Paul Krugman Podcast

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  1. Talking Vibes With Jared Bernstein

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    Talking Vibes With Jared Bernstein

    Jared Bernstein, former top Biden economist and all-round economic expert, and I bat around the puzzle of persistent negative economic sentiment. Recorded Wednesday. . . . TRANSCRIPT: Paul Krugman in Conversation with Jared Bernstein (recorded 4/22/26) Paul Krugman: Hi everyone. This week I’ve got Jared Bernstein with me for a talk about economic vibes. We had planned and hoped to have G. Elliott Morris in on the conversation, but he came down sick. So it’s just going to be two economists talking about why people are still so negative about the economy. Clearly this is very important for lots of purposes, but also just kind of interesting. So, hi Jared. Maybe you should lead off by explaining why it’s so compelling and then I’ll chime in. We’ve both done work on this, but you’ve done more. Jared Bernstein: Yeah, well, to me, it’s personal because I was in the White House—in the Biden administration’s Council of Economic Advisers, as you know—during this period when what began to be called the vibecession arose. I associate that term with Kyla Scanlon. This was a situation where we were posting some good strong macroeconomic numbers. GDP was strong. It was above trend. We got back to full employment very quickly after the pandemic-induced recession. But there was a big spike in inflation. As that spike came down, we were rolling down the other side of inflation mountain in the second half of 2022, we thought that was a pretty good development, given how upset people were. But consumer sentiment, consumer confidence, people’s feeling about the economy—these vibes—just kept getting worse. And it seemed to me at the time that that shock, not just to inflation, but to the level of prices—how much prices went up—was more important than most economists were realizing. As you well know, people in our field think a lot about inflation and inflationary shocks. We think less about the level of prices and sort of take that as a given. So that struck me as quite important at the time. And I began to look into it in ways I’m sure we’ll get into. Krugman: I mean, what was striking about it was that historically, there’s a pretty good relationship between consumer sentiment and macroeconomics. And way back they called it the misery index, which is the inflation rate plus the unemployment rate. It was designed by Arthur Okun, and it did a pretty good job. And then you added a little more sophisticated version of that, and it has historically done a pretty good job of tracking sentiment. But after 2022, even by these measures that had worked before, it looked like an economy that should have had people feeling a lot happier, but they weren’t. But let’s talk a little bit about price level because what always struck me, even from the beginning, was a question about: what period of inflation are we talking about? You know, why should it be the one-year rate of inflation that enters into the misery index as opposed to a two-year, or three-year, or four-year? That’s how we kind of started. In your recent work, you started by saying, “well, maybe with inflation over a longer period,” but this kind of morphed into this price level issue. So why don’t you tell me about that? Bernstein: So, a couple of things to amplify points you were just making. My coauthor on a recent paper, Daniel Posthumus, and I made a model of consumer sentiment. And this works both on the Michigan version and on the Conference Board version. Krugman: By the way, people should know that U. Michigan is the longest-standing regular survey of how people feel. But the Conference Board—I don’t know how far back they go. Bernstein: It actually goes back to ‘62, and U. Michigan goes back to ‘52. But that’s kind of relevant for what I was about to say. So we built a model to predict the sentiment or confidence indices. We used the stock market returns, real consumer spending, inflation, and unemployment. Very simple. And we ran it from 1990 to 2019. It then predicts very well what the index does all the way back to the 1950s. So even though we ran it from ‘90 to 2019, it tracks the index very well. And then as you said, it breaks down in 2019. And as you well know, the ‘20, ’21, ‘22 inflation shock wasn’t the first inflation shock in our history. But it was the first one in this series where you see this big gap between how people should feel based on those variables, those predictors, and how they do feel. And I do want to get this down early on: that’s a pretty complicated thing to explain—how people feel about the economy. You know, you ask ten economists what “vibes” mean, or pollsters, whatever; they’ll tell you ten different things. But I think what happened to prices is very important. But I want to be clear— and you’ve underscored this in some of your recent work— it’s not the only thing. So, there’s that. I guess one other thing I’ll say: I have a particular set of experiences. I used to go out on WHNL, which stands for White House, North Lawn, and that’s where we used to go and talk to the cameras about how things were going. And no matter where we started, no matter what we were talking about, like a good unemployment report: “We just had 250,000 payroll jobs.” You know, “productivity is up, GDP inflation’s way down.” “Groceries had a 12% inflation rate. Now they have a 1.5% rate.” These are the things we were talking about out on WHNL, and it always got back to [the press saying], “Why do people feel so bad about the economy? They’re telling us things are too expensive. What are you going to do about that?” So that really got into my head. Krugman: So your story is one that I have largely gone with. You did the hard work on the econometrics, which I have not, but again— you or I would say, “Look, inflation is way down.” They said, “What do you mean? Things cost so much more than they did in 2019.” And so you kind of introduced this “excess price level” as a story, which is very widespread. But why not that as opposed to just inflation over a longer period, or is there really a better story there? Bernstein: Yeah. So, they’re quite similar. Inflation over a longer period is basically asking the question: how much did the level of prices go up over this period? So you raise a fair point. Most of what we talk about on inflation day is the change in the monthly inflation rate or, maybe, the yearly rate. But I think in some senses we’re circling around the same thing, which is people’s memory about prices. And that’s key to this research. It’s something I hadn’t thought enough about but I’ve more recently been kind of obsessed with, which is people’s memory of what things used to cost. And this gets you down an interesting set of questions. So if that were the only thing in play here, everybody—including me and you—would be walking around totally depressed all the time because when I started driving, gas cost $0.60 a gallon. And, you know, right now it’s a $4 national average, but this increase from $0.60 to where it is now or any other price you want to focus on—that’s salient to the consumer market basket. It tends to go up very gradually. When you have a shock, like we did in ‘21, ’22, people have this set of prices still emblazoned in their head. I used to call it the “personal price vector,” which is this idea that we walk around knowing what the things we buy kind of cost. And when that gets shocked, you know, it’s really quite upsetting to folks, and it takes a while for them to acclimate. The question is, what do we mean by “a while”? And I’m still wrestling with that question. Krugman: Yeah, I think there has to be a statute of limitations there somewhere. I mean, people aren’t pining for the days of 15-cent McDonald’s hamburgers. I started driving a lot earlier than you did. So, I don’t remember what gas cost, but I do remember a quarter to go to the movies. But obviously, at some point, people stop remembering. I’m probably going to get all nonlinear here, but I mean, we’re now five years on from the big price shocks from Covid. Admittedly, I am more affluent than most of the population, but I don’t remember what ground beef or eggs cost in April 2021, but I’m not sure that many people really do. So how is it that we are still feeling this? Bernstein: Yeah. So this is something I think about a lot. And I think the answer is that it’s not just that we had that one shock—one and done, done and dusted. It’s that we’ve actually had a series of shocks and that people haven’t had time. A lot of this comes under the rubric of Trumpian chaos or, put differently, horrible crap that the Trump administration has thrown at the economy. You know, just really bad economic policy that has continued to fuel the shock that consumers have been experiencing. So, again, if it was one and done, I think people would be feeling better. But you get the Trump tariffs—that’s the big shock to prices. Now granted, we only import 11% of our GDP in goods. But walk down the aisles of Target and Walmart, and you’ll see a lot of those imports. So that’s in play. And now we have the shock of the war. I think there are some other factors in play. Social media amplifies this stuff in a way that it hasn’t in the past. And, you know, actually, while I take your point about remembering what things cost—from talking to a few people, looking at some polling— actually, people do still remember at least what eggs cost, which was around $2 a dozen, or $1.50 a dozen. Although it’s not that far from that now, it’s closer to $2.50 or $3, depending on what kind of sale you can get. It wasn’t that long ago that it was four and five because of avian flu. So there’s been a lot of other shocks to prices in the interim. And I think that’s played an amplifi

    50 min
  2. Kevin Warsh is Trump's Sock Puppet

    22 ABR

    Kevin Warsh is Trump's Sock Puppet

    Some quick thoughts about yesterday’s hearing. Transcript Kevin Warsh, the next chairman of the Federal Reserve, is Donald Trump’s sock puppet. But we knew that. The question during yesterday’s confirmation hearing was whether he was sufficiently brave, sufficiently good at acting to pretend that he was more than that. And the answer is no. Hi, Paul Krugman here with a Wednesday update. I didn’t watch or write about the Warsh hearing because it seemed there wasn’t really that much at stake. He’s going to be confirmed pretty much regardless and there’s a whole lot else going on in the world. But I thought I should weigh in a bit on what we actually learned from the hearing. Now about Warsh, he is smart. He is very good at saying things that sound thoughtful and impressive, but he is also, and it’s really very clear, a partisan hack. He’s for tight money when a Democrat is in the White House and for easy money when there’s a Republican. He has managed to claim that he was part of the great economic rescue that took place after the global financial crisis. But at the time, although he was on the Federal Reserve Board, he basically trashed his colleagues for trying to do their job. And he has made a lot of criticisms over the years, but they’re always very selective. Often when he makes a statement, you wonder, what exactly did he say? Because there tends to be lots of complex verbiage that sounds sophisticated, but when you try and distill it down to what it was all about, it’s very hard to figure out, except that, again, it’s always tight money if there’s a Democrat in the White House, easy money if there’s a Republican. Recently, Employ America, which is a group that I follow, wrote about Warsh. They aren’t very partisan. They do mostly inflation analyses and inflation nowcasting, trying to predict what the next number will be. But they had a scathing survey of his positions over the years, which says that he is a partisan who has chosen to align conveniently with the current president, that he is someone who abandons his principles “for whatever might suit his personal and partisan interests.” That’s not very nice, but it seems to be quite accurate. So there was a hearing, and everybody knows pretty much who he is.There are people, sort of centrist Democrats, who claim to find some virtues in him. But I think that’s all positioning. I think everybody understands what we’re getting with Warsh. The question in the hearing was, could he put on an act? Because he is usually a pretty slick customer. He’s not someone who simply rants and raves and spouts MAGA propaganda. And he was asked a a question which isn’t about monetary policy, but is very much exactly a kind of litmus test for, not really for who he is, but what he’s willing to say, at least in the interest of appearing to be not a complete sock puppet. He was asked who won the 2020 election. which is not a question that is remotely in doubt. This is not something about which reasonable people can disagree. There is nothing to the claims of a rigged election except the fact that Donald Trump can’t admit that he lost that election. And Warsh evaded. He said, well, this body certified that election, which is not the question. The question is basically, are you willing to challenge Trump on a completely obvious grotesque lie? And it would have been in Warsh’s interest, you would think, to say, well, no, I believe that Joe Biden won that election. But to do that would be to show some independence, even not in action, but some independence, at least rhetorically, from Donald Trump. And he wouldn’t do that. He was also asked about the spurious prosecution of Lisa Cook, asked about the spurious charges being brought about Jay Powell and refused to take a stand in support of people who will be his colleagues once he gets to the Fed. So what we got was not a test of how he will behave, not a test really of his policy views. I mean, there were no interesting policy arguments going on here. There are some discussions we could have about shrinking the Fed’s balance sheet and all of these things, where I do think that Warsh’s expressed views are quite wrong. But that’s kind of not what was on trial here. What was on trial was, can he at least pretend to be not a total hack? And the answer is no. He’s afraid to even show a little bit of verbal independence without substance when it comes to Donald Trump, which is bad. It should be utterly disqualifying for the position because being the Fed chair is important. It requires a lot of independent judgment and requires a lot of credibility because the Fed is mostly needed in moments of crisis. And in those moments of crisis, people need to believe, markets need to believe, but the general public needs to believe that we’re talking about people who are serious experts and seriously have the interests of the nation at stake rather than their partisan political views. He failed that test with flying colors. And he will be confirmed anyway. Get full access to Paul Krugman at paulkrugman.substack.com/subscribe

    6 min
  3. Trump Can't Even Surrender Right

    18 ABR

    Trump Can't Even Surrender Right

    Transcript When you’re losing a war, but it’s not an existential defeat, your country, your government can continue pretty much as before. Aside from the humiliation, there’s a well-established technique, which is to declare victory and pull out. But it appears that Trump can’t even pull that off. Hi, Paul Krugman with a Saturday update on the situation in the Strait of Hormuz and all of that. It’s been clear for a while that the United States has basically lost this war. The goal was to achieve regime change, possibly to take Iran’s uranium. Neither of those is going to happen. The Iranian regime is harder line than it was before. Iran has ended up strengthened because it’s demonstrated its ability to shut off traffic through the Strait of Hormuz. No way the United States, even under current management, is going to commit ground troops to attempt to really do in Iran’s nuclear program on a sustained basis. So the indicated strategy was to essentially give up, but claim that something wonderful was accomplished, and that’s certainly something that Trump is good at doing. But he hasn’t been able to pull that off, I think because he himself is incapable of facing reality. So the Iranians said that they are willing to allow free passage of shipping through the strait, by which it turns out they mean basically passage that stays close to the Iranian coast and pays a toll along the way. Well, what’s our alternative to that? What is it that we want to get? The United States has started imposing a blockade on Iran, which hurts the Iranians. It does give them a reason to seek a deal, but only if they get something out of it. So if allowing ships to start carrying oil and LNG and fertilizer and helium out of the Gulf allows them to sell their own oil again and to import food, which apparently is an important issue for Iran, then that’s a deal that can be done. It will, in practice, be a strategic defeat for the United States, but something that the Trump administration could try to spin as a victory. But in order to get that, you have to actually deliver on that deal. You can claim that you’re winning and that they’re surrendering, not us, but you have to actually deliver on the deal. What Trump tried to do was to say, great, they’re opening up the strait, but meanwhile, we’re going to continue our blockade. And also, they have promised that we can have the uranium, which they had not. That doesn’t work. It’s just basic logic. Why would the Iranians agree to a deal if they don’t get a lifting of the US embargo, don’t get their ability to sell oil and their ability to import food back? If that’s what’s going to happen, then you might as well keep the strait blocked. So what was this supposed to be? What was the idea? What was the thinking? Well, as best I can tell, and this is all speculation now, I don’t think that Trump has taken on board, maybe he’s emotionally incapable of taking on board the reality that he screwed up, that he took us to war and lost, that he, in his mind, still thinks that America has the upper hand and that the Iranians are cowering in fear over the might of the U.S. military, and that he doesn’t need to make any concessions, Does he really believe that? Do we even know? Is really believing a thing that makes sense in his case? Probably not. But to some extent, he is at least incapable of accepting as a basic proposition, never mind in public, but at least in terms of actual policymaking, accepting as a proposition that, well, the U.S. just found the limits to its power, and they turn out to be closer to our goal than they are to the Iranians’ goal. So we basically have to cut our losses by making a deal that leaves the Iranians with some stuff that they didn’t have before. He can’t seem to do that. But if he doesn’t do that, then the Strait of Hormuz will remain closed. In fact, it’s more closed than before because the Iranians are not managing to export oil, which is new. They were exporting oil before, and now that little bit of supply to the world market has been cut off. It’s about 2% of world oil supply. Not huge, but in a very tight oil market, it is significant. And I have no idea where it goes from here. Once again, we’re in a situation of total uncertainty. Now, I might be willing to say, maybe I’m misunderstanding, maybe the United States does have, in some sense, more leverage. But, you know, we do have markets. The futures markets are closed for the weekend. So let’s see what happens when they reopen Sunday night. But the prediction markets are open, and for all the problems with the prediction markets, they show very clearly that the perceived probability that the strait would reopen by June 1st spiked last week and is now back basically to where it started. All of a sudden, we’re down to a 30% or so probability of getting the strait open anytime soon, which looks about right. Maybe that’s even a bit high. But, my God, like I said, we are led by people who not only can’t plan a war right, they can’t even successfully execute a surrender. And that’s a really bad omen, not just for the Iran conflict, but for everything else. Get full access to Paul Krugman at paulkrugman.substack.com/subscribe

    6 min
  4. Kim Lane Scheppele on Hungary

    18 ABR

    Kim Lane Scheppele on Hungary

    More than a year ago I interviewed my old friend and colleague Kim Lane Scheppele, a constitutional scholar who speaks Hungarian and knows Hungary, about the march of autocracy. Now, suddenly, a much happier occasion. I found her account of how this happened startling — a lot I didn’t know, even though I’ve been following the news obsessively. And some of it is wild. Here’s a transcript: . . . TRANSCRIPT: Paul Krugman in Conversation with Kim Lane Scheppele (recorded 4/16/26) Paul Krugman: Going back after a number of months to Kim Lane Scheppele, my former office neighbor at Princeton and I think we can safely say America’s leading constitutional scholar who also knows Hungary and speaks Magyar, although you’re probably the only one. Kim Lane Scheppele: Sorry to interrupt you, but the language is Magyar nyelv, and Magyar, the name of the person we’re going to be talking about, who’s also the new prime minister, means Hungarian. That’s your Hungarian lesson for the day. Ha! Krugman: Oh, wow. Thanks. I would have gotten that all wrong. All right. Well, anyway, as you say, it’s been quite a week. You were on this case on my blog starting in 2010, but I think we want to just talk about first reactions to this extraordinary election on Sunday. Scheppele: Well, yeah. It’s been hard to even comprehend the magnitude of this. I mean, not only did Péter Magyar win this election, but he won the election overwhelmingly in a rigged system. And so that’s the miracle magic of it. It turns out that Viktor Orbán had rigged the election rules so that only he could win. And the shortcut of what he did was that essentially a vote in the countryside counted three times as much as a vote in the cities. And what he counted on was that usually, if you get a challenger to a right-wing autocrat, they’re all going to be liberals, right? They’re all going to get their votes from the cities, from the educated populations. And Orban had a lock on the countryside. And then he put all the weight of the system on counting his people more than others. So Peter Magyar spent the last two years going out to villages, just meeting all of these people in person and getting around the fact that Orban also controlled all the media. So the media was rigged, the election system was rigged. And when the vote came in on Sunday, he was at 15 to 20 points ahead in the polls. Krugman: Right. Scheppele: But that did not guarantee he was going to win. And it did not guarantee that he was going to win by the majority. And so when the numbers started piling up, like I was watching the early returns and the early returns were coming in from villages that should have been the Orban vote. And it was a Tisza vote, it was a Peter Magyar vote. And so you knew just from the first 2 or 3% of the vote that it was going to be overwhelming. And sure enough, the whole evening the results came in and Peter Magyar won. It might shift a little bit, 1 or 2 numbers now, but about 138 seats out of the 199 seats in the parliament, and Orban had to concede. There was just no way that he could even claim fraud or try to do anything to change it, because he just didn’t have votes come in from anywhere. Krugman: Okay, it’s funny but that’s the first clear explanation I’ve gotten of how the rigging worked. Because the reporting has been pretty vague. And, you know, there’s still a fair number of people saying, “oh, it can’t really have been rigged, because after all, he lost.” Scheppele: Yeah. No, it was so rigged. I mean, literally, Orban rewrote all the rules in 2015. And, Paul, I need to give you a shout out here because, you know, Americans didn’t know anything about this. And I live in my head in Hungary. And I would come in every day to campus and see you in my office next door and go on whining and complaining about how Orban had been building a dictatorship starting in 2010. And you said, “Well, how come The New York Times isn’t covering it?” And I said, “Well, no one’s covering it because no one can see it.” It was all legal. It was all technical. It was really hard to see how Orban was nailing things down. And then you called me up on a Sunday and said, “Okay, I’m going to do tomorrow’s column on Hungary.” And so, remember, we scrambled around, I was translating documents. The fact checkers were calling me up, and you wrote that blog post on a Monday, and then you said to me, “Look, you know, it’s more complicated than I could say. You can put something up on my blog.” And then we did that for like 3 or 4 years. You were putting all my commentaries up on your blog, and I was the only one covering it in English at that time. So, you know, if it wasn’t for your venue, it would have been impossible to get this on the radar screen of Americans. So, Paul, it’s your victory, too. Krugman: I hope it is. I mean, I feel like I was facilitating your victory, it’s obviously the Hungarian people’s victory. But actually one of the things that strikes me here is that, we talk a lot about how Orban muzzled and controlled the media in Hungary, but, effectively, there was an international muzzling coming out of a couple of things. Scheppele: Yeah. Krugman: I remember you saying that basically even big international news organizations sort of had one stringer in Budapest who often turned out to be somebody affiliated with Fidesz. So. Scheppele: Right. Well, there were a whole bunch of ways that he muzzled the international press. So one was just that, if you were a domestic journalist reporting for the international press, you were under surveillance, you were under threat. The international news organizations, including, by the way, the New York Times, had to start providing physical security for the reporters because they were really being threatened with death threats and the whole nine yards. And, you know, I got death threats, too, sometimes through the comments section on your blog. Right? So, everybody commenting on it was really under threat in some sense. But the other thing that happened was once the international press pulled out because they couldn’t pay for the security anymore, they’d hire Hungarian stringers and then the Hungarian stringers would have other things happen to them, like they’d get doxxed and there’d be mobs outside their apartment and they’d have to move out of their houses. And really, it was a huge campaign. And then the final thing, and maybe not the final thing, but at every single Hungarian embassy in the world, the ambassador was told, “Your job is to keep negative news about Hungary from appearing in the press.” So every time there was a story criticizing Orban, the embassy would call the editors and say, “You’ve got to give us equal time,” or “you can’t trust those journalists,” or “you should never use those sources again.” Going back, this was during your days at the Times, there was a Hungarian-American reporter who was writing for the Times, and the Hungarian government called the Times and said, “we don’t trust this guy.” And they stopped putting his byline on stories until they did a full check on him. Krugman: Okay. Scheppele: So that was happening to the international press. So it’s not just the domestic press that was muzzled, but the international press as well. And so it took a very long time. I mean, Orban had the whole system locked down in just three years, and it took until five, 6 or 7 years later before the rest of the world caught up to the fact that a dictatorship had been constructed in plain sight. Krugman: What’s also extraordinary is that even now — I mean, this is the first time I’ve heard anyone, and I’ve been reading the news reporting obsessively, but the first time I’ve had as clear an explanation of how the rigging worked and how Magyar broke it. And, you know, the eyes of the world have been on Hungary a lot, if only because Hungary has been the star of CPAC for years now. And you would think that by now reporting would have gotten it right. Scheppele: Yeah. Well, I’ll tell you, part of the problem is that Orban and his circle are lawyers, and they pioneered this sort of 21st-century version of dictatorship where you don’t shut down the media. You just regulate them or you threaten them or whatever. Everything was done technically by law. And I think most Hungarians didn’t understand how the law was rigged. I wrote a quite detailed article about this in the Journal of Democracy after the last election, going in detail step by step through all the stages of exactly how Orban rigged things. So, it was gerrymandering. It was things like, the districts expected to vote for Orban had 30,000 voters, and the district expected to vote for the opposition had 90,000 voters. Krugman: Right, right. Scheppele: And then there were all kinds of other election tricks that Orban borrowed. For the 2014 election, I wrote about this on your blog in five parts. Remember? You put up five parts. “Election in Question, part one,” “Election in Question, part two.” There was just every single which way [they could change the rules]. So just another example. Orban said, “we have all these minority groups in Hungary. They should be represented in the parliament.” Everybody’s cheering, like minority representation—what a good thing. So there was this possibility of the Roma having a separate representative in parliament and the Germans and other ethnic groups. And it turns out if you registered to vote on that party list, you only needed 20,000 votes to get a seat. So all those seats got colonized by Orban’s people. The Roma guy was a Fidesz person. That’s Orban’s party. The German guy was a Fidesz person. So all these little things gave Orban one seat here, four seats there and so on. And if you look at Orban’s popularity in Hungarian opinion polls going back to 2010, he

    52 min
  5. Trump Wants Regime Change at the Fed

    16 ABR

    Trump Wants Regime Change at the Fed

    No time for a regular post today, so here’s a video. Transcript When Donald Trump took us to war with Iran, he dismissed warnings from the experts, from the military, from the intelligence community, saying that this was a highly risky proposition. Now he wants to bring that same level of clarity and judgment to monetary policy, and we should all be very afraid. Hi, Paul Krugman here. Today, I’m going to do a video rather than a proper post because I just have too much stuff going on. I’ve been too busy to actually do the charts and quantitative analysis that would be involved in actually writing a post about this stuff. I’m recording this on Wednesday afternoon. The news to which I’m reacting is that in the midst of everything else that’s going on, Trump is doubling down on his attempt to turn the Federal Reserve into a personalized institution that will do what he wants, and never mind the fact that it’s set up to have substantial independence, never mind the fact that there’s a long tradition of respecting the Fed’s independence. Trump thinks that he should be, as George Bush would say, the decider on monetary policy. This would be a bad thing even if Trump was somebody who generally had good judgment. Monetary policy, what the Fed does — control of short-term interest rates, control of the money supply— monetary policy is technical. Doing it right does require that you know quite a lot about what’s going on. It’s something that you really do want, technocrats at least having a strong role in the decision-making process. And in fact we generally leave it up to technocrats. Part of the reason for doing that is it’s too easy. It doesn’t require legislation to change interest rates. It just requires a phone call to the open market desk in New York City. So it’s really easy for a president who wants to rev up the economy, wants to juice things up before an election or just plain has crackpot economic ideas, it’s just too easy for a president to do a lot of damage. So we put layers of insulation. Members of the Federal Reserve Board are appointed for long terms. The whole setup is one that is designed to at least take some time. It doesn’t allow a madman in the Oval Office to muck with monetary policy. It’s especially bad if the guy in the Oval Office is somebody like Trump, who is impulsive, very much short-term reward-centered, and, of course, doesn’t read, doesn’t study, doesn’t listen to experts. And we know that Trump has a bee in his bonnet, that interest rates should be drastically lower than they are now, which is simply not supported by any of the facts about what’s happening to the economy. Inflation is running hotter than it should be. The Fed has a target of 2 percent inflation on the PCE price index. It’s actually running at around 3. That’s not good conditions for a rate cut. The economy doesn’t need a rate cut, at least it doesn’t appear to right now. We’re not in a recession. So technocrats at the Federal Reserve will not actually deliver the rate cuts Trump wants unless he’s able to exert personal control. Now, the way he’s been trying to do that is itself outrageous. His minions at the Justice Department have tried to force Lisa Cook off the Federal Reserve Board based on totally spurious charges about her mortgage applications long before she was at the Fed. And they’re trying to force Powell out over allegations of cost overruns in Federal Reserve construction projects. This is crazy stuff, and nobody takes it seriously. Nobody thinks those are genuine charges. This is all about trying to use the mechanisms of the Justice Department to intimidate monetary policy makers and turn them into instruments of the presidential will. The presidential will here, aside from being utterly self-centered, is also deeply uninformed. If you read what Trump has had to say about monetary policy, it’s clear that he doesn’t think of interest rates as a tool to manage the economy, as a tool to control inflation, and so on. He thinks of low interest rates as a gold star that you get if we have a great economy. So he keeps on saying that it’s a wonderful golden age, the economy is terrific, none of which is actually true. It’s not a golden age. Inflation is running high. None of that is true, but in any case, that’s not how it works. Monetary policy is not a reward for good behavior. It’s not a reward for achievement. It’s something that is a tool for keeping the economy on an even keel. If he does get his way, this will be bad. The Federal Reserve has credibility, the fact that people making decisions, particularly decisions about pricing, believe that the Fed will keep the economy on an even keel, that it will not allow inflation to remain stubbornly too high. It did allow some inflation for 21-22, which was arguably the right thing to do to allow some, but it quickly took the steps needed to bring it back down again. And that credibility, the fact that people believed that the Fed would do the right thing actually helped it to do the right thing, allowed us to have “immaculate disinflation,” a big fall in the inflation rate without a big rise in the unemployment rate. If Trump gets his way, that will all be gone. The credibility of the Federal Reserve will be shot. Now, I don’t think he’ll get his way there. I don’t think he will get his way on monetary policy. But he might. And more than that, what the fight over the Fed is telling us is that Trump has learned nothing. You would think that the debacle in Iran would lead to some loss of self-confidence, some dent in the arrogant ignorance, the belief that just because the intelligence agencies and the generals and the admirals say that this is very risky and what about the Strait of Hormuz, never mind, I know this will be a quick, easy war. And apparently the fact that it hasn’t turned out that way hasn’t led to any questioning of his own impeccable, perfect judgment. So the attack on the Fed is a bad thing in itself, and it’s also a symptom of “this is not a guy who should be in the White House.” And the fact that he still commands so much deference from his own party and so much timidity on the part of people who should be standing up to him really makes me worried about the future of America and the world. Get full access to Paul Krugman at paulkrugman.substack.com/subscribe

    8 min
  6. How America Is Losing the World | Lunch Money with Paul Krugman and Heather Cox Richardson

    15 ABR

    How America Is Losing the World | Lunch Money with Paul Krugman and Heather Cox Richardson

    Thank you Quentin Hardy, Beth Arnold, Jane Trombley, Resistance Media, Victoria Priya, and many others for tuning into my live video with Heather Cox Richardson! Join me for my next live video in the app. Transcript HCR: Hey, everybody here from Bonita Springs, Florida and Elgin, Illinois and Portland, Oregon and Seattle, Washington, Fairbanks, Alaska. Boy, it must be getting beautiful up there right now. Newfoundland, Canada, Oak Park, Illinois. Still, we do not have a duplicate Plano, Texas. Then we got I think we got Oak Park, Illinois. That’s two Illinois. We got Cuyahoga Falls, Ohio, Vienna, Austria. Where is our Facebook? from Albuquerque, New Mexico, Dublin, Ohio. And Kristen is here from Facebook. So welcome, everybody. And here, Dr. Krugman and I go again with Lunch Money. Hey, Paul, how are you? PK: Hi, I’m good. How are you? HCR: I’m good. We have spring here, finally, which is unbelievable. PK: We’re hitting 86 this afternoon in New York. HCR: Oh, I can be there in about three hours. We’re not going to be 60. PK: So yeah, here from beautiful New York City, actually more or less across the street from the Empire State Building. This is my academic office. HCR: Oh, that’s nice. That’s nice. I’m just across from trees. Listen, so the world is changing so quickly that it’s kind of hard to get your mind around it. And one of the things that jumped out to me this week was the degree to which we’re focusing on the loss of soft power. We’re looking at the loss of you know, the idea of American military dominance. That’s another question. But I’m really interested in what it means for the U.S. economy to have taken such a dramatic turn away from dominance around the world. And what got me thinking was I did an interview the other day with Vanessa Williamson of the Brookings Institution about taxes, right? And she really offhandedly said, well, you know, we have this thing in economics called the resource curse, where if you have a country that has a reliance on an easily accessible resource like gold or oil or whatever, it means that they don’t really the leaders don’t really have to pay any attention to the people, because they can just dig it out of the ground. And she said, I’ve always kind of thought that maybe America’s resource curse was the fact that we were the world’s reserve currency. So we could borrow as much money as we wanted at really low prices. But that’s changing. And she just kind of threw it out there. And I thought, oh, my heavens, I have never thought about this at all that way. And I thought to come to you and say, I don’t know if she was right. I don’t know if this makes any sense at all, but what are we looking at in terms of the economy with the extraordinary instability of the United States on the world stage right now? PK: Okay, so let me first of all just say that, one resource curse that we have in the U.S. is an actual resource curse. We would not be rejecting renewable energy, we would not be rejecting electrotech, probably, if we didn’t have all of this oil and gas. That in some sense, our politics are kind of polluted by the power of our own fossil fuel industry. And that’s actually probably ending up being an economic disadvantage. So just to say that we’re not that different from countries that actually have mineral resources that end up to be negatives, not positive for them. On the dollar: I do need to say that that’s one of those things where the people who have studied it most tend to think that the special role of the dollar is least important. And it’s people who haven’t who tend to think that it must be tremendously important. So, okay, the dollar is the overwhelmingly dominant currency of international business. If somebody in Brazil wants to do business with somebody in Malaysia, the stuff’s going to be invoiced in dollars. The debts are going to be in dollars. And those private uses of the dollar are more important than the official reserves, although that’s part of it as well. HCR: Can I stop you for a second there? And for them to do that exchange, it has to go through the SWIFT bank, right? Probably, yes. Can you explain all this stuff? Yeah. So there’s an interbank market. So if you’re going to exchange reais in Brazil for Malaysian ringgit banks that are going to do the deal. And the interbank markets are all against dollars. There is no market where you can exchange Brazilian currency for Malaysian currency directly. The banks will sell one for dollars and then use dollars to buy the other. The interbank market is conducted primarily through this thing called SWIFT, which I forgot what the acronym stands for, but anyway, it’s the electronic settlement system based in Belgium, rather oddly, but effectively answering to the United States. There are ways around it, but it’s by far the most convenient way to, to do these transactions. And the role of the dollar gives the U S government a lot of power. Everything that goes through SWIFT is revealed to the National Security Agency. The United States can effectively veto transactions. Because everybody needs to have an account at a U.S. bank in order to do basically any business anywhere in the world, the U.S. government can blockade transactions. And so this is an extremely powerful lever of power. Actually, I’ll recommend a book by friends of mine, Henry Farrell and Abe Newman, called Underground Empire, which is all about these invisible channels of power, and the currency stuff is a big part of it. There are ways around it. The United States has tried to embargo Iranian transactions for many years, and the Iranians have costly, kludgy workarounds, but they do have workarounds. The Chinese yuan has done nothing as international currency, but people do make deals that involve using China’s banking system to get around the U.S. blockade. But it’s still a big influence of the United States. So, okay, this is really important. Now, some think that the dollar is about to collapse, that people are going to stop using dollars. Yeah, if we are crazy enough, we can do that, but it’s really hard. I think I’m getting a little nonlinear here, but anyway, the best essay I’ve ever seen on this — the best paper I’ve ever read, but it’s just in the form of an essay, no math, no diagrams, was on the dollar. It was an old article by, my late teacher, Charlie Kindleberger, called The Politics of International Money and International Language, in which he said that the role of the dollar in the world economy is like the role of English. Everybody in the world who needs to communicate does it in English, because everybody else does it. Everybody uses dollars because everybody else does it. And that’s actually extremely hard to dislodge. Even if United States policy is crazy, it’ll take a lot to change that. Think about what it would take for us to start doing international business in Mandarin. That’s not going to happen overnight. Sorry, I’m going on too long. I haven’t let you get a word. HCR: No, no, no. This is great. Does all of this translate into the United States can borrow without limit? PK: Well, first of all, we are not the only country that can borrow a lot. It turns out that if you are looking at the ability to run large trade deficits year after year, the United States has done that, but so has Australia. So has Britain. So it’s not actually the case that the United States has a unique ability to borrow. We are impressive in the ability to borrow in dollar denominated debt. Not that we get free borrowing, but that U.S. borrowers — the government, but also corporations —issue debt that’s payable in dollars, which does give the United States some autonomy. If the dollar plunges on world markets, so do our debts. So we’re insulated from that particular concern. But it’s not unique. We aren’t uniquely able to run big deficits. Whether we get cheaper borrowing or more borrowing, whatever the effect is, it’s not strong enough to be clear. for the signal to overwhelm the noise. You try and look for, is America able to borrow more cheaply than Britain or Japan? Maybe, but you can’t really see it in the data. It’s not overwhelming. So at a basic level, I don’t think that the resource curse story vis-a-vis the dollar is especially compelling. I would say that the role of financial services qualifies, although that’s much bigger for Britain than for the United States. I mean, Britain really suffers, everything in Britain except for London suffers from the city of London’s role in international finance, but the United States a little bit. But I think it’s more a psychological thing, a sense of impunity that the United States tends to have because of the role of the dollar. We don’t think about, nobody ever thinks about a U.S. financial crisis and the IMF having to come in. And maybe we should. HCR: So that was just sort of a starting point because what that did, whether or not that was something that I should be staying up at night about, was it really made me think about, you know, I look at the politics of where we are and I look at soft power and I look at the cultural norms and so on And certainly I look at individual pieces of the fact, for example, that oil is getting very expensive and therefore we’re going to see inflation, more inflation than we’re already seeing and so on. But on a cosmic level, you know, on a really big level, what does it mean for the what is the instability that we are seeing coming out of the Trump administration? And you can define that however you wish. What does that mean for the American people? I mean, like literally, I don’t even know where to start with that. Does it mean nothing? I can’t imagine that. Does it just mean inflation? You suggested it doesn’t mean that we have to worry about not any longer being able to borrow. What does it mean?

    34 min
  7. Delusions of Grandeur, Hungary Edition

    11 ABR

    Delusions of Grandeur, Hungary Edition

    Transcript What is Hungary to us or we to Hungary? Hi, Paul Krugman here. A Saturday morning update ahead of the big election in Hungary taking place tomorrow. The eyes of the world are upon Budapest. It’s a little odd that Hungary is so much the focus of a lot of people, myself included. It has about the same population as New Jersey, about a quarter of New Jersey’s GDP. It’s not a big place, but it’s symbolic. It is a role model for right-wing authoritarians everywhere. It still formally has the institutions of democracy, but has for the past 16 years been a one party state — ruled by a right-wing authoritarian ethno-nationalist regime that enforces its will partly by rigging elections, partly through an extensive system of crony capitalism that rewards its friends and punishes its enemies. In other words, it’s a MAGA kind of place. It’s what they would like to do to the United States, although with less sophistication and more brutality. Donald Trump has been frantically trying to keep Viktor Orban in power, largely in ways that demonstrate that he really doesn’t understand how the world views him. Sending JD Vance to campaign for Orban is not helpful to Orban. It’s a boost to the opposition. Spewing frantically on Truth Social about how important it is that Orban win is, again, a gift to the Hungarian opposition. The system is still very rigged in Hungary, but there’s pretty good reason to hope that the popular wave against Orban and Fidesz is so large that it will sweep away all of the rigging that they’ve imposed to try and keep themselves in power. We’ll all be watching the polls eagerly tomorrow. What struck me, however, as something new is that lately, at the very end, Trump is now saying, oh, elect Orban and I will help you out economically. And just yesterday, he put up a post saying that if Orban is re-elected, that the Economic Might of the United States will come in to aid Hungary and its well-deserved prosperity and all of that. Which is interesting because it’s an illustration of the megalomania, the delusions of grandeur that really afflict the current U.S. administration, a complete inability to have a sense of the limits of American power. What Hungary is to us or what Hungary is to MAGA is clear, but what are we to Hungary? Look at Hungarian trade. It is a relatively open economy, which depends a lot on its role as a relatively low-cost manufacturing platform, which it has been able to maintain despite the crony capitalism and all of that. Where does Hungary export to? Well, about 80% of its exports go to either the European Union, or Britain has a little bit on top. So essentially the democracies of Western Europe are where 80% of Hungarian exports go. How much does it export to the United States? 3.5%. Basically, Hungary, for practical purposes, does no business with the United States. This is mostly about gravity: The “gravity equation” in international trade says among other things that trade depends very much inversely on the distance between countries. Hungary is in the middle of Europe. It’s going to inevitably do a lot of trade with Europe. And that’s even larger because the special role that Hungary has taken is that of being a a manufacturing platform for relatively low-wage pieces of the European manufacturing sector. In a way, kind of like Mexico is for North American manufacturing. By the way, the fact that German companies in particular have invested a lot in Hungarian production is a large part of the reason that the European Union has been so derelict in trying to rein in Orbán and his destruction of democracy. But in any case, the point is that there’s just no way that the United States is going to be an important economic partner for a small country in the middle of Europe. It’s a complete misunderstanding of how big, how important, how powerful the United States is. It is in a way kind of the economic counterpart of imagining that the United States can easily effect regime change and bludgeon Iran into submission. This is not who we are. It’s not our role. We are not big enough. We are not the sole global superpower. And in any case, being a superpower isn’t what it used to be. So all of this will be ignored by the Hungarians. The one thing that may happen is that the clear message that Trump favors Orban may be the straw that breaks the camel’s back, maybe the final, tipping point that removes Orban from power. I’m not counting any paprika chickens before they’re hatched. There is a kind of a nightmare here about what happens if there’s a clear attempt to simply overrule, defraud the Hungarian electorate, not just the rigging that has worked so far, but something even more extreme. And then will the Europeans ever live up to their own values, their own ideals? I hope we don’t come to that point. But anyway, whatever is happening, one thing that’s clear is that U.S. economic partnership or lack thereof with Hungary doesn’t make a damn bit of difference. Get full access to Paul Krugman at paulkrugman.substack.com/subscribe

    7 min
  8. Talking with Lisa Graves

    11 ABR

    Talking with Lisa Graves

    Lisa Graves is a legal activist and the author of a remarkable and terrifying book, Without Precedent, that documents the assault on democracy via the story of John Roberts. I spoke with her about how America has come to its current state, and what the future may hold: . . . TRANSCRIPT: Paul Krugman in Conversation with Lisa Graves (recorded 4/9/26) Paul Krugman: I’m speaking today with Lisa Graves, author of an incredibly revelatory and deeply disturbing book called Without Precedent, about the Roberts Court and what it has done to America. And...hi, Lisa. Welcome on. Lisa Graves: Paul, thank you so much for having me on. It’s an honor to be here with you. And thank you for your kind words about my book. Krugman: I guess I was first sort of seriously alerted to what was happening at the Supreme Court in 2000, with the stolen election and all that. But I have to say, I don’t think I fully appreciated what Citizens United would do. And so why don’t you give us a little background on what has happened, the court and its role and what’s been happening to America? Graves: Well, I really appreciate your starting with Bush v. Gore, because that in some ways is the beginning of this period. It’s a precursor in a way to what we’ve been experiencing. And that was when the US Supreme Court, in a sharply partisan decision — although not all the Republicans voted to stop the recount — five Republicans voted to stop the recount in 2000, in Florida. And the effect of that was to give George W. Bush the presidency and with it, not just the power to, in essence, make war with the consent of Congress, but also the power to remake the courts, the Supreme Court in particular. And by the way, as part of my research for the book, I looked into what was happening at that time, and it turned out that Clarence Thomas’s wife Ginni Thomas was working for the Heritage Foundation on the predecessor to Project 2025 — basically Project 2000. And she was screening people for positions in the potential George W. Bush administration. And Clarence Thomas didn’t recuse himself from that case. By the way, that five-four decision — it would have been four-four. The count would have been allowed to proceed. And the count that actually occurred with news organizations after the fact, after Bush was sworn in, showed that Gore would have won Florida and would have become the president of the United States. By the way, after Thomas voted to effectively make George W. Bush the president, Ginni Thomas was given a promotion as the liaison from the Heritage Foundation to the White House, and she became the highest paid non-board member of the Heritage Foundation. And so she was rewarded very well for her work and, basically, for the consequence of her husband’s decision to vote to stop that recount. So that was really a moment where I think a lot of people didn’t understand what was happening. And because that decision happened so quickly, there were no motions for Thomas to recuse himself. It just was a very rapid, very political, partisan decision by the court. And it is really a precursor to what’s happened next, which is that George W. Bush was reelected as an incumbent, or elected anew in 2004. And there were two vacancies that came up immediately. It was for O’Connor’s seat and Rehnquist’s seat. And John Roberts got the role of chief justice, and Sam Alito got the role of associate justice. And then to fast forward to your question about Citizens United, again, this is a 5-to-4 decision issued by the Roberts Court, where Clarence Thomas sat on that case — the fifth vote, in essence, on that case — even though a billionaire named Harlan Crowe had staked his wife Ginni Thomas with $500,000 to launch a group to take advantage of the decision to come in Citizens United, to allow these so-called C4 groups under the IRS code to spend unlimited money to influence elections. And Clarence Thomas did not recuse himself from that case, and even had the audacity to write a concurring opinion saying that disclosure of money being spent by these groups — who the sources are — would chill speech, meaning money, like the money to his wife, which he did not disclose. And so that decision unleashed a tsunami of cash into our elections, where candidates are routinely outspent by the outside groups. And this has given a disproportionate, and extraordinarily disproportionate, power to billionaires in our society, in America, to secretly influence elections in order to get people into positions of power to advance their interests, like the huge tax breaks that Donald Trump signed into law at the behest of Charles Koch and his groups in the first term of President Trump. And again, similarly, in this second term of Donald Trump, the extension of those deeply unfair and destructive tax cuts for the richest few. Krugman: You kind of described what Citizens United is, but let’s talk more about that. Citizens United is the birth of super PACs, right? Graves: Yes. Krugman: And it’s basically saying that outside players — but it ends up being largely billionaires — can put lots of money with some basically tissue-thin restrictions on what they can do, but can basically put in unlimited amounts of money to influence political campaigns. Graves: That’s right. And so Citizens United was a decision that basically asserted that under the First Amendment, money is speech, and that outside groups that were not coordinating with the candidate — so-called independent expenditures — they could spend unlimited money, and they were not subject to the rules that the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, BiCRA, otherwise known as McCain-Feingold, sought to put in place to deal with this sort of what they were calling soft money — money that was outside the campaigns that was not required to be disclosed. So Citizens United and its progeny — a case called Speech Now vs. FEC — that’s what spawned these super PACs, where you have enormous money going into PACs, political action committees. That money can be million-dollar, even $10 million checks. For the super PACs that are operating in a particular way, they have to disclose their donors. But for the C-4 groups, which are these other nonprofits, they don’t have to disclose their donors. And so what it’s created is a situation in which, on the one hand, a billionaire can now give millions to a super PAC in a way that they could not give directly to the candidate. They couldn’t just write a check to the presidential candidate or congressional candidate. They can do it now in an unlimited amount through the super PACs. And then separately, they can give tens of millions of dollars — unlimited money — secretly to a C-4 group that runs so-called issue ads. Those are the ads that say vote for or against this person, or call them because you oppose their policy. But it’s really obviously about influencing the election, and that’s the dark money that’s being spent in our elections. Krugman: The Times found that 300 billionaires represented 19% of all campaign financing in the 2024 cycle. But I’m not sure how they know. Are the C-4s even in there? It may be more than that, right? Graves: It’s certainly more than that. And only under certain circumstances can you actually see some of the funding of a C-4, based on how it’s related — who’s funding it, if who’s funding it is known. So for example, if a foundation gives to a C-4, if it has the capacity through a trust or a foundation to give to a C-4, that sort of giving is required to be disclosed. But if an individual, a billionaire like Charles Koch, writes a check to the C-4, that is not disclosed. It’s only if it comes through a nonprofit entity that you can see just a glimpse of the sources of that funding. So whenever I talk to reporters who are doing those calculations about how much money is being spent by billionaires, I always tell them that their counts are going to be extraordinarily under the actual reality, because we know that these outside groups, these C-4 groups, are spending hundreds of millions of dollars cumulatively in the election cycle, and the only people who know who’s giving to them are the groups themselves. And probably some of the candidates know who’s giving to those C-4s. Krugman: Wow. So if we look at someone like Peter Thiel, who basically bought a Senate seat for JD Vance. I don’t actually know the number, but the numbers we see may actually be only the tip of the iceberg. Graves: That’s correct. There are a couple of rules in states and also at the federal level for certain types of independent expenditures, or if you have what’s known as a 527 group under the IRS code, that is allowed to spend directly in elections. But even then, what you see is a shell game. So for example, the Republican State Leadership Committee, RSLC, has created a subgroup to target state Supreme Court races. And it’s the sole funder of the subgroup. So when the subgroup discloses who funds it, it’s disclosing its parent organization. So it doesn’t disclose how much of that money is from Leonard Leo, or how much of that money is from Charles Koch or Koch Industries or the oil companies that goes into the bigger pool of funds. And so there are all these ways in which I believe that most of the money that’s being spent in our elections in America is not disclosed. It’s not disclosed under the campaign finance reports of the candidates, of the party, or the super PACs, because it’s the C-4 money that is most potent, because it’s the vehicle that allows them to hide the true funders — the biggest funders of these operations. Krugman: If we look at issues like energy and climate policy, there’s obviously huge amounts of fossil fuel money flowing into elections, but there’s also huge amounts of money going into supporting pseudo

    48 min
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