Fixed + Floating - The Credit Podcast

Josef Pschorn
  • 0.0 (0)
  • 投資
  • 每兩星期更新

Fixed + Floating is a credit podcast for investors and finance professionals. Hosted by credit portfolio manager Josef Pschorn, the show features conversations with leading voices from investing, research, and academia on private credit, high yield, distressed debt and credit cycles. We break down the technical mechanics of credit markets — from covenant evolution and liability management to restructuring, quantitative credit, and the impact of macro policy. New episodes twice per month.

  1. 6月23日

    Big Market Delusion: Why Private Credit Is AI’s Biggest Loser | Aswath Damodaran (NYU)

    Each AI company can price itself on an internally consistent story about winning its market. Sum those stories and the implied revenues exceed any market that could exist — the big market delusion. Aswath Damodaran puts a ceiling on it: $142 trillion in global revenues last year against $20–25 trillion in employee costs, which makes the $26 trillion addressable market in SpaceX’s IPO pitch fiction. The sharper question for credit investors is who absorbs the loss when it corrects. Full analysis: https://open.substack.com/pub/fixedfloating/p/financing-the-big-market-delusion?r=718tew&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web&showWelcomeOnShare=true Josef Pschorn speaks with Aswath Damodaran of NYU Stern about valuing the AI boom, the corporate life cycle, and why the credit side of the build-out carries the asymmetric risk. Key takeaways: ​The biggest loser when the delusion corrects is private credit, not equity — lenders carry the downside without the upside, and “you can’t make interest payments withpotential and promise.” ​Financing should act its age: young companies should use converts or no debt; default risk belongs in the cash flows (value the firm twice, weight by survival probability), not in an inflated discount rate. ​In distress, equity is a call and debt is a put — a passive lender in a levered company is short an option whose variance the equity holder controls. Connect with Aswath Damodaran: https://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/ | X https://x.com/AswathDamodaran Connect with Fixed + Floating: https://www.linkedin.com/company/fixed-floating | Xhttps://twitter.com/FixedFloating Fixed + Floating is for informational purposes only. Not investment, legal, or tax advice. Recorded: 15.06.2026#fixedfloating #creditmarkets #privatecredit #valuation #Damodaran

    59 分鐘

  2. 6月9日

    Distress in Auto Suppliers: Why Operational Fixes No Longer Work | Steiner (PWC) & Hauke (Willkie)

    A third of Europe’s auto suppliers now sit in the distressed zone, and the share has barely moved in two years. Thesector has stopped behaving like a set of single restructuring cases and started behaving like a structural problem — one where operational stabilization no longer fixes the credit story. Full written analysis: https://open.substack.com/pub/fixedfloating/p/the-autosupplier-problem-that-refinancing?r=718tew&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web Josef Pschorn speaks with Daniel Steiner of PwC and Dr. Hendrik Hauke of Willkie Farr & Gallagher about whyEuropean auto-supplier distress has become structural, and how the restructuring toolkit actually gets used when it does. Key takeaways: 40% of automotive CEOs expect their company not to last ten years on the current path; 33% of Europeansuppliers are already distressed. The binding constraint is the cost ofcapital — German suppliers carry the highest interest-to-EBIT ratio of anyregion. Europe runs 25–30% overcapacity and China around 50%, making consolidation, not refinancing, the real cure. LEONI’s StaRUG delevered successfully the balance sheet Guest links: PwC https://www.pwc.de | Willkie https://www.willkie.com Fixed + Floating: ⁠https://www.linkedin.com/company/fixed-floating⁠⁠ | ⁠⁠https://twitter.com/FixedFloating⁠⁠ | ⁠⁠https://fixedfloating.substack.com/⁠⁠ This podcast is for informational purposes only and does not constitute investment advice. Recorded: 04 June 2026. #fixedfloating #creditmarkets #autosuppliers #restructuring #distresseddebt

    1 小時 33 分鐘

  3. 5月26日

    HY Building Materials: Why It’s Really One Housing Trade | Andy Belton (Creditsights)

    US high-yield building products are a leveraged play on the US housing cycle dressed up across ten different tickers — and the concurrent distress in Cornerstone, JELD-WEN, Old Castle, and USLBM is the proof. Full written analysis: https://open.substack.com/pub/fixedfloating/p/one-housing-trade-ten-tickers-the?r=718tew&utm_medium=ios Andy Belton, Senior Analyst and Head of European Basics & Infrastructure at CreditSights, joins Josef Pschorn to unpack the structural fault lines that separate heavyside (cement, aggregates, ready-mix) from lightside (windows, doors, cabinets, distribution) in credit terms — and why that distinction is now producing a wave of concurrent liability management exercises on both sides of the Atlantic. Key takeaways: ​Cement prices compounded at 4–5% annually over 20 years versus 1–3% for lumber — structural pricing power, not cycle management​A 5% volume decline translates into a 10–20% EBITDA decline for fixed-cost light side manufacturers at today's utilization rates​JELD-WEN carries nine times leverage with December 2027 maturities going current in December 2026 — the unsecured bonds are already pricing the shock absorber role​Pfleiderer's Silekol drop-down — 90% equity sold to unrestricted subs, new debt raised — is the European J.Crew playbook, now deployed post-restructuring​When sponsors reach for LMEs instead of conventional refis, they are signalling they no longer believe the cycle turns fast enough to clean up the capital structure Guest: Andy Belton is Senior Analyst and Head of European Basics & Infrastructure at CreditSights, where he has covered global building materials for over two decades. Prior to CreditSights, he spent ten years at Citigroup as Head of European Ratings Advisory and began his career at Fitch predecessor IBCA. — https://creditsights.com Fixed + Floating: https://www.linkedin.com/company/fixed-floating⁠ | ⁠https://twitter.com/FixedFloating⁠ | ⁠https://fixedfloating.substack.com/⁠ This podcast is for informational purposes only and does not constitute investment advice. Recorded: 18 May 2026. #fixedfloating #creditanalysis #creditmarkets #buildingmaterials #highyield #LME #JELDWEN #CreditSights #cement #housingmarket

    1 小時 24 分鐘

  4. 5月12日

    Significant Risk Transfer (SRT) Mechanics: Capital Relief, Tranching, and Cycle Risk | Frank Benhamou (Cheyne Capital)

    Significant Risk Transfers have quietly grown into a $1T+ hedged market — now bigger than European CLOs — and they sit at the centre of how banks manage RWAs, capital, and CET1 ratios. Full analysis: ⁠https://open.substack.com/pub/fixedfloating/p/significant-risk-transfer-has-quietly?r=718tew&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web⁠ Josef Pschorn speaks with Frank Benhamou, Partner & Portfolio Manager and Head of SRT at Cheyne Capital, about the mechanics, pricing, and cycle behaviour of SRTs — from a $1B reference portfolio walk-through to what actually happens when defaults hit and banks can't roll their hedges. Key takeaways: A bank hedging the first 80M of a 1B corporate pool can claim ~75% capital relief once the regulator agrees significant risk has transferred. Annual SRT tranche issuance now sits around $30–35B against $350–400B of hedged portfolios, implying over $1T outstanding — larger than the European CLO market. SRTs are funded insurance in tranched format — not CDS, not CLOs — with assets remaining on the bank balance sheet and the investor stepping into a true-up / true-down loss mechanism. Returns sit at cash + 6–11%, with a triple-B-equivalent average pool rating that has been materially less volatile than CLO equity through recent stress. In a downturn, banks restructure the reference pool itself — excluding chemicals, metals, or whichever sectors are under stress — rather than only paying wider spreads.Despite the bull case, SRT does not drive loan origination at the deal level. It feeds into origination only at the macro level via freed-up capital. Frank Benhamou: https://www.linkedin.com/in/frankbenhamou Cheyne Capital: https://www.cheynecapital.com Connect with Fixed + Floating: https://www.linkedin.com/company/fixed-floating | https://twitter.com/FixedFloating | https://fixedfloating.substack.com/ Disclaimer: Fixed + Floating is for informational purposes only. Not investment, legal, or tax advice. Recorded: 01.05.2026 #CreditAnalysis #FixedIncome #CorporateCredit #SignificantRiskTransfer #SRT #BankCapital #SyntheticSecuritisation #BaselIII #PrivateCredit #StructuredCredit

    1 小時 11 分鐘

  5. 4月21日

    Liability Management in Software Credit: Covenant Erosion, Drop-Downs & the Xerox JV Maneuver | Sabrina Fox (Fox Legal Training)

    Covenant quality is weakening at a measurable rate, and software credits are where it is going to matter most. Full analysis: https://open.substack.com/pub/fixedfloating/p/why-software-credits-are-lme-catnip?r=718tew&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web Josef Pschorn speaks with Sabrina Fox of Fox Legal Training about the systematic erosion of lender protections in leveraged finance documentation and why software credits sit at the intersection of weak covenants and uniquely portable assets. Key takeaways: * LBO covenant quality deteriorated from 3.33 in 2023 to 3.53 in Q1 2026, compounding on a base that had been weakening since the early 2010s — 2024 saw a record 34 LME transactions * Software IP can be transferred to unrestricted subsidiaries, valued at board discretion without independent appraisal, and licensed back the same day — making drop-downs a low-friction exercise that standard covenant packages were never designed to prevent * Xerox circumvented its own J.Crew blocker by structuring a joint venture instead of a subsidiary, exploiting the definition of "subsidiary" as >50% voting power — a maneuver ION Platform lenders should be watching closely * Two pending court cases on creditor co-ops could determine whether lenders retain their primary collective defence mechanism against LMEs in 2026 Sabrina Fox: sabrina@foxlegaltraining.com Fox Legal Training: https://foxlegaltraining.com | LinkedIn: https://linkedin.com/in/sabrinafox Connect with Fixed + Floating: LinkedIn https://www.linkedin.com/company/fixed-floating | X https://twitter.com/FixedFloating Disclaimer: Fixed + Floating is for informational purposes only. Not investment, legal, or tax advice. Recorded: 17.04.2026 #CreditAnalysis #FixedIncome #CorporateCredit #LiabilityManagement #SoftwareCredit #CovenantAnalysis #LeveragedFinance #DropDown #JCrewBlocker #IONPlatform #Xerox #DistressedDebt

    51 分鐘

  6. 3月24日

    Private Credit, Life Insurers, and Rating Arbitrage | Jakub Lichwa (TwentyFour AM)

    A three-notch downgrade on a zero-default portfolio can more than double an insurer's capital requirement. Read the full investment breakdown on Substack: https://open.substack.com/pub/fixedfloating/p/when-annuities-meet-private-credit?r=718tew&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web Catch our first deep dive with Jakub on the PE Insurance Flywheel (Episode 3): https://fixedfloating.substack.com/p/private-credits-insurance-flywheel Josef Pschorn speaks with Jakub Lichwa of TwentyFour Asset Management about how PE-backed insurers use annuities to fund private credit exposure, why offshore reinsurance creates regulatory arbitrage, and where these capital structures begin to echo pre-2008 shadow banking patterns. Key Takeaways: Rating downgrades hit capital requirements faster and harder than actual credit defaultsPrivate placements offer an illiquidity premium that structurally matches annuity durationsAsset-intensive reinsurance enables massive capital release through offshore affiliated structuresState guaranty funds provide backstops today that were absent in the shadow banking eraFull analysis: https://open.substack.com/pub/fixedfloating/p/the-invisible-tech-moat?r=718tew&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web Connect with Fixed + Floating: LinkedIn ⁠https://www.linkedin.com/company/fixed-floating⁠ | X ⁠https://twitter.com/FixedFloating⁠ Check out Jakub's work at TwentyFour Asset Management Disclaimer: Fixed + Floating is for informational purposes only. Not investment, legal, or tax advice. Host/guest views are their own. Consult professionals before investing.   #CreditAnalysis #FixedIncome #CorporateCredit #PrivateCredit #Insurance #Annuities #RegulatoryArbitrage #Reinsurance #LifeInsurance #PEInsurance

    56 分鐘

  7. 3月10日

    Software Moats & AI Capex Risk: Why Dominant Firms Stay Dominant | James Bessen (Boston University) #09

    Many dominant firms may be harder to disrupt today than popular narratives suggest. Josef Pschorn speaks with James Bessen of Boston University’s Technology & Policy Research Initiative about how proprietary software creates structural advantages for incumbent issuers, why AI capex may carry more tail risk than many investors assume, and how software complexity can create hidden credit risk. Key takeaways: Proprietary software becomes a true moat when scale, data, and workflow complexity reinforce one anotherAI capex may be more fragile than earlier infrastructure cyclesSoftware complexity can create regulatory and operational risks thattraditional credit analysis may missTechnology spending can act as business-model defense, not just capex Full analysis: https://open.substack.com/pub/fixedfloating/p/the-invisible-tech-moat?r=718tew&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web James Bessen:TPRI at BU: https://sites.bu.edu/tpri/X: https://x.com/JamesBessen Connect with Fixed + Floating: LinkedIn https://www.linkedin.com/company/fixed-floating | X https://twitter.com/FixedFloating Disclaimer: Fixed + Floating is for informational purposes only. Not investment, legal, or tax advice. Recorded: 19.02.2026#CreditAnalysis #FixedIncome #CorporateCredit #TechMoats #HighYield #ArtificialIntelligence #CompetitiveAdvantage #JamesBessen #TechCapex

    51 分鐘

  8. 2月24日

    Software Credit Below 80: Who Survives AI in a $40B Loan Market? | Alec Keblish & Matthew Hughes (9fin) #08

    A growing pool of software loans is trading below 80 as the market reassesses durability, pricing power, and AI disruption risk. Josef Pschorn speaks with Alec Keblish and Matthew Hughes of 9fin about which software credits look fragile, which still have resilience, and how investors should distinguish repricing from real impairment in software credit. Key takeaways: Loans below 80 need a more differentiated framework than simple “cheap or distressed”Software business models will not be affected equally by AIRecurring revenue and switching costs still matter, but not uniformlyInvestors need to separate spread pain from lasting impairment risk Full analysis: https://open.substack.com/pub/fixedfloating/p/40b-below-80-a-credit-analysts-framework?r=718tew&utm_medium=ios Transcripts and analysis: https://fixedfloating.substack.com Connect with Fixed + Floating: LinkedIn https://www.linkedin.com/company/fixed-floating | X https://twitter.com/FixedFloating Disclaimer: Fixed + Floating is for informational purposes only. Not investment, legal, or tax advice. #CreditMarkets #HighYield #PrivateCredit #LeveragedFinance #FixedIncome #SaaS #AIDisruption #SoftwareCredit #LBOs #PrivateEquity #CreditAnalysis #DistressedDebt #9fin #BDC #TechDebt

    1 小時 29 分鐘
查看全部 (17)

預告

關於

Fixed + Floating is a credit podcast for investors and finance professionals. Hosted by credit portfolio manager Josef Pschorn, the show features conversations with leading voices from investing, research, and academia on private credit, high yield, distressed debt and credit cycles. We break down the technical mechanics of credit markets — from covenant evolution and liability management to restructuring, quantitative credit, and the impact of macro policy. New episodes twice per month.

資料

你可能也會喜歡