MCMP – Philosophy of Physics

MCMP Team
MCMP – Philosophy of Physics

Mathematical Philosophy - the application of logical and mathematical methods in philosophy - is about to experience a tremendous boom in various areas of philosophy. At the new Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy, which is funded mostly by the German Alexander von Humboldt Foundation, philosophical research will be carried out mathematically, that is, by means of methods that are very close to those used by the scientists. The purpose of doing philosophy in this way is not to reduce philosophy to mathematics or to natural science in any sense; rather mathematics is applied in order to derive philosophical conclusions from philosophical assumptions, just as in physics mathematical methods are used to derive physical predictions from physical laws. Nor is the idea of mathematical philosophy to dismiss any of the ancient questions of philosophy as irrelevant or senseless: although modern mathematical philosophy owes a lot to the heritage of the Vienna and Berlin Circles of Logical Empiricism, unlike the Logical Empiricists most mathematical philosophers today are driven by the same traditional questions about truth, knowledge, rationality, the nature of objects, morality, and the like, which were driving the classical philosophers, and no area of traditional philosophy is taken to be intrinsically misguided or confused anymore. It is just that some of the traditional questions of philosophy can be made much clearer and much more precise in logical-mathematical terms, for some of these questions answers can be given by means of mathematical proofs or models, and on this basis new and more concrete philosophical questions emerge. This may then lead to philosophical progress, and ultimately that is the goal of the Center.

  1. 2019/04/18 · 影片

    Gravity. An exercise in quantization

    Igor Khavkine (Utrecht) gives a talk at the MCMP workshop "Quantum Gravity in Perspective" (31 May-1 June, 2013) titled "Gravity. An exercise in quantization". Abstract: The quantization of General Relativity (GR) is an old and chellenging prob- lem that is in many ways still awaiting a satisfactory solution. GR is a partic- ularly complicated field theory in several respects: non-linearity, gauge invari- ance, dynamibal causal structure, renormalization, singularities, infared effects. Fortunately, much progress has been made on each of these fronts. Our under- standing of these problems has evolved greatly over the past century, together with our understandig of quantum field theory (QFT) in general. Today, the state of the art in QFT knows how to address each of these challenges, as they occur in isolation in ohter field theories. There is still an active research program aiming to combine the relevant methods and apply them to GR. But, at the very least, the problem of the quantization of GR can be formulated as a well defined mathematical question. On the other hand, quantum GR also faces a different set of obstacles: timelessness, non-renormalizability, naturality, unification, which reflect, not its technical difficulty, but rather the aesthetic and philosophical preferences of practing theoretical physicists. I will briefly discuss how the technical state of the art and a scientifically conservative philosophical position make these obstacles irrelevant. Time per- mitting, I will also briefly touch on some aspects of the state of technical state of the art that have turned the quantization of GR into a (still challenging) exercise: covariant Poisson structure, BV-BRST treatment of gauge theories, deformation quantization, Epstein-Glaser renormalization.

    42 分鐘
  2. 2019/04/18 · 影片

    How to Bite the Bullet of Quidditism - Why a Standard Argument against Categoricalism in Physics Fails

    Andreas Barrels (Bonn) gives a talk at the MCMP Colloquium (7 May, 2014) titled "How to Bite the Bullet of Quidditism - Why a Standard Argument against Categoricalism in Physics Fails". Abstract: Categoricalism is the statement that fundamental properties of physics are categorical, i.e., they have their dispositional characters not with metaphysical necessity. According to Black (2000), Bird (2005, 2007), and Esfeld (2009), categoricalism entails quidditism, the possible existence of properties which are not exclusively individuated by their dispositional characters. If quidditism is true, we cannot know, in principle, whether it is property F or its “Doppelgänger” G that shows up by exhibiting a certain set of dispositional characters. Since we cannot accept our metaphysics of properties to condemn us to necessary ignorance of fundamental properties, we must reject quidditism. Therefore, categoricalism fails. I argue that the possible epistemic situation revealed by quidditism is a case of empirical underdetermination of theoretical properties. This type of situation is not conceived, in general, as the occurrence of some necessary limit of knowledge. There are rational procedures to deal with empirical underdetermination in physics, and thus to decide about the properties the existence of which we are committed to accept. Thus, the unacceptability claim against quidditism is not well founded and categoricalism cannot be defeated that way.

    39 分鐘
  3. 2018/04/11 · 影片

    Best Possible Worlds and Random Walks: The Principle of Least Action as a Thought Experiment

    Michael Stöltzner (South Carolina) gives a talk at the Irvine-Munich Workshop on the Foundations of Classical and Quantum Field Theories (14 December, 2014) titled "Best Possible Worlds and Random Walks: The Principle of Least Action as a Thought Experiment". Abstract: Over the centuries, no other principle of classical physics has to a larger extent nourished exalted hopes of a universal theory, has constantly been plagued by mathematical counterexamples, and has ignited metaphysical controversies than has the principle of least action (PLA). The aim of this paper is first to survey a series of modern approaches, among them the structural realist readings of Planck and Hilbert, a neo-Kantian relativized a priori principle, and more recent discussions about modality within the context of analytic metaphysics. But these considerations seem outrun by the broad applicability of the PLA beyond classical physics. In the case of Feynman’s path integral, the PLA does no longer amount to the distinction of the actual dynamics among the possible ones, but to the definition of a stochastic process to which all possibilities contribute with a certain probability. To reach a unified philosophical picture of all the various applications of the PLA and its kin, I suggest to consider them as a thought experiment about the applicability of mathematics to a physical problems.

    33 分鐘

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簡介

Mathematical Philosophy - the application of logical and mathematical methods in philosophy - is about to experience a tremendous boom in various areas of philosophy. At the new Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy, which is funded mostly by the German Alexander von Humboldt Foundation, philosophical research will be carried out mathematically, that is, by means of methods that are very close to those used by the scientists. The purpose of doing philosophy in this way is not to reduce philosophy to mathematics or to natural science in any sense; rather mathematics is applied in order to derive philosophical conclusions from philosophical assumptions, just as in physics mathematical methods are used to derive physical predictions from physical laws. Nor is the idea of mathematical philosophy to dismiss any of the ancient questions of philosophy as irrelevant or senseless: although modern mathematical philosophy owes a lot to the heritage of the Vienna and Berlin Circles of Logical Empiricism, unlike the Logical Empiricists most mathematical philosophers today are driven by the same traditional questions about truth, knowledge, rationality, the nature of objects, morality, and the like, which were driving the classical philosophers, and no area of traditional philosophy is taken to be intrinsically misguided or confused anymore. It is just that some of the traditional questions of philosophy can be made much clearer and much more precise in logical-mathematical terms, for some of these questions answers can be given by means of mathematical proofs or models, and on this basis new and more concrete philosophical questions emerge. This may then lead to philosophical progress, and ultimately that is the goal of the Center.

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