Coffee and a Case Note

James d'Apice

I’m Australian lawyer, James d’Apice. Coffee and a Case Note began as a video series where I sip a coffee and chat about recent legal cases. This is the audio version! I hope it brings you value.

  1. 2 days ago

    Lanmar Pty Limited (No 2) [2026] NSWSC 800

    “You haven’t proved the shares’ value, so we need a receiver!” ___ P, D3, and D4 were equal 1/3 shareholders in a defence consulting Co. P sought a s 233 order that D3 and D4 buy its shares: [1], [2], [9]There were disputes between the dirs (each controlling P, D3, and D4) in managing the Co: [3] – [43]In late 2024 the Co was invited to tender for defence work. D3 and D4 were unimpressed with P’s contribution calling P “a complete dud”: [65] – [71]D3 and D4 relied on ChatGPT to guide their removal of P – “not a prudent choice of adviser…”: [73], [77], [82], [83]ChatGPT’s output was employment focused; silent on corporate risks: [86], [93]The plan, which was executed in essence, was to gradually exclude P and to withhold dividends: [88], [121]Following this plan, D3 and D4 conducted meetings and sent emails incorrectly framing as employment only: [89] – [98]P removed D3’s and D4’s access to the Co’s Xero account: [99]The erosion of trust and confidence justified a s 461(1)(k) winding up orders, and amounted to oppression: [113]Further steps were taken to exclude P from a role at the Co, including directing P not to present to a new client: [116] – [129]In May 2025 P’s lawyers wrote to the D3, D4, and the Co making complaints upheld and accepted by the Ds in XX. No remedial steps were taken: [161], [162]On 14 May 2025 proceedings were commenced. D3 and D4 set a meeting for 7.30am the following day, apparently to frustrate P’s application: [163] – [167]D3’s and D4’s conduct, combined with the litigation, saw P’s role at the Co further reduced: [174]D3 and D4 took steps (in relation to IT and external contractors) that required unanimous approval without P’s consent: [178]D3 and D4 executed a contract between the Co and an external sub-Co they controlled, for provision of services: [189]Oppression was established noting the exclusion of P in the absence of a genuine offer to buy P’s shares; and in respect of the dividend strategy allowing D3 and D4 to be paid while P was not: [265]The Court found it could not accept either valuer’s evidence as to share value – leaving no finding made as to the valuation of P’s shares, and so no ability to make a buyout order: [285], [315]The Court was unmoved by one expert’s methodology; and disagreed with the way the other expert dealt with the “only one client who can terminate for convenience risk” of working for defence: [316]A share buyback did not arise as the Co did not appear: [320]After considering appointment of a receiver to sell the shares at length, and noting the Co was a viable one, the Court concluded a receiver was the best alternative: [340]Orders appointing a receiver to sell the shares were made: [351]

  2. 17 July

    Lao v Taing [2026] VSCA 131

    “It’s not my fault the payments were a pointless waste!”___2 families resolved to develop land through a unit trust: [1], [2]R held a 40% stake. A, and related interests, held the remaining 60%: [2] – [4]At trial, R won an oppression claim alleging A caused the Co’s conduct to be unfairly prejudicial: [6]The Co bought land in 2012 for $3m and sold it for $11m in 2015. The sale proceeds were distributed at A’s direction: [8]The docs for the sale were strange, including A instructing lawyers while withholding the purchase price: [35]After settlement, A finally disclosed the $11m sale price, and $3m in other payments: [47]Apart from costs, legal fees, duties, commission, balance to the Co etc, 3 further payments were made: one to the mortgagee, and two others which R criticised: [100]One of the payments was made to an entity controlled by A’s sibling: [109]The other was “highly unusual… to say the least”, with A’s evidence “very unimpressive”. The amount was large, not owed, and paid to a Co incorporated days before settlement whose Dir and s/h was known to A, with no connection to the land: [111]The sole Dir and s/h of the purchaser of the property was also a Dir of the real estate agent who enjoyed a commission of $1m on the sale: [30], [31]The trial judge found for R, that: (i) A was responsible for the payments, (ii) that the two payments made on settlement were oppressive, and (iii) A’s responses to requests for info were inadequate: [11]A appealed on the basis that: (i) the judge was wrong for finding A responsible for the payments, (ii) R delayed their claim, and (iii) the judge erred re A’s response to R’s enquiries: [13]There was no contest about whether the 3rd party recipients were entitled to receive the two payments. (All agreed they weren’t.) The issue was A causing the payments to be made: [14]The primary judge found A gave the payment directions, was responsible, and should have ensured all payments were properly incurred: [48] – [52], [54]Some payments were a “pointless waste” of Co funds: [53], [56]The trial judge found A’s responses to info requests for information were unfairly discriminatory: [59]The judge found any delay from R had not prejudiced A: [64]A’s subs on appeal were, broadly, that A was a mere intermediary; not responsible: [68] – [88]R said R’s claim was about a breach of duty misunderstood the nature of s 232: [89] – [93]The Court agreed with the primary judge that A was not a “mere intermediary”; mindlessly and powerlessly accepting direction from their sibling: [104], [105]The primary judge accepted A “did not profit personally” from the strange additional payments, though noted an entity controlled by their sibling did: [109], [110]A did not demonstrate an error made by the trial judge re R’s delay, or A’s non-disclosure: [119], [120]Appeal dismissed: [121], [122] ___ Please follow James d'Apice, Coffee and a Case Note, and Gravamen on your favourite platform and podcast provider!

  3. 22 May

    Warren v Whittaker [2026] NSWSC 470

    “Who pays the legal fees for the property sale and the partnership windup?”___A recent, short decision concerned a s 66G application for the sale of a property and a winding up of the partnership that owned it: [2]In 1991 the partnership was formed between a sibling, some companies, and the deceased. The parties to the proceedings were the partners and some of the deceased’s children: [3]In 2022 the deceased died.At the time of the hearing, the deceased’s stake in the property was held by the deceased’s executors: [4]An accusation of “foot-dragging” on the part of the Ds coloured the Ps’ approach: [8]The Ps commenced proceedings seeking the appointment of s 66G trustees and for the winding up of the partnership: [2]The parties reached agreement that the orders sought ought to be made: [5]Unresolved was the question of legal costs: [6]The Ps took the view that the Ds’ foot-dragging conduct was unreasonable, thereby inviting the litigation. Based on this – the Ps said – the Ps should have their costs from residue but the Ds should not: [8]The Ds said the normal position ought to be maintained, that their conduct did not warrant a departure from it (noting the negotiations engaged in over the course of the matter): [9]The Court considered the usual position as to costs in a s 66G application and a partnership dissolution – absent an alternative order the parties’ costs be paid from residue: [10] – [12]Having considered the evidence tendered by both parties detailing their interactions over the course of years the Court was not satisfied that the usual costs order ought to be departed from: [14]Following some argument about a suggestion that proceeds ought to be paid into a controlled monies account, the Court ordered that the proceeds ought to be paid into Court: [16] – [21]___If you made it this far please consider giving my firm Gravamen a follow on your favourite platform! www.gravamen.com.au

  4. 14 Apr

    Deemhire Pty Limited [2026] NSWSC 318

    “The appointor is dead. Long live the appointor!” ___ G was born in 1923 and died in 2011. Before death G enjoyed business success and made a succession plan: [5] G had 4 children and a number of grandchildren: [15] – [20] The trust was settled by deed in 1986 with G appointor and settlor. P was (and remained) the trustee: [44] and [48] The property of the trust was real property of some value and some publicly traded shares: [76] G’s plan included a trust with unusual aspects, and without clear reasons: [9] The structure was odd: (i) the trust’s terms caused the range of benefs to be reduced on G’s death; (ii) G’s role as appointor had no path for a successor on G’s death; and (iii) G failed to let their family and advisers know their reasons for this approach: [7] P came to Court in 2025 seeking amendments to the trust deed pursuant to s 86A: [10] P’s proposed amendments included dealing with the appointor issues and the breadth of beneficiaries: [13], [14] The wording of the trust deed will dictate the nature of each appointor’s role: [26], [33] The role of appointor is an administrative power dictated by each trust deed: [26] – [36] No fiduciary duty attaches to the role of appointor. The Court considered contrasting authorities regarding how an appointor’s powers – to be used in good faith and for the benefs as a whole, or for the appointor’s benefit (perhaps in their capacity as benef): [41] – [43] The trust deed had no provision dealing with the death of the appointor: [51] G was the named appointor. The deed dictated various tasks the appointor could perform, and various matters referable to the appointor’s life: [60] E.g. (i) the number of benefs was reduced after G’s death; (ii) the trustee could validly distribute income to Cos whose board included G; and (iii) the trust could only be varied during G’s life: [61] The provenance of the trust deed was not clear with some suggestion the deed was a “standard precedent”: [71] – [74] In certain circs the Court can appoint an appointor pursuant to its inherent jurisdiction: [91] – [97] (Respectfully) Excellent consideration was given to the statutory underpinning of the Sup Ct’s power to amend trusts: [106] – [150] After reviewing various jurisdictions’ evolving position on the point, the Court found the Sup Ct had that power to insert an appointor: [167] The Court noted it had the power to widen the pool of benefs and a discretion to approve proposed arrangements or amendments to trusts: [171], [172] The Court resolved its inherent jurisdiction would be exercised in this case to appoint the appointors contended for by P: [182] Having heard evidence that restoring the beneficiary class to its “pre-G’s death” position would be beneficial for family harmony, the Court made the amendment to that effect: [188] – [197] ___ Please follow James d'Apice, Gravamen, and Coffee and a Case Note on your favourite platform! www.gravamen.com.au

4.8
out of 5
48 Ratings

About

I’m Australian lawyer, James d’Apice. Coffee and a Case Note began as a video series where I sip a coffee and chat about recent legal cases. This is the audio version! I hope it brings you value.