The CIA: Cold War Operations

YesOui

Forty-five years of covert operations the agency fought and rarely admitted to. Each episode takes a single declassified operation: Iran 1953 and Mosaddegh, Guatemala 1954, Bay of Pigs, Operation Mongoose, Phoenix Program, Chile 1973, the Afghan mujahideen pipeline, Iran-Contra, the hunt for Aldrich Ames and Robert Hanssen, the Berlin tunnel, the U-2 programme. The dark companion piece to the Cold War. — a daily series with new episodes every day.

Episodes

  1. 6 days ago

    Iran 1953: The Coup That Built the CIA's Playbook

    (00:00:00) Iran 1953: The Coup That Built the CIA's Playbook (00:01:34) The Doctrine of Deniability (00:03:00) Iran and the First Template (00:04:18) The Eisenhower Calculation (00:06:24) Guatemala and the Confidence Problem (00:07:46) Cuba and the Limits of the Playbook (00:09:46) The Assassination Instinct (00:10:58) The Pattern Takes Shape (00:12:40) The Reckoning, Partial and Incomplete (00:14:21) What the Beginning Built In 1953, a covert operation codenamed Ajax changed the course of Iranian history — and quietly set the blueprint for forty-five years of CIA covert action. This opening episode traces the origins of the Central Intelligence Agency's licence to operate in the shadows: the doctrine of plausible deniability, the permission structures built into the agency's founding logic, and the first real test of that doctrine in the streets of Tehran. At the centre of the story is Mohammad Mosaddegh, Iran's democratically elected prime minister, who in 1951 moved to nationalise Iranian oil and reclaim its profits for the Iranian people. He was not a communist. He was a nationalist and a democrat. But the Eisenhower administration, viewing the world through a rigid Cold War lens, saw a vulnerability — and authorised the CIA to act. Kermit Roosevelt coordinated the coup from inside Tehran: cultivating military officers, funding street agitators, manufacturing chaos. Within weeks, Mosaddegh was arrested, the Shah was restored to power, and Western oil interests were secured. On paper, it was a clean operational success. In practice, it planted the seeds of a crisis that would erupt twenty-six years later in the Iranian Revolution. But the episode is about more than Iran. It is about the architecture of covert power — the question a small group of Washington insiders asked themselves after World War Two: what are we willing to do that we're not willing to admit? The answer they built proved almost impossible to dismantle. This is where it began. This episode includes AI-generated content.

    17 min

  2. 6 days ago

    Operation Ajax: How the CIA Learned to Topple Governments

    (00:00:00) Operation Ajax: How the CIA Learned to Topple Governments (00:01:55) How Britain Recruited America (00:04:33) Operation Ajax Takes Shape (00:06:06) The Coup That Almost Failed (00:07:39) What Ajax Actually Produced (00:09:08) The Template Is Set In 1953, Iran had a democratically elected Prime Minister, Mohammad Mosaddegh, who wanted one thing: for Iran's oil to belong to Iran. What followed was the CIA's first experiment in regime change — and it changed everything. Operation Ajax is the blueprint. Before 1953, the United States had never overthrown a foreign government. After it, the CIA would do so repeatedly, with growing confidence and shrinking hesitation. This episode traces exactly how that happened: how Britain's MI6, shut out of Iran by an oil embargo that wasn't working, recruited the newly formed CIA into a joint covert operation by reframing an economic dispute as a Cold War emergency. How the Dulles brothers — Allen at Langley, John Foster at the State Department — proved far more receptive than Truman's team had been. And how Kermit Roosevelt Jr., grandson of a president, ran a black operation from Tehran that paid off journalists, bribed religious figures, hired crowds from the criminal underworld, and manufactured the appearance of a popular uprising. Mosaddegh was not a communist. The intelligence didn't firmly support that conclusion. But the ideological predisposition of the Eisenhower administration made the British case feel convincing — and that gap between evidence and action would become a defining feature of CIA covert operations for the next forty years. This is the coup that built the playbook. This is how the CIA learned what it could do. This episode includes AI-generated content.

    13 min

  3. 5 days ago

    PBSUCCESS: The Playbook Is Written in Guatemala

    (00:00:00) PBSUCCESS: The Playbook Is Written in Guatemala (00:00:58) The Setup: Land, Power, and United Fruit (00:02:34) The Misreading (00:04:08) The Operation (00:06:05) What the Agency Took Away (00:07:45) The Plausible Deniability Machine (00:09:25) The Blowback Problem (00:10:46) The Line From Guatemala to Cuba In June 1954, the CIA removed Guatemalan President Jacobo Árbenz from power in under two weeks — without a single American soldier crossing a border in combat. Operation PBSUCCESS used psychological warfare, a fabricated radio station called the Voice of Liberation, CIA-piloted aircraft, and a small force of trained exiles to make Árbenz believe he was facing a force far larger than the one that actually existed. He resigned. The operation was declared a success. But success for whom, and at what cost? This episode examines PBSUCCESS in full — the corporate conflicts of interest that helped drive it (United Fruit Company's connections ran directly into the Eisenhower administration, through John Foster Dulles and CIA Director Allen Dulles), the ideological misreading of Árbenz as a Soviet proxy when the evidence was thin, and the operational overconfidence the CIA carried out of Tehran in 1953 and straight into Guatemala City. The deeper story is what the agency took away from the operation. PBSUCCESS appeared to validate a model: small team, limited resources, psychological pressure, plausible deniability. That model would be applied again in Cuba, in Chile, and beyond — each time with the Guatemala template as proof it could work. Each time the context was different enough that the template would fail, or succeed only by creating something worse. Jacobo Árbenz was not a communist. He was a reformist pursuing land redistribution in one of the most unequal countries in the Western Hemisphere. Understanding why Washington couldn't see that difference — and what happened because they didn't — is essential to understanding the next forty years of CIA covert operations. This episode includes AI-generated content.

    13 min

  4. 4 days ago

    Plausible Deniability: Why the Bay of Pigs Was Doomed Before Dawn

    (00:00:00) Plausible Deniability: Why the Bay of Pigs Was Doomed Before Dawn (00:01:00) How It Got This Far (00:02:39) The Plan and Its Contradictions (00:04:16) The Air Strike Problem (00:06:06) Seventy-Two Hours (00:07:34) Kennedy and the Aftermath (00:09:20) The Prisoners and the Price (00:10:22) What the Bay of Pigs Left Behind On April 17, 1961, Brigade 2506 came ashore at the Bay of Pigs. Within 72 hours, the operation was over — 1,200 men captured, the United States humiliated, and Fidel Castro handed the greatest propaganda victory of his career. This episode of the CIA's Cold War story examines not just what happened on that beach, but why it was structurally broken long before the first shot was fired. The plan grew from the same institutional confidence that had toppled Mosaddegh in Iran and Árbenz in Guatemala. Those operations worked. They worked fast, cheaply, and cleanly. The CIA had convinced itself that covert action was not just a tool — it was a reliable one. Cuba would prove that confidence catastrophically wrong. This episode traces the compounding failures: the move from Trinidad to the Bay of Pigs that eliminated the brigade's only escape route; the cancelled second wave of air strikes that left Castro's planes operational; the cover story that unravelled at a Florida press conference two days before the landing; and the fundamental miscalculation that Castro's Cuba was anything like Árbenz's Guatemala. At the centre of it all is a structural problem that would haunt the CIA for decades: the analysis and the operational ambition were not talking to each other. Planners saw what the plan needed to be true and weighted the intelligence accordingly. Kennedy wanted deniability. The CIA wanted to preserve the operation. Neither side pushed hard enough on what the compromise meant for the men in the water. The Bay of Pigs is not just a Cold War disaster story. It is a case study in how institutions fail — and how the lessons learned from failure can be just as dangerous as the failure itself. This episode includes AI-generated content.

    12 min

  5. 3 days ago

    Mongoose: The Assassination Plots That Unravelled a Superpower

    (00:00:00) Mongoose: The Assassination Plots That Unravelled a Superpower (00:01:10) The Kennedy Obsession (00:02:36) The Mechanics of Murder (00:04:41) Lansdale's Wider War (00:05:53) October Changes Everything (00:07:20) The Accountability Problem (00:08:48) What Mongoose Tells Us Operation Mongoose is the most revealing failure in CIA history — not because it didn't kill Fidel Castro, but because of what the attempt exposed about how American power actually worked in the Cold War. Eight separate assassination plots. Botulinum-laced cigars. A frozen poison capsule in a Havana hotel freezer. A contaminated diving suit delivered as a goodwill gift. Organised crime bosses recruited as cut-outs. The specifics read like dark comedy, but the institutional logic behind them was deadly serious. This episode traces Mongoose from its origins in the wreckage of the Bay of Pigs — the humiliation that left Robert Kennedy consumed by what he simply called 'the problem' — through the formal programme Edward Lansdale constructed in November 1961. Lansdale's mandate was vast: political propaganda, economic sabotage, paramilitary raids, and the removal of Castro by whatever mechanism was understood but never written down. The plausible deniability doctrine, which had been evolving since Iran 1953, was now fully institutionalised. No written orders authorising lethal action were required. None were given. We examine the Special Group Augmented — Robert Kennedy, Dean Rusk, Robert McNamara, John McCone — and Robert Kennedy's unusually personal role in driving the operation forward. We look at how the CIA's Technical Services Division became a factory for operationally bizarre weapons. And we trace the decision to bring Santos Trafficante and Sam Giancana into the plot: the moment when an intelligence operation and organised crime entered a relationship that neither side could fully control. Mongoose is where the Bay of Pigs failure hardened into something more dangerous — a doctrine that equated ambiguity with deniability, and deniability with permission. This episode includes AI-generated content.

    12 min

  6. 2 days ago

    Operation Gold & the U-2: When the CIA's Best Secrets Were Already Blown

    (00:00:00) Operation Gold & the U-2: When the CIA's Best Secrets Were Already Blown (00:01:46) Digging Toward the Enemy (00:04:38) The Plane That Flew Too High to Catch (00:06:48) The Day the Myth Broke (00:09:06) What Both Operations Actually Meant (00:11:12) The Intelligence Lesson That Stayed Buried In the early 1950s, the Soviet Union was a black box. Its military strength, its weapons programmes, its intentions — all of it was nearly invisible to Western intelligence. The CIA's answer was two of the most technically ambitious covert operations of the Cold War: a tunnel bored beneath divided Berlin to tap Soviet military cables, and a spy plane designed to fly so high that nothing could shoot it down. Operation Gold — the Berlin Tunnel — was a joint CIA and MI6 operation that ran for nearly a year, feeding real-time Soviet communications back to London and Washington. What the agency didn't know was that British intelligence officer George Blake had handed the entire blueprint to the KGB before the first shovelful of earth was moved. The Soviets let it run, carefully managing the traffic, protecting their real secrets while sacrificing the rest. When they finally staged a dramatic discovery in April 1956, the CIA had been celebrating a triumph Moscow had been quietly controlling from the start. The U-2 programme, developed in secret by Lockheed's Skunk Works under CIA contract, delivered photographs that genuinely changed what Washington knew about Soviet capabilities. But on 1 May 1960, pilot Francis Gary Powers was shot down over Sverdlovsk. The Eisenhower administration's cover story collapsed within days. The Paris Summit fell apart. The era of permissive overflights was over. Together, the tunnel and the U-2 form a paired case study in Cold War intelligence: extraordinary operational creativity undone by penetration, politics, and the limits of technical advantage. This episode examines both in full. This episode includes AI-generated content.

    14 min

  7. 1 day ago

    Phoenix Program: The War Inside the War

    (00:00:00) Phoenix Program: The War Inside the War (00:01:13) Building the Shadow-Killing Machine (00:03:03) The Numbers and What They Mean (00:04:56) The Men on the Ground (00:07:01) Colby, Congress, and the Reckoning (00:08:23) The Bigger Picture (00:10:42) The Lesson That Didn't Stick Beneath the helicopters and jungle firefights of Vietnam, a quieter and more disturbing conflict was being waged — one fought not with artillery but with informant networks, dossiers, and paramilitary teams operating in the dark. The Phoenix Program was the CIA's attempt to destroy the Viet Cong not as an army, but as a political organisation embedded deep inside South Vietnamese civilian life. In this episode, we trace how Phoenix evolved from the CIA's early Provincial Reconnaissance Units and the Intelligence Coordination and Exploitation program into a formalised, bureaucratic killing machine launched in 1968 under the CORDS umbrella. At its centre was William Colby — not a zealot, but a technocrat who believed, until his death, that Phoenix was a rational solution to a real problem. We examine the program's architecture: province-level intelligence centres, multi-source targeting dossiers, and the deliberately engineered distance between American designers and Vietnamese executors. We interrogate the numbers — 81,000 neutralisations, 26,000 dead — and ask what those figures actually tell us when the informant system was riddled with personal vendettas, land disputes, and fabricated accusations. And we hear from the men on the ground: the CIA officers, the young military personnel, and the Provincial Reconnaissance Unit operatives who ran operations at night, outside normal command structures, with bonuses tied to results. Phoenix is one of the most debated covert programmes of the Cold War. Understanding it means understanding how the CIA fought — and what it was willing to become. This episode includes AI-generated content.

    14 min

  8. 7 hr ago

    Make the Economy Scream: Chile, 1970–1973

    (00:00:00) Make the Economy Scream: Chile, 1970–1973 (00:00:37) Track One and Track Two (00:02:45) The Architecture of Destabilization (00:05:01) The Generals Move (00:06:49) What Followed (00:08:02) Congress Responds (00:09:27) The Pattern and What It Means (00:11:11) The Record Salvador Allende won Chile's presidential election in September 1970. He didn't seize power — he won it democratically. Within days, Richard Nixon ordered the CIA to ensure his government would fail. This episode traces the full arc of one of the Cold War's most documented and disturbing covert operations. It begins with Nixon's instruction — recorded in Helms's own notes — that Chile must not be allowed to go communist, and the two simultaneous CIA programmes that followed. Track One tried to manipulate Chile's congress into blocking Allende's ratification. Track Two went directly to the Chilean military and ended with the assassination of General René Schneider, the army commander who refused to move against an elected president. When both tracks failed to prevent Allende from taking office, Washington shifted strategy. The goal became making his government look incompetent. Nixon's phrase — 'make the economy scream' — became operational policy. Eight million declassified CIA dollars funded opposition newspapers including El Mercurio, opposition political parties, and a propaganda campaign designed to accelerate economic collapse. International credit was blocked. The World Bank was pressured. Truckers were funded to strike and paralyse the country. Allende held on longer than Washington expected. But by September 1973, General Augusto Pinochet was ready to move. On the 11th, Chilean air force jets bombed La Moneda. Allende died inside the palace. The junta that followed would go on to torture and disappear thousands. This episode asks the question the operation raises and never cleanly answers: what exactly does the CIA owe to democracy? This episode includes AI-generated content.

    13 min
  • 8 Episodes

About

Forty-five years of covert operations the agency fought and rarely admitted to. Each episode takes a single declassified operation: Iran 1953 and Mosaddegh, Guatemala 1954, Bay of Pigs, Operation Mongoose, Phoenix Program, Chile 1973, the Afghan mujahideen pipeline, Iran-Contra, the hunt for Aldrich Ames and Robert Hanssen, the Berlin tunnel, the U-2 programme. The dark companion piece to the Cold War. — a daily series with new episodes every day.

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