Controversy & Clarity Damien O'Connell

In this episode, we discuss the following topics.

 

*What drew Kendrick to study military innovation

 

*How he defines military innovation

 

*What conventional wisdom says about military innovation

 

*How innovation differs from adaption

 

*Some recent historical examples of military innovation

 

*Whether military innovation fails more often than it succeeds

 

*Popular instances of military innovation in the West

 

*Kendrick’s essay “Dangerous Changes: When Military Innovation Harms Combat Effectiveness” 

 

*What drives innovation in military organizations

 

*Warped innovation

 

*Incremental vs. radical innovation 

 

*What drew Kendrick to studying British armored warfare innovation during the Interwar Period and the British Army’s experiences in North Africa as a case of military innovation

 

*The US Army’s Pentomic Divisions 

 

*Guarding or hedging against dangerous innovations

 

*The claim that the character of war is changing rapidly

 

*Force Design 2030



*Communication strategies in support of military innovation efforts

 

*The innovator's dilemma as it applies to the military innovator

 

*Innovation and adaptation in Ukraine 

 

*Recommended books on military innovation and military effectiveness

 

*Defining and measuring military effectiveness

 

*The prospect of the US forces fighting another counterinsurgency war or low-intensity conflict 

 

*Kendrick’s upcoming articles



Links

“Dangerous Changes: When Military Innovation Harms Combat Effectiveness,” by Kendrick Kuo, International Security

https://direct.mit.edu/isec/article/47/2/48/113546/Dangerous-Changes-When-Military-Innovation-Harms

 

“The Future of Military Innovation Studies” by Adam Grissom, Journal of Strategic Studies (paywall)

https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01402390600901067?journalCode=fjss20

 

“What is a Military Innovation and Why It Matters” by Michael Horowitz and Shira Pindyck, Journal of Strategic Studies (paywall)

https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01402390.2022.2038572

 

“Aircraft Carriers Versus Battleships in War and Myth” with James R. FitzSimonds, YouTube

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hD43yEnbfL4

 

“Future Visions and Planned Obsolescence: Implementing 30-Year Horizons in Defense Planning” by Travis Reese and Dylan Phillips-Levine, CIMSEC

https://cimsec.org/future-visions-and-planned-obsolescence-implementing-30-year-horizons-in-defense-planning/

 

Steve Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military

https://a.co/d/88ckH5T

 

Military Innovation in the Interwar Period (revised edition) edited by Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett 

https://a.co/d/1gUNGcc

 

The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars by Barry Posen

https://a.co/d/dEJSypm

 

Technological Change and the Future of Warfare by Michael O’Hanlon

https://a.co/d/5NBsZl6

 

The Innovation Delusion: How Our Obsession with the New Has Disrupted the Work That Matters Most by Lee Vinsel and Andrew Russell 

https://a.co/d/gFFzzHH

 

The Shock Of The Old: Technology and Global History since 1900 by David Edgerton

https://a.co/d/6oaUtZk

 

“Superiority,” a short story by Arthur C. Clarke

https://www.baen.com/Chapters/1439133476/1439133476___5.htm


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Please visit: www.oarfoundation.org

 

In this episode, we discuss the following topics.



*Aaron’s thoughts on the two-year anniversary of Copperhead Company’s arrival at HKIA



*His experiences as a rifle platoon commander with the 26th MEU and combat advisor with TF Southwest and how these influenced the way he led at HKIA

 

*C/1/8’s deployment with the 24th MEU prior to heading to HKIA

 

*The company’s training and preparations for the NEO

 

*TDGs and the benefits they provide for learning ROEs

 

*How TDGs translated to real-world application at HKIA

 

*When C/1/8 first got news it was heading to Kabul for sure and the reaction of the Marines

 

*Aaron’s understanding of the situation on the ground before getting to HKIA

 

*C/1/8’s first day there, 15 August

 

*The company’s role in the fight for the airfield and perimeter security

 

*1/8’s employment of maneuver warfare concepts and tools

 

*Aaron’s reaction to the National Strike Unit’s clearing of the airfield 

 

*Instances where Coppehead Company came under fire

 

*Concerns that Coalition forces might have to carry out an “Alamo” operation in northern HKIA

 

*Aaron’s reaction to the news that Coalition forces would work with the Taliban

 

*Charlie Company’s opening of North and East Gates as evacuation control centers

 

*A detailed summary of events and commentary on gate operations at East Gate

 

*What it was like working with the Taliban

 

*The need to become emotionally hardened while working with the crowds 

 

*How these crowds could quickly become the enemy in situations

 

*Charlie Company’s fight to provide and maintain a sense of calm, order, and process for the crowd

 

*The appearance of the NSU at East Gate

 

*The concepts of unity of command and battlespace and their application at East Gate

 

*Special operators and special missions and the effects these had on gate operations 

 

*The decision to give up the picket line at East Gate

 

*The continued relevance of MCDP-1 Warfighting

 

*What C/1/8 was doing on 26 August, the day of the Abbey Gate Bombing, and how it responded to the situation

 

*The company’s actions between 27 August and its departure from HKIA

 

*The rules of engagement at HKIA

 

*What Aaron observed in himself and his Marines your Marines in the aftermath of the mission  

 

*His advice for future leaders on talking to their people about going through situations like HKIA

 

*The role of mental health checks, mental services, and other kinds of support

 

*What it was like returning home to Camp Lejeune

 

*The influence and role of cell phones at HKIA

 

*The demil efforts

 

*The order to clean up trash

 

*The ROEs at HKIA

 

*Aaron’s interactions with the State Department

 

*Support provided by the BLT’s engineer platoon

 

*The MEU’s Female Search Team?

 

*Creating and maintaining a culture of discipline within Charlie Company

 

*The roles that exhaustion and discipline played at HKIA

 

*The actions of Coppehead Company that make Aaron proudest 

 

*His self-assessment as a leader and decision-maker at HKIA

 

*The lessons he took away from HKIA, including those with potential implications for FD 2030

 

*Operating in a way that accounts for long-term implications of decisions

 

*The one thing Aaron would like Marines and other service members to know about what C/1/8 did at HKIA


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Link to Operation Allies Refuge (OAR) Foundation

 

OAR Foundation’s Instagram handle: OARfoundation

 

Lee’s Instagram handle: Leer_Bow

 

In this episode, we discuss the following topics.

 

*The skills and missions of EOD Marines

 

*How Lee’s previous five deployments shaped the way he led and made decisions at HKIA

 

*The people and organization of Blackbeard's EOD Section

 

*What Lee’s 2021 deployment with the 24th MEU looked like before heading to HKIA

 

*The section’s preparation for HKIA

 

*Lee’s preparations for the mission 



*Lee’s understanding of the situation on the ground before getting to HKIA

 

*Working with other US EOD teams

 

*The inherently joint nature of the NEO

 

*The missions of the Blackbeard teams that did not make it to HKIA



*The fall of the US embassy in Kabul

 

*Some of the challenges posed by the geometries of fire at HKIA

 

*Lee’s participation in trying to clear the runway

 

*His advice to service members who might find themselves in similar situations

 

*Lee’s reaction to Coalition forces partnering with the Taliban

 

*What Lee’s teams did 20-22 August

 

*His involvement in an incident where civilians risked overrunning the Military Terminal

 

*Widespread failures to inform refugees about each step of the evacuation process

 

*The value of Afghan refugees who spoke English and could serve as interpreters

 

*The atrophy of electronic countermeasure skills in the Marine Corps

 

*Finding large caches of weapons and ammo aboard HKIA

 

*The two holding areas at the airport

 

*Lee’s tour of the gates

 

*The frustration Lee felt as pressure built to evacuate as many refugees as possible while also conducting a joint tactical exfiltration 

 

*Being told by the JTF-CR staff that controlled detonations of gear and weapons were prohibited 

 

*The JTF’s decision to bury ammo and arms

 

*An incident involving friendly fire between 1/8 Marines and the NSU

 

*Blackbeard’s actions on the day of the Abbey Gate Bombing 

 

*Lee’s participation in a post-blast analysis at Abbey Gate 

 

*The performance of the units Blackbeard supported

 

*What Blackbeard’s teams did on 27-28 August

 

*Returning to Kuwait and what Lee observed in his Marines

 

*Lee’s advice to leaders on talking to their teammates about situations as harrowing as HKIA

 

*The role mental health checks, mental health services, and other kinds of support should play in the lives of HKIA veterans

 

*What it was like returning home to Camp Lejeune

 

*The influence of cell phones on operations at HKIA

 

*The demilitarization process

 

*Maneuver warfare concepts and tools used during the NEO

 

*Lee’s approach to leading Marines

 

*The command relationships at HKIA

 

*Serving alongside EOD techs from other countries

 

*The MEU’s Female Search Team

 

*The 2nd Recon element at HKIA

 

*Preserving the capacity of Blackbeard's section

 

*Logistical challenges during the NEO

 

*The most frustrating and rewarding aspects of the mission at HKIA

 

*The actions of Lee’s Marines at HKIA that make him proudest

 

*Lee's most challenging decision at HKIA

 

*Where he thinks he performed well as a leader and decision-maker and where he could have done better

 

*The lessons Lee took away from HKIA and how these might apply to the Marine Corps in the future in the context of FD 2030

 

*Lee’s thoughts on the role and value of decision games based on HKIA

 

*How well the Marine Corps has studied and learned from the Kabul NEO and, more generally, its experiences in Afghanistan

 

*Lee’s thoughts on the other Voices of HKIA podcasts 

 

*The one thing Lee would like Marines and other service members to know about what Blackbeard's section did at HKIA

 

*The Operation Allies Refuge Foundation


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Erik's Social Media Links

Twitter: https://twitter.com/Erikhistorian

Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/erikthehistorian

LinkedIn: ⁠https://www.linkedin.com/in/erikvillard/⁠



In this episode, we discuss the following topics.



*How Erik became a military historian

 

*Roleplaying games as training for military historians

 

*Which military historians influenced Erik most

 

*Becoming a digital military historian

 

*The creation of Vietnamwarhistoryorg

 

*What Erik’s ideal training for future military historians would look like

 

*Making military history useful to operational commands

 

*The US Army’s History and Heritage efforts

 

*Those Center for Military History (CMH) projects Erik finds most rewarding



*The challenges of writing official military history

 

*The monograph review process at CMH

 

*How studying military history provides literacy in evaluating sources

 

*The claim that military history is under siege in US universities

 

*Some of the giants of Vietnam War historiography in the English-speaking world

 

*Historical works that Erik recommends for US small unit leaders

 

*Small unit military history

 

*Unit historians (“5X” in the US Army)

 

*General William Westmoreland’s strategy in Vietnam

 

*Friction between Army and Marine Corps commands

 

*The controversy of Westmoreland’s single air manager concept

 

*1st Cavalry Division and 101st Airborne Division units in the Battle for Hue

 

*The possibility of North Vietnam capitulating

 

*Whether or not the US lost any battles during the war

 

*Why the Army lost the lessons of Vietnam

 

*Requests for historical materials in support of Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom

 

*The poor state of record keeping in US commands during the Global War on Terror

 

*Some of Erik’s solutions to that problem



Links

Combat Operations: Staying the Course, October 1967 to September 1968 by Erik Villard



The 1968 Tet Offensive Battles of Quang Tri City and Hue City by Erik Villard



U.S. Army Center of Military History


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In this episode, we discuss:



*Hayden’s experiences in 2/10 before joining the 24th MEU

 

*Becoming a battery XO as a second lieutenant 

 

*Easy Battery’s experiences with the 24th MEU prior to HKIA

 

*Initial indicators that the MEU might head to HKIA

 

*Easy Battery’s training and preparations for HKIA

 

*The challenge of knowing when to “flip the switch” of aggression and when to turn it off

 

*Assuming command of Easy Battery

 

*Hayden's understanding of the situation at HKIA before arriving

 

*The decision to leave the battery’s howitzers behind

 

*The influence of Marine Major Zach Schwartz on Hayden’s professional development

 

*Hayden’s first day at HKIA

 

*Easy Battery’s first mission

 

*Hayden’s initial observations of conditions at North Gate

 

*Turning over the battery’s positions to the 82nd Airborne

 

*Easy Battery’s occupation of the holding area

 

*The trying conditions of the holding area

 

*Managing 5,000 refugees with 99 Marines

 

*Handling riots

 

*The mental and emotional toll of working in the holding area

 

*The concept of surfaces and gaps at HKIA

 

*An incident involving suspected enemy artillery 

 

*Hayden’s experiences at Abbey Gate

 

*Easy Company’s activities before departing HKIA

 

*What Hayden observed in himself and his Marines while in Kuwait

 

*Hayden’s advice for small unit leaders on talking about traumatic events with their Marines

 

*The role of mental health support for veterans

 

*The role of cell phones and Signal Chat at HKIA

 

*The role of discipline

 

*The role of exhaustion and the need for tough, realistic training

 

*The most frustrating and rewarding aspects of Hayden’s time at HKIA

 

*Hayden’s self-assessment as a leader during the evacuation

 

*His lessons learned from the operation


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Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/damien-oconnell/support

In this episode, we discuss:



-What drew Col Reynolds to studying history 

 

-The value of history for the military professional

 

-Avoiding traps and pitfalls in studying and using history

 

-Studying at Oxford

 

-German General Ludwig Beck

 

-Doctrine in the German army (1914-1945)

 

-How the Marine Corps used history while Col Reynolds was a company-grade officer

 

-His time as a student at The Basic School (TBS)

 

-The state of the Marine Corps in the mid to late 1970s

 

-The decision to leave the Marine Corps and transitioning

 

-Col Reynold’s time in the Central Intelligence Agency

 

-His experiences at TBS as an individual mobilization augmentee

 

-How TBS had changed since his time as a student

 

-Tactical decision games (TDGs) and sand table exercises as intellectual revelations

 

-Writing good TDGs

 

-Col Reynold’s contest-winning article, “Turn on Your Lights!”

 

-Criticisms of studying and drawing from the 20th-century German military tradition



-Researching and writing Just Cause and A Skillful Show of Strength

 

-Serving as the officer-in-charge of Marine Corps Field History in Operation Iraqi Freedom-I

 

-Interviewing Marine and Coalition leaders in Iraq

 

-Writing Basrah, Baghdad, and Beyond

 

-Areas where Marine forces in Iraq could have improved

 

-The relief of Colonel Joe Dowdy, the commander of Regimental Combat Team-1

 

-The turnover of Tikrit from Task Force Tripoli to the US Army’s 4th Infantry Division

 

-The U.S. failure to adequately prepare for Phase IV (stability) operations

 

-How Marine Corps historians seem less critical of Marine leaders compared to Army historians writing about Army generals

 

-The controversy and conversation surrounding Force Design 2030 



Links



Colonel Reynold's website: https://www.nicholasreynoldsauthor.com

 

"Turn on Your Lights!" by Major Nicholas E. Reynolds, USMCR, Proceedings, November 1991



Fighting Power: German and U.S. Army Performance, 1939-1945 by Martin van Creveld

 

Just Cause: Marine Operations in Panama, 1988-1990 by Lieutenant Colonel Nicholas E. Reynolds, USMCR



A Skillful Show of Strength: US Marines in the Caribbean, 1991-1996 by Colonel Nicholas E. Reynolds, USMCR

 

U.S. Marines in Iraq, 2003: Basrah, Baghdad, and Beyond by Colonel Nicholas E. Reynolds, USMCR (Rett)

 

Writer, Sailor, Soldier, Spy: Ernest Hemingway's Secret Adventures, 1935-1961 by Nicholas Reynolds



Need to Know: World War II and the Rise of American Intelligence by Nicholas Reynolds


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