Religious Epistemology, Contextualism, and Pragmatic Encroachment

Oxford University
  • ٤٫٠ (١)
  • تعليم
Religious Epistemology, Contextualism, and Pragmatic Encroachment

New Insights and Directions in Religious Epistemology, a series of workshops held in Oxford University on 13th-14th March and 12th-13th June 2013. The aim of this project is to make a bold and lasting impact on religious epistemology. This project aims to bring recent developments in epistemology to bear on topics in the philosophy of religion in a way that will open up new channels of research in religious epistemology. The project is centered around, but not limited to, interesting and novel applications developing out of six main topics: (i) contextualism and pragmatic encroachment, (ii) safety and knowledge, (iii) epistemic defeat, (iv) testimony, (v) formal epistemology, and (vi) etiology of belief. The project will be led by John Hawthorne and will involve 3 postdoctoral researchers, 3 PhD students, 22 visiting research fellowships, 9 public lectures, 4 roundtable discussions, 6 workshops, and 1 major international conference. This project, valued at 1.3 million GBP, has been made possible by the generous support of the John Templeton Foundation.

الحلقات

  1. ٢٧‏/٠٩‏/١٤٣٦ هـ

    Reasoning with Plenitude

    Roger White (MIT) gives the final talk in the New Insights in Religious Epistemology International Conference, held in Oxford in June 2015.

    ٤٣ من الدقائق

  2. ٢٧‏/٠٩‏/١٤٣٦ هـ

    Testimony, Error, and Reasonable Belief in Medieval Religious Epistemology

    Richard Cross (Notre Dame) gives a talk in the New Insights in Religious Epistemology International Conference, held in Oxford in June 2015. The commentator is Christina Van Dyke, Calvin

    ٢٨ من الدقائق

  3. ٢٧‏/٠٩‏/١٤٣٦ هـ

    Fine-Tuning Fine-Tuning

    John Hawthorne (Oxford/USC) gives a talk in the New Insights in Religious Epistemology International Conference, held in Oxford in June 2015.

    ٥٤ من الدقائق

  4. ٢٧‏/٠٩‏/١٤٣٦ هـ

    What is Justified Group Belief

    Jennifer Lackey (Northwestern) gives a talk in the New Insights in Religious Epistemology International Conference, held in Oxford in June 2015.

    ٥٩ من الدقائق

  5. ٢٧‏/٠٩‏/١٤٣٦ هـ

    Foundations of the Fine-Tuning Argument

    Hans Halvorson (Princeton) give a talk in the New Insights in Religious Epistemology International Conference, held in Oxford in June 2015. The commentator is John Pittard (Yale).

    ٣٥ من الدقائق

  6. ٢٧‏/٠٩‏/١٤٣٦ هـ

    How to Appear to Know that God Exists

    Keith DeRose (Yale), gives a talk in the New Insights in Religious Epistemology International Conference, held in Oxford in June 2015. The commentator is Jane Friedman (NYU).

    ٤٢ من الدقائق

  7. ٢٧‏/٠٩‏/١٤٣٦ هـ

    Show and Tell

    Paulina Sliwa (Cambridge) gives the first talk in the New Insights in Religious Epistemology International Conference, held in Oxford in June 2015.

    ٤٢ من الدقائق

  8. ٢٧‏/٠٩‏/١٤٣٦ هـ

    The Rev’d Mr Bayes and the Life Everlasting

    Peter van Inwagen (Notre Dame) gives the second talk for the New Insights in Religious Epistemology International Conference, held in Oxford in June 2015. The commentator is Jeffrey Sanford Russell (USC).

    ٢٦ من الدقائق

  9. ٢٧‏/٠٩‏/١٤٣٦ هـ

    Phenomenal Conservatism and Religious Belief

    Richard Swinburne, University of Oxford, gives the first talk in the New Insights in Religious Epistemology International Conference, held in Oxford in June 2015.

    ١ س ٤ د

  10. ١٣‏/٠٧‏/١٤٣٥ هـ

    The inevitable implausibility of physical determinism

    Richard G. Swinburne, Emeritus Professor of Philosophy, University of Oxford, gives a talk for the New Insights and Directions for Religious Epistemology seminar series. Abstract: Epiphenomenalism is the scientific theory that conscious events never cause physical events (and so intentions never cause brain events). The Libet programme seeks to prove epiphenomenalism by showing that it never makes any difference to a sequence of brain events whether or not an intention occurs during the course of it. To show that, it needs to show when (relative to brain events) some intention occurs; and to show that it relies on the reports of subjects about when and whether they form any intention. But while we are always justified in believing claims based on apparent experience, memory, or testimony in the absence of defeaters, it is a defeater to any such claim that some event occurred, that the apparent experience, memory, or testimony was not caused by the event. So we would only be justified in believing these reports if we were justified in believing that the reports were caused by subjects' having an intention to make words come out of their mouths which correctly report their other intentions. So the programme to prove epiphenomenalism relies on evidence about subjects' intentions on which it would only be justified in relying if epiphenomenalism is false. Hence the programme is self-defeating; and so is any other programme purporting to show that we can have a justified belief in epiphenomenalism and so in the causal closure of the physical. Creative Commons Attribution-Non-Commercial-Share Alike 2.0 UK: England & Wales; http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.0/uk/

    ٥٢ من الدقائق

  11. ١٣‏/٠٧‏/١٤٣٥ هـ

    The inevitable implausibility of physical determinism (Other Resource)

    Richard G. Swinburne, Emeritus Professor of Philosophy, University of Oxford, gives a talk for the New Insights and Directions for Religious Epistemology seminar series. Abstract: Epiphenomenalism is the scientific theory that conscious events never cause physical events (and so intentions never cause brain events). The Libet programme seeks to prove epiphenomenalism by showing that it never makes any difference to a sequence of brain events whether or not an intention occurs during the course of it. To show that, it needs to show when (relative to brain events) some intention occurs; and to show that it relies on the reports of subjects about when and whether they form any intention. But while we are always justified in believing claims based on apparent experience, memory, or testimony in the absence of defeaters, it is a defeater to any such claim that some event occurred, that the apparent experience, memory, or testimony was not caused by the event. So we would only be justified in believing these reports if we were justified in believing that the reports were caused by subjects' having an intention to make words come out of their mouths which correctly report their other intentions. So the programme to prove epiphenomenalism relies on evidence about subjects' intentions on which it would only be justified in relying if epiphenomenalism is false. Hence the programme is self-defeating; and so is any other programme purporting to show that we can have a justified belief in epiphenomenalism and so in the causal closure of the physical. Creative Commons Attribution-Non-Commercial-Share Alike 2.0 UK: England & Wales; http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.0/uk/

  • ١١ حلقة

التقييمات والمراجعات

حول

New Insights and Directions in Religious Epistemology, a series of workshops held in Oxford University on 13th-14th March and 12th-13th June 2013. The aim of this project is to make a bold and lasting impact on religious epistemology. This project aims to bring recent developments in epistemology to bear on topics in the philosophy of religion in a way that will open up new channels of research in religious epistemology. The project is centered around, but not limited to, interesting and novel applications developing out of six main topics: (i) contextualism and pragmatic encroachment, (ii) safety and knowledge, (iii) epistemic defeat, (iv) testimony, (v) formal epistemology, and (vi) etiology of belief. The project will be led by John Hawthorne and will involve 3 postdoctoral researchers, 3 PhD students, 22 visiting research fellowships, 9 public lectures, 4 roundtable discussions, 6 workshops, and 1 major international conference. This project, valued at 1.3 million GBP, has been made possible by the generous support of the John Templeton Foundation.

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