Talking Strategy

Royal United Services Institute

Our thinking about defence and security is shaped by ideas. What we see depends on our vantage point and the lenses we apply to the world. Governments, military and business leaders are seeking to maximise the value they gain from scarce resources by becoming more 'strategic'. Standing on the shoulders of the giants of strategy from the past helps us see further and more clearly into the future. This series is aimed at those looking to learn more about strategy and how to become more strategic – leaders, practitioners and scholars. This podcast series, co-chaired by Professor Beatrice Heuser and Paul O'Neill, examines the ideas of important thinkers from around the world and across the ages. The ideas, where they came from and what shaped those whose ideas shape us now. By exploring the concepts in which we and our adversaries think today, the episodes will shine a light on how we best prepare for tomorrow. The views or statements expressed by guests are their own and their appearance on the podcast does not imply an endorsement of them or any entity they represent. Views and opinions expressed by RUSI employees are those of the employees and do not necessarily reflect the view of RUSI.

  1. ٨ أبريل

    S6E15: Integrating Today's Forces for Air and Missile Defence

    Rear Admiral Archer M Macy Jr describes today's military, organisational, human and cultural risks and opportunities in integrating forces for air and missile defence. Many modern defence reviews focus on the need for integration. Arguably, nowhere is the need more important today than in providing air and missile defence. State and non-state adversaries have shown varying abilities to combine their attacks in ways that pose multiple dilemmas. Using small, slow-moving and low flying drones intended to swamp defences, coordinated with aircraft and cruise, hypersonic and ballistic missiles, these packages present huge challenges across a wide span of heights, speeds and trajectories. As well as being a problem for fielded forces, it is an industrial challenge in making sure there are enough interceptors at the right price point to sustain the defences. In this episode, RAdm Macy USN (Retd) offers his unique perspective on the challenges and opportunities based on his time in the Aegis Program Office and most recently as the Director of the Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defense Organization in the US Joint Staff. Further Reading Sidharth Kaushal, Archer Macy, and Alexandra Stickings. The future of NATO's air and missile defence. RUSI Occasional Paper, Royal United Services Institute, 2021, available at https://static.rusi.org/NATOMissileDefence2021.pdf.   Brian R. Green, Offense-Defense Integration for Missile Defeat: the Scope of the Challenge, Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 2020, available at https://www.csis.org/analysis/offense-defense-integration-missile-defeat.   David C. Gompert, Preparing Military Forces for Integrated Operations in the Face of Uncertainty, RAND 2003, available at: https://www.rand.org/pubs/issue_papers/IP250.html.   Luke Harding, 'Judges with machine guns: the part-time drone hunters defending Kyiv', The Guardian, 9 May 2024.    Talking Strategy, Season 6, Episode 14, Force Integration in 1940 – Dowding's Air Defence System, RUSI Podcast, 2026, available at https://www.rusi.org/podcasts/talking-strategy/episode-14-force-integration-1940-dowdings-air-defence-system.

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  2. ٢٤ مارس

    S6E14: Force Integration in 1940: Dowding's Air Defence System

    Air Chief Marshal Hugh Dowding's air defence system was crucial during the Battle of Britain. The RAF Museum's Andrew Renwick describes how it was created. In the 1930s, Great Britain, wrestled with the challenge of achieving wide area air defence to protect against threats from continental Europe while reliant on many different elements. ACM Hugh Dowding was tasked with solving this problem. His solution was a system that integrated detection systems, including classified intelligence sources and the new radar technology, with disaggregated command and control systems directing fighters onto the enemy. It was this 'Dowding System' that underpinned British success in the Battle of Britain. As Winston Churchill put it: 'All the ascendancy of the Hurricanes and Spitfires would have been fruitless but for this system, which had been devised and built before the war.' Paul and Beatrice are joined by Andrew Renwick, the curator of photographs at the Royal Air Force Museum Hendon. He is the author of RAF Hendon, Birthplace of Aerial Power, published by Flight Recorder Publications in 2021.   Further Reading John Terraine, Right of the Line: The Role of the RAF in World War Two, Pen & Sword, 2010. Vincent Orange, Dowding of Fighter Command: Victor of the Battle of Britain. Grub Street, 2008. Basil Collier, Leader of the Few: the authorised biography of Air Chief Marshal Lord Dowding of Bentley Priory. Jarrolds, 1957. T. C. G. James, The Growth of Fighter Command 1936-1940, Air Defence of Great Britain Vol. I (Royal Air Force Official Histories, Air Historical Branch), Routledge, 2001. Understanding the Dowding System, a Briefing Paper by the Association of RAF Fighter Control Officers, https://www.raffca.uk/art_UnderstandingTheDowdingSystem.php

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  3. ١٠ فبراير

    S6E11: Finland's Comprehensive Security Model

    Often seen as the gold standard for societal resilience, Finland has many admirers. The Secretary General of its Security Committee, Petteri Korvala, describes Finland's approach. Many nations are exploring how to build societal resilience as part of a comprehensive approach to security. The Scandinavian countries are often seen as exemplars of best practice, with Finland arguably leading the pack. But delivering resilience through comprehensive security requires trust across all elements of society and a cultural shift as much as it needs the right structures and processes. In this episode, we hear from the Secretary General of Finland's Security Committee, Petteri Korvala, about how their comprehensive security system works. Petteri Korvala has over 30 years of experience in Finland's defence forces and internationally, including in the Ministry of Defence and in Finland's Permanent Representation to the European Union, as well as having served as a liaison officer in United States European Command. Further Reading: Finnish Government, Security Strategy for Society: Government Resolution, 2025:3, available at https://julkaisut.valtioneuvosto.fi/items/0126122a-1e8a-4ffa-9868-6286292efc01 Vesa Valtonen & Minna Branders, 'Tracing the Finnish Comprehensive Security Model', in Sebastian Larsson & Mark Rhinard (eds.), Nordic Societal Security, Routledge, 2020, pp.91-108. Available at: https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/oa-edit/10.4324/9781003045533-7/tracing-finnish-comprehensive-security-model-vesa-valtonen-minna-branders. Ari-Elmeri Hyvönen & Tapio Juntunen, 'From "spiritual defence" to robust resilience in the Finnish comprehensive security model', in Sebastian Larsson & Mark Rhinard (eds.), Nordic Societal Security Routledge, 2020, pp.154–178. Tom Woolmore, The Porcupine and the Hedgehog: The Influence of Finland's Comprehensive Security Model on the British Whole-of-Society Approach, King's College London Master's Dissertation, 2025, available at: https://turvallisuuskomitea.fi/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/MA-Thesis-Thomas-Woolmore.pdf Andrew Sharples (London School of Economics and Political Science): From Bowling Alone to Fighting Together: Social Capital and Whole-of-Society Defence.

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  4. ١٣ يناير

    S6E9: The Iron Chancellor: Otto von Bismarck's Unification of Germany

    Professor Michael Epkenhans describes how Otto von Bismarck's adroit use of war, realpolitik and the harnessing all levers of state power unified the German nation. Otto von Bismarck, Prussian Chancellor and – after 1871 – the leading political figure of the Second German Empire after the Kaiser, hated to be bullied but managed to manipulate and bully all around him into following his complex strategic plan. This involved not only keeping German democrats at bay but also Denmark, Austria, and France. Tricking Denmark and France into breaking conventions and declaring war on Prussia and its allies respectively, he got the other German states to close ranks and back the Prussian claim for leadership in a newly united German State. By putting Prussia on the defensive, the other European great powers – the United Kingdom and Russia – did not intervene, even though the emergent German superstate changed the balance of powers in Europe. Stopping short of aiming for overseas territories, taking on the role of the honest broker of the quarrels among others, Bismarck avoided pushing Britain and Russia over the brink into coalescing against Germany – which his immoderate successors did not. We are joined by Michael Epkenhans, Beatrice Heuser's successor as Director of Research at the Bundeswehr's Military History Research Office, and specialist on 19th century German and Prussian history.

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  5. ٦ يناير

    S6E8: Prioritising Innovation: Creating a Secure and Resilient Ecosystem

    Innovation has long been a Western strategy, but how can it be made effective against an industrially and economically strong China? Dame Fiona Murray explains. A defining feature of the West's Cold War approach to the Soviet Union was leveraging its technological and economic advantages, including through 'offset strategies'. While defence innovation remains a pillar of Western security, its focus has shifted toward dual-use technologies, reflecting a broader move of the locus of innovation from states to private industry. However, just as earlier episodes in Season 5 explored (Episodes 10 and 11 regarding US industrial mobilisation during the Second World War, and Jean Monnet's plans for European post-war cooperation), success requires many actors coming together to create a resilient ecosystem. Achieving this demands alignment by all parties. Professor Dame Fiona Murray is the Chair of the NATO Innovation Fund and William Porter (1967) Professor of Entrepreneurship at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. She advises the UK Government and sits on the European Innovation Council Joint Expert Group. Her work is published widely in Science, Nature, American Journal of Sociology, Organisation Science and the Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organisation. Her most recent book Accelerating Innovation: Competitive Advantage through Ecosystem Engagement, (MIT Press, 2025) is with Phil Budden. Further Reading Phil Budden and Fiona Murray, Accelerating Innovation: Competitive Advantage through Ecosystem Engagement, MIT Press, 2025. Edlyn V. Levine and Fiona Murray, How the US and its allies can rebuild economic security, in MIT Technology Review, 30 July 2024. Stefan Raff, Fiona E. Murray, and Martin Murmann, Why You Should Tap Innovation at Deep-Tech Startups, in MIT Sloan Management Review, Fall 2024. Gene Keselman and Fiona Murray, Dual-use is a Strategy, Not a Category (Nor a Trap), War on the Rocks, 2 January 2025.

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حول

Our thinking about defence and security is shaped by ideas. What we see depends on our vantage point and the lenses we apply to the world. Governments, military and business leaders are seeking to maximise the value they gain from scarce resources by becoming more 'strategic'. Standing on the shoulders of the giants of strategy from the past helps us see further and more clearly into the future. This series is aimed at those looking to learn more about strategy and how to become more strategic – leaders, practitioners and scholars. This podcast series, co-chaired by Professor Beatrice Heuser and Paul O'Neill, examines the ideas of important thinkers from around the world and across the ages. The ideas, where they came from and what shaped those whose ideas shape us now. By exploring the concepts in which we and our adversaries think today, the episodes will shine a light on how we best prepare for tomorrow. The views or statements expressed by guests are their own and their appearance on the podcast does not imply an endorsement of them or any entity they represent. Views and opinions expressed by RUSI employees are those of the employees and do not necessarily reflect the view of RUSI.

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