With war on the continent and uncertainty surrounding transatlantic guarantees, Europe is being forced to confront vulnerabilities in its defence. The combination is forcing governments to tackle long-standing inefficiencies – and to ask whether current plans go far enough. As the war grinds on in Ukraine and alliances shift under pressure, policymakers across Europe are confronting a stark reality: security can no longer be taken for granted. For decades following the Cold War, Europe operated within a relatively stable framework. Defence spending was reduced, industrial capacity thinned, and reliance on the United States became an accepted cornerstone of European defence. That model is now under strain. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has brought high-intensity conflict back to the continent, while political uncertainty in Washington has raised questions about the durability of US commitments. In response, the European Union is rethinking its approach. It has taken practical steps in the form of initiatives such as the Security Action for Europe (SAFE), which offers up to €150 billion of loans to member states looking to invest in advanced weapons and other hardware. More broadly, the bloc aims to ramp up defence capabilities and production within the decade as part of a plan first dubbed Rearm Europe and now known as Readiness 2030. The EU is trying to correct decades of uneven investment while adapting to a rapidly changing security landscape. The challenge is not simply to spend more, but to spend better. EU chief unveils €800bn plan to 'rearm' Europe and support Ukraine Change of mindset Europe has faced repeated security crises in recent years, from Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 to its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, but responses have varied across countries and taken time to coordinate. Speaking to RFI, Brussels-based security consultant Serge Stroobants says SAFE should be seen not as a standalone fix, but part of a broader shift in thinking. "It’s trying to solve the lack of a security mindset within the EU, the lack of security readiness … and also the lack of strategy and strategic autonomy," he says. The shifting role of NATO is central to Europe’s recalibration. For years, the alliance relied heavily on US military capabilities, with European allies contributing more modestly. Under pressure from US President Donald Trump, all 32 of NATO's members met the target of spending 2 percent of GDP on defence last year, according to an annual report published this week. They have agreed to up investment to 5 percent of GDP by 2035. France to increase nuclear warheads as part of shared plan to protect Europe Yet defence budgets still vary significantly across Europe. Poland now spends more than 4 percent of GDP on defence, while Baltic states Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania – like Poland, on Russia's doorstep – spend over 3 percent. Meanwhile France, Italy, Spain, Belgium and others spend little more than 2 percent. However, increased spending alone will not fix long-standing structural problems. Much of the recent surge in European defence budgets has been reactive, driven by the war in Ukraine. National industries remain fragmented, procurement systems differ across countries, and EU decision-making is often slow. The result is not just delay, but inefficiency. Piecemeal procurement drives up costs, duplication of weapons systems complicates logistics, and industrial rivalries undercut collective strength. Without deeper coordination, new funding risks reinforcing those problems. SAFE is designed to address some of these issues. To qualify for the programme's loans, member states must buy weapons together with other members of the EU or the European Economic Area, or Ukraine. By funding joint purchases, the ambition is to avoid duplication and boost interoperability of defence systems across Europe. Hybrid threats The continent must also adapt to quickly evolving threats. "What experts are telling us, especially intelligence services, is Europe might face some form of major conflict by 2030," says Stroobants, who points not only to Russian aggression but other forms of danger. Beyond conventional warfare, Europe faces an expanding range of hybrid threats – from economic pressure to cyber attacks to disinformation. In this environment, adversaries use both military and civilian tools. This approach, sometimes described as "unrestricted warfare", reflects a broader shift in how power is exercised. Stroobants traces its origins back to China in the late 1990s, when strategists concluded they could not compete purely militarily with the United States. “If you cannot go head to head [with the US] ... you need to find other ways,” he says, describing a strategy built on influencing societies “by every potential means available”. For Europe, adapting to this reality requires more than incremental change. Stroobants argues that it will take political will and a clear strategy – something the EU has often struggled to sustain. Von der Leyen urges stronger EU response to Russia’s 'hybrid war' Widening security horizon Geography is also reshaping Europe’s priorities. Regions once seen as peripheral, such as the Arctic, are becoming more important. As climate change opens new maritime routes and access to resources, the region is emerging as an area of competition involving the US, Russia and China. And with security challenges now spanning multiple regions simultaneously, Europe must be prepared to respond across several fronts at once. For Stroobants, the problem is not a failure of awareness, but of execution. The EU can identify the risks it faces, he says, yet continues to struggle to convert that insight into coordinated, timely action. Failing to unite and boost its defence capacities risks leaving the bloc sidelined, he suggests. “The consequences are already visible today,” he says. “It’s this absence of power … taking away your capacity to influence international relations.” The war in Ukraine illustrates his point. Despite being directly affected, European countries have found themselves reacting to decisions taken elsewhere – such as Washington's proposals for a peace plan drafted without EU input. In a context that is "very transactional, very aggressive, very competitive", Stroobants says a lack of influence constitutes vulnerability. "We live in a world today that is based on power."
