The Catholic Thing

The Catholic Thing is a daily column rooted in the richest cultural tradition in the world, i.e., the concrete historical reality of Catholicism.

  1. 22h ago

    Sacrifice: Religion and the Revitalization of Christian Life

    By Elizabeth A. Mitchell Sacrifice is a paradox. A compelling paradox. In his new book, Sacrifice: Religion and the Revitalization of Christian Life, Clemens Cavallin dives headfirst into the historical, theological, and salvific nature of sacrifice throughout the human and divine story, calling his readers to a renewed embrace of the true nature of God's redemptive plan. This compelling book is a reflection on the reality of sacrifice, both secular and religious, and its lamentable absence from modernity. Cavallin examines the modern world's attempt to eliminate sacrifice, and the consequent attempt by some within the Church to reconstruct Christianity without sacrifice. This endeavor, Cavallin argues, must ultimately prove futile because there is a fundamental human need for sacrifice, and hence for a priestly office and mediation with the supernatural. Cavallin contends that our non-sacrificial, modern civilization has shaped the Christian churches themselves, weakening their understanding of sacrifice as a fundamental reality. Modern culture fosters the illusion that peace is possible without a serious reckoning with evil. When catastrophic violence erupts, many modern Christians are therefore left bewildered. The secular narrative assumes that history should keep moving steadily upward: materially, socially, and psychologically. Yet when that promise fails – when suffering, violence, and disorder persist – dismay naturally follows. For Cavallin, this confusion points to a deeper loss. To understand civilization honestly, Christians must recover the centrality of sacrifice. Only then can Christian life regain its vigor and renew its capacity to direct civilization beyond itself, toward the supernatural. Evil, Cavallin observes, involves the sacrifice of others as one pursues one's own selfish interests. The gas chambers of the Third Reich, the Soviet Gulags, or the ubiquitous abortion mills of the West are just a few salient examples. But the reality of violent evil, of course, is nothing new – it's as old as Cain and Abel. This is why all the ancient religions contained some form of sacrifice. Indeed, as Cavallin posits, the need for sacrifice, in response to evil and as a means of communion with the supernatural, is inherent in what it means to be human. Cavallin presents an informative study of comparative religion, seeing sacrificial religion as a general human phenomenon present throughout human history, a phenomenon that is indeed even prehistoric. Cavallin builds all this on a solidly Thomist foundation, finding much that is positive in natural religion, even while acknowledging the effects of the Fall on the human intellect and will. The human heart has a natural religious inclination which is ultimately fulfilled in the sacrifice of Christ on the Cross, but the Christian can undertake careful discernment and find elements of profound truth in other religious traditions on the philosophical, theological, and spiritual level. Cavallin leads the reader through such a careful discernment, examining themes of sacrifice present in natural religion; the distinction between what is sacred and profane; the relationship between violence and sacrifice; and the ultimate fulfillment of natural sacrifice and its transformation by Christ on the Cross. Ritual sacrifice, Cavallin observes, requires a sacred place and time in which the sacrifice is accomplished. The ritual unites humans with the gods. At the center of the ritual is the offering of the victim, an action which requires violence because the victim must be slain. The victim being slain may serve as a scapegoat, a substitute that offers redemption and fellowship with the gods as a result of its sacrifice. This is why the sacrifice necessarily also includes a meal, a meal to which the gods are also invited. Even when the prophets critiqued the sacrifices of ancient Israel, pointing out that they did not correspond to the necessary interior conversion and obedience to...

  2. 1d ago

    The Original 'Liturgy Wars': Between East and West

    By Dmitri Solzhenitsyn But first a note: This summer, the Faith & Reason Institute held its first "Enrichment Days" – conversations about the relations between Eastern and Western Christianity – in Kosice, Slovakia. We're hoping to make this a regular activity in order to promote the presence of all orthodox Christians in the world. We're delighted to have this first column in what will be a series from Dmitri Solzhenitsyn, grandson of the great Alexander Solzhenitsyn. Now for today's column... In August 2026, America Magazine reported that "the liturgy wars are back (and never really left)." The fight Catholics have been having on and off – regarding the Traditional Latin Mass versus the Novus Ordo, Traditionis Custodes versus Summorum Pontificum, and so forth – is nearly six decades old. Yet where the Orthodox are concerned, the original liturgical-canonical divergence goes back more than twenty-five times further. In the Catholic-Orthodox dialogue, liturgical matters are not usually as contested as are theological questions. (Among the latter are papal authority and the filioque, as I explore in my book Reuniting Rome with the Orthodox.) Nevertheless, differences in rites can hinder the ability of communions to claim the same experience of worship and, at the extreme, can even make it harder for them to identify with one another as fellow Christians. Accordingly, the gradual East-West divergence is worth exploring. Rome and the East still had more in common than not throughout the early Christian period. Significant differences, however, were appearing by the fourth century. By the end of the 300s, invoking the Holy Spirit in the Liturgy of the Eucharist was more emphasized among Constantinople and the Greek Churches than among the Western Churches, which instead focused on the words of institution. Also, during the later 300s the Greek liturgy was uniquely refined: garments like the sticharion (a kind of long tunic), hymnography like the short troparia, and sophisticated vessels were a much more prominent feature of Byzantine rites than of the simpler Latin rites. Language differences, too, arose: while Rome had initially used Greek, Latin was added in the third century and became dominant by the fourth. To express its faith, the West preferred the pre-Nicene Apostles' Creed (the "Roman Symbol"); the Greeks adopted the Symbol of Faith produced at Nicaea. By the end of the seventh century, East and West had diverging prayers, hymns, cadences, and even iconography. And by the 9th century, the West had switched to unleavened bread in the Eucharist, while the East maintained leavened bread. All of this established the Roman rite as distinct from the Byzantine. Meanwhile, from the fourth century on, East and West also developed starkly different attitudes toward clerical celibacy. Priests throughout the communion of orthodox Churches had been allowed to marry prior to ordination. Rome campaigned, however, to make celibacy universal. By the 700s papal decretals had solidified the Western practice. On the other hand, the Apostolic Canons, better received in the East, forbade clergy to divorce their wives on grounds of celibacy – on pain of excommunication – and the Synod of Gangra anathematized certain radical proponents of clerical celibacy. At the Quinisext Council of 692 under Justinian II, Eastern Churches limited celibacy to the episcopate. Those differences could be tolerated for a long time. But in the eleventh century, when cultural contacts became more widespread, the combination of erstwhile isolation and sudden contact dramatically soured East–West relations. Long-endured differences in discipline – unleavened versus leavened bread, fasting, clerical celibacy – came prominently, and painfully, into view. Patriarch Cerularius of Constantinople wrote combatively to Pope Leo IX in 1053, critiquing the use of unleavened (azymes) bread in the Eucharist and Saturday fasting. And the infamous schism of 1054 was at least i...

  3. 2d ago

    Theology of the Body in the Age of AI

    By Stephen P. White Everyone who knows anything about Pope John Paul II's "theology of the body" "knows" that it is about sex. Anyone who knows more than a little about the theology of the body understands that to say it is about sex is a bit like saying the book of Genesis is a treatise on the morality of fruit consumption. The theology of the body is an extended exercise in incarnational anthropology. It is about human embodiedness. Because of this, it has a great deal to teach us beyond the realm of human sexuality. To the point, the theology of the body offers a striking and underappreciated relevance for our thinking about Artificial Intelligence. Much of our fascination with (and anxiety about) AI has understandably focused on the ability of AI to simulate the human mind. And so much of the discussion about AI focuses on our ability to reliably distinguish AI "thinking" from human thought. In his encyclical Magnifica humanitas, Pope Leo XIV distinguishes some of the tantalizing capacities of artificial intelligence from the authentically human capacities that AI is designed to mimic: So-called artificial intelligences do not undergo experiences, do not possess a body, do not feel joy or pain, do not mature through relationships and do not know from within what love, work, friendship or responsibility mean. Nor do they have a moral conscience, since they do not judge good and evil, grasp the ultimate meaning of situations, or bear responsibility for consequences. They may imitate language, behavior and analytical skills, or even simulate empathy and understanding, but they do not understand what they produce, for they lack the affective, relational and spiritual perspective through which human beings grow in wisdom. (MH, 99) Pope Leo mentions the human body right at the outset, but he focuses on distinguishing AI's capacity to simulate human language and learning from our human capacity for the same. These are all important distinctions, to be sure. But the evident, objective differences between AI and the human mind are not the only – and perhaps not even the most important – distinction between humanity and AI. The old Scholastic categories of form and matter are suddenly relevant again. To be human is to be body-and-soul, not simply a soul in a body. Our souls are the form and principle of our bodies. The one cannot exist independent of the other, except by supernatural means. This is why we are mortal and why we are made for resurrection. To be human means to be, in a way, incomplete in ourselves. We were made for communion, a reality of which our very bodies, male and female, are a sign. To be human is to be a social and political animal, both of which require bodies. To be human is to be, as it were, a matrimonial animal. None of this could be accomplished simply by uploading a mind into a machine (even a biological machine) even if such a thing were possible. It's worth noting that we humans also learn language through imitation. We learn "behavior and analytic skills," "empathy and understanding" in much the same way. If we are to identify what separates us from AI, we will have to dig deeper than the assertion that AI's abilities are a mere "simulation" of human qualities, however accurately imitated. Our consciences are formed (or disfigured) by learning through imitation. Through conscience, we can distinguish good from evil, but we do not always do so. We can feign moral judgment and conviction. In fact, we humans are so good at feigning certain judgments and behaviors that we can deceive others, and even ourselves, about our true motives and feelings. While we may be good judges of our own authentic intentions (provided our conscience is well formed), we are often quite bad at judging the same in others. Each of us is intimately aware of our own personal experiences of both consciousness and conscience. But these experiences in others, while somehow communicable, remain in some way utterly inaccessible to...

  4. 3d ago

    All The King's Men

    By Steven Jonathan Rummelsburg Sitting atop his ivory wall, the pedantic egghead Humpty Dumpty tells Alice that any word he uses means "just what I choose it to mean – neither more nor less." "The question is," said Alice, "whether you can make words mean so many different things." Humpty Dumpty deflects: "The question is. . . .which is to be master – that's all." Humpty Dumpty means master in the sense of ruler, the one who holds power over the word. But "master" carries an older sense that he has discarded: the ancient term for teacher (magister), whose authority ought never to be power, but the conformity of his mind to reality. In this scene with Humpty Dumpty, Lewis Carroll gives us a portrait of a certain kind of Oxford academic: pompous, contemptuous, and confident in his own authority. He subordinates the true source of speech, which is reality, to his will. Humpty Dumpty is the prototype for a veritable army of modern professors, convinced that in controlling the meaning of words, they control the world. Sit through an accreditation review, or a staff development day, and you'll encounter Humpty's prolific progeny. The radical abuse of speech is no isolated phenomenon; it is the new norm in "education." What Carroll conveyed through Humpty Dumpty has now proliferated throughout the entire profession. Even the most vital words in teaching, "school" and "education" have lost their grounding in reality, a crisis academia fails to address. We ought to follow, instead, St. Augustine's thought in De magistro "On the Teacher"; a word's meaning is never ours to invent. Augustine gives us a dialogue with his son on what a teacher's words can actually do when they pass from one mind to another. Augustine demonstrates that words cannot put truth into another human soul; they can only prompt the hearer to accept or reject the truth of what is said. He asserts that it is only the "teacher within," the Logos Himself, who is the one true teacher. In Augustine's own borrowed wisdom, we are "not to call anyone on earth our master because there is only one Master of all who is in Heaven." A teacher who arrogates to himself the right to have his words mean whatever he wants them to mean has abandoned the source of all truth. We are apt to think that "school" is a building where children go for instruction. Our modern notions of "school" differ radically from ancient exemplars like Plato's Academy, Aristotle's Lyceum, or the gymnasium where bodily discipline accompanied the contemplation of philosophical truth. The word "school" once conveyed a surprising meaning. In antiquity, school meant leisure, not in the modern sense, but as an interior disposition of the soul: at rest, still, and yet wide awake to receive all of reality as it truly is. School, or leisure, is the proper interior state of being to hear a good lecture or to receive from a master teacher what is real and true. In past ages, if one was gifted with leisure time, it was the proper response to spend that time cultivating the interior life. The word "education" is as much abused as "school." A few years ago, I interviewed top teachers, school leaders, and county administrators to ask them to define the word "education." The answers were noteworthy in at least two concerning ways. First, I received as many different definitions as the people I asked. Second, none of the answers conveyed a concept of education rooted in reality. In the Catholic Intellectual Tradition, to educate has always meant to educe, to lead a student forth, out of the darkness of error and sin, and into the light of truth and virtue. Education is the formal cause of a nation, or as Chesterton put it, "education is simply the soul of a society as it passes from one generation to another." This understanding of education is nowhere to be found in modern schools. It's no small irony that leisure and "leading a student forth" are now conspicuously absent from the very institutions we call "schools." Th...

  5. 4d ago

    Three To Get Married

    By Randall Smith Fulton Sheen, officially to be declared "blessed" in a few days, began his wonderful book Three to Get Married with these four sentences: It takes three to make Love in Heaven – Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. It takes three for Heaven to make love to earth – God, Man, and Mary, through whom God became Man. It takes three to make love in the Holy Family – Mary, and Joseph, and the consummation of their love, Jesus. It takes three to make love in hearts – The Lover, the Beloved, and Love. This was a brilliant summary of the relationship between the threefold communion of love that binds the three persons of the Triune God and the love that should bind the spouses and children within a family. How can we begin to understand the Triune God, a reality that transcends our human reason? We begin with what we know concretely in our own world: human marriages. So too, we begin to understand God as "Father" in relation to our own fathers. "He is not merely an angry, distant God," we say, "He loves us like a Father." But upon reflection, we come to understand that the relationship really operates in the reverse. God is the paradigm "Father," and our human fathers merely participate in His "fatherhood." Our human fathers are partially responsible for our existence, but not fully, as is God. Our human fathers care for us, but not perfectly, as does God. So, as we reflect upon the fatherhood of God, we better understand what human fatherhood is meant to be. The closest we come in this life to understanding the loving communion of Father, Son, and Spirit is the family. It begins with a man, a woman, and the love that binds them. But then the love they share becomes incarnate in an actual person – a child. Anyone who has married friends has probably experienced a slight awkwardness spending time with one but not the other. It may be that you were close friends with one of them before the marriage, so you just mix more naturally with that spouse. But if you know that these parents love their children, then you will also probably know that there are few things better you can do for your friends than to love and support their children. Loving and supporting their children is loving and supporting them – the fruit of their union as a couple. It is not his child or her child; it's their child. The child is the embodied union of their love. So we start with human marriage, but upon reflection, we realize that we can understand marriage and the family best as modeled by the Triune God: a unity of love that does not destroy their distinctness, and a distinctness of persons that does not make impossible their true unity. And this is a unity of persons that is not closed in on itself, but is expressed outwardly, abundantly inviting others into communion and fellowship. The love of a great family never stops at the door of the house. It goes out to invite others in. What makes this sort of love in marriage possible? As Catholics, we believe that we are given the grace to love this way by the Holy Spirit. Since the Holy Spirit is the Love shared between the Father and the Son instantiated as a distinct divine person, when we share in the gifts of the Spirit, we participate in the very Love shared between the Father and the Son. In Tolstoy's novel Anna Karenina, Konstantin Levin, an unbeliever, marries Kitty, a woman he has loved deeply for years. At the wedding ceremony in the Church, Levin is led through what are to him a series of awkward steps he barely understands. But he does them anyway because of his love for his bride, and he is delighted. At one point in the service, he hears these words: "Vouchsafe to them love made perfect, peace and help, O Lord, we beseech Thee." Tolstoy writes: "Levin heard the words and they impressed him. How did they guess that it is help, just help that one wants? thought Levin, recalling all his recent fears and doubts. 'What do I know? What can I do in this fearful business,' he thought, 'without h...

  6. 5d ago

    'Third-Party' Punishment is Not Catholic

    By Casey Chalk Earlier this year a meta-analysis in Advances in Psychological Science found a correlation between having a heightened sense of self-righteousness and what is called "third-party punishment," meaning punishing someone for a perceived infraction, even when you are not the victim of that infraction. An earlier study in the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology found that people are eager to express outrage and punish wrongdoers even when there is no identifiable personal benefit, because moralistic behavior signals our moral character to others. Worrying contemporary factors aggravate this phenomenon. We live in a culture that diminishes the role of sin and personal culpability while amplifying our sense of self. Social media encourages the creation of curated versions of ourselves that foreground our "best version of ourselves" while concealing our vices or shortcomings. We inhabit a deracinated, atomized society in which we know and are known by few people, but, ironically, are beholden to an obsession with celebrity – not only actual celebrities, but the cult of celebrity, where we aspire to be celebrated through "likes" and "shares." Much of this digital culture primes us for both virtue signaling and participation in "cancel culture." It's alarming, not only because of the likelihood of unjustly ruining reputations and careers, but because of what this paradigm does to the souls of those who participate in it. We don't know these online people, and are rarely privy to sufficient context to effectively evaluate them. Yet we caustically comment on the public, viral misdeeds of others – parenting decisions, relationship choices, appearance, or social etiquette. How could such behavior not do bad things to our souls? The Church offers a different way of understanding correction, a truly Christian ethic based on a proper anthropology, an understanding of human weakness, of repentance, forgiveness, and redemption that enables us to overcome errors. It does good, both for the one being corrected, as well as the one correcting. At Sunday Mass earlier this month, we read: "If your brother sins against you, go and tell him his fault between you and him alone." (Matthew 18:15) This is a method of correction that is discreet, respectful, and premised on the existence of a relationship, someone we know, with whom there exists a degree of trust and social currency. That correction, in turn, is not a way of burnishing our own moral credentials, but a desire for metanoia and the strengthening of personal bonds. We admonish the wayward because we love them and desire their good. Another component of the Christian conception of correction is the prudential evaluation of circumstances. Is the person we perceive to be in the wrong capable of receiving correction? If not, attempting to do so may very well retard that person's ability to receive correction later. Even if we think someone capable of listening to us, we may be rebuffed, and must prudently judge whether the error is so egregious as to be raised in a broader setting, which could very well also provoke evils worse than the first one. Perhaps, the offense is simply worth patiently suffering and praying over. It's dissatisfying but often the best option, because many wrongs, though censurable, risk causing far more harm if they are publicly exposed. The sacrament of penance provides another proper forum for confrontation and repentance, because all Catholics are expected to regularly examine their consciences according to an objective standard of justice, and confess sins to a priest offering absolution in persona Christi. Many Catholics do not avail themselves of this incomparable gift. But those who do, even those stubbornly resistant to perceiving their own sins, enter into a framework where they are humbly willing to be instructed and strengthened by sacramental grace. I knew a laywoman serving in a variety of authority roles in the Church who became incen...

  7. 6d ago

    Devolution a la Mode

    By Anthony Esolen In the pilot episode of the old television show The Waltons, the six Walton children have gathered outdoors in the cold and the snow, where a lady from a religious charity is handing out Christmas presents to the littler ones. The presents have been donated by people better off than almost anybody in their mountain village. She gives a present in exchange for a Bible verse. Mary Ellen, the oldest of the Walton girls, knows a lot of verses, not because she is pious, but because Mrs. Walton makes her memorize them when she has misbehaved or talked back to her elders, which is often. She's the one to go to when you need a verse. "That's too long!" says one of the local boys. "Give me a shorter one." "Jesus wept," says Mary Ellen. That earns the boy a gift, and a look of pious ecstasy from the charitable lady. But things are not all well. When the smallest Walton, Elizabeth, about five years old, opens her present, it's a porcelain baby doll with a crack and a large hole in the face. "She's dead!" the little girl cries in horror and dismay. We are to feel the shame of it, and indignation, that someone would donate a dead baby doll for the poor. Not from malice, but from sheer thoughtlessness. Fifty years later, the feminist claptrap called Barbie opens with a group of little girls playing with their baby dolls, when a goddess-like Barbie shows up, stylish and gigantic and as feminine as a mannequin in a couturier's shop. Then, to Richard Strauss's fanfare from Also Sprach Zarathustra, one of the girls, in awe, smashes her doll's head on a rock, and another throws hers up in the air, spinning in space, just like the bone one of the apes has tossed in Stanley Kubrick's 2001: A Space Odyssey. It becomes the sign: BARBIE. So our "evolution" is from little girls playing with baby dolls, as the narrator tells us, to Barbie – or, as I'd put it, from something warm, natural, self-giving, and productive, to something cold, unnatural, self-worshiping, and sterile. Sure, I know, it's a joke. We're not to take it seriously. So goes the bait-and-switch. Yet somehow, I cannot see the humor in a dead baby. "Did you hear the one about the dead baby flying in the air?" said nobody at a bar, ever. The odd thing about it, what the film's makers somehow managed to miss, is that without babies there is no evolution. That is the Darwinian imperative. In mammals, the mother must suckle the babies, and the longer the period of immaturity, the greater the dependence of the offspring on the parents. Without a strong maternal instinct, mammals do not survive. We need not accept Darwin's account of the origin of species in order to admit this much. It is the inexorable logic of survival. You must play your cards most wisely to beat the house. Toss away your aces, and you die. Not immediately; but the house, Nature, has all the time in the world, and you do not. Only the spiritually exhausted Western world would make a joke about little girls smashing their baby dolls. But the joke is on the West. We are contracepting and aborting ourselves to death. Nor are we healthy apart from those obvious evils, since we have sown confusion in our children and suspicion and recrimination between the sexes, supposing even that we humble ourselves to acknowledge that there are two sexes. And only two. The dealer looks at your winnings and shrugs. The pile will dwindle to nothing. It must. "I have set before you life and death, blessing and cursing," says the aged Moses to the people. "Therefore choose life, that both thou and thy seed may live." (Deuteronomy 30:19) The terms are not ours, but God's. Man can no more create a moral law than he can summon a grain of sand into existence from nothing, or invent and impose a new law of gravitation. And the people of Israel would have the choice of death right before them as they entered Canaan. Worship of the Canaanite god Moloch, accompanied by child-sacrifice as a quid pro quo, turns the public square int...

  8. Sep 12

    A Century of Catholic Education

    By James P. MacGuire In 1896, Episcopal clergyman John Byron Diman founded St. George's School in Newport, R.I. It became one of the so-called Saint Grottlesex schools, that name being a portmanteau of St. George's, St. Mark's, St. Paul's, Groton, and Middlesex: Protestant prep schools that fairly defined the Gilded Age But then the Rev. Diman had a change of heart. He converted to Catholicism and joined the Benedictine Order at nearby Portsmouth Priory, a community founded from Fort Augustus in Scotland. As now Father Hugh Diman, O.S.B., and ever the energetic educator, he founded Portsmouth School on the priory grounds in 1926. (Hugh was his name "taken in religion.") In his original prospectus, Fr. Diman noted that the Portsmouth school would be the first Benedictine school in the United States belonging to the English Congregation and cited such characteristics of Benedictine education as: a general appreciation of scholarship, thoroughness in work and a belief in broad and liberal education as opposed to narrow specialization….Religion enters into the warp and woof of the School's daily life. The chapel for the religious community and the School is the same. Students may enter or leave it at will. Thus, while religion is not thrust upon them, the daily spectacle of the Mass, the occasional presence of sung Vespers or some other part of the Office, the sight of the quiet and ordered routine of the Community often reach the mind and soul of even the most light-hearted looker on, where calculated effort would generally fail. English boys' preparatory schools such as Ampleforth College and Downside School served as its models, and, like Portsmouth Abbey, both are co-educational today. Eighteen students enrolled in the school's first year. Among them was Christopher Wyatt, brother of actress Jane, whose mother's name, Euphemia van Rensselaer Waddington Wyatt, was the longest in the Social Register. The school's enrollment doubled in the second year, and by the early 1930s "Father Diman's School" had a national reputation, six forms, and students from across the country. By 1939, the school could count 118 graduates since its first Commencement in 1931. Of these, thirty had gone to Harvard, nineteen to Yale, thirteen to Georgetown, and eight to Princeton. Father Hugh died after a second heart attack in March of 1948. Alumni of all his three schools attended the Pontifical Requiem Mass for his soul in the Priory chapel. Headmasters served as pallbearers, a fitting tribute to an extraordinary educator and priest. In more recent years, the now Portsmouth Abbey School has undergone changes of development and crisis. Most of the present campus was designed by the Italian-American architect Pietro Belluschi in a modernist redwood-and-fieldstone motif; the octagonal church at its centerpiece modeled after the Justinian Revival church of San Vitale in Ravenna, and often referred to by architectural historians as a "mid-twentieth-century masterpiece." But Portsmouth Abbey has experienced the shock of several faculty sex abuse cases and consecutive abbots who resigned for troubling personal lapses. But under the Headmastership of Matthew Walter and his dynamic wife Paula, Portsmouth Abbey School is entering what St. John Henry Newman would call a "Second Spring," with record applications, a much-strengthened faculty, and ever-improving college placement. Along the way, Portsmouth has known some wonderful characters. Librarian Brother Basil Cunningham, for instance, a leading tournament bridge competitor who could recite entire genealogies of European royal families but had such a deathly fear of lightning that he would summon a cab from Newport eight miles away to drive him during a storm the two hundred yards from the library to the monastery. Or the polymath eccentric genius Dom Andrew Jenks, who seemed never to sleep, seldom showered, computed the school's entire daily class schedule in his head, and produced day-old pancakes from...

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The Catholic Thing is a daily column rooted in the richest cultural tradition in the world, i.e., the concrete historical reality of Catholicism.

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