Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran Michelle Cohen Farber

Today’s daf is sponsored by the Hadran Women of Long Island in loving memory of Joan Behrmann a”h, beloved mother of our friend and co-learner Marcy Behrmann Farrell. "Marcy’s passion for truth and equity has deep roots, and we daven that our learning will serve as a merit for the entire family. המקום ינחם אותם בתוך שאר אבלי ציון וירושלים."
After two failed attempts at understanding the case in the Mishna where interest is forbidden by rabbinic law, Rava brings an explanation according to Rabbi Oshaya's braita and according to Rabbi Yannai's opinion - that one can turn a loan of money into a loan of produce. If the borrower has the item in his/her possession, even if the price goes up, there is no concern for interest. Rav disagrees with Rabbi Yannai and holds that one cannot turn a loan for an item into the value of that item and return the value in money as it appears like interest. How can Rav explain the braita of Rabbi Oshaya per his opinion? Two explanations are given - either the braita is referring to a case where the borrower designated a corner and placed the produce there or it follows the unique opinion of Rabbi Yehuda that a transaction where there is potential for interest but it is not clear that there will be an interest payment is permitted, as perhaps maybe prices will stay the same or go down and the lender will not receive more. Rava infers from Rabbi Yannai's position why it is permitted to pay in advance for produce and receive it later, even if the seller does not have it yet in his/her possession. Since the seller has the money and could potentially buy produce with that money, it is considered as if the seller has the produce. This, however, would only work in a sale, not a loan. Rabba and Rav Yosef give a different reason why this kind of sale works even if the price goes up and the buyer will receive produce later at a higher value. The benefit of receiving produce at a higher value is not a benefit as the buyer can say, "If I hadn't given the money to the seller (to receive the produce at a later date), I could have bought the produce from a different seller at the time and they would have increased in value in my possession." Two difficulties are raised with Rabba and Rav Yosef. Why wouldn't this argument permit loaning a seah of grain for a seah of grain? Isn't it a benefit to the buyer that there was no extra payment for a middleman? Both difficulties are resolved. Rabba and Rav Yosef require a buyer who pays in advance to receive produce later, at the current rate, to meet the seller on the threshing floor. For what purpose? Rav Nachman teaches that any case of getting payment for waiting is considered interest and he brings an example of one who discounts a price for receiving the money upfront. This would be permitted only if the seller has the items in his/her possession.

Today's daf is sponsored by Yechiel Berkowicz in loving memory of his mother Sara F. Berkowicz. "She was a holocaust survivor and strong supporter of Jewish education."
Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi Elazar engage in a debate over whether the court holds the authority to compel the return of interest payments collected at a fixed rate from the outset. Rabbi Eliezer supports his stance by referencing a verse from Vayikra 22:27, which concludes with "and your brother shall live with you," suggesting that one should return the interest to foster a harmonious relation with the borrower. However, Rabbi Yochanan interprets this verse differently, aligning it with Rabbi Akiva's opinion in his dispute with Ben Petura regarding the scenario of two individuals traveling with only one canteen of water. In this dilemma, where the water is insufficient for both to survive, is it preferable for each to consume half and neither will cause the death of the other, or for the canteen owner to drink it all and survive. Two sources are cited to challenge Rabbi Yochanan's view that the court lacks the authority to enforce the lender to return the interest collected. These objections are somewhat reconciled to support Rabbi Yochanan's position. Rav Safra, aligning with Rabbi Elazar, delineates between interest payments that the court can compel the lender to return and those that they cannot. Although Abaye and Ravina initially raise objections to Rav Safra's distinction, these concerns are eventually resolved. The initial Mishna of the chapter presents a case of interest prohibited by the rabbis. However, it conflicts with a subsequent Mishna within the same chapter. Raba and Abaye propose interpretations of the case details, but their explanations are ultimately rejected.

What is the source indicating that both the borrower and lender are prohibited from borrowing or lending on interest? Why did the Torah find it necessary to delineate separate negative commandments for interest, theft, and exploitation (ona’ah), rather than deriving one from the other, considering their similarities in taking what isn't rightfully theirs? Furthermore, why does the Torah mention the Exodus from Egypt in verses concerning interest, tzitzit, and using fair measurements in business? Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi Elazar debate whether the court can compel individuals who have collected interest at a fixed rate from the outset (ribit k’tzutza) to return the interest payments they received.

What practices are permissible in conducting an ethical business? Can one commingle produce from various fields or dilute wine before selling it? What criteria determine what is allowed or prohibited? What tactics are deemed acceptable or forbidden in a competitive commercial environment? Different rabbis offer varying perspectives on these questions. The fifth chapter delves into the laws of interest. The Mishna initiates the discussion by delineating what is interest that is prohibited by Torah law and by rabbinic law. The Gemara elucidates the terminology used in the Torah - neshech (interest causing a loss for the borrower) and marbit (interest generating gain for the lender) - and elucidates that both terms signify the existence of two negative commandments concerning lending or borrowing money with interest that both apply in all cases.

It is regarded as a grave transgression to humiliate another person. Some emphasize the prohibition against verbally abusing one's spouse, noting that maintaining food (financial stability) in the household is advisable to preserve harmony. While many prayers may not always find immediate acceptance, the prayers of those who have suffered verbal abuse will always be heard, and God will punish the perpetrators. The story of the oven of Achnai illustrates the potency of prayers from those who have endured verbal abuse. Rabbi Eliezer, who stood against the majority opinion of the rabbis and was subsequently excommunicated and mistreated, serves as a prime example. Despite presenting miraculous signs and even a heavenly voice affirming the correctness of his stance, Rabbi Yehoshua asserted, "It is not in heaven." This narrative underscores the authority of the rabbinic system to establish its own truths, even if they diverge from the absolute truth of God. However, mentioning this story in this context highlights the impact of words and how the mistreatment of Rabbi Eliezer ultimately led to the death of Rabban Gamliel through his prayers. The prohibition against abusing converts is emphasized, with the Torah warning against it in thirty-six (or forty-six) instances. This underscores the severity of the offense and the importance of treating converts with respect and dignity.

The Mishna established that in cases involving hekdesh (sanctified property), a shomer who watches for free is exempt from taking an oath, while a paid shomer is exempt from liability in cases of theft or loss. However, there are tannaitic sources that appear to contradict the Mishna, prompting various proposed resolutions. Rabbi Shimon distinguishes between different categories of sanctified items, arguing that some are subject to exploitation laws. Rabbi Yehuda excludes specific items from exploitation laws altogether. The Gemara elucidates both positions. The Mishna asserts that alongside the Torah prohibition against exploitation in monetary matters, there exists a Torah injunction against verbal abuse. Various examples are cited to underscore the severity of this offense, highlighting its gravity in Jewish law.