Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran

Michelle Cohen Farber
Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran

Hadran.org.il is the portal for Daf Yomi studies for women. Hadran.org.il is the first and only site where one can hear a daily Talmud class taught by a woman. The classes are taught in Israel by Rabbanit Michelle Cohen Farber, a graduate of Midreshet Lindenbaum’s scholars program with a BA in Talmud and Tanach from Bar-Ilan University. Michelle has taught Talmud and Halacha at Midreshet Lindenbaum, Pelech high school and MATAN. She lives in Ra’anana with her husband and their five children. Each morning the daf yomi class is delivered via ZOOM and then immediately uploaded and available for podcast and download. Hadran.org.il reaches women who can now have access to a woman’s perspective on the most essential Jewish traditional text. This podcast represents a revolutionary step in advancing women’s Torah study around the globe.

  1. 17 HR AGO

    Bava Batra 138 - November 10, 9 Cheshvan

    If one receives a gift and doesn't immediately say, "I don't want it," the gift is acquired by that person, even if they later scream that they don't want it. However, if someone else accepted the gift on their behalf and they were in the room and did not protest, there is a debate between Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel and the rabbis about whether or not the gift is acquired. If on one's deathbed, one promised different amounts of money to a few different people in one sentence, it is assumed that the person intended to gift it to them each at the same time. Therefore, if a creditor of the deceased comes to collect a debt, it is collected proportionally from each of them, depending on the amount they were given. However, if the person promised the gift in a particular order, the creditor collects first from the one who received last, and then from the second-to-last, etc. If on one's deathbed one said he was giving an amount of money to one who was "owed" money by them (i.e. a firstborn, wife, or creditor), was the intention to return the money owed or was this a gift in addition to money owed. This depends on how the promise was worded. If he said, "as is appropriate for him/her," the money is considered an addition to what was owed. But if the promise was "for his portion as a firstborn/for her ketuba, then the son/wife receiving can choose to accept either the amount of money promised on the deathbed or the double portion/ketuba. If it is a creditor, the amount promised is taken for the debt. Rav Nachman explains that this is based on Rabbi Akiva's position that if one adds unnecessary words, they must be adding something. Therefore, when one says "as is appropriate," it is understood to be adding something more than what was owed. If on one's deathbed one says that someone owes him/her money, can witnesses document the statement without verifying? Is there a concern the court will act upon it without checking into it (therefore the witnesses can't write it) or can we assume the court will do their homework (and therefore the witnesses can write it)? According to a braita, Rabbi Meir holds that it can be written without verifying and therefore when the heirs want to collect based on the document, they must prove they are owed the money. The rabbis hold that it cannot be written unless it is verified and therefore do not require any further proof to collect. However, Rav Nachman explains that there is a different version of the braita that Rabbi Meir says the document cannot be written based on the statement of the person on their deathbed, whereas the rabbis permit. He further explains that Rabbi Meir is concerned about a court that may rule without checking for further proof and therefore the document should not be written. The ruling is that we are not concerned that a court will err and not check into the details. However, this is true for a case of witnesses, not for a previous court ruling. If a court supervises a chalitza or mi'un, they must check the details carefully as a later court will rely on it, permitting a woman to remarry, without checking that it was all done properly. However, a document signed by witnesses testifying to what a person said on their deathbed can be written without checking the details, as the court will check the veracity of the contents of the document before ruling based on it.

    45 min
  2. 2 DAYS AGO

    Bava Batra 137 - Shabbat November 9, 8 Cheshvan

    In resolving a contradiction between two braitot, the Gemara answers that there is a tannaitic debate (between Rebbi and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel) regarding the same issue that Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish were debating - when one acquires the produce do they acquire rights to the property itself, meaning do they have rights to sell it? The case where they disagree is one who promised one's possession to one person and after that person's death, they will go to another person and after them to a third person. If the first person sold the property, would the second person be able to demand the property after the death of the first person? Rebbi holds a sale of the property would be invalid. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds that the sale would be valid even though in the case discussed, he thinks one should not be able to sell it ab initio. Rabbi Yochanan held like Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel with one exception. He also added a few cases that would be included within this ruling.   If one received an etrog as a gift that was to be passed on after their death to another or taken from the estate's funds before they were divided, is one able to fulfill the mitzva or not? While in the former case, they can fulfill the mitzva, Rebbi and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel would disagree about whether they could sell the etrog. Is a gift given upon the condition that it be returned considered a gift? Can one fulfill a mitzva with an etrog that they received in this manner?

    36 min
  3. 2 DAYS AGO

    Bava Batra 136 - November 8, 7 Cheshvan

    What is the language in a document that makes it clear that the document itself only served to strengthen the commitment of the person on their deathbed, and was not meant as a document necessary for affected the transaction? What wording must be used to designate one's property to others in his lifetime when he is healthy? Rabbi Yehuda holds that one must write "From today and after my death." Rabbi Yossi does not require adding "From today." Once this is written, the property is considered to belong to the recipient, while the proceeds belong to the giver. Can either of them sell their rights to their share? Why does the language of "From today and after my death" work here, but it is not effective in a divorce document? Raba bar Avuha accepted Rabbi Yossi's opinion because the date on the document makes it clear that it is in effect from the date it was written, even without adding the words "from today." If an act of acquiring was performed from the giver to witnesses on behalf of the recipient, this would preclude the need for writing "from today," even according to Rabbi Yehuda. However, there is a debate about whether this applies across the board or is it dependent on the language used in the document. If the recipient sells their rights and then predeceases the giver, does the buyer acquire the property upon the giver's death or does it revert to the giver's heirs? Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish disagree on this based on a debate about whether one who acquires proceeds to an item (in this case the giver retains rights to the proceeds) is considered the main owner of the item. They debate this issue in another case as well. Why is there a need to mention their debate here if it could be inferred from the other case? To answer this question, the Gemara explains why one could have differentiated between the cases. Rabbi Yochanan raises a difficulty from a braita on Reish Lakish's position, but it is resolved.

    45 min
  4. 3 DAYS AGO

    Bava Batra 135 - November 7, 6 Cheshvan

    Two statements in the name of Rabbi Yochanan contradicted each other. In one he ruled that a husband is believed to say he divorced his wife and in the other, he is not believed. The resolution was that the former meant that we accept his statement regarding her status from this moment forward and the latter is retroactive. Despite this resolution, Rava was unwilling to rule using this principle in a case that was before him where a man said his wife was exempt from levirate marriage (and should be believed since he could have said he divorced her) and preferred to be stringent and require chalitza. In another case, where it was presumed the man had no brothers and as he was dying, he also said he had no brothers. Abaye was stringent as there were rumors that there were people far away who could testify that he had brothers. Even though in the case of a woman taken captive, Rabbi Chanina did not forbid her to her husband based on rumors that people far away could testify that she engaged in relations with her captors, Abaye distinguishes between that case and this one. The Mishna brought a case where one brother claimed they had another brother, but the other brothers denied the claim. The Gemara establishes that the other brothers must have said "We don't know if he is our brother," meaning, their claim was one of uncertainty. This qualification is meant to explain why they receive an inheritance from that brother if they deny he is their brother. Can we learn from here regarding other cases where one has a confident claim (bari) and the other is unsure (shema), such as, one claimed money from another and the other responded, "I don't know if I owe you"? If the comparison is true, the ruling would be that the claimant who is unsure would not have to pay, like the brothers who do not have to give up their inheritance to the others. Rava agrees with this comparison, but Abaye denies it and rather compares our case to one where the confident claim is that the other owes money to a third party, not to the claimant. In the ruling of the Mishna, if the brother whose status is unclear dies, the property he received from the inheritance from one of the brothers is returned to that brother. Rava asks what happens if the property goes up in value. Would the brother receive the added value as well or would it be like money that the brother in question acquired on his own, which would be divided evenly between all the brothers? If one has a will wrapped around one's leg at the timeof death, it is invalid, even if it is later found in the hands of the person to whom the money was promised in the will. But if before the person died, they transferred ownership of the document to someone else, it is valid. What wording must be used to designate one's property to others in his lifetime when the person is healthy? The person needs to say, "From today and after my death. If one intended to transfer money to another using a document, i.e. on one's deathbed one said, "Write and give this document to...," if the person dies before the document was given, we do not write and give the document as one cannot transfer items using a document after one's death. However, if it is clear that the document was intended just as proof of the property transfer, one can write and give the document even after the person dies.

    46 min
  5. 5 DAYS AGO

    Bava Batra 133 - November 5, 4 Cheshvan

    Some cases are brought, with different circumstances, where the wife received property from the husband with her children and the rabbis deliberated whether she was able to also demand her ketuba money. Rav Huna explained that if a person on their deathbed wrote all of his property to another without specifying a language of inheritance or gift, we see whether the heir was a relative or not. If the heir was a relative who was in line to inherit, they received it as inheritance. If not, they receive it as a gift. Rav Nachman questions Rav Huna, "Why didn't you say directly that you hold by Rabib Yochanan ben Broka!" Rav Nachman answers his own question by quoting a case where the ruling was worded in the same way as Rav Huna's ruling. Still, it was unclear what was the relevance of the inheritance/gift differentiation in both rulings. Rav Ada bar Ahava suggested that the ramification was whether the deceased widow could demand food supplements from the heir. However, Rava rejected this suggestion and explained the ramifications - if the deceased had promised it only to the heir until their death, and after the property would go to someone else. If it is considered an inheritance, this statement is disregarded, but if it is a gift, it is upheld. Is it permitted to bypass one's son's inheritance and give one's property to someone else? Does it make a difference if the son does not behave appropriately or does not behave appropriately toward the father? Is there a debate about the latter question in the Mishna or do both tannaim agree? Two sources are brought to answer this question. The first source explains that Yosef ben Yoezer bypassed his son and a story is told about the aftermath. However, the story is inconclusive regarding this question as there are two different versions of the punchline of the story. A second source, a statement of Shmuel to Rav Yehuda, proves that there is a debate between the tannaim. Another story is told of one who bypassed his sons and passed his inheritance to Yonatan ben Uziel who in turn returned a third of it to the sons. Shamai attacks him for doing it but he proves to Shamai that he was correct.

    48 min
  6. 6 DAYS AGO

    Bava Batra 132 - November 4, 3 Cheshvan

    If one wrote all of his possessions to his wife it assumed that the man intended only to appoint her as a steward and wrote it in that manner so that the recipients of the will would respect the executor. Would this be the case only if he wrote it on his deathbed or would it apply even if it was written when the husband was healthy? The answer to this question is brought from a braita relating to a case where the husband wrote to give his wife all of his property and on account of a debt of the husband, the property was collected from the wife, does she forfeit the right to collect her ketuba. Although there is a debate about this, it is clear that if he wrote to give her all of his property, she inherits it all and is not appointed to be a steward. First, the Gemara assumes that it is a case where the husband is not on his deathbed, as on his deathbed, she would be appointed to be a steward. However, this answer is rejected as the rule on one's deathbed has some exceptions, like a woman who was only betrothed or divorced. If the case was in one of those situations, then it could have been even if he was on his deathbed, thus leaving the original question unanswered. Rav Nachman ruled in the ketuba case above that the woman forfeits her right to collect the ketuba when she accepts all of the husband's property. A difficulty is raised from a braita, from a different case where Rav Nachman ruled that we assess one's intention and allow one's possessions to be returned, which we do not do by the woman regarding her ketuba. It was resolved by differentiating between the cases. A Mishna in Peah is quoted, as later Rava will ask if the ruling also applies only if it was done on a man's deathbed or even if he was healthy. If a husband writes all of his possessions to his son and gives his wife any size portion of land, she loses her right to her ketuba. Three amoraim suggest different explanations for this puzzling ruling - each suggesting that the woman indicated (although not explicitly) her acceptance of this arrangement. The Gemara quotes the continuation of the Mishna to raise a difficulty on the three opinions as Rabbi Yossi holds that even if the husband did not write a document to her granting her the land, but the woman accepts it she gives up her rights. This implies that the first tanna requires both a written document and the woman's explicit consent. There is no resolution to the difficulty against the three amoraim. Rav Nachman ruled that the woman forfeits her right to collect the ketuba in the case described above. He explained that the woman is willing to give up these rights as the husband made her his partner is dividing the property to the sons and this affords her honor on account of which she is willing to forfeit her right to her ketuba. Rava asked if this ruling applies also to a man who divided his property in this manner when he was healthy, or only on his deathbed. The Gemara explains the two sides of the question but leaves the question unresolved.

    45 min

About

Hadran.org.il is the portal for Daf Yomi studies for women. Hadran.org.il is the first and only site where one can hear a daily Talmud class taught by a woman. The classes are taught in Israel by Rabbanit Michelle Cohen Farber, a graduate of Midreshet Lindenbaum’s scholars program with a BA in Talmud and Tanach from Bar-Ilan University. Michelle has taught Talmud and Halacha at Midreshet Lindenbaum, Pelech high school and MATAN. She lives in Ra’anana with her husband and their five children. Each morning the daf yomi class is delivered via ZOOM and then immediately uploaded and available for podcast and download. Hadran.org.il reaches women who can now have access to a woman’s perspective on the most essential Jewish traditional text. This podcast represents a revolutionary step in advancing women’s Torah study around the globe.

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