Moving forward, every podcast will be accompanied by a full-length article. This is for those subscribers who prefer to read over listen. If you read the article below, you will get the gist of the podcast episode. If you prefer to hear our conversation about it, you can find our podcast on most platforms. On to this week’s episode... It’s been a little over two weeks since our last podcast, and quite a bit has happened. Iran’s streets are still on fire, Xi Jinping just gutted his own military leadership in a way we haven’t seen in decades, and the last nuclear arms treaty between the U.S. and Russia quietly expired while almost nobody was paying attention. Plus a Navy collision and a very fishy story out of El Paso. Iran Protests It has been hard to determine exactly what is happening on the ground in Iran as the regime has instituted an internet blackout. The regime has used internet disruptions before, but what we’re seeing now is a broad, sustained effort to throttle connectivity. Now, our intelligence picture isn’t entirely dependent on the internet being up. We have other sources and methods we obviously can’t get into here. And there’s been reporting—the Wall Street Journal had a great piece on this—about the U.S. smuggling Starlink terminals into Iran to help people get information out even when the regime clamps down. That tells you something about how deeply our intelligence agencies have penetrated into the country. Mossad has clearly done the same. So while the casualty numbers coming out of these protests vary wildly—we’ve seen reports anywhere from tens of thousands to as high as 90,000, all unconfirmed—we probably have a decent picture of what’s actually happening on the ground. While Tehran is killing its own people, the U.S. and Iran are also heading into another round of nuclear talks. The second round is in Geneva, with Oman mediating, and the IAEA is pressing for clarity on Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile and access to key sites. So what does success actually look like here? It’s not regime change. We want to be really clear on that. Regime change is a phrase people throw around like it’s a switch you flip. It’s not. Even when you remove a leader—as we saw in Venezuela—the regime is still in place, the oppressive government is still doing what it does. Actual regime change in Iran without major U.S. boots on the ground is, in our view, impossible. And even then, you have to ask: change to what? The realistic definition of success is narrower: tighter constraints on enrichment, accountability for stockpiles—especially the highly enriched uranium that was moved before last summer’s strikes—real verification, and a deal that reduces the sprint-to-a-weapon risk without tipping into a broader war. Iran will be a tough negotiator. As Sandy likes to point out, the Iranians invented chess. They play things very close to the line. And they’ve lost most of their regional leverage—Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis have all been significantly degraded. The only real card they have left to threaten Israel is ballistic missiles, so getting them to give those up is going to be extraordinarily hard. Israel, for its part, is exactly where it’s always been: deeply skeptical of any negotiated outcome short of total elimination with intrusive inspections. Netanyahu made that clear just the other day. Trump pushed back, saying he’d prefer a deal to returning to combat. But the second carrier strike group heading to the region sends a very clear signal—and we literally just used that kind of posture in Venezuela a few months ago. What we’re watching: Is this mostly sticks, or will there be carrots? We think it’s mostly the release of the stick, “we won’t strike you if you give us a deal,” with maybe a minor symbolic carrot, like limited sanctions relief, that Iranian leaders can point to domestically. Whether Iran responds to that kind of pressure, or whether things escalate further, is the question of the next few weeks. China is Purging its Own Generals Xi Jinping has been systematically dismantling his own senior military leadership, and it just escalated significantly. In late January, China announced an investigation into Zhang Youxia, a vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission and someone long considered one of Xi’s closest allies. Their fathers were boyhood friends. This wasn’t a corruption charge, either. The stated basis was essentially “trampling on the chairman’s duty to lead,” meaning this guy directly challenged Xi’s authority. That’s a very different kind of removal than the corruption purges we’ve seen before. At this point, Xi has removed all but one of the CMC’s vice-chairmen. He is, effectively, the sole leader of the world's largest military. Now, we need to be careful here, because we’ve had our own senior military shakeups in the U.S.—the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Chief of the Coast Guard, a combatant commander, others—all removed in the past year. We’re not equating the two systems. Our officers aren’t going to prison. Lisa Franchetti isn’t in jail—she’s in retirement. The U.S. purge was driven by perceptions around DEI and a desire for change, not by officers threatening the president. That’s just not how our military operates. But rapid senior turnover in any system creates disruption and uncertainty, and that’s worth acknowledging honestly. Does this change Taiwan's timelines? Probably not. A possible invasion of Taiwan hinges on bigger factors: PLA readiness (something strategic leaders have little to do with), political windows (i.e., the 2028 Olympics), perceived U.S. and allied posture, and the complex calculus of escalation. A purge can signal turbulence, but it can also strengthen loyalty. One interesting wrinkle: the CIA just released a recruitment video explicitly targeting disaffected PLA personnel, trying to capitalize on the resentment and turmoil inside the system. It went viral in U.S. military circles. Whether it actually penetrated China is another question—what resonates with an American audience may not land the same way in another culture. But it tells you something about how opaque China’s military remains. As we’ve said before, it’s essentially a black hole from an intelligence perspective, and some of those six things you need for a great military—will, skill, culture, technology, mass, logistics—are very hard to assess from the outside until someone actually has to fight. One of the Most Important Stories Almost Nobody Talked About On February 5th, the New START Treaty—the last remaining nuclear arms control agreement between the U.S. and Russia—expired. And unless you’re plugged into national security circles, you probably didn’t even hear about it. That’s a problem, because this is one of the most consequential things that happened in the last two weeks within the realm of national security and foreign policy. New START wasn’t just about the headline numbers, though those mattered: 1,550 deployed strategic warheads and 700 deployed delivery systems per side. The real value was the verification architecture—on-site inspections, data exchanges, and notifications when missiles moved. That infrastructure is what “strategic stability” actually means in practice: two nations that can wipe each other out maintaining enough confidence that it’s very unlikely to happen. Sandy was part of the team that negotiated this treaty. He was on the Washington end—working out of the White House Situation Room and providing guidance to the forward negotiating team led by Rose Gottemoeller at the State Department. One of the interesting dynamics he remembers: because of our IT systems and decision-making processes, the U.S. side could quickly turn around answers to negotiating questions. The Russian side had a much more cumbersome bureaucratic system. What this meant was that the U.S. side would reach decisions faster than the Russians. The discipline was not to “negotiate against yourself” during those delays—the Russians weren’t rejecting proposals, they were just slow. Putin offered a one-year extension to keep the New START limits in place while negotiating a new agreement. Trump rejected it, saying he wants a more modern deal that includes China. On paper, that sounds responsible. In practice, it’s brutally hard. Sandy calls it the “three-body problem” — negotiating between two nuclear powers is already agonizing, and bringing in a third makes it nearly unsolvable. China has consistently resisted joining the trilateral arms control regime because its arsenal is smaller and it doesn’t want to lock itself into a perceived disadvantage. There could also be a political dimension. It is likely that Trump doesn’t want to live with an Obama-era treaty. He wants to put his own stamp on something. Neither side is going to suddenly build a bunch of new warheads. That process is expensive, politically difficult, and would take time that would be visible to intelligence collection. The real risk is the lack of verification, leading to less information and a more clouded decision matrix. That’s how miscalculation risk rises, especially during crises that involve cyber, space, and conventional operations alongside nuclear signaling. It’s also worth noting: the actual number of warheads on each side—roughly 5,400 for Russia and 5,100 for the U.S.—is much larger than the deployed limits. Most are in storage, not readily deployable. Generating them would be a deliberate, recognizable process. But without a treaty framework, even the confidence that comes from knowing what the other side is doing erodes over time. This story is going to keep evolving. And frankly, negotiating something like this is probably the single most important thing a president can do. Speed Round Two Navy Sh