Practical Wisdom

Massimo Pigliucci
  • 5.0（12則評分）
  • 哲學
  • 每週更新
Practical Wisdom

Practical Wisdom is a short weekly podcast produced by Prof. Massimo Pigliucci of the City College of New York. The idea is to do a deep dive into some of the most crucial philosophical writings of a wide range of Greco-Roman authors in search of insights that may be useful for modern life. Available also on Apple, Google, and Spotify. thephilosophygarden.substack.com

  1. Plato on being friends without knowing what friendship is

    2月14日

    Plato on being friends without knowing what friendship is

    “‘Shall we assume, then, that … the bad is akin to the bad; the good to the good; and what is neither good nor bad to what is neither good nor bad?’ They said they thought it was so: each was akin to its counterpart. ‘In that case, boys,’ I said, ‘haven’t we fallen back into those first statements of ours about friendship, which we rejected, since one unjust man will be a friend to another unjust man, a bad man to another bad man, no less than one good man to another good man?’ ‘It would appear so,’ they said. … ‘Then I don’t know what more to say.’ With that I was intending to provoke another of the older men into speaking. Just then, like evil spirits, Lysis’s and Menexenus’s tutors came over with the boys’ brothers, called to them, and told them to come home; it was already late. … However, I did say, just as they were leaving, ‘Lysis and Menexenus, we’ve now made utter fools of ourselves, an old man like me and you, since these people will go away and say that we think that we’re friends of one another – for I consider myself one of your number – though we were not as yet able to find out precisely what a friend is.’” (Lysis, 222c-223b) Get full access to The Philosophy Garden: Stoicism and Beyond at thephilosophygarden.substack.com/subscribe

    5 分鐘
  2. Plato on loving things for the sake of other things

    2月7日

    Plato on loving things for the sake of other things

    “‘All right then,’ I said. ‘Now that we’ve got as far as this, boys, let’s be careful not to be deceived.’ … ‘Let’s consider the following case: medicine, we say, is a friend for the sake of health.’ ‘Yes.’ ‘Is health a friend too, then?’ ‘Of course.’ ‘If it is a friend, it is so for the sake of something.’ ‘Yes.’ ‘And that something is a friend, if it is to be consistent with what we admitted earlier.’ ‘Of course.’ ‘And that too, in its turn, will be a friend for the sake of a friend?’ ‘Yes.’ ‘Well then, aren’t we bound to get tired going on like that and give up, or else arrive at some point of origin which will not refer us to yet another friend, but which will constitute the first thing that is a friend, for the sake of which we say that all the others too are friends?’ ‘We are.’ … “Admittedly, we do often say that we value gold and silver highly, but that hardly comes any nearer the truth. What we value most highly is that thing (whatever it may reveal itself as being) for the sake of which both gold and everything else that is procured are procured. Shall we settle for that?’ ‘Of course.’” (Lysis, 219c-220a) The Philosophy Garden: Stoicism and Beyond is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. Get full access to The Philosophy Garden: Stoicism and Beyond at thephilosophygarden.substack.com/subscribe

    5 分鐘
  3. Plato on who really loves wisdom

    1月31日

    Plato on who really loves wisdom

    “‘That’s why we’d say that those who are already wise, whether they are gods or men, no longer love wisdom, and that those who are so ignorant that they are bad do not love wisdom either, because no bad or stupid man loves wisdom. So, we’re left with those who possess that bad thing, ignorance, but have not yet been rendered foolish or stupid by it, in that they still believe they don’t know what they don’t know. Consequently those who are still neither good nor bad do, in fact, love wisdom; whereas all those who are bad, as well as all those who are good, do not, because, as we decided earlier in our discussion, neither is opposite the friend of opposite, nor like of like. Don’t your remember?’ ‘Of course,’ they said. ‘So now, Lysis and Menexenus,’ I said, ‘we’ve done it! We’ve discovered what a friend is and what it is not. We say that in the soul, in the body and anywhere else, it is what is neither bad nor good that is the friend of the good because of the presence of bad.’ The two of them agreed wholeheartedly, admitting that it was so.” (Lysis, 218a-218c) The Philosophy Garden: Stoicism and Beyond is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. Get full access to The Philosophy Garden: Stoicism and Beyond at thephilosophygarden.substack.com/subscribe

    5 分鐘
  4. Plato on why friendship between bad people is not possible

    1月24日

    Plato on why friendship between bad people is not possible

    “‘Have you come across the writings of our wisest men, which say that like must always be friend to like? These are, of course, the men who discuss and write about nature and the universe.’ ‘That’s true,’ he said. ‘Well,’ I said, ‘are they right?’ ‘Possibly,’ he replied. … [But] ‘We think that the closer one wicked man gets to another wicked man and the more he associates with him, the more he becomes hated by him, because he wrongs him; and it is, of course, impossible for wronger and wronged to be friends, isn’t it?’ ‘Yes,’ he replied. … ‘Well then, in my opinion, Lysis, this is what people mean when they say, in their cryptic way, that like is friend to like: friendship exists only between good men, whereas the bad man never achieves true friendship with either a good or a bad man. Do you agree?’ He nodded assent.” (Lysis, 214b-214d) The Philosophy Garden: Stoicism and Beyond is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. Get full access to The Philosophy Garden: Stoicism and Beyond at thephilosophygarden.substack.com/subscribe

    4 分鐘
  5. Epicurus on justice and injustice

    1月10日

    Epicurus on justice and injustice

    “The justice that seeks nature’s goal is a utilitarian pledge of men not to harm each other or be harmed. Nothing is either just or unjust in the eyes of those animals that have been unable to make agreements not to harm each other or be harmed. … Justice was never an entity in itself. It is a kind of agreement not to harm or be harmed. It is impossible for a person who underhandedly breaks the agreement not to harm or be harmed to feel sure that he will escape punishment, even though he manages to do so time after time; for up to the very end of his life he cannot be sure that he will actually escape. In its general meaning, justice is the same for all because of its utility in the relations of men to each other, but in its specific application to countries and various other circumstances it does not follow that the same thing is just for all. If somebody lays down a law and it does not prove to be of advantage in human relations, then such a law no longer has the true character of justice.” (Leading Doctrines, 31-38) The Philosophy Garden: Stoicism and Beyond is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. Get full access to The Philosophy Garden: Stoicism and Beyond at thephilosophygarden.substack.com/subscribe

    5 分鐘
  6. Epicurus on friendship

    1月3日

    Epicurus on friendship

    “Of all the things that wisdom provides for the happiness of the whole man, by far the most important is the acquisition of friendship. It is the same judgment that has made us feel confident that nothing fearful is of long duration or everlasting, and that has seen personal security during our limited span of life most nearly perfected by friendship.” (Leading Doctrines, 27-28) The Philosophy Garden: Stoicism and Beyond is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. Get full access to The Philosophy Garden: Stoicism and Beyond at thephilosophygarden.substack.com/subscribe

    4 分鐘
  7. Epicurus on the importance of sense perception

    2024/12/27

    Epicurus on the importance of sense perception

    “It is necessary to take into account both the actual goal of life and the whole body of clear and distinct perceptions to which we refer our judgments. If we fail to do this, everything will be in disorder and confusion. If you reject all sensations, you will not have any point of reference by which to judge even the ones you claim are false. … If at any time you fail to refer each of your acts to nature’s standard, and turn off instead in some other direction when making a choice to avoid or pursue, your actions will not be consistent with your creed.” (Leading Doctrines, 22-25) Get full access to The Philosophy Garden: Stoicism and Beyond at thephilosophygarden.substack.com/subscribe

    3 分鐘
  8. Epicurus on the limits of true pleasure

    2024/12/20

    Epicurus on the limits of true pleasure

    “Bodily pleasure is not enlarged once the pains brought on by need have been done away with; it is only diversified. And the limit of mental pleasure is established by rational reflection on pleasures themselves and those kindred emotions that once instilled extreme fear in human minds. Infinite time contains no greater pleasure than does finite time, if one determines the limits of pleasure rationally. … One who understands the limits of the good life knows that what eliminates the pains brought on by need and what makes the whole of life perfect is easily obtained, so that there is no need for enterprises that entail the struggle for success.” (Leading Doctrines, 18-21) The Philosophy Garden: Stoicism and Beyond is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. Get full access to The Philosophy Garden: Stoicism and Beyond at thephilosophygarden.substack.com/subscribe

    4 分鐘
顯示全部 (63)

評分與評論

5
（滿分 5 顆星）
12 則評分

簡介

Practical Wisdom is a short weekly podcast produced by Prof. Massimo Pigliucci of the City College of New York. The idea is to do a deep dive into some of the most crucial philosophical writings of a wide range of Greco-Roman authors in search of insights that may be useful for modern life. Available also on Apple, Google, and Spotify. thephilosophygarden.substack.com

資訊

  • 創作者
    Massimo Pigliucci
  • 活躍年代
    2023年 - 2025年
  • 集數
    63
  • 年齡分級
    兒少適宜
  • 版權
    © Massimo Pigliucci
  • 節目網站
    Practical Wisdom

你可能也會喜歡

若要收聽兒少不宜的單集，請登入帳號。

隨時掌握此節目最新消息

登入或註冊後，即可追蹤節目、儲存單集和掌握最新資訊。
選取國家或地區

非洲、中東和印度

亞太地區

歐洲

拉丁美洲與加勒比海地區

美國與加拿大