Exploring Offshore Litigation

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Exploring Offshore Litigation is a captivating podcast series containing audio of written blog content that dives deep into the intriguing world of offshore litigation, including the BVI and Cayman. Each episode sails through complex legal waters, bringing you up-to-date analysis of recent high-stakes cases and expert commentary from the leading minds in this specialised field. Our episodes demystify legal jargon and break down complex cases to make them accessible to all. Harneys, an international law firm with entrepreneurial thinking, brings each episode to you.

  1. 2D AGO

    The Privy Council closes with a wide

    A long-standing question in offshore trust practice concerns the role of the protector and the nature of their power. When a trust instrument requires a protector's consent before trustees can act, does the protector simply check that the trustees' decision is lawful and rational, or can the protector form its own independent view on whether the proposed course of action serves the beneficiaries' interests? These two competing positions have become known as the "Narrow Role" and the "Wider Role." Under the Narrow Role, the protector satisfies itself only that a reasonable and properly informed body of trustees could lawfully take the decision in question and, if so, must consent. Under the Wider Role, the protector may decide for itself whether to consent by reference to its own assessment of the beneficiaries' interests and the merits of the proposal, even where the trustees' decision is perfectly rational. This debate, which has divided courts and commentators across trust jurisdictions, has now been squarely addressed by the Privy Council in A and 6 Others v C and 13 Others (Bermuda) [2026] UKPC 11. Facts and judicial history The case arose from a group of family settlements, many of which had been amended in the early to mid-1990s. Those amendments introduced common-form protector provisions requiring the protector's prior written consent for two categories of high-impact decision: capital appointments and dealings with (including the voting of) what were called "Specified Securities" (primarily a large, coordinated shareholding in a family operating company). The trustees proposed a substantial reorganisation that would allocate the trusts' aggregate assets between two family branches in a broadly two-thirds to one-third split. The protectors, having been consulted, indicated they were minded not to approve the proposal. Their objection was not that the trustees' proposal was unlawful or irrational, but rather that, in their own independent assessment, the proposal did not best serve the beneficiaries' interests. This distinction went to the heart of the dispute: under the narrow view, if the protectors could only withhold consent on the basis of the legality and rationality of the trustee's proposed action, and there were no legality or rationality concerns in this proposed split, then the protector's objection had no proper basis; whereas, under the wider view, if the Protector's could bring their own judgment to bear on the merits, it did have proper basis. The trustees responded by seeking the Bermuda court's blessing under Public Trustee v Cooper jurisdiction and, subsequently, a declaration on the proper scope of the protector's role. At first instance, Justice Kawaley held that the protector possessed only the Narrow Role. The reasoning emphasised the trustees' paramount substantive powers, the ancillary character of the consent requirement, the unanimity requirement among joint protectors, and concerns that a Wider Role would create duplication and deadlock. The Court of Appeal for Bermuda affirmed, describing the protector as a "watchdog" whose function was to supervise trustee legality and rationality rather than to substitute its own independent judgment. The appeal to the Privy Council squarely presented the same binary choice. One branch of the family contended for the Wider Role; the other urged the Narrow Role. The trustees and protectors remained neutral. The Privy Council's decision The Board's reasoning proceeded in two stages. First, it addressed the correct analytical framework. Second, it applied that framework to the particular trust instruments before it. The Board's starting point was to reject the premise that courts must choose a single, universal "default role" for protectors in the abstract. Instead, the proper question is always one of construction: what constraints, if any, does the particular trust instrument impose on the protector when exercising a power of consent, bearing in mind any ...

    9 min

  2. MAR 13

    Unfair prejudice remedies: Is limitation dead?

    In THG Plc v Zedra Trust Company, the UK Supreme Court, by 4-1, overturned the Court of Appeal and held that no statutory limitation period applies to unfair prejudice petitions under section 994 of the Companies Act 2006 (the CA). Relevant legal provisions Section 994 of the CA allows a shareholder in a company to petition to the court for a remedy on grounds that the company's affairs are being or have been conducted in a manner that is unfairly prejudicial to the interests of members generally or some of its members, or that an actual or proposed act or omission of the company is or would be unfairly prejudicial. If unfairly prejudicial conduct is established, the court may grant a variety of relief that it thinks fit pursuant to section 996 of the CA, including the payment of compensation. Meanwhile, the Limitation Act of 1980 (the 1980 Act) governs time limits for bringing proceedings in a court of law. Section 8 of the 1980 Act provides that unless an action for which a shorter period of limitation is prescribed elsewhere in the Act, "[a]n action upon a speciality shall not be brought after the expiration of twelve years from the date on which the cause of action accrued." Under Section 9 of the 1980 Act, "An action to recover any sum recoverable by virtue of any enactment shall not be brought after the expiration of six years from the date on which the cause of action accrued." Finally, Section 36 of the 1980 Act disapplies the limitation periods in sections 8 and 9 for "any claim for specific performance of a contract or for an injunction or for other equitable relief", except where the court applies such time limit by analogy in limited circumstances. Background Zedra acquired a 13.2% stake in THG plc in 2011 when it was a private company under the name of The Hut Group Ltd. In 2019, Zadra filed a petition to the court under section 994 of the CA, alleging that the conduct of THG's affairs was unfairly prejudicial to it in a number of respects. In 2022, Zadra sought to amend its petition to include an allegation that it was unfairly prejudiced by being excluded from a bonus issue of shares made more than six years earlier to some shareholders, seeking equitable compensation for its alleged loss. THG opposed the amendment, arguing that it was "an action to recover any sum recoverable by virtue of any enactment" and therefore time-barred by section 9 of the 1980 Act. The High Court held that the 1980 Act does not impose any limitation period to petitions under section 994 of the CA and as such, the amendment was not time-barred and should be allowed. On appeal, the Court of Appeal ruled that all petitions under section 994 of the CA are subject to a 12-year limitation period under section 8 of the 1980 Act and that claims for monetary relief under section 994 are subject to a six-year limitation period under section 9. As the only remedy Zedra sought was compensation, its claim fell within section 9 and was therefore time-barred. Zedra appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that neither section 8 nor 9 of the 1980 Act applied to an unfair prejudice petition. Judgment In a 4-1 majority decision, the Supreme Court allowed Zedra's appeal, holding that a claim under section 994 is neither an "action upon a speciality" under section 8 of the Limitation Act, nor an "action to recover any sum recoverable by virtue of any enactment" under section 9 of the Act. The central issue in this case on appeal is whether any limitation period applies to unfair prejudice petitions under section 994 of the CA. The Supreme Court decided that: Under section 8 of the 1980 Act, "an action upon a speciality" is, in essence, an action to enforce an obligation which is created by a deed or a statute. Section 994 of the CA, however, does not create any obligations but merely provides for remedies and rights of petition if there is or has been unfair prejudice in the conduct of a company's affairs. Hence, a claim under section 994 is not an acti...

    11 min

  3. MAR 12

    Mistakes happen but the court is here to help – Bermuda court sets aside trustee's tax-blind distribution

    In Conyers Trust Company (Bermuda) Limited (as trustee of the First Trust) v The Protector of the Second Trust, the Supreme Court of Bermuda exercised its power to set aside a trustee's mistaken exercise of its fiduciary powers to unwind a transaction which would have resulted in unintended tax implications. The trustee was the trustee of two related trusts, the A Trust and the B Trust. As part of a restructuring, the trustee, acting in its capacity as trustee of the B Trust, entered into a phased transaction which entailed the distribution of all the assets of the B Trust to a beneficiary. Thereafter, the beneficiary made a gift of those assets to the trustee in its capacity as trustee of the A Trust. The final step of the transaction was the amendment of the A Trust to reflect the terms of the restructuring. However, the trustee had not taken appropriate UK tax advice before exercising its power to make the distribution to the beneficiary. Had the trustee done so, it would have realised that the distribution would attract unnecessary additional tax liabilities, and it would not have exercised its power in the way that it did. As a result, the trustee applied to the court under section 47A of the Trustee Act 1975 for an order to set aside its exercise of its power and consequential declaratory relief that the distribution from the B Trust to the beneficiary be treated as never having occurred. In order to engage the court's jurisdiction under section 47A, the trustee was required to satisfy the court that (i) when exercising the fiduciary power it did not take into account a consideration of fact or law that was relevant to the exercise of the power and (ii) but for the failure to take that consideration into account the trustee would not have exercised the power at all or would have done so on a different occasion or would have exercised the power in a different manner. Where those conditions are met, the court has a broad and unfettered jurisdiction to set aside the exercise of the fiduciary power either wholly or in part without there being any need to demonstrate that the power was exercised in breach of trust. The effect of making such an order is that the exercise of the relevant power is treated as never having occurred. The evidence demonstrated that the trustee did not take into account a relevant consideration, namely the effect of an aspect of UK tax law, before exercising its power to make the distribution. Had the trustee taken such tax advice, the trustee would not have exercised its power in the way that it did. Consequently, the court found that the conditions for relief under section 47A were met and set aside the exercise of the trustee's power and granted a declaration that the distribution from the B Trust to the beneficiary be treated as if it had never occurred. This decision is a useful reminder to trustees of the care that must be taken when exercising their powers. However, where transactions are entered into under a mistaken understanding of their effect, Bermuda's statutory regime (along with similar ones which exist in the British Virgin Islands and the Cayman Islands) is helpful in enabling trustees to seek the court's assistance to unwind those transactions to avoid unintended consequences.

    4 min

  4. MAR 6

    Stay denied: BVI Court of Appeal reaffirms threshold for a stay in US$40 million shareholder dispute Background The Court of Appeal's decision Practical implications

    In a previous blog post, we discussed the first instance judgment in the Phoenix BVI litigation, where Justice Mangatal considered the formalities for becoming a shareholder under s49 of the BVI Business Companies Act, Revised Edition 2020 (BCA). That judgment has now been appealed, with an accompanying application for a stay of execution. On 27 February 2026, in ICM SPC v Jarvis, the Court of Appeal refused the stay. The judgment restates the C-Mobile Services Ltd v Huawei Technologies Co Ltd criteria for stay relief and offers guidance on credibility-based appeals, the limits of using stays as leverage in foreign proceedings and impecuniosity arguments. Phoenix Commodities PVT Ltd (Phoenix BVI) was placed into voluntary liquidation in April 2020. The joint liquidators (JLs) settled a list of members which included Ancile Special Opportunity and Recovery Fund Segregated Portfolio (ASOR), a segregated portfolio of ICM SPC (ICM), a Cayman Islands company. ASOR disputed its shareholder status, arguing that neither it nor any authorised agent had agreed in writing to become a shareholder. The judge at first instance dismissed this application, finding that ASOR had so agreed through its representative. The JLs subsequently issued a call to ASOR for over US$40 million (Call). ICM appealed and sought a stay of the first instance judgment, Order and the Call, though it later narrowed its stay application to the judgment and Order only. Meanwhile, the JLs served a statutory demand on ICM in the Cayman Islands and filed a winding-up petition. The Court of Appeal dismissed the stay application with costs. It applied the five settled principles from C-Mobile Services Ltd in determining ICM's application: consider all circumstances;treat stays as exceptional;require cogent evidence of stifling;apply a balance of harm test; andassess prospects only where strong grounds exist. On its appeal prospects, ICM failed to demonstrate a realistic chance of success. While the appeal raised questions about the interpretation and application of s49 of the BCA, the trial judge's findings were heavily influenced by credibility assessments – in particular, her observations that ICM's main witness was "inconsistent, incredible and convoluted" – and appellate courts are traditionally reluctant to disturb such findings absent exceptional circumstances. On stifling, even if ICM were wound up, then the liquidators could pursue the appeal if they considered it meritorious. ICM's evidence regarding its concerns that a winding up order would result in reputational harm and irreparable damage to itself and a second segregated portfolio, fell short of demonstrating that those fears would actually be realised. On balance of harm, Phoenix BVI's creditors had waited nearly six years for the liquidation to complete. Their prejudice from further delay outweighed ICM's. While a winding-up would mean ICM's "death", liquidators could pursue the appeal alongside their other duties. The Court was also critical of ICM's true objective: using the stay to influence the Cayman winding-up proceedings. This had "unflattering optics" and amounted to seeking a "coercive measure in extra-territorial proceedings". In any event, the BVI judgment has no binding force on the Cayman Islands Court; it is merely persuasive, to be treated as a matter of judicial comity. Finally, impecuniosity was not relied upon, but the Court observed that any such argument requires cogent evidence of means, failing which the application would be "irremediably undermined". This case affirms the five C-Mobile Services criteria for stay applications. Three key takeaways: First, appeals challenging credibility-based findings face a steep uphill battle. Absent exceptional circumstances, appellate courts will not disturb them.Second, courts will scrutinise the true purpose behind a stay application. Using stay relief to gain leverage in foreign proceedings will not be tolerated.Third, impecuniosity argument...

    6 min

  5. FEB 16

    English High Court considers tests for worldwide freezers and duty of full and frank disclosure There were several grave failings in the presentation of the applicant's case The court determined that

    In Lakhany v Hasan, the English High Court* discharged a worldwide freezing order (WFO) for an applicant's failure to adequately discharge their "full and frank" disclosure duty. This case is a welcome reminder of the consequences for artificially elevating a general suspicion of dissipation to a "real risk" before the court. The facts concerned a contractual dispute over an alleged debt of approximately GBP1 million. The remaining background is of only tangential interest: the key takeaway for litigators is how the "real risk of dissipation" was presented to the court. Despite the respondent having relocated from the UK to Pakistan in December 2024 (and contemporaneously informing the applicant's solicitors of this), the applicant gave misleading evidence that the relocation took place months later in March 2025. The applicant invited the court to infer that the respondent had fled the UK to avoid the consequences of any adverse judgment; In respect of a London-based property which the applicant wanted to injunct for the purposes of potential future enforcement, the applicant took four weeks to act on a property alert (being a search to protect a pending purchase) but nonetheless described the alleged risk of dissipation as "compelling". No explanation was given for the delay between the search and the filing of the injunction application (or indeed the hearing of said application, which took place a further four weeks later); and The applicant alleged that the respondent (a) had control over the property; and (b) was seeking to "liquidate his only asset within the jurisdiction" in circumstances where a reasonable public search would have revealed this to be inaccurate: the London-based property was neither the respondent's asset, nor under his control (following the appointment of an LPA receiver on 11 August 2020). To compound the misleading presentation of the case, the applicant's skeleton argument stated that no response to the application for injunctive relief had been received when, in fact, the application had not even been served on the respondent. The Judge hearing the application, unconvinced that the facts supported a conclusion that a risk of dissipation existed, adjourned the hearing to hear from the respondent, but the respondent – by then living abroad – only received two days' clear notice of the adjourned hearing. The hearing proceeded in his absence (despite some informal written representations being made) and the WFO was granted. Remarkably, the applicant's procedural inadequacies persisted post-hearing: neither (a) the transcript of the freezing injunction hearing; nor (b) the subsequent judgment itself were provided to the respondent for over 18 weeks. That transcript recorded the fact that the claimant was only seeking a freezing order in respect of the London property, and not a WFO (as had been granted). When the respondent was provided with a copy of the freezing order on 2 July 2025, he was therefore unaware of the basis upon which the WFO was sought and obtained. In these circumstances, the WFO (granted before the inconsistencies became apparent) could not survive the applicant's complete failure to provide "full and frank" disclosure. As an aside, the applicant attracted further criticism by drafting a freezing order which (a) not only failed to set a return date, but (b) also failed to provide any exception for either (i) living; or (ii) legal expenses. Inadequate notice was given for the injunction hearing; The applicant made misleading representations about the respondent's move to Pakistan and failed to disclose that the property in question was under LPA receivers' control since August 2020; and There was no solid evidence establishing a risk of dissipation. In the circumstances, it's difficult to see how the court could have arrived at another conclusion. The test, of course, for a "real risk of dissipation" is whether "unless restrained by injunction, the defendant will dissipate or dis...

    6 min

  6. JAN 16

    Grand Court confirms inherent jurisdiction to compel parties to participate in ADR

    In the recent decision of Unicorn Biotech Ventures One Ltd v Unicorn Biotech Ventures Two Ltd the Grand Court has for the first time considered the issue of whether it has jurisdiction to compel parties to participate in alternative dispute resolution (ADR) against their wishes, and if so, what factors should be taken into account. The Grand Court held that it does have the power to do so and the ultimate test will be whether compelling participation in ADR has a real prospect of furthering the overriding objective by bringing about a fair, speedy and cost-effective solution to the dispute. The application arose in the context of two actions commenced by limited partners of an exempted limited partnership in which they sought declarations regarding the conduct of the fund by the general partner, and the winding up of the fund. There had been a complete breakdown in the personal relationships between those behind the corporate entities which are the LPs and GPs. Notwithstanding proximity to trial, the GP sought orders compelling the parties to attend a mediation at the same time that the parties were due to be exchanging witness statement and preparing for trial. The application raised two issues which had not previously been considered by the Grand Court. Does the Grand Court have the power to compel parties to attend mediation or other means of ADR against their wishes? The Grand Court, following the guidance set out by the English Court of Appeal in Churchill v Merthyr Tydfil, held that it does have inherent jurisdiction to compel parties to participate in ADR in a suitable case. The English Court had observed that courts regularly adjourn hearings and trials to allow the parties to discuss settlement and it would be absurd if they could not to do simply because one of the parties resisted the adjournment. In addition, the court has a long-established right to control its own process including by staying or delaying existing proceedings whilst a settlement process is underway. Justice Asif noted that by virtue of section 11 of the Grand Court Act, the Grand Court has the same jurisdiction as the High Court of Justice in England. His Lordship held that the decision in Churchill was of very persuasive value and should be applied in the Cayman Islands, and it is consistent with the overriding objective to assist the parties to a resolution of their dispute which may be quicker and cheaper than a court-based determination. What are the factors that the Court should consider in determining how to exercise its discretion? Examples of potentially relevant criteria (as raised in Churchill) include the form of ADR proposed, whether parties are represented, the urgency of the case and reasonableness of the delay caused by ADR, whether any delay would vitiate the claim or give rise to limitation issues, the costs of ADR in real terms, relative to the claim and parties' resources, whether there is any realistic prospect of resolution through ADR, any imbalance in bargaining power, and the reasons given by a party not wishing to mediate. However, Justice Asif held that the decision whether to order ADR is multifaceted and declined to lay down any particular criteria to be applied. Ultimately, the test is whether compelling participation in ADR has a real prospect of furthering the overriding objective by bringing about a fair, speedy and cost-effective solution to the dispute and the proceedings. It is not a balance of probabilities test but whether ADR would have a "real prospect of a useful outcome". Outcome The Grand Court declined to compel the parties to attend mediation. The Court considered that the positions taken by the parties to date, and the nature of the dispute and relief sought, meant there was no prospect that mediation would be successful. The GP's application was also late in the day and imposing a mediation at the same time that parties were preparing for trial would be a time-consuming distraction. Overall, the Cou...

    6 min

  7. JAN 5

    Privy Council abrogates Shareholder Rule and issues Willers v Joyce direction The facts The decisions below Origin and foundation for the Shareholder Rule The Board's decision: Should the Shareholder Rule continue in some form? Takeaways

    In Jardine Strategic Limited v Oasis Investment II Master Fund Ltd & Ors the Privy Council (on appeal from Bermuda) held on July 24 that the so-called "Shareholder Rule" should be abrogated. This rule provided that a company could not, in the course of litigation between a company and shareholders, withhold documents from inspection on the basis of legal advice privilege. The Board held that the original proprietary justification for the Shareholder Rule no longer exists and the company shareholder relationship is not one that falls into the joint privilege relationship family. The Board also held, pursuant to its Willers v Joyce jurisdiction (where the Privy Council, not being a court of the United Kingdom but comprising the same Justices those who sit in the House of Lords and the UK Supreme Court, may direct that its decision also represents the law of England and Wales), that the domestic courts of England and Wales should treat this decision as binding and part of the law of England and Wales. This decision is significant for common law jurisdictions – it is binding in Bermuda and England and Wales, and likely to be highly persuasive in other common law jurisdictions such as the Cayman Islands. It provides certainty to company directors seeking legal advice and, in the context of shareholder appraisal proceedings under section 106 of the Bermuda Companies Act (and likely also in the Cayman Islands in shareholder appraisal proceedings under section 238 of the Cayman Islands Companies Act), clarifies that companies are not required to produce legal advice obtained when setting fair value offered to dissenting shareholders. This is the second decision of the Privy Council arising out of the amalgamation of two companies within the Jardine Matheson group and section 106 proceedings issued by the dissenting shareholders seeking a fair value appraisal by the Court. In the present matter on appeal, the dissenting shareholders had sought discovery of legal advice that was given to the Jardine Matheson group when it was setting the $33 value which was offered as fair value to dissenting shareholders who had their shares cancelled. The Company asserted that the advice was covered by legal advice privilege. The dissenters asserted that where a party seeking to access the documents is a shareholder, that will override the usual rules on privilege. They submitted that the Shareholder Rule was in reality a sub-set of joint interest privilege, such that it remains justified notwithstanding the fading away of the original proprietary basis for its creation. The primary issue for the Board was whether the Shareholder Rule exists as a matter of Bermudian law. At first instance, Chief Justice Narinder Hargun of the Court of Appeal of Bermuda rejected the Company's claim to privilege on the basis that the Shareholder Rule was a long established and complete answer to any assertion of legal professional privilege by a company against its shareholders. The Company appealed the decision. The Court of Appeal of Bermuda dismissed the appeal. Justice of Appeal Geoffrey Bell who gave the main judgment, recognised that the Shareholder Rule had not been applied in any decision in Bermuda but that the Court of Appeal had clearly operated on the basis that the rule did exist in at least one previous case. Justice of Appeal Bell regarded the rule, if it existed, as based on joint interest privilege and not 19th century case law (from which the rule originated). Justice of Appeal Ian Kawaley reached a more nuanced conclusion. He rejected the traditional view that the company shareholder relationship was enough to establish an exception to privilege. Rather, it would depend upon all the circumstances and was a flexible and context-based rule rather than status-based rule. President Sir Christopher Clarke agreed with both judgments and added that the joint interest principle, applicable to defeat what would otherwise be a successful claim to legal advic...

    14 min
  8. Privy Council decision - Cayman Islands: Submission to foreign courts

    12/11/2025

    Privy Council decision - Cayman Islands: Submission to foreign courts

    In a recent Privy Council decision IGCF SPV 21 Limited v Al Jomiah Power Limited and another, the Board ruled on when a party is held to have submitted to the jurisdiction of a foreign Court as a matter of Cayman law. The parties' positions It was common ground between the parties that an applicant will forfeit its right to an injunction if it submits to the Court of a foreign jurisdiction. The Appellant was pursuing proceedings against the Respondent in Pakistan. The Respondent had sought to appear in Pakistan in order to contest jurisdiction. The Respondents applied for an anti-suit injunction in the Cayman Courts, seeking to restrain the Appellant from pursuing the proceedings in Pakistan. The Appellant's argument was that the Respondent had submitted to the jurisdiction of Pakistan. The Rule in Geoprosco The Appellant relied on what they called the "Rule in Geoprosco" - a 1975 English Court of Appeal case that held that appearing before a foreign Court (Pakistan) simply to contest jurisdiction counted as submission. Since Geoprosco was decided, it had in fact been reversed in England and Wales by a 1982 statute. Without an equivalent Cayman statute, the question arose: what was the Cayman position? The Board concluded at [52] that Geoprosco "should form no part of Cayman law". Put simply, appearing in a foreign Court to contest jurisdiction did not count as submission. What counts as submission? In deciding what counts as submission, the Board held that Cayman law should reflect the current law in England and Wales, namely the seminal case of Rubin v Eurofinance. Key takeaways The Board's approach to a legislative lacuna in Cayman is noteworthy. The Board analysed academic texts and English Hansard Debates, and compared the solutions of other common law jurisdictions. It was also emphasised that the "Cayman courts may decline to follow English court decisions where there is good reason to do so" [47]. Interestingly, the Board noted that some common law jurisdictions had adopted legislation similar to the English statute, and that others without a legislative equivalent had declined to follow Geoprosco. The Board highlighted a first instance case from Bannister J in the BVI to that effect. The Appellants had not been able to point to a single common law jurisdiction which followed the Rule in Geoprosco. Although a Cayman judgment, the case may well have extra territorial influence in years to come in those jurisdictions where common law solutions have so far been found, but only at the first instance level. Finally, and as a mark of the jurisprudential significance of the BVI, this judgment is one of a number of important decisions in which the Board was assisted by the BVI's the Honourable Dame Janice Pereira, who heard the appeal together with four permanent members.

    3 min
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About

Exploring Offshore Litigation is a captivating podcast series containing audio of written blog content that dives deep into the intriguing world of offshore litigation, including the BVI and Cayman. Each episode sails through complex legal waters, bringing you up-to-date analysis of recent high-stakes cases and expert commentary from the leading minds in this specialised field. Our episodes demystify legal jargon and break down complex cases to make them accessible to all. Harneys, an international law firm with entrepreneurial thinking, brings each episode to you.

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