Supreme Court of Canada Hearings (Floor Audio‪)‬ SCC Hearings

(Publication ban in case)The appellant, Emanuel Lozada, along with other individuals, participated in two fights, the second of which resulted in the fatal stabbing of the victim. At the appellant’s trial for manslaughter, the Crown argued that the appellant was liable for manslaughter either as a co-principal with the man alleged to have stabbed the victim, or as an aider and abettor of the stabber. The jury found the appellant guilty. The appellant appealed the manslaughter conviction. He alleged, among other grounds of appeal, that the trial judge erred in his instructions to the jury on the law of causation with respect to co-principal liability. The majority of the Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal. It concluded that read as a whole, the jury instructions accurately put the law of causation as it applied to the appellant. Paciocco J.A., dissenting, would have allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction and ordered a new trial. He found that the trial judge twice misdirected jurors by understating the standard of “reasonable foreseeability” they could use in determining whether the appellant’s unlawful act amounted to a “significant contributing cause” of the victim’s death. Argued Date 2024-02-13 Keywords Criminal law — Charge to jury — Co-principal liability — Law of causation — Whether the trial judge erred by misdirecting the jury with respect to the “causation” element of unlawful act manslaughter — Whether the doctrine of “intervening act” applies in the context of a group assault — Criminal Code, s. 21(1)(a) Notes (Ontario) (Criminal) (As of Right) (Publication ban in case) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

(Publication ban in case)In July 2019, in two separate cases, the respondents appeared in the Court of Québec to answer charges for indictable offences that were punishable by a maximum of 14 years of imprisonment, but that had been punishable by a maximum of 10 years of imprisonment at the time they were allegedly committed. The respondents were thus entitled to a preliminary inquiry. On September 19, 2019, s. 535 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 (“Cr. C.”), was amended and the right to a preliminary inquiry was abolished for an accused charged with an indictable offence punishable by less than 14 years of imprisonment. The respondents both requested a preliminary inquiry after September 19, 2019. Both requests were denied by the Court of Québec on the basis that it lacked jurisdiction followed the amendment to s. 535 Cr. C. The Quebec Superior Court denied judicial review in each case. The Quebec Court of Appeal determined that the amendment to s. 535 Cr. C. applies prospectively; it allowed both appeals and referred each case back to the Court of Québec for a preliminary inquiry. Argued Date 2024-02-14 Keywords Criminal law — Preliminary inquiry — Legislation — Prospective application of legislative amendments to preliminary inquiry rules — Interpretation — Whether Quebec Court of Appeal erred in law in finding that right to preliminary inquiry depends on law in force at time of commission of offence with which accused is charged — Whether accused charged with indictable offence has right to preliminary inquiry even if not personally liable to 14 years or more of imprisonment — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 535. Notes (Quebec) (Criminal) (By Leave) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

In 2018, the Province of British Columbia (hereafter, “BC”) enacted the Opioid Damages and Health Care Costs Recovery Act (the “ORA”). The ORA allows BC to recover health care costs caused or contributed to by “opioid-related wrongs” committed by manufacturers and distributors of opioid drugs.Section 11 of the ORA applies to proceedings relating to opioid-related wrongs that were ongoing as of the date that it came into force; such proceedings are continued in accordance with the ORA. Section 11(1)(b) states that for the purposes of s. 4 of the Class Proceedings Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 50 (the “CPA”), BC may “bring an action” on behalf of a class consisting of one or more of the governments of Canada and the provinces or territories of Canada (a so-called “multi-Crown” proceeding). Section 11(2) preserves the right of those governments to opt out of the proceeding in accordance with s. 16 of the CPA.Appellants Sanis Health Inc., Shoppers Drug Mart Inc., Sandoz Canada Inc., and McKesson Canada Corporation (collectively, “Sanis”), are named as defendants in the proposed “multi-Crown” class proceeding which underlies this appeal. The underlying proceeding was commenced before s. 11 of the ORA came into force, and it is the only proceeding to which s. 11 applies.Sanis sought, by way of summary trial, an order striking s. 11 as ultra vires the Legislative Assembly of British Columbia and therefore of no force or effect pursuant to s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982.The summary trial judge held that the s. 11 was within the legislature’s authority, and dismissed Sanis’ applications for a declaration of constitutional invalidity. A unanimous Court of Appeal held that the summary trial judge did not err in upholding the constitutional validity of s. 11 of the ORA, and dismissed Sanis’ appeal. Argued Date 2024-05-24 Keywords Constitutional law — Division of powers — Civil procedure — Class actions — Multi-Crown proceedings — Provincial legislation providing province may bring an action on behalf of a class consisting of governments of Canada and the provinces and territories of Canada — Whether s. 11 of the Opioid Damages and Health Care Costs Recovery Act, S.B.C. 2018, c. 35 is ultra vires the Legislative Assembly of British Columbia and of no force or effect pursuant to s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982 — Opioid Damages and Health Care Costs Recovery Act, S.B.C. 2018, c. 35, s. 11 Notes (British Columbia) (Civil) (By Leave) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

In 2018, the Province of British Columbia (hereafter, “BC”) enacted the Opioid Damages and Health Care Costs Recovery Act (the “ORA”). The ORA allows BC to recover health care costs caused or contributed to by “opioid-related wrongs” committed by manufacturers and distributors of opioid drugs.Section 11 of the ORA applies to proceedings relating to opioid-related wrongs that were ongoing as of the date that it came into force; such proceedings are continued in accordance with the ORA. Section 11(1)(b) states that for the purposes of s. 4 of the Class Proceedings Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 50 (the “CPA”), BC may “bring an action” on behalf of a class consisting of one or more of the governments of Canada and the provinces or territories of Canada (a so-called “multi-Crown” proceeding). Section 11(2) preserves the right of those governments to opt out of the proceeding in accordance with s. 16 of the CPA.Appellants Sanis Health Inc., Shoppers Drug Mart Inc., Sandoz Canada Inc., and McKesson Canada Corporation (collectively, “Sanis”), are named as defendants in the proposed “multi-Crown” class proceeding which underlies this appeal. The underlying proceeding was commenced before s. 11 of the ORA came into force, and it is the only proceeding to which s. 11 applies.Sanis sought, by way of summary trial, an order striking s. 11 as ultra vires the Legislative Assembly of British Columbia and therefore of no force or effect pursuant to s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982.The summary trial judge held that the s. 11 was within the legislature’s authority, and dismissed Sanis’ applications for a declaration of constitutional invalidity. A unanimous Court of Appeal held that the summary trial judge did not err in upholding the constitutional validity of s. 11 of the ORA, and dismissed Sanis’ appeal. Argued Date 2024-05-23 Keywords Constitutional law — Division of powers — Civil procedure — Class actions — Multi-Crown proceedings — Provincial legislation providing province may bring an action on behalf of a class consisting of governments of Canada and the provinces and territories of Canada — Whether s. 11 of the Opioid Damages and Health Care Costs Recovery Act, S.B.C. 2018, c. 35 is ultra vires the Legislative Assembly of British Columbia and of no force or effect pursuant to s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982 — Opioid Damages and Health Care Costs Recovery Act, S.B.C. 2018, c. 35, s. 11 Notes (British Columbia) (Civil) (By Leave) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

This case concerns the third party spending limits most recently added to the Election Finances Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E.7 (“EFA”), in 2021, and whether they infringe the informational component of the right to vote (i.e., a citizen’s right to exercise their vote in an informed manner), which is protected by s. 3 of the Charter.The amendments to the EFA sparked constitutional challenges. The application judge heard and decided two sequential proceedings.In the first proceedings: Working Families Ontario v. Ontario, 2021 ONSC 4076, 155 O.R. (3d) 545 (“Working Families 1”), the application judge concluded that the extension of a 6-month pre-writ restricted period to one that was doubly restrictive was unjustifiable as it did not minimally impair the free expression rights of third party advertisers.In response to that ruling, the Ontario government announced its intention to invoke the notwithstanding clause in s. 33 of the Charter, and introduced Bill 307, which received Royal Assent five days later as the Protecting Elections and Defending Democracy Act, 2021, S.O. 2021, c. 31 (“PEDDA”). Other than the addition of the notwithstanding clause, the PEDDA amendments to the EFA are identical to the amendments that were invalidated in Working Families 1.In the second proceedings, which give rise to these appeals, the legislation was challenged as a violation of s. 3 of the Charter, and as an improper use of s. 33 of the Charter. The application judge concluded that the use of the notwithstanding clause in enacting PEDDA was not improper, and that the re-enacted spending limits on third party advertising during the pre-writ period did not infringe the right to vote under s. 3.The majority of the Court of Appeal agreed that the notwithstanding clause was properly invoked. However, it concluded that the appeals should be allowed and declared the challenged spending restrictions invalid, but would suspend the effect of the declaration for 12 months. Argued Date 2024-05-22 Keywords Charter of rights — Constitutional law — Elections — Right to vote — Third party election spending limits — Constitutionality of limits imposed by Ontario Election Finances Act, on third party political advertising expenditures in Ontario during 12-month pre-writ period before a fixed date provincial election — Whether s. 37.10.1(2) of Election Finances Act, unjustifiably infringes s. 3 of Charter — What is appropriate standard of review — Whether majority of Court of Appeal erred by reformulating test in Harper v. Canada (Attorney General), 2004 SCC 33, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 827, to turn on two “proxies”, namely whether restrictions are “carefully tailored” and whether they permit a “modest information campaign”, and thereby conflating s. 2(b) and s. 3 analyses — Whether majority erred in importing justificatory analysis to s. 3, and in scrutinizing government’s rationale for where lines had been drawn for amount and duration of spending limits — Whether majority erred by failing to give deference to application judge’s factual findings — Whether majority erred by focusing on “change” in impugned spending restrictions as compared with earlier iterations of legislation — In alternative, is any breach of s. 3 justified under s. 1 — Election Finances Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E.7. Notes (Ontario) (Civil) (By Leave) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

This case concerns the third party spending limits most recently added to the Election Finances Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E.7 (“EFA”), in 2021, and whether they infringe the informational component of the right to vote (i.e., a citizen’s right to exercise their vote in an informed manner), which is protected by s. 3 of the Charter.The amendments to the EFA sparked constitutional challenges. The application judge heard and decided two sequential proceedings.In the first proceedings: Working Families Ontario v. Ontario, 2021 ONSC 4076, 155 O.R. (3d) 545 (“Working Families 1”), the application judge concluded that the extension of a 6-month pre-writ restricted period to one that was doubly restrictive was unjustifiable as it did not minimally impair the free expression rights of third party advertisers.In response to that ruling, the Ontario government announced its intention to invoke the notwithstanding clause in s. 33 of the Charter, and introduced Bill 307, which received Royal Assent five days later as the Protecting Elections and Defending Democracy Act, 2021, S.O. 2021, c. 31 (“PEDDA”). Other than the addition of the notwithstanding clause, the PEDDA amendments to the EFA are identical to the amendments that were invalidated in Working Families 1.In the second proceedings, which give rise to these appeals, the legislation was challenged as a violation of s. 3 of the Charter, and as an improper use of s. 33 of the Charter. The application judge concluded that the use of the notwithstanding clause in enacting PEDDA was not improper, and that the re-enacted spending limits on third party advertising during the pre-writ period did not infringe the right to vote under s. 3.The majority of the Court of Appeal agreed that the notwithstanding clause was properly invoked. However, it concluded that the appeals should be allowed and declared the challenged spending restrictions invalid, but would suspend the effect of the declaration for 12 months. Argued Date 2024-05-21 Keywords Charter of rights — Constitutional law — Elections — Right to vote — Third party election spending limits — Constitutionality of limits imposed by Ontario Election Finances Act, on third party political advertising expenditures in Ontario during 12-month pre-writ period before a fixed date provincial election — Whether s. 37.10.1(2) of Election Finances Act, unjustifiably infringes s. 3 of Charter — What is appropriate standard of review — Whether majority of Court of Appeal erred by reformulating test in Harper v. Canada (Attorney General), 2004 SCC 33, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 827, to turn on two “proxies”, namely whether restrictions are “carefully tailored” and whether they permit a “modest information campaign”, and thereby conflating s. 2(b) and s. 3 analyses — Whether majority erred in importing justificatory analysis to s. 3, and in scrutinizing government’s rationale for where lines had been drawn for amount and duration of spending limits — Whether majority erred by failing to give deference to application judge’s factual findings — Whether majority erred by focusing on “change” in impugned spending restrictions as compared with earlier iterations of legislation — In alternative, is any breach of s. 3 justified under s. 1 — Election Finances Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E.7. Notes (Ontario) (Civil) (By Leave) Language Floor Audio Disclaimers This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).