trump’s America-first approach to foreign policy. Putin is neither Hitler nor Stalin. But Trump is not comparable to American wartime leaders Roosevelt or Truman either, and there is no strong leader like Churchill in sight in Europe. The war in Ukraine, therefore, is likely to mark a few more milestones of questionable achievement before there might be another opportunity to prove again that aggression never pays. An earlier version of this analysis was published by The Conversation on January 15, 2026. We hope you’ll share Navigating the Vortex with anyone you think might find it of interest. Also, you can listen to our podcast editions via the website and on all major podcast platforms, including: Apple Podcasts Spotify Amazon/Audible This Substack is reader-supported. To receive new posts and support our work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. Get full access to Navigating the Vortex at www.navigatingthevortex.com/subscribe

    7 min

  8. 5 JAN

    Trump's Venezuela raid foreshadows more turbulence in a new 'great power' carve-up of the world

    The US military operation in Venezuela in the early hours of January 3, rang the new year in with a bang — even by the current standards of American foreign policy. After months of military build-up and planning, US president Donald Trump gave the go-ahead for the apprehension of the president of Venezuela, Nicolás Maduro. Operation Absolute Resolve — the codename for this successful effort to capture and abduct a sitting head of state — has no recent precedent other than the US under President George H. W. Bush snatching Panama’s strongman Manuel Noriega some 36 years ago. This latest blatant and unashamed violation of international law confirms even for the last doubter that Trump cares little about rules and norms. As such, it also signals the continuing erosion of what is left of the rules-based international order. For all of the US president’s triumphalism at his post-operation press conference, he cannot be certain that the undoubted tactical success of capturing Maduro will equate to an enduring success of moulding the western hemisphere in his own image. As his predecessors have found in Afghanistan and Iraq, regime change is a fraught and costly business. It is also one that is deeply unpopular among Trump’s Maga base. The temptation for the White House, therefore, is to declare victory after the weekend’s operation against Maduro and quickly move on to other targets while the world is still stunned by the audacity of kidnapping a sitting foreign leader. But any expectations that other countries in the western hemisphere will fall like the proverbial dominoes that Trump’s neo-con predecessors envisioned in the Middle East after the toppling of Saddam Hussein in 2003 are deeply misplaced. And yet the people and leaders of Cuba (long an obsession for Trump’s secretary of state, Marco Rubio), Colombia (the largest supplier of cocaine to the US) and Mexico (the key route through which fentanyl gets into the US) will be deeply worried about their future prospects in a Trumpian world after they got name-checked at Trump’s press conference. The same goes for Greenlanders. Trump has, since his first term in office, repeatedly claimed that the US needs Greenland, which is legally part of EU and Nato member Denmark. And he did so again in the aftermath of the operation against Venezuela, stating over the weekend that the US “need[s] Greenland from the standpoint of national security”. Equally unsettling was the ominous tweet by Maga influencer Katie Miller — the wife of Trump’s influential deputy chief of staff, Stephen Miller — showing a map of Greenland in the colours of the US flag, with the caption “SOON”. Much to the dismay of Greenlanders, the US president certainly won’t be discouraged by the meek response from many European officials to the intervention in Venezuela. This, too, is deeply disconcerting, signalling that many of the erstwhile most ardent defenders of international law have given up pretending it matters any more. The EU’s foreign policy chief, Kaja Kallas, was first out of the block, with a post that started by pointing out Maduro’s lack of legitimacy as president and ended with an expression of concern for European citizens in Venezuela. She just about managed to squeeze in that “the principles of international law and the UN charter must be respected”. But this sounded like — and almost certainly was — an afterthought. A subsequent joint statement by the EU26 (that is, all member states except Hungary) was similarly equivocal and did not explicitly condemn Washington’s breach of international law. The British prime minister, Sir Keir Starmer, focused his statement on the fact that “the UK has long supported a transition of power in Venezuela”, that he “regarded Maduro as an illegitimate President” and would “shed no tears about the end of his regime”. Before closing with his desire for a “safe and peaceful transition to a legitimate government that reflects the will of the Venezuelan people”, the former human rights lawyer briefly reiterated his “support for international law”. The German chancellor, Friedrich Merz, however, wins the prize for prevarication. Not only did he make almost identical comments about Maduro’s lack of legitimacy and the importance of a transition in Venezuela, he also noted that a legal assessment of the US operation is complicated and that Germany will “take its time” to do so. While there was a mixture of enthusiasm and worry across Latin America, the strongest condemnations came from Moscow and Beijing. Russian President Vladimir Putin had signalled his support for Maduro early on in the escalating crisis at the beginning of December. A statement by the Russian foreign ministry initially merely offered support for efforts to resolve the crisis “through dialogue”. In subsequent press releases, Russia took a stronger line, demanding that Washington “release the legitimately elected president of a sovereign country and his spouse.” China similarly expressed concern about the US operation as a “clear violation of international law” and urged Washington to “ensure the personal safety of President Nicolás Maduro and his wife, release them at once, stop toppling the government of Venezuela, and resolve issues through dialogue and negotiation.” The Russian position in particular is, of course, deeply ironic, but hardly surprising. To condemn the US operation as an “unacceptable violation of the sovereignty of an independent state” may be correct but it is hardly credible in light of Moscow’s war against Ukraine that has been ongoing for over a decade and involved the illegal occupation and annexation of nearly 20% of Ukraine’s territory. China, on the other hand, can now have its cake and eat it. Taiwan is not widely recognised as a sovereign and independent state, and with regime change now back on the international agenda as a seemingly legitimate endeavour, little is left, from Beijing’s point of view, of the case against reunification, if necessary by force. Trump’s actions against Venezuela may not have accelerated Chinese plans for forceful reunification, but they will have done little to curb them. And for all of China’s righteous indignation about US violations of international law, Beijing will certainly feel emboldened to push territorial claims against its neighbours in the South China Sea even harder. Yet China and Russia also will be acutely aware of their inability to do much about the US operation against Venezuela beyond condemning it publicly. All this points, yet again, to a gradual conversion of American, Chinese and Russian geopolitical interests — to have their own recognised spheres of influence in which they can do as they please. Yet without an obvious or straightforward way to delineate where one sphere of influence begins and another one ends, more instability is likely in areas where the boundaries between different spheres are contested, be that in eastern Europe, the South Caucasus, Central Asia, the Arctic, the Indo-Pacific, the Middle East or Africa. The expectation of a protracted and destabilising carve-up of the world between Washington, Moscow and Beijing also explains the lack of European outrage over Trump’s operation against Venezuela. It signals a European realisation that the days of the liberal international order are well and truly over. Europe will not take a futile stand that would only heighten yet further the risk of being abandoned by Trump and assigned to Putin’s sphere. On the contrary, European leaders will continue to do their utmost to gloss over differences with the US and try to capitalise on an almost throw-away remark by Trump at the end of his press conference on Saturday that he is “not thrilled” with Putin. What matters for Europe now are no longer the niceties of international norms but keeping the US and its mercurial president on side in defending Ukraine and deterring Russia. But such efforts to accommodate the US president are only going to work to some extent. That Trump restated his ambition to annex Greenland for reasons of American security and access to the island’s vast critical minerals resources is bad enough. That he did so in late December between launching his new national security strategy (NSS) and the operation to capture Maduro is an indication that his vision of absolute dominance in the western hemisphere does not end with regime change in Venezuela. The public rebuke of Trump’s claims by the Danish prime minister, Mette Frederiksen, and her Greenlandic counterpart, Jens-Frederik Nielsen, correctly pointed out that annexing Greenland would be neither necessary — Greenland is covered by Nato’s Article 5 — nor legal. But in light of the EU’s general reluctance to condemn Trump’s actions in Venezuela, the Danish pleas sound helpless and smack of double standards. Trump’s latest and, so far, most egregious breach of international law further accelerates the re-ordering of the world. The Trump corollary to the Monroe doctrine, as articulated in the NSS, may have a certain logic to it. But the wider repercussions of US military action against Venezuela illustrate that this operation is unlikely to go down in history as a shining example of the “common-sense and potent restoration of American power and priorities, consistent with American security interests” that the drafters of the NSS envisaged. And beyond the western hemisphere, if the Venezuela operation, as is likely, further encourages Chinese territorial claims in the South China Sea and possibly a move on Taiwan, it will not achieve the NSS aim of preventing military confrontation with America’s most significant geopolitical rival. Nor will further destabilising the transatlantic alliance by threatening the territorial integrity of Denmark over Greenland and possibly abandoning Europe a

    11 min
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About

We live in a complex and ever-changing world. To navigate the vortex we must adapt to change quickly, think critically, and make sound decisions. Lucy Marcus & Stefan Wolff talk about business, politics, society, culture, and what it all means. www.navigatingthevortex.com

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  • Creator
    Lucy P. Marcus & Stefan Wolff
  • Years Active
    2023 - 2026
  • Episodes
    83
  • Rating
    Clean
  • Copyright
    © Lucy P. Marcus & Stefan Wolff
  • Show Website
    Navigating the Vortex