In today’s episode, I want to talk about an idea I call fifth-generation management. 1/ Fifth-generation management is an emerging style of management we don’t know much about because it doesn’t actually exist yet. But it is guaranteed to emerge post-Covid because historically, big sharp disruptions have reliably triggered discontinuous changes in management culture, and it is already clear that this one is doing that. 2/ The idea of generations in management, in the form I’m going to lay it out, is causally related to the idea of generations of warfare, and in particular the idea that contemporary styles of warfare strongly shape future styles of management. So if there are generations in warfare, they are going to cause generations in management. Military ideas are not the only cause of course, but I’m going to argue that historically they’ve been the strongest one. Strong enough to almost be determinative. During WW2 for instance, business and military culture became almost the same thing for a few years. 3/ This is not a universally popular idea because a significant number people find even the business-as-war metaphor distasteful, let alone the suggestion that military culture directly shapes business culture, or worst of all, that it is in fact the dominant source of business thinking. But personally, I’ll admit I’m enough of both a military nerd and a management nerd that I actually find the connection stimulating rather than depressing to think about. And I have a little bit of history here, my research during my PhD and postdoc fifteen-twenty years ago was on military command and control models, and a lot of my consulting work draws from that experience. 4/ For better or worse, the connection between military and business evolution happens to be historically solid, and seems set to remain true. In the past this was much stronger, due to a large number of men serving in wars and then entering business, and business being male-dominated. Today, the coupling mainly has to do with relative rates of technology adoption in military vs business evolution, and to a lesser extent, shared exogenous events affecting both military and business affairs. 5/ Before we get into it, a couple of caveats. First, as with any clean, linear, sequential or cyclic model applied to a messy branching, evolutionary reality, you have to apply it very tastefully. You have to think like a historical artisan, matching up the conceptual boundaries of a constructivist notion you’re working with to real history. And where they don’t line up, actual historical events should shape your thinking rather than the abstract idea of one sequence of generations driving another. Second caveat, don’t make the mistake of thinking that each generation fully displaces the previous one in either military or business. Instead, it adds a new layer, and the older layer simply gets confined to a small zone of the action. Generations accumulate like geological layers, they don’t displace each other. 6/ To understand the management version, we have to understand the military version first. The idea of generations of warfare was popularized by William S. Lind, who coined the term fourth-generation warfare around 1980. It became the dominant style in actual warfare after the Iraq War, which was probably the last major third-generation war. 7/ I have illustrated the generations in the lower half of the diagram. The story basically starts with the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, after the Thirty Years War. The first generation lasted almost 150 years. The second generation lasted about 100 years from 1815 to 1915, the third about 65 years from 1938 to 2003. The fourth, I will argue, only lasted about 15 years, from 2003 to 2020, and Covid will trigger a shift to a fifth generation. 8/ The first generation was based on final abandonment of medieval warfare, and relied on early smooth-bore muskets. It utilized uniformed, paid armies fighting for nations rather than feudal lords, or mercenary companies. It involved what is known as line-and-column warfare. Think of armies marching in long columns towards strategic targets. Maybe a little large-scale maneuvering and flanking, but lacking the communications and intelligence capabilities to do more. 9/ The second generation stretches roughly a century from the end of the Napoleonic wars, around 1815 to World War I. It was based on the development of rifled breech-loading guns, interchangeable parts, and early electronic communications with the telegraph. Technology improved steadily so that WW1 was quite different from say the war of Mexican independence. But the broad style is what’s known as attrition warfare between roughly evenly matched forces in numerical and materiel terms. Armies bogged down in trenches or extended sieges. In second generation warfare, usually the side with the greater economic resources eventually prevails, as in the US Civil War. 10/ Third-generation warfare was developed primarily by the German military in the interwar period, and is what is usually called Blitzkrieg in the historical case, or maneuver warfare in more modern terminology. It makes use of fast-moving mechanized infantry, tanks, and sophisticated local communications to move very fast behind enemy lines, maneuver and reorient rapidly in response to changing situations, and collapse the enemy from the inside. 11/ This is the style that was developed and refined by John Boyd, and is roughly what lasted all the way through the Iraq War. In third-generation warfare, often an asymmetrically smaller and technologically primitive force can beat a larger, technologically superior force. This is the style that is based on the OODA loop, which we talk about a lot. 12/ This asymmetric outcome potential often creates a conundrum around how to establish the peace after the victory, because economic superiority may not line up with military superiority. In the case of WW2, eventually the Allies got better at maneuver warfare, the Germans got worse and backslid into 2nd generation to some extent, and economic superiority prevailed. And after the war, the Allies won the peace with the Marshall Plan, which was second-generation peace thinking. So in a way WW2 was actually a Generation 2.5 war. 13/ Third-generation warfare is also what is sometimes called total war, where you fight with unsentimental professional skill to win. It’s not about honor or fair-play, and deceit, cunning, and cheating are considered legitimate. This means it can get really ugly by design. In older styles of warfare, you would have a collapse of honor norms like “giving quarter,” but for third-generation warfare, which is an extremely rational kind of warfare, you had to have things like the United Nations laws and the idea of war crimes and trials. Because everything from gas chambers to concentration camps is otherwise on the table. 14/ Now fourth-generation warfare is best defined not by how war is fought, but by who fights the war. In some ways the Vietnam War for the US, and the Afghanistan War for the Soviet Union, were both early fourth-generation wars. But proper fourth-generation warfare requires non-state actors who can operate with near capability parity on many fronts, which requires the internet and cellphones. It also often has non-state actors with more legitimacy than mere third-generation terrorist groups, and state actors that have much less legitimacy than they used to in the past. In a way, the Peace of Westphalia made states the legitimate combatants, and the Great Weirding is reversing that legitimacy after almost 400 years. 15/ Of course, as we’ve all learned by now, fourth-generation warfare, since about 2003, also means dank memes, influence operations, fake news, and disruption of political processes, especially democratic ones like elections, using social media. A good example is modern conflict like Syria involves both state forces, in this case Syria and Russia, as well as ISIS and a people’s resistance. Or Ukraine. It is what is sometimes called hybrid or nonlinear war, and Russia has been the leading practitioner of it. Arguably, the West has been subject to a fourth-generation war attack for four years from Russia. 16/ And of course this mix has always been present in warfare in some form, but what distinguishes 4th-generation warfare is that guerrilla goals shape the conflict via leveraged high-tech digital means, instead of just being subject to first, second, or third generation logic, or limited to violent terror tactics. This also means guerrilla goals become top-level political goals, instead of being subsidiary to the goals of a sponsor state. Guerrilla goals are what Henry Kissinger described with his famous line: “The conventional army loses if it does not win. The guerrilla wins if he does not lose.” 17/ In other words, fourth-generation warfare brings guerrilla goals to the political table directly. It is not total war, but what I call infinite war: it brings infinite-game war goals, into the picture, the goal being to continue the game rather than win it (infinite game in the sense of James Carse). It’s a true fourth-generation war if at least one top-level combatant is fighting with the guerrilla goal of simply staying in the game, rather than trying to win formally in the sense of a declared war, getting the opponent to surrender, and doing so without a state sponsor. Sometimes of course, the guerrilla actually wins in a conventional sense, in which case they often struggle to transition from a stateless actor to a state actor, as with the Taliban. 18/ Okay, now that we have our four generations lined up, let’s talk about how that connects to generations of business management. To do that, I want to talk about an episode you may have heard of, called the Millennium War Games, but you probably haven’t heard anything like my spin on it. 19/ Briefly, the Millennium War Games
