In mid-February 2021, a not-as-rare-as-it-used-to-be winter storm swept across the country, causing massive power outages in the state of Texas with deadly consequences. In this episode, hear the highlights of the congressional investigation into the causes of the extended power outages. They were foreseeable, and in fact foreseen, and similar power outages can be prevented; the only question is whether they will be. 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Articles/Documents Article: Report: Bulk of February power plant outages 'weather related' amid historic Texas freeze, By Bob Sechler, Austin American Statesman, April 6, 2021 Article: Why Texas was not prepared for Winter Storm Uri, By Kara Norton, PBS, March 25, 2021 Article: Texas power grid CEO Bill Magness getting fired in wake of deadly blackouts, CBS, March 4, 2021 Article: ERCOT CEO Refuses $800K Payout Following Firing, By Jaclyn Diaz, npr, March 5, 2021 Article: What's behind $15,000 electricity bills in Texas?, By Seth Blumsack, The Conversation, February 24, 2021 Article: How Winter Storm Uri Impacted the United States, By Theresa Machemer, Smithsonian Magazine, February 19, 2021 Transcript: ERCOT Update Press Conference on Texas Power Outages February 17, Rev, February 17, 2021 Article: Why the Texas power grid is struggling to cope with the extreme cold, By Umair Irfan, Vox, February 16, 2021 Article: Winter Storm Uri Spread Snow, Damaging Ice From Coast-to Coast, Including the Deep South (Recap), The Weather Channel, February 16, 2021 Article: Bitter cold deepens state's power crisis, By Marcy de Luna and Amanda Drane, Houston Chronicle, February 14, 2021 Article: Shellenberger's Optimistic, Viral Take on Climate Future Challenged by Scientists He Cites, By Alex Kasprak, Snopes, August 4, 2020 Additional Resources Michael Shellenberger DeSmog Texas' Energy Market and Power Grid 101, Electric Choice Campaign Finance Summary: John A Barrasso, opensecrets.org Sound Clip Sources Hearing: POWER STRUGGLE: EXAMINING THE 2021 TEXAS GRID FAILURE, House Committee on Energy and Commerce: Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, March 24, 2021 Watch on Youtube Witnesses: Sylvester Turner 2015 -: Mayor of Houston, TX 1989 - 2016: Member of the TX House of Representatives Bill Magness President and CEO of the Electric Reliability Council of TX (ERCOT) Testified after being given notice that he would be getting fired at the beginning of May Christi Craddick Chairman of the Railroad Commission of TX Michael Shellenberger Founder and President of Environmental Progress Website: "He has helped save nuclear reactors around the world." James Robb President and CEO of the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) The standard setting body for reliability associated with the electric power industry 1988 - 2002: Principal at McKinsey Transcript: 35:45 Cathy McMorris Rodgers: Recent trends show a transition away from coal and nuclear power plants designed to function as baseload capacity toward variable renewable energy sources with just in time natural gas backup. States like California that rely more on weather dependent renewables experienced energy failures on a regular basis. Indeed, California residents experienced blackouts on an ongoing annual basis as the state fails to manage summer electricity demand and wildfire risk. These events suggest that replacing nuclear plants with variable renewable energy sources could make energy grids less resilient. Policies that drive renewables at the expense of firm baseload put lives at risk. 49:09 Bill Magness: Let me give you a bit of background to explain ERCOT's role in the provision of electric power in Texas. We manage the flow of electric power to more than 26 million Texas customers. That's about 90% of the state's electric load and about 75% of the landmass of Texas, ERCOT does not own power plants. We do not own poles and wires. We are the grid operator, like air traffic control for the grid. We're also the settlement agent for the market. We do the bookkeeping and billing, we don't participate in the financial side of our market. Our number one job is to see that supply and demand on the grid are in balance at all times. As the independent system operator for the region, ERCOT schedules power on an electric grid that connects more than 46,500 miles of transmission lines and over 680 generating units. It also performs financial settlement for the competitive wholesale bulk power market and administers retail switching for 8 million premises in the competitive areas in ERCOT. We're a membership based 501 c four nonprofit corporation governed by a board of directors and subject to oversight by the Public Utility Commission of Texas and the Texas Legislature. Our members include consumers, cooperatives, generators, power marketers, retail electric providers, and best droned electric utilities, transmission and distribution providers and municipally owned electric utilities. ERCOT's not a policymaking body. We implement the policies adopted by the Public Utility Commission and the Texas Legislature and we operate under reliability rules adopted by the North American Electric Reliability corporation or NERC. Generators produce power from a variety of sources in ERCOT such as gas, coal, wind, solar and nuclear. These are private and public entities subject to regulation by various state and federal agencies. Transmission and distribution providers own the wires and transport the power to consumers subject to their own sets of federal and state regulations. 24 hours a day, seven days a week ERCOT monitors the entirety of the system to make sure that when transmission lines go down, we can work around them. We talk to generators instructing them to bring load onto the system or to back it down as needed. We oversee the scheduling of maintenance and more. The work is done with one purpose to maintain the 60 hertz frequency that's needed to ensure the stability of the grid. There's a constant balancing act to manage the supply and demand to ensure a stable frequency. During the week of February 15, the Texas electric market experienced more demand than available supply. At its worst the storm took out 48.6% of the generation available to ERCOT to balance the grid. We always keep reserves, but when you lose nearly half your generation, you're going to have a problem. And supply quickly diminished the frequency of the grid dipped perilously low. Many generators stayed off for days and this led the system unable to serve that high demand. We use the last tool in our toolkit. Planned outages. Calling for load shed to manage the stability of the grid. This crisis required are caught using procedures established for emergencies like this to call on Transmission providers to use control load shedding to balance the system and prevent a devastating blackout for the entire grid. avoiding a complete blackout is critical. Were to occur, the Texas grid could be down for several days or weeks while the damage to the electrical grid was repaired and the power restored in a phased and highly controlled process. The cost of restoration of the system. The economic loss for Texas and the personal costs of the well being of Texas citizens would be unfathomable. as terrible as the consequences of the controlled outages in February were if we had not felt the blackout power could have been out for over 90% of Texans for weeks. The steps we took were difficult, but they had to be taken and when power was able to be fully restored. The Texas electric delivery system immediately returned to its pre emergency conditions. 57:36 Christi Craddick: As the storm sat over Texas wind, solar, coal, nuclear oil and natural gas all experienced challenges. Through numerous conversations with the oil and gas industry and operators, we learned of frozen roadways preventing crews from accessing the fields. But the number one problem we heard reported from operators was a lack of power at their production sites. As outages spread across the state operators were unable to keep their systems functioning as power was cut. Some operators did need to preemptively shut in their wells for safety and well integrity purposes prior to the storm, beginning as early as February 9. Starting on Tuesday, February 16, as it was safe to return to the oilfield, crews arrived to find that their facilities were experiencing electricity outages. The oil fields simply cannot run without power, making electricity the best winterization tool. 59:13 Christi Craddick: For just one moment, I'd like to highlight the overall success of our LDC's our local distribution companies. They are the companies that provide gas directly to residential customers. If you have a gas powered stove, fireplace, furnace heat, you're an LDC customer. As millions of homes lost electricity in Texas, only 2,153 LDC customers experienced service disruption. That means that 99.95% of all customers did not lose gas. 4.6 million households in Texas utilize natural gas in their homes representing about 13 million Texans and these families were able to continue to heat their homes. 1:11:19 Rep. Diana DeGette (CO): ERCOT has stated publicly that the recent extreme weather in Texas, 'cau
