In January, Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger officially withdrew from the Economic Community of West African States, or ECOWAS, having already established the Alliance of Sahel States, or AES, as an alternative regional grouping. The move has had a multitude of consequences, including ongoing diplomatic spats between the AES states and those that remain committed to ECOWAS, as well as challenges to trade and freedom of movement across the region. But the security implications of the fracturing of ECOWAS as a regional bloc are also important to consider, as West Africa faces an array of challenges that are increasingly affecting what are usually thought of as the region's more stable coastal countries, such as Senegal, Ghana and Cote d'Ivoire. All three of the military-run AES states face long-running jihadist and domestic insurgencies, including armed groups with links to the Islamic State and al-Qaida. Most prominent among them are the Islamic State-Sahel Province and Jamaat Nasr al-Islam wal-Muslimin, or JNIM, which is affiliated with al-Qaida and is also active in northern Cote d'Ivoire, Benin and Togo. These groups have been active throughout the Sahel for over a decade, typically exploiting local grievances and intercommunal tensions, particularly between farmers and pastoralists as well as against the Peuhl community, which is often portrayed as being sympathetic to the jihadists. The jihadists mobilize these tensions to stoke conflict and recruit among marginalized communities in a broader effort to seize territory and create an Islamic caliphate in the Sahel and West Africa. These groups have targeted civilians and government forces alike, and their attacks have often been tactically sophisticated and significant in impact. In August 2024, for instance, an attack by JNIM in Barsalogho, in northern Burkina Faso, killed around 600 people. And in November 2023, an ambush in Niger's Tillaberi region killed at least 200 soldiers and wounded at least 34 others. Jihadist violence has increased at an accelerating rate in recent years, killing 11,643 people across the Sahel in 2023, a 43 percent increase from the previous year and a threefold increase since 2020, according to the African Centre for Strategic Studies. It has also increasingly spilled over into coastal West African states, with Ghana, Togo, Benin and Cote d'Ivoire all now threatened by these groups as well, albeit to a much lesser extent than the Sahelian states. In Togo, an attack on an army barracks last year killed 12 soldiers, for instance, and JNIM is increasingly fortifying its positions near the borders of Togo and Benin. The problems posed by insecurity are exacerbated by the refugee crisis that violence in the Sahel is causing. By early 2025, nearly 87,000 people had fled their homes in the Sahel into coastal countries. This has put a strain on local communities, especially in Cote d'Ivoire, where nearly 58,000 of the refugees have fled. The rampant insecurity has also fueled political instability, with the three AES states having experienced a combined five coups between 2020 and 2023. The ECOWAS split could exacerbate many of these security challenges, not least because it has created or exacerbated tensions between many countries that have remained in ECOWAS and those that have left. In the past 12-18 months, for instance, Cote d'Ivoire, known as a staunch defender of ECOWAS, and neighboring Burkina Faso have engaged in repeated diplomatic spats linked to mutual fears of destabilization as well as Burkina Faso's rejection of the region's and ECOWAS' historical pro-Western leanings. Gun battles and disputes at the border between Burkinabe and Ivoirian troops have become common, with Ivoirian gendarmes having even been detained in Burkina Faso. Earlier this year Burkina Faso withdrew its diplomatic personnel from Cote d'Ivoire. These disputes have increased instability on the two countries' shared border, exacerbating tensions driven by an inflow of Burk...
