Canada's Court: Oral Arguments from the SCC Criminal Lawyers' Association

In the case of Derrick Michael Lawlor v The King, Mr. Lawlor, the appellant, appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada as of right from the Court of Appeal for Ontario, on the basis of a dissenting judge.
The appellant had engaged in a sexual encounter with the deceased and another man at a park. Hours later, the body of the deceased was found, and the cause of death was determined to be neck compression. The appellant suffered from mental illness and had consumed both psychiatric medication and alcohol around the time that he was in the park. The appellant had made statements before and after the deceased’s death stating that he wanted to kill gay men. In the days following, the appellant had searched the internet for news with respect to a body being found in a park.
The appellant was convicted by a jury of 1st degree murder. He appealed his conviction on the basis of several deficiencies in the jury charge. The majority at the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on the basis that the instructions to the jury were appropriate. Justice Nordheimer, dissenting, would have allowed the appeal on the basis that the judge failed to instruct the jury with respect to the appellant’s mental health and level of intoxication as it related to the intent for murder, and on the basis that the judge failed to provide a limiting instruction for the use of after the fact conduct evidence.

CASE SUMMARY- TREVOR LINDSAY V. HIS MAJESTY THE KING

At what point should a police officer lose the protection offered by section 25 of the Criminal Code, justifying the use of as much force as necessary, so long as the officer acted on reasonable grounds and used that force for something the officer was required or authorized to do?
This appeal comes to the Supreme Court of Canada as of right from the Court of Appeal of Alberta. Officer Lindsay was charged with aggravated assault against an individual in his custody following an incident, much of which was captured on video. Following a brief interaction with the prisoner, Officer Lindsay was seen punching him in the face and, after another interaction, three more times to the back of the head. The most significant injury, a skull fracture, occurred when, during the course of either throwing the man to the ground or, as the officer testified, lowering him to the ground, the man’s head hit the pavement.
The officer explained that he was concerned initially that the prisoner, whom he had been advised was an intravenous drug user with a history of being aggressive to police, might have a serious infectious disease such as hepatitis C, which could pose a risk should he spit at him or his partner in the cruiser. This concern grew after the first blow, which bloodied the man’s nose, after which he spit some blood at the cruiser.
The officer went on to explain that he meant to lower the man to the ground by the collar of his hoodie but inadvertently got hold of the hood. The slack between the hood and the collar resulted in his not being able to lower him in the controlled fashion he meant to employ, and the resultant contact led to injuries sufficiently serious that defence counsel conceded they were enough to constitute aggravated assault, should the judge conclude that an assault had, in fact occurred.
The trial judge found that there were no reasonable grounds for the first strike as there was no objective basis for any fear. The force used thereafter was excessive.
The majority of the Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge’s finding that neither section 25 nor section 34 were of assistance to the officer. Wakeling, J.A., in dissent, felt that the trial judge ought to have considered several key questions, including whether a reasonable person with the officer’s training would have considered the assessment of risk reasonable; whether the officer felt the force used was no more than necessary; whether a reasonable person with the officer’s training would have considered that the belief in the need for force and the use of no more force than necessary was reasonable; and whether the harm likely to result to the officer if less force was used should be considered in the context of the degree of harm the detainee might suffer with the use of force chosen.
In particular, he emphasized the need for the trial judge to consider what act(s), in particular, constituted the offence here, as it was essentially the act of putting the man to the ground which resulted in the significant head injury, and what level of intention would have to be proven with respect to the harm which resulted from that conduct.
In today’s society, the use of force by police has been the subject of considerable scrutiny, whether in Canada or elsewhere. The Supreme Court is in a position to provide important clarification on the extent to which such use of force may be justified, such that a criminal conviction ought not to result therefrom.

The appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada originates from Court Martial Appeal Court (CMAC). Prior to the appeal being filed, multiple decisions came out by military judges which held that there is a lack of institutional independence because of their risk of prosecution under the military’s code of Service Discipline. It leaves military judges at risk of being influenced by a senior member of the Canadian Armed Forces. The separate roles is a fundamental postulate of the rule of law. Therefore, judicial independence must not only exist in fact, but it must also be seen to exist to a reasonable person.

The appellants are members of the Canadian Armed forces who had various charges laid against them. The appeals focus on whether the role and status of military judges as military officers in the chain of command compromises their institutional independence, denying the appellants their right to a hearing under s.11 (d) of the Charter.

The question in issue before the Supreme Court of Canada are the following:

1) Since Genereux, do military judges deciding cases still raise a reasonable apprehension of bias?

2) Has there been significant societal change which dissipates this court’s concern that a trial before a military judge is a matter of practical necessity?

3) If so, does the military status of judges, prescribed under the National Defence Act’s legislative scheme, lead an informed person, viewing the matter realistically and practically, to conclude that there is an apprehension of bias contrary to s.11 (d) of the Charter?

4) If so is this violation saved under s 1 of the Charter?

5) If not, what is the appropriate constitutional remedy under s 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982?

In this episode, you will hear the oral submissions from the Appellant Don Johnson vs His Majesty the King. Mr. Johnson was charged with two counts of first-degree murder of brothers, Justin, and Jerome Waterman. The three of them were known to be friends. At trial before a judge and jury, Mr. Johnson denied the crime and that he was the shooter. Further, he alleged that a man named Marcus Cumsille likely murdered the brothers. The Crown argued that it was unlikely Mr. Cumsille was the shooter.

At trial, the Judge instructed the jury, that even if Mr. Johnson was not the shooter, he must be found guilty if there was any intention to assist the shooter, in other words, if he was found to be aiding. After the jury convicted Mr. Johnson, he appealed to the Court of Appeal for Ontario on the basis that the trial judge did not have a factual basis for the party instruction and that a finding of guilt on such was not open to the jury.

The majority dismissed the appeal. In his dissenting remarks, Nordheimer J.A. would have allowed the appeal. He was of the view that there was no evidentiary foundation for party liability that the jury could consider. Furthermore, there was no reason to believe that Mr. Johnson would have assisted the shooter in committing the crime if he was not the shooter.

Mr. Johnson is now appealing to the Supreme Court of Canada as of right.

Mr. Metzger was convicted of two counts of robbery, breaking and entering to steal a firearm, and disguise with intent in relation to 2017 home invasion. Mr. Metzger was convicted largely on the strength of DNA evidence which tied him to a cigarette butt found within the getaway vehicle 11 hours after the robbery. The trial judge concluded that this evidence permitted him to infer both recent possession of the vehicle and guilt in the robbery. The defence appealed the convictions to the Court of Appeal of Alberta on the grounds that the trial judge misapprehended the cigarette butt evidence when he found that it supported the conclusion that Mr. Metzger was in recent possession of the vehicle. The defence further argued that the trial judge misapplied the doctrine of recent possession in his reasons. A majority of the Court of Appeal upheld the verdict, holding that the trial judge did not misapprehend the evidence or err in law by relying on the doctrine of recent possession to infer guilt. Veldhuis J.A., dissenting, would have granted the appeal and substituted an acquittal, holding that the trial judge misapplied the doctrine of recent possession and that the verdict was unreasonable. The defendant appealed as of right to the Supreme Court of Canada. One of the main issues to be determined is whether the trial judge could reasonably convict on the basis of the cigarette butt evidence and the complainant’s testimony - that he may have heard the name "Metzger" spoken during the robbery.

Il y a une ordonnance de non-publication dans le dossier

L’intimé, H.V., a plaidé coupable à une infraction de leurre, poursuivie par voie sommaire, commise entre le 31 juillet et le 9 août 2017. Lors de la détermination de la peine, l’intimé a soulevé l’inconstitutionnalité de la peine minimale obligatoire de 6 mois prévue à l’al. 172.1(2)b) du Code criminel, en vertu de l’art. 12 de la Charte canadienne des droits et libertés. Il a été d’avis qu’une peine d’emprisonnement serait injustifiée. La poursuite a réclamé une peine entre 9 et 12 mois d’emprisonnement avec une probation.

La Cour du Québec a déclaré la peine minimale obligatoire de 6 mois inopérante à l’égard de l’accusé et sursoit au prononcé de la peine en imposant une probation de deux ans avec l’obligation d’effectuer 150 heures de travaux communautaires.

La Cour supérieure a accueilli l’appel, et a confirmé que la peine minimale obligatoire de 6 mois d’emprisonnement prévue par l’al. 172.1(2)b) du Code criminel est inopérante à l’égard de l’accusé au regard de l’art. 12 de la Charte et n’est pas sauvegardée par l’application de l’article premier ; elle a déclaré invalide et inopérante la peine minimale obligatoire et annulé la peine imposée en première instance. Elle a condamné l’accusé à purger 90 jours d’emprisonnement de façon discontinue, avec une probation de 3 ans qui inclut l’exécution de 150 heures de travaux communautaires. Elle a maintenu les autres conditions, modalités et ordonnances prononcées en première instance.

La Cour d’appel a rejeté l’appel de la poursuite, confirmant la peine d’emprisonnement de 90 jours et la déclaration d’invalidité de la peine minimale de 6 mois d’emprisonnement prévue à l’al. 172.1(2)b) du Code criminel. La Cour d’appel a conclu que la Cour supérieure n’a pas prononcé une peine manifestement non indiquée qui n’atteste pas de la gravité objective et subjective du crime commis et qu’elle n’a pas erré en droit en concluant à l’invalidité constitutionnelle de l’al. 172.1(2)b).