Die Universitätsbibliothek (UB) verfügt über ein umfangreiches Archiv an elektronischen Medien, das von Volltextsammlungen über Zeitungsarchive, Wörterbücher und Enzyklopädien bis hin zu ausführlichen Bibliographien und mehr als 1000 Datenbanken reicht. Auf iTunes U stellt die UB unter anderem eine Auswahl an elektronischen Publikationen der Wissenschaftlerinnen und Wissenschaftler an der LMU bereit. (Dies ist der 1. von 3 Teilen der Sammlung 'Volkswirtschaft - Open Access LMU'.)
Contests with multi-tasking
The standard contest model in which participants compete in a single dimension is well understood and documented. Multi-dimension extensions are possible but are liable to increase the complexity of the contest structure, mitigating one of its main advantages: simplicity. In this paper we propose an extension in which competition ensues in several dimensions and a competitor that wins a certain number of these is awarded a prize. The amount of information needed to run the contest is hence limited to the number of dimensions won by each player. We look at the design of this contest from the point of view of maximizing effort in the contest (per dimension and totally), and show that there will be a tendency to run small contests with few dimensions. The standard Tullock model and its results are encompassed by our framework.
Economic integration and redistribuitive taxation
We set up a simple political economy model where economic integration raises the profitability of multinational firms. In this setting redistributive taxation may rise following economic integration, if the effects of the widened income gap dominate the higher excess burden of the tax.
The Intensity of Incentives in Firms and Markets: Moral Hazard with Envious Agents
While most market transactions are subject to strong incentives, transactions within firms are often not incentivized. We offer an explanation for this observation based on envy among agents in an otherwise standard moral hazard model with multiple agents. Envious agents suffer if other agents receive a higher wage due to random shocks to their performance measures. The necessary compensation for expected envy renders incentive provision more expensive, which generates a tendency towards flat-wage contracts. Moreover, empirical evidence suggests that social comparisons like envy are more pronounced among employees within firms than among individuals who interact only in the market. Flat-wage contracts are thus more likely to be optimal in firms than in markets.
Estimation with Numerical Integration on Sparse Grids
For the estimation of many econometric models, integrals without analytical solutions have to be evaluated. Examples include limited dependent variables and nonlinear panel data models. In the case of one-dimensional integrals, Gaussian quadrature is known to work efficiently for a large class of problems. In higher dimensions, similar approaches discussed in the literature are either very specific and hard to implement or suffer from exponentially rising computational costs in the number of dimensions - a problem known as the "curse of dimensionality" of numerical integration. We propose a strategy that shares the advantages of Gaussian quadrature methods, is very general and easily implemented, and does not suffer from the curse of dimensionality. Monte Carlo experiments for the random parameters logit model indicate the superior performance of the proposed method over simulation techniques.
Self-Serving Biases in Bargaining
There is strong evidence that in bargaining situations with asymmetric outside options people exhibit self-serving biases concerning their fairness judgements. Moreover, psychological literature suggests that this can be a driving force of bargaining impasse. This paper extends the notion of inequity aversion to incorporate self-serving biases due to asymmetric outside options and analyses whether this leads to bargaining breakdown. I distinguish between sophisticated and naive agents, that is, those agents who understand their bias and those who do not. I find that breakdown in ultimatum bargaining results from naiveté of the proposers.
Ratification quotas in international agreements
This paper analyses the role of ratification quotas in multilateral agreements over emission reduction. The higher is the quota, the lower is the level of emissions in case the agreement comes into force, but the higher is also the risk of failure. In a setting with incomplete information, two country types and a binary contribution to the provision, I examine the differences between simultaneous and sequential ratification. When the benefits from emission of both types are smaller than the social costs, the outcome in the simultaneous case is essentially identical to the sequential case. The optimal quota is 100% and achieves the first best. With the high type's benefits exceeding the social costs, I find that the optimal quota is as small as possible, if ratification is simultaneous. In the sequential ratification case, I cannot determine the optimal quota. However, I find that the aggregate expected surplus decreases with respect to the simultaneous case.