Indefensible New Zealand Simon Ewing-Jarvie

The New Zealand Defence Force has a number of well documented problems. Even at full strength, it lacks the mass, firepower and sustainability to engage in medium to high intensity conflict. However, at the moment it also has significant recruitment, retention, morale and mental health problems. The latter extends to the veteran community as well.

All service chiefs are due for replacement in the next few weeks and months. With a new defence (Hon Judith Collins) and associate defence minister (Hon Chris Penk), the time is right to consider the best trajectory for rebuilding the NZDF for the future. Trying to rebuild it in its current form is a mistake.

However, the hardest part of  implementing  new ideas  in Defence is getting the old ways out. Organisational disobedience is a strong part of the NZDF culture. This longer than usual podcast looks at some of the sacred cows that need to go in order for the NZDF culture to position itself for the strategic environment it will next fight in.

Simon discusses rank modernisation, reduction in the number of headquarters, independent sub units, private military companies, the defence estate, accrual accounting and legislative changes amongst other topics

It is not a comprehensive lists of changes. There will be other episodes on change required.

Recorded on 6 February 2024 which is Waitangi Day in New Zealand. Simon discusses the lack of meaning of the national day for most New Zealanders. The discussion then travels to thinking about how the NZ Defence Force epitomises an effective multi-cultural example of unity for the country and how this could be enhanced while simultaneously dealing with current personnel shortages.

The episode ends with a call to make the day less about grievance and appeasement and more about a national celebration of our shared history and future.

There has been a lot of speculation about defence since the announcement of the new Cabinet. I would classify much of this as “breathless longing” in that many are joining the dots between last year’s documentary assessments, a deteriorating international security situation, a hollow defence force and a strong national security related ministerial line-up in a new government to incorrectly conclude that Defence is in for a financial sugar rush.
That is simply not going to happen for reasons I outlined in the previous episode of Indefensible New Zealand.
At this point, I wish to shamelessly award myself the Chocolate Fish of Honour Award for correctly picking three defence ministers in a row. Hop over to my other podcast, VoterTorque, where Heather Roy and I discuss politics in plain english for verification.
If you want a stronger, more capable defence force for New Zealand then lobbying is an essential and largely missing element of pursuing that.
 Most people’s idea of lobbying (apart from hiring a professional lobbyist) is getting a meeting with a minister. If you manage to, you’ll be lucky to get 10-15 minutes in their schedule.
You will be competing with their external party demands, electorate needs, caucus activities, Cabinet meetings, portfolio requirements and a host of other duties and events.
Get the picture?
I’m not saying don’t see the minister. Just don’t base your plan solely on that. Politicians like to be offered solutions. To do that you might need to first point out the problem including the risk it poses to the minister or government.
So clearly define the problem. Develop courses of action. Select a recommended course for the government based on specific criteria. Do your best to cost your solution. Then personalise it to all the stakeholders.
And believe me, there are a lot of stakeholders you must get into your tent!

Listen as Simon Ewing-Jarvie takes you through the list of politicians, officials and staff that you need to consider if you're serious about lobbying defence.

 Welcome to Season 2 of Indefensible New Zealand - the podcast all about New Zealand's national security. In this episode, Dr Simon Ewing-Jarvie discusses the post-election situation for defence. At the time of recording, the new coalition government parties are still negotiating and it is not yet known who will be the Minister of Defence and Veterans. 

Welcome to the final episode of season 1. This is the third part of our discussion about defending New Zealand against an invading force that is intent on occupying our land. In episode 8, I took a red team view of how New Zealand might be attacked. That was followed in the next two episodes with a long-range defence without the involvement of allies and a discussion about how New Zealand could be made ‘not worth the cost’ of coming too close. Now it’s time to consider the worst case, that our arch enemy, Buranda, has landed forces on our shores.
The reasons why New Zealand might be directly and conventionally attacked are many including resources, access to Antarctica and regime change to undermine western alliances. Traditionally, the writers of defence assessments include something in their analysis stating that ‘New Zealand is unlikely to face direct attack.’ This is a very convenient and, quite frankly, lazy way of putting tough decisions in the ‘nothing to see here basket.’
There are a range of possible scenarios but I’ve selected one for the purpose of the podcast.
Buranda has established a forward operating base on the Chatham Islands. This began with a commercial joint fishing venture with locals. The development of wharves and airfield was welcomed by Chatham Islanders who had seen little infrastructure investment from New Zealand. The Burandan Investment and Development Bank also built a new school, hotel, fire and police station. It also took a majority shareholding in Air Chathams which saw a fleet of modern mid-sized aircraft and several medium utility helicopters enter service.
While there were critics, Buranda had done nothing illegal. They claimed that they were just there to trade. The Burandan Blue Pacific Fishing Company openly supported a range of candidates in the 2025 local body elections. They were all successful. To celebrate the victory, the Republic of Buranda Navy proposed to send a warship to the Chathams to host a party for the Mayor and Council. The New Zealand government declined but the guided missile destroyer RBS Juu Wewe sailed there anyway together with the replenishment ship RBS Siku Za Furaha.  There was little that New Zealand could do as the country lacked the capability to even approach the Chathams. Allies encouraged a diplomatic solution. Meanwhile, the Chatham Islands seceded to become an independent administration zone under the Republic of Buranda. A rapid build-up of Burandan military assets quickly followed. When conflict flared soon after in the South China Sea, Buranda made its move.

Would New Zealanders really put up a fight or would they allow themselves to be occupied?
Hopefully we will never know but it is useful to consider in advance what sort of resistance could realistically be offered.
This episode is published on 28 October which is the national commemoration day for the New Zealand Wars. These clashes between Maori and British troops took place in various parts of NZ from the early 1840s to mid 1870s. Right now, most Kiwis know more about overseas wars than those that took place in their own country. There is much to learn in studying them. Just google “New Zealand Wars” to find plenty of resources.

In the second part of 'Defending New Zealand', I discuss how the country might configure itself to deal with an invading force that has the intention of putting boots on the ground.

This discussion touches on overt kinetic attacks such as missiles, rockets and bombs, digital attack and covert (fifth column or enemy SOF) attacks on military and civil infrastructure.

New Zealand's need for self-reliance in manufacturing the materiel needed to defend itself is premised on the potential for an air/sea blockade. To be safe, the country needs to be able to out-range any force attempting to  approach and make the price of such an approach too high to pay. In order to do this, New Zealand needs to intensively develop its missile capability (including warheads and fuel), harness existing space capability and grow it along with massive investment in un-crewed systems in all domains.

New Zealand must strive for at least parity in the cyber battlespace, harden its command and control systems and push for excellence in targetting. In effect, the biggest mistake that New Zealand could make is to prepare and configure for wars being fought now. It must develop a uniquely New Zealand strategy for a war that the world has not yet seen except in movies.

New Zealand must become the 'Prickly Kiwi' that everyone acknowledges is too hard to attack.