Exploring Offshore Litigation

Harneys

Exploring Offshore Litigation is a captivating podcast series containing audio of written blog content that dives deep into the intriguing world of offshore litigation, including the BVI and Cayman. Each episode sails through complex legal waters, bringing you up-to-date analysis of recent high-stakes cases and expert commentary from the leading minds in this specialised field. Our episodes demystify legal jargon and break down complex cases to make them accessible to all. Harneys, an international law firm with entrepreneurial thinking, brings each episode to you.

  1. -9 H

    Stay denied: BVI Court of Appeal reaffirms threshold for a stay in US$40 million shareholder dispute Background The Court of Appeal's decision Practical implications

    In a previous blog post, we discussed the first instance judgment in the Phoenix BVI litigation, where Justice Mangatal considered the formalities for becoming a shareholder under s49 of the BVI Business Companies Act, Revised Edition 2020 (BCA). That judgment has now been appealed, with an accompanying application for a stay of execution. On 27 February 2026, in ICM SPC v Jarvis, the Court of Appeal refused the stay. The judgment restates the C-Mobile Services Ltd v Huawei Technologies Co Ltd criteria for stay relief and offers guidance on credibility-based appeals, the limits of using stays as leverage in foreign proceedings and impecuniosity arguments. Phoenix Commodities PVT Ltd (Phoenix BVI) was placed into voluntary liquidation in April 2020. The joint liquidators (JLs) settled a list of members which included Ancile Special Opportunity and Recovery Fund Segregated Portfolio (ASOR), a segregated portfolio of ICM SPC (ICM), a Cayman Islands company. ASOR disputed its shareholder status, arguing that neither it nor any authorised agent had agreed in writing to become a shareholder. The judge at first instance dismissed this application, finding that ASOR had so agreed through its representative. The JLs subsequently issued a call to ASOR for over US$40 million (Call). ICM appealed and sought a stay of the first instance judgment, Order and the Call, though it later narrowed its stay application to the judgment and Order only. Meanwhile, the JLs served a statutory demand on ICM in the Cayman Islands and filed a winding-up petition. The Court of Appeal dismissed the stay application with costs. It applied the five settled principles from C-Mobile Services Ltd in determining ICM's application: consider all circumstances;treat stays as exceptional;require cogent evidence of stifling;apply a balance of harm test; andassess prospects only where strong grounds exist. On its appeal prospects, ICM failed to demonstrate a realistic chance of success. While the appeal raised questions about the interpretation and application of s49 of the BCA, the trial judge's findings were heavily influenced by credibility assessments – in particular, her observations that ICM's main witness was "inconsistent, incredible and convoluted" – and appellate courts are traditionally reluctant to disturb such findings absent exceptional circumstances. On stifling, even if ICM were wound up, then the liquidators could pursue the appeal if they considered it meritorious. ICM's evidence regarding its concerns that a winding up order would result in reputational harm and irreparable damage to itself and a second segregated portfolio, fell short of demonstrating that those fears would actually be realised. On balance of harm, Phoenix BVI's creditors had waited nearly six years for the liquidation to complete. Their prejudice from further delay outweighed ICM's. While a winding-up would mean ICM's "death", liquidators could pursue the appeal alongside their other duties. The Court was also critical of ICM's true objective: using the stay to influence the Cayman winding-up proceedings. This had "unflattering optics" and amounted to seeking a "coercive measure in extra-territorial proceedings". In any event, the BVI judgment has no binding force on the Cayman Islands Court; it is merely persuasive, to be treated as a matter of judicial comity. Finally, impecuniosity was not relied upon, but the Court observed that any such argument requires cogent evidence of means, failing which the application would be "irremediably undermined". This case affirms the five C-Mobile Services criteria for stay applications. Three key takeaways: First, appeals challenging credibility-based findings face a steep uphill battle. Absent exceptional circumstances, appellate courts will not disturb them.Second, courts will scrutinise the true purpose behind a stay application. Using stay relief to gain leverage in foreign proceedings will not be tolerated.Third, impecuniosity argument...

    6 min

  2. 16 FÉVR.

    English High Court considers tests for worldwide freezers and duty of full and frank disclosure There were several grave failings in the presentation of the applicant's case The court determined that

    In Lakhany v Hasan, the English High Court* discharged a worldwide freezing order (WFO) for an applicant's failure to adequately discharge their "full and frank" disclosure duty. This case is a welcome reminder of the consequences for artificially elevating a general suspicion of dissipation to a "real risk" before the court. The facts concerned a contractual dispute over an alleged debt of approximately GBP1 million. The remaining background is of only tangential interest: the key takeaway for litigators is how the "real risk of dissipation" was presented to the court. Despite the respondent having relocated from the UK to Pakistan in December 2024 (and contemporaneously informing the applicant's solicitors of this), the applicant gave misleading evidence that the relocation took place months later in March 2025. The applicant invited the court to infer that the respondent had fled the UK to avoid the consequences of any adverse judgment; In respect of a London-based property which the applicant wanted to injunct for the purposes of potential future enforcement, the applicant took four weeks to act on a property alert (being a search to protect a pending purchase) but nonetheless described the alleged risk of dissipation as "compelling". No explanation was given for the delay between the search and the filing of the injunction application (or indeed the hearing of said application, which took place a further four weeks later); and The applicant alleged that the respondent (a) had control over the property; and (b) was seeking to "liquidate his only asset within the jurisdiction" in circumstances where a reasonable public search would have revealed this to be inaccurate: the London-based property was neither the respondent's asset, nor under his control (following the appointment of an LPA receiver on 11 August 2020). To compound the misleading presentation of the case, the applicant's skeleton argument stated that no response to the application for injunctive relief had been received when, in fact, the application had not even been served on the respondent. The Judge hearing the application, unconvinced that the facts supported a conclusion that a risk of dissipation existed, adjourned the hearing to hear from the respondent, but the respondent – by then living abroad – only received two days' clear notice of the adjourned hearing. The hearing proceeded in his absence (despite some informal written representations being made) and the WFO was granted. Remarkably, the applicant's procedural inadequacies persisted post-hearing: neither (a) the transcript of the freezing injunction hearing; nor (b) the subsequent judgment itself were provided to the respondent for over 18 weeks. That transcript recorded the fact that the claimant was only seeking a freezing order in respect of the London property, and not a WFO (as had been granted). When the respondent was provided with a copy of the freezing order on 2 July 2025, he was therefore unaware of the basis upon which the WFO was sought and obtained. In these circumstances, the WFO (granted before the inconsistencies became apparent) could not survive the applicant's complete failure to provide "full and frank" disclosure. As an aside, the applicant attracted further criticism by drafting a freezing order which (a) not only failed to set a return date, but (b) also failed to provide any exception for either (i) living; or (ii) legal expenses. Inadequate notice was given for the injunction hearing; The applicant made misleading representations about the respondent's move to Pakistan and failed to disclose that the property in question was under LPA receivers' control since August 2020; and There was no solid evidence establishing a risk of dissipation. In the circumstances, it's difficult to see how the court could have arrived at another conclusion. The test, of course, for a "real risk of dissipation" is whether "unless restrained by injunction, the defendant will dissipate or dis...

    6 min

  3. 16 JANV.

    Grand Court confirms inherent jurisdiction to compel parties to participate in ADR

    In the recent decision of Unicorn Biotech Ventures One Ltd v Unicorn Biotech Ventures Two Ltd the Grand Court has for the first time considered the issue of whether it has jurisdiction to compel parties to participate in alternative dispute resolution (ADR) against their wishes, and if so, what factors should be taken into account. The Grand Court held that it does have the power to do so and the ultimate test will be whether compelling participation in ADR has a real prospect of furthering the overriding objective by bringing about a fair, speedy and cost-effective solution to the dispute. The application arose in the context of two actions commenced by limited partners of an exempted limited partnership in which they sought declarations regarding the conduct of the fund by the general partner, and the winding up of the fund. There had been a complete breakdown in the personal relationships between those behind the corporate entities which are the LPs and GPs. Notwithstanding proximity to trial, the GP sought orders compelling the parties to attend a mediation at the same time that the parties were due to be exchanging witness statement and preparing for trial. The application raised two issues which had not previously been considered by the Grand Court. Does the Grand Court have the power to compel parties to attend mediation or other means of ADR against their wishes? The Grand Court, following the guidance set out by the English Court of Appeal in Churchill v Merthyr Tydfil, held that it does have inherent jurisdiction to compel parties to participate in ADR in a suitable case. The English Court had observed that courts regularly adjourn hearings and trials to allow the parties to discuss settlement and it would be absurd if they could not to do simply because one of the parties resisted the adjournment. In addition, the court has a long-established right to control its own process including by staying or delaying existing proceedings whilst a settlement process is underway. Justice Asif noted that by virtue of section 11 of the Grand Court Act, the Grand Court has the same jurisdiction as the High Court of Justice in England. His Lordship held that the decision in Churchill was of very persuasive value and should be applied in the Cayman Islands, and it is consistent with the overriding objective to assist the parties to a resolution of their dispute which may be quicker and cheaper than a court-based determination. What are the factors that the Court should consider in determining how to exercise its discretion? Examples of potentially relevant criteria (as raised in Churchill) include the form of ADR proposed, whether parties are represented, the urgency of the case and reasonableness of the delay caused by ADR, whether any delay would vitiate the claim or give rise to limitation issues, the costs of ADR in real terms, relative to the claim and parties' resources, whether there is any realistic prospect of resolution through ADR, any imbalance in bargaining power, and the reasons given by a party not wishing to mediate. However, Justice Asif held that the decision whether to order ADR is multifaceted and declined to lay down any particular criteria to be applied. Ultimately, the test is whether compelling participation in ADR has a real prospect of furthering the overriding objective by bringing about a fair, speedy and cost-effective solution to the dispute and the proceedings. It is not a balance of probabilities test but whether ADR would have a "real prospect of a useful outcome". Outcome The Grand Court declined to compel the parties to attend mediation. The Court considered that the positions taken by the parties to date, and the nature of the dispute and relief sought, meant there was no prospect that mediation would be successful. The GP's application was also late in the day and imposing a mediation at the same time that parties were preparing for trial would be a time-consuming distraction. Overall, the Cou...

    6 min

  4. 5 JANV.

    Privy Council abrogates Shareholder Rule and issues Willers v Joyce direction The facts The decisions below Origin and foundation for the Shareholder Rule The Board's decision: Should the Shareholder Rule continue in some form? Takeaways

    In Jardine Strategic Limited v Oasis Investment II Master Fund Ltd & Ors the Privy Council (on appeal from Bermuda) held on July 24 that the so-called "Shareholder Rule" should be abrogated. This rule provided that a company could not, in the course of litigation between a company and shareholders, withhold documents from inspection on the basis of legal advice privilege. The Board held that the original proprietary justification for the Shareholder Rule no longer exists and the company shareholder relationship is not one that falls into the joint privilege relationship family. The Board also held, pursuant to its Willers v Joyce jurisdiction (where the Privy Council, not being a court of the United Kingdom but comprising the same Justices those who sit in the House of Lords and the UK Supreme Court, may direct that its decision also represents the law of England and Wales), that the domestic courts of England and Wales should treat this decision as binding and part of the law of England and Wales. This decision is significant for common law jurisdictions – it is binding in Bermuda and England and Wales, and likely to be highly persuasive in other common law jurisdictions such as the Cayman Islands. It provides certainty to company directors seeking legal advice and, in the context of shareholder appraisal proceedings under section 106 of the Bermuda Companies Act (and likely also in the Cayman Islands in shareholder appraisal proceedings under section 238 of the Cayman Islands Companies Act), clarifies that companies are not required to produce legal advice obtained when setting fair value offered to dissenting shareholders. This is the second decision of the Privy Council arising out of the amalgamation of two companies within the Jardine Matheson group and section 106 proceedings issued by the dissenting shareholders seeking a fair value appraisal by the Court. In the present matter on appeal, the dissenting shareholders had sought discovery of legal advice that was given to the Jardine Matheson group when it was setting the $33 value which was offered as fair value to dissenting shareholders who had their shares cancelled. The Company asserted that the advice was covered by legal advice privilege. The dissenters asserted that where a party seeking to access the documents is a shareholder, that will override the usual rules on privilege. They submitted that the Shareholder Rule was in reality a sub-set of joint interest privilege, such that it remains justified notwithstanding the fading away of the original proprietary basis for its creation. The primary issue for the Board was whether the Shareholder Rule exists as a matter of Bermudian law. At first instance, Chief Justice Narinder Hargun of the Court of Appeal of Bermuda rejected the Company's claim to privilege on the basis that the Shareholder Rule was a long established and complete answer to any assertion of legal professional privilege by a company against its shareholders. The Company appealed the decision. The Court of Appeal of Bermuda dismissed the appeal. Justice of Appeal Geoffrey Bell who gave the main judgment, recognised that the Shareholder Rule had not been applied in any decision in Bermuda but that the Court of Appeal had clearly operated on the basis that the rule did exist in at least one previous case. Justice of Appeal Bell regarded the rule, if it existed, as based on joint interest privilege and not 19th century case law (from which the rule originated). Justice of Appeal Ian Kawaley reached a more nuanced conclusion. He rejected the traditional view that the company shareholder relationship was enough to establish an exception to privilege. Rather, it would depend upon all the circumstances and was a flexible and context-based rule rather than status-based rule. President Sir Christopher Clarke agreed with both judgments and added that the joint interest principle, applicable to defeat what would otherwise be a successful claim to legal advic...

    14 min
  5. Privy Council decision - Cayman Islands: Submission to foreign courts

    11/12/2025

    Privy Council decision - Cayman Islands: Submission to foreign courts

    In a recent Privy Council decision IGCF SPV 21 Limited v Al Jomiah Power Limited and another, the Board ruled on when a party is held to have submitted to the jurisdiction of a foreign Court as a matter of Cayman law. The parties' positions It was common ground between the parties that an applicant will forfeit its right to an injunction if it submits to the Court of a foreign jurisdiction. The Appellant was pursuing proceedings against the Respondent in Pakistan. The Respondent had sought to appear in Pakistan in order to contest jurisdiction. The Respondents applied for an anti-suit injunction in the Cayman Courts, seeking to restrain the Appellant from pursuing the proceedings in Pakistan. The Appellant's argument was that the Respondent had submitted to the jurisdiction of Pakistan. The Rule in Geoprosco The Appellant relied on what they called the "Rule in Geoprosco" - a 1975 English Court of Appeal case that held that appearing before a foreign Court (Pakistan) simply to contest jurisdiction counted as submission. Since Geoprosco was decided, it had in fact been reversed in England and Wales by a 1982 statute. Without an equivalent Cayman statute, the question arose: what was the Cayman position? The Board concluded at [52] that Geoprosco "should form no part of Cayman law". Put simply, appearing in a foreign Court to contest jurisdiction did not count as submission. What counts as submission? In deciding what counts as submission, the Board held that Cayman law should reflect the current law in England and Wales, namely the seminal case of Rubin v Eurofinance. Key takeaways The Board's approach to a legislative lacuna in Cayman is noteworthy. The Board analysed academic texts and English Hansard Debates, and compared the solutions of other common law jurisdictions. It was also emphasised that the "Cayman courts may decline to follow English court decisions where there is good reason to do so" [47]. Interestingly, the Board noted that some common law jurisdictions had adopted legislation similar to the English statute, and that others without a legislative equivalent had declined to follow Geoprosco. The Board highlighted a first instance case from Bannister J in the BVI to that effect. The Appellants had not been able to point to a single common law jurisdiction which followed the Rule in Geoprosco. Although a Cayman judgment, the case may well have extra territorial influence in years to come in those jurisdictions where common law solutions have so far been found, but only at the first instance level. Finally, and as a mark of the jurisprudential significance of the BVI, this judgment is one of a number of important decisions in which the Board was assisted by the BVI's the Honourable Dame Janice Pereira, who heard the appeal together with four permanent members.

    3 min
  6. Appointment of an Equitable Receiver in Cyprus

    10/12/2025

    Appointment of an Equitable Receiver in Cyprus

    Harneys successfully secured the appointment of a receiver by way of equitable execution over a Cyprus private company, in order to assist in the execution of a judgment against a villa in Limassol Marina. Facts Our client obtained a Singapore judgment for over USD 124 million plus interest against the defendants. After filing a common law action in Cyprus based on that judgment, the District Court of Larnaca issued a summary judgment, effectively recognising and localising the Singapore judgment in Cyprus against the judgment debtors. Subsequent enforcement measures were pursued in Cyprus to target assets of the judgment debtors located within the jurisdiction. One such asset was a villa at the Limassol Marina, for which no separate title deed had been issued. This, in turn, necessitated the filing of an application for the appointment of a receiver over the judgment debtor owning the villa and/or the villa itself. Legal background The Cyprus courts may appoint a receiver by way of equitable execution, where there exists a practical or legal hindrance or difficulty, which prevents enforcement through ordinary statutory means. The courts must be satisfied that the receiver is likely to meaningfully assist in executing the judgment. The appointment is discretionary and grounded in equity principles. This type of order is particularly appropriate, as in this case, when the debtor's interest in immovable property cannot be enforced under existing statutory provisions. The case Harneys argued that there was a legal impediment to execution against the property, as no separate title deed had been issued in the name of the judgment debtor. The property, one of the villas at the Limassol Marina, is held by the judgment debtor under a long-term lease agreement with the Ministry of Energy, Commerce and Industry, as well as a sublease agreement with another Cyprus company. Following the issuance of the summary judgment, the judgment creditor attempted to register a memorandum of judgment over the property, with the intention of initiating its sale under the provisions of the Cyprus Civil Procedure Law, Cap. 6. However, this was not possible. The District Lands Office of Limassol confirmed in writing that such registration could not be effected "since [the judgment debtor] is not the registered owner [of the property] as provided by the relevant legislation." Relying on this confirmation, Harneys argued that the absence of registered title deed meant that no other legal mechanism was available to execute the judgment against the property. This constituted a clear impediment to execution against the property, thereby justifying the appointment of a receiver by way of equitable execution. Ruling The District Court of Larnaca held that, indeed, the absence of a separate title deed created a legal difficulty that prevented the property from being sold through the ordinary execution process. Accordingly, the Court found it necessary to appoint a receiver with powers to take control of the property, assess its condition and proceed with a private sale by one of several possible means: assignment of rights; cancellation of the existing lease and sublease agreements and execution of new agreements with a buyer; or even the transfer of rights from the lease and sublease agreements to a company, with the sale ultimately effected through the sale of that company's shares. The Court concluded that this was an appropriate case for the appointment of a receiver, finding that there was a reasonable prospect that the receiver's involvement and the ancillary powers granted would substantially assist in the execution of the judgment. Consequently, the Court appointed the proposed receiver, an experienced lawyer and insolvency practitioner, and issued ancillary orders to facilitate the execution process. Comment This decision is particularly significant in the context of cross-border litigation and judgment enforcement, as it demonstrates the Cyprus cour...

    5 min
  7. Enforcing security over mortgage assets in the British Virgin Islands: the emerging battle grounds Appointment Powers and duties Disputes relating to the appointment of receivers Conclusion

    04/12/2025

    Enforcing security over mortgage assets in the British Virgin Islands: the emerging battle grounds Appointment Powers and duties Disputes relating to the appointment of receivers Conclusion

    There has been a significant increase in the number of lenders enforcing against secured assets in the BVI, which has entailed an uptick in the appointment of out-of-court receivers. This guide highlights the types of disputes arising out of such appointments. As many offshore companies operate as holding vehicles, security is often granted by way of share mortgage. The BVI Business Companies Act 2004 (BCA), provides a mortgagee with security over shares in a BVI company a statutory right to appoint receivers over those shares. That right is typically mirrored in the underlying security instrument. The process for appointing receivers in the BVI is set out in the Insolvency Act 2003 (Insolvency Act). Once appointed, out-of-court receivers act as agent for the mortgagor unless the instrument pursuant to which they are appointed provides otherwise. While receivers are generally personally liable for their actions, this agency affords them a degree of protection as they act in the name of and on behalf of the mortgagor. BVI legislation is relatively light-touch on the powers granted to a receiver, generally deferring to what has been agreed and set out within the instrument pursuant to which the receiver is appointed. In the case of security over shares, the receiver will generally have the power to (1) sell the shares, (2) vote the shares, and (3) take such other steps as they consider necessary or desirable to protect, improve or realise the shares. According to the Insolvency Act, receivers are subject to a primary duty to exercise their powers (1) in good faith and for a proper purpose and (2) in a way they believe (on reasonable grounds) to be in the best interests of the person on whose behalf they are appointed. To the extent consistent with these primary duties, a receiver has a secondary duty to have reasonable regard to the interests of certain interested parties, such as creditors and those with an interest in any equity of redemption. As the number of receiverships increase, so does the range of issues being disputed by mortgagors, often seeking to prevent appointed receivers from exercising their powers. The following trends are beginning to emerge: 1. Challenges to appointment A mortgagor seeking to resist having their security enforced will often start by challenging the validity of the receiver's appointment by reference to the security documents. The relevant documents must have been properly executed and valid, the right to appoint receivers must have accrued (usually contingent upon an event of default) and the necessary processes carried out to notify the mortgagor of the default and give effect to the receiver's appointment. 2. Extent to which the Insolvency Act applies to receiverships over shares in BVI companies owned by an individual or entity located elsewhere The Insolvency Act has an entire part governing the appointment of receivers. However, there is ambiguity as to whether several key provisions, such as those setting out the duties of a receiver, apply to all receivers appointed in relation to assets in the BVI. Various provisions apply specifically to a receiver of a 'company', a company being defined as a company in respect of whose assets a receiver is appointed, unless the context requires otherwise. The overarching definition of a 'company' in the Insolvency Act is restricted to BVI registered companies. Arguably, therefore, where a receiver is appointed over shares in a BVI company, but not the assets of a BVI company, these provisions do not apply. This ambiguity can lead to disagreements over what steps should or should not be taken by receivers and provides fertile grounds for legal disputes. 3. Balancing duties The tripartite nature of receiverships (between mortgagee, mortgagor and receiver) has given rise to extensive authority on how receivers ought to balance the various duties that arise. But there is no one-size-fits all solution: a receiver must evaluate the competing interests ...

    7 min
  8. A Tale of Two Arbitrations: Lessons from the BVI Court of Appeal

    03/12/2025

    A Tale of Two Arbitrations: Lessons from the BVI Court of Appeal

    In the recent judgment of TAX v FDQ, the BVI Court of Appeal provided guidance on the granting of anti-suit arbitration injunctions and the Court's supervisory jurisdiction over arbitrations commenced in the BVI. Background The applicant/appellant, TAX, and the respondent, FDQ, entered into a license agreement in 2018 and further agreed that any disputes arising out of the agreement would be arbitrated in accordance with the BVI Arbitration Act 2013. Their relationship subsequently broke down and on 21 January 2021, TAX initiated arbitration proceedings in the BVI (the 1st Arbitration). The Final Award of the 1st Arbitration was handed down on 21 February 2023. On 23 March 2023, FDQ filed a Fixed Date Claim Form in the BVI High Court, seeking to challenge the Final Award by way of appeal. On the same date FDQ also filed a notice of application in the High Court for leave to appeal several points of law. The leave has been granted but the appeal is yet to be heard. FDQ's Fixed Date Claim Form was heard in December 2023. On 25 June 2024, Mr Justice Wallbank ordered that the Final Award be set aside (the Setting Aside Order). In his judgment, Mr Justice Wallbank indicated that by setting aside the Final Award, this will give the parties opportunity to refer their disputes to a differently constituted tribunal if they so wish. TAX has since obtained leave to appeal the Setting Aside Order. The appeal also remains to be heard. On 21 July 2025, FDQ started a new arbitration in the BVI (the 2nd Arbitration) with identical subject matter, factual background and issues as the 1st Arbitration. On 29 July 2025, TAX applied to the BVI Court of Appeal for an interim injunction to restrain FDQ from pursuing the 2nd Arbitration. Key legal issues At the heart of this appeal is whether it is just and convenient to grant interim injunctive relief to restrain FDQ from pursuing the 2nd Arbitration while two appeals are pending. The Court's starting point is that it may, in the exercise of its equitable jurisdiction and discretion, grant interim injunctive relief where satisfied that it is just and convenient to do so. While acknowledging the policy imperatives in the Act against judicial interference in arbitration proceedings, the Court reiterated well-established case law, that the Court retains the power to prevent abuse of process in the conduct of Court or arbitral proceedings. It would exercise those powers of control only if necessary, and would do so judicially, not to interfere with an arbitration, but rather to restrain a party from abusing the process of a Court or arbitral tribunal or using either forum in an oppressive or unconscionable manner. This principle applies whether the arbitration is domestic or foreign. Applying the above principles, the Court was be satisfied that it was just and proper to grant an interim injunction, subject to an undertaking in damages based on the following findings: 1. There are two pending appeals before the Court in relation to the 1st 2. Parties agree that the issues to be determined on appeal are similar to some of the issues that will arise in the 2nd Arbitration, including construction and meaning of the license agreement and liability. 3. If the 2nd Arbitration advances at the same time as the appeals, those issues would be considered in parallel. 4. By executing the arbitration agreement, the parties have agreed that the BVI is the seat of arbitration and that the Act is applicable, thereby submitting them to all stages of the arbitration process including any appeals that may be pursued under the Act. The 1st Arbitration will only conclude after the determination of the two appeals. 5. By attempting to pursue the 2nd Arbitration while the 1st Arbitration is in train, FDQ will cause duplication of efforts, expenditure and resources, which would run contrary to the overriding objective of the BVI Civil Procedure Rules (Revised Edition) 2023. 6. More fundamentally, such a course is manifestly...

    6 min
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Exploring Offshore Litigation is a captivating podcast series containing audio of written blog content that dives deep into the intriguing world of offshore litigation, including the BVI and Cayman. Each episode sails through complex legal waters, bringing you up-to-date analysis of recent high-stakes cases and expert commentary from the leading minds in this specialised field. Our episodes demystify legal jargon and break down complex cases to make them accessible to all. Harneys, an international law firm with entrepreneurial thinking, brings each episode to you.

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