China Global The German Marshall Fund

Two and a half years after China imposed trade restrictions on more than one dozen Australian products, bilateral trade may be returning to normal as the diplomatic thaw between Canberra and Beijing gains momentum. Chinese trade bans on products like coal, lime, lobster, timber, and barley were imposed after former Prime Minister Scott Morrison called for an independent investigation into the origins of COVID-19 in September 2020.

Relations began to warm this past November when Chinese leader Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Anthony Albanese met at the G-20 Summit in Bali, Indonesia. Since then, there have been meetings between the two countries’ foreign ministers and a virtual meeting between trade ministers. Early this year, China resumed coal imports from Australia, and some speculate the coal ban may soon be lifted completely. In another sign of warming ties, the Australian government approved a 1.38 billion US dollars Chinese investment in an iron ore joint venture, which is the largest Chinese investment in Australia since 2019.

So, what explains China’s sudden about face in its approach to Canberra? What does China seek to gain in return if anything? And is Canberra likely to moderate its approach toward Beijing to sustain the positive momentum?

To discuss China’s new approach to Australia, the motivating factors behind it, and the potential future course of China-Australia relations, host Bonnie Glaser speaks with Dr. Benjamin Herscovitch, a research fellow at the Australian National University’s School of Regulation and Global Governance and National Security College, whose research focuses on China’s economic statecraft and Australia-China relations. He is also the writer of Beijing to Canberra and Back, a fortnightly newsletter on Substack, that analyzes Australia-China ties. Previously, he was an analyst and policy officer in Australia’s Department of Defence.

China’s newly appointed foreign minister, Qin Gang, upheld a 33-year tradition by making his first trip since taking office to Africa. Gang visited Ethiopia, Angola, Gabon, Benin, and Egypt. Chinese President Xi Jinping has prominently elevated the continent as a foreign policy priority and himself traveled there ten times between 2014 and 2020.

After Beijing launched its Belt and Road Initiative in 2013, Chinese investment in Africa surged, peaking at $28.4 billion in 2016. For 2020 the figure was only $1.9 billion, lowered, in part, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, changing Chinese priorities, and African governments’ difficulties repaying Chinese loans.

Meanwhile, President Joe Biden’s administration has deepened US engagement with Africa. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen and US Ambassador to the United Nations Linda Thomas-Greenfield visited in January. A month before that, Biden hosted 49 African leaders at the United States-Africa Leaders Summit in Washington, DC. He announced then that he will visit sub-Saharan Africa later this year, the first trip there by a US president in a decade.

To discuss China’s interests and US-China competition in Africa, host Bonnie Glaser speaks with Dr. Joshua Eisenman, associate professor of politics at the Keough School of Global Affairs at the University of Notre Dame. Eisenman’s research focuses on China’s development and its relations with the Global South, particularly Africa. His forthcoming book, "China’s Relations with Africa: A New Era of Strategic Engagement," co-authored with Ambassador David Shinn, will be available this summer.

On January 28 , just days before US Secretary of State Antony Blinken was due to travel to Beijing, a high-altitude Chinese surveillance balloon carrying a payload the size of three buses entered the US Air Defense Identification Zone north of the Aleutian Islands. It drifted eastward, over Alaska and Canada, before reaching the continental United States. Officials in Washington claim that the balloon’s entry into US airspace, not to mention its loitering over sensitive military installations in Montana, violated American sovereignty and international law. US President Joe Biden, advised that the balloon posed no immediate threat and that shooting it down over land risked harm to civilians and property, ordered the military to end the balloon’s meanderings once it reached the Atlantic Ocean. Blinken’s trip was postponed.

The Chinese expressed regret about the intrusion, maintaining that the vessel was a weather balloon that had gone off course. Beijing also condemned the decision to shoot it down, saying the act was a “clear overreaction and a serious violation of international practice”. The Chinese indicated that they reserved the right to respond.

To discuss China’s intelligence operations and the implications of the surveillance balloon for US-China relations, host Bonnie Glaser speaks with retired Senior Intelligence Officer John Culver. He worked at the Central Intelligence Agency for 35 years analyzing East Asian affairs, including those related to China and the People’s Liberation Army. From 2015 to 2018, he was the National Intelligence Council’s national intelligence officer for East Asia.

“As close as lips and teeth.” So described Mao Zedong China’s relationship with North Korea, the only country with which, since 1961, China has a mutual defense treaty. But many sources of bilateral friction exist, including North Korea’s nuclear weapons program and China’s close relationship with South Korea.

Recent regional and global developments are now causing China to adjust its policy toward North Korea. The war in Ukraine may be driving the two countries closer together, as evidenced by Beijing’s veto last May of a draft UN Security Council resolution aimed at tightening sanctions against Pyongyang. This was the first time China wielded its veto on the issue. Since 2006, the Security Council approved ten similar resolutions unanimously. Given China’s new stance, how would it respond if North Korea conducts a nuclear test in the coming months?

To discuss China’s evolving policy, host Bonnie Glaser speaks with Yun Sun, a senior fellow and co-director of the East Asia Program, and director of the China Program, at the Stimson Center.

President Xi Jinping smiled when he met his US counterpart, Joe Biden, on the margins of last November’s G20 summit in Indonesia. Xi also struck a moderate tone in his remarks and in meetings with several other leaders, especially Australia’s new prime minister, Anthony Albanese. Are we seeing a shift in Chinese foreign policy? If so, is it tactical or more strategic? And what is driving it?

The National Security Council Coordinator for the Indo-Pacific, Kurt Campbell, recently suggested that the Chinese have recognized that certain elements of their foreign policy, such as their wolf-warrior diplomacy, have been unsuccessful and, in many respects, have backfired. Other experts speculate that Xi needs to focus attention on addressing mounting domestic economic and pandemic challenges , and consequently needs a more favorable external environment including, in particular, reduced tensions with the United States.

To discuss the factors shaping current Chinese foreign policy and the direction China’s approach to the world is taking, host Bonnie Glaser speaks with Ryan Hass, a senior fellow in the Center for East Asia Policy Studies and the Chen-fu and Cecilia Yen Koo Chair in Taiwan Studies at the Brookings Institution.

In early December, Chinese President Xi Jinping traveled to Saudi Arabia for a three-day trip, his first to the country since 2016. Xi met with King Salman and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and signed a strategic partnership agreement with the Kingdom, which promises to usher in a “new era” of China-Saudi relations. Xi also held a summit with six Gulf Cooperation Council countries and a China-Arab States Summit with leaders from 21 countries of the Arab League.

To discuss Xi’s visit and China’s policy towards the Middle East and North Africa, host Bonnie Glaser speaks with Dr. Jonathan Fulton, an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Zayed University in Abu Dhabi, a non-resident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, and the host of the China-MENA Podcast.