We are now recording an audio version of written posts that we will upload to Apple, Spotify, and YouTube, which you can listen to by clicking the button the play button above. As the Strait of Hormuz (SoH) Crisis completes its third month and on-again/off-again peace talks drag on, we are starting to see the outlines of various structural themes emerging, and, as importantly, some that are not. Thematically we see the following: * Power Surge! Our Power Surge! super-cycle theme has not only not been knocked off track by the SoH Crisis, but has likely been enhanced based on “the four Ds” of pragmatic energy policy orientation we discuss below. Recently completed 1Q 2026 earnings season shows the AI (artificial intelligence) and broader digital transformation theme is as strong as ever. * Geopolitical Super Vol. Geopolitical Super Vol remains our commodity macro framework, in particular for crude oil prices. Since Russia-Ukraine and through SoH-to-date, we have resisted crude oil super-cycle framings while also, importantly, rejecting perma bear doom-and-gloom. The unforgiving math of global oil demand being forced down to circa 95 million b/d of supply from around 105 million b/d pre-crisis suggests recession is the most likely clearing mechanism rather than a structural increase in long-dated oil prices in the event a significant disruption to flows persists. To be clear, we do see scope for a modest increase in long-end oil on the order of $10/bbl to account for both cost inflation and an increased geopolitical risk premium. * Molecules to markets. In our view, getting molecules to markets is the more pressing strategic imperative for countries than simply trying to find the molecules in the first place. In traditional energy, this puts a premium on well-positioned midstream and downstream assets. In the upstream business, there is always an opportunity to find acreage that is well positioned on the future cost curve. Having a midstream or downstream solution (e.g., LNG) may be an increasing success factor for larger E&P (exploration and production) companies. * New business models > pure-play (for larger companies). The era of extreme pure-play specialization we think will fade, or at least will no longer be the dominant ask of investors. Business model evolution is likely to continue to separate leaders from laggards. Examples we find intriguing include pressure pumpers and midstream companies diversifying into behind-the-meter (BTM) power, US shale gas producers expanding into midstream and potentially LNG, refiners that have grown midstream capabilities, midstream companies that have grown export opportunities, and the expanded commercial trading opportunities that larger companies have pursued. The list is growing. * Brownfield > greenfield (usually). The advantage of doing more from existing assets is something both countries and companies have in common. Brownfield almost always beats greenfield on profitability and speed-to-market, though a best-in-class greenfield project like Guyana oil is the type of exception that exists to the general rule. From an energy policy perspective, the Strait of Hormuz Crisis reveals what we are now calling the four Ds of country-level energy policy aspiration: * Do as much Domestic production as possible; * Diversify energy sources and technologies; * Do more from existing assets; and * embrace Digital transformation and AI. Subscribe to Super-Spiked to receive all content via email. Also available on https://veriten.com. The Four Ds of Pragmatic Energy Policy The four Ds are the pragmatic policy implication of country leaders recognizing energy’s natural hierarchy of needs (Exhibit 1). On the right side of Exhibit 1, we rank (higher on list is better) resource rich countries and resource challenged areas in terms of federal policy orientation that recognizes energy’s natural hierarchy of needs and implementation of the four Ds relative to a given country’s strengths and weaknesses. Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates among resource rich regions and China among resource challenged areas we see as having favorable federal energy policy orientations. Laggards are not surprising: Western Europe, California, Canada, and Australia. What KSA, UAE, and China have in common are national leadership that emphasizes the ideas of “all of the above,” maximum (or optimal) output of what you can control, and unapologetic “their own country first” mentalities. Super-Spiked subscribers know we have a very favorable view of Canada’s oil and gas potential and the leading companies in the province of Alberta. We had an unfavorable view of the federal energy policies pursued by the prior Trudeau regime, with the jury out on the current Carney administration. On the latter, we appreciate that the rhetoric has improved off a low starting point. The proof will be in the policy implementation pudding. No country should aspire to follow the path of California or Western Europe and their “climate first” ideology (dishonorable mention goes to many states in the US northeast). Sadly, poor energy policy choices made in those areas are going to mean that less fortunate consumers and businesses in developing Asia suffer from being outbid for needed energy like LNG, jet fuel, and diesel during times of stress, as we last saw in the early days of Russia-Ukraine. It has been some time since we have done a deep dive on Australia; our sense would be that it is in the Canada category of having substantial oil and gas resources that the world would massively benefit from, but is being held back by ill-advised climate-first ideology by its national leaders. Exhibit 1: A Hierarchy of Energy Needs & Country Policy Objectives and Orientation Source: Veriten. Doing More From Existing Assets In previous issues of Super-Spiked, we have discussed three of the Ds: do as much domestic production as possible, diversify energy sources and technology, and embrace digital transformation and AI. Therefore, in this post we will expand on the “do more from existing assets” theme. * A major advantage the developed world has over China, India, and other developing areas is a large installed base of assets and infrastructure. Prematurely retiring old power plants in the name of “energy transition” and “The Climate Crisis” is the type of 2020-2023 mistake that has hurt competitiveness and affordability in the United States and Western Europe. In power generation, we are intrigued with trying to answer the question of how much new generation from legacy sources (e.g., natural gas, BTM, and traditional nuclear) is needed versus how much new generation technology is needed (e.g., fuel cells, enhanced geothermal, advanced nuclear) versus how much can existing grid utilization be improved via flexible loads and various grid enhancing technologies. How much more can we get from existing is important to how much we need from the other two options. * In crude oil markets, we do not believe there is the urgency to figure out “what’s next” from a resource perspective as there was in the 2004-2014 super-cycle. To be clear, this comment is intended at the macro level; individual companies are almost always in need of figuring out what’s next. Exploration and capital spending is likely to grow but we do not believe the kind of re-rating that happened during China/BRICs is warranted now. Rather we are most intrigued with what companies are doing to extend asset life (i.e., resource to production ratio) via a combination of technology application, business development, and midstream/downstream investment that can ensure molecules get moved to markets and turned into usable end products. Ironically, the Middle East looks like a compelling upstream opportunity for western oil and gas firms, given improved fiscal terms in certain areas. We have long held a favorable view of Canada (our concerns about its federal energy policies notwithstanding) and Alaska. Recent developments in many Latin American countries warrant a fresh look at the region for western players. * The largest areas that seem ripe to “do more from existing” include US shale oil, US shale gas, Middle East oil, Canada’s oil sands, Venezuela oil, and developed market power grids. Growth and opportunity The five areas of energy where we are most confident in growth include: * US and global power generation * Midstream and downstream infrastructure for crude oil and various metals and minerals * Grid enhancing technologies * US and global natural gas * Renewables and storage The long-term opportunity to grow nuclear power is going to prove to be compelling for many countries, justifying the required patience in terms of time to development. Nuclear is the ultimate baseload, domestic, clean energy source. We remain open-minded about emerging and new energy technologies. We are seeing current growth in fuel cells and optimism about enhanced geothermal on the power generation side of the business. The SoH Crisis will accelerate adoption of electric vehicles and LNG trucks in particular in oil importing countries for diversification and affordability reasons. The success of new business models should diminish investor and activist demand for pure-plays There is a misperception that investors prefer pure-plays or that investors only want more dividends and stock buybacks. Investors prefer companies that generate superior profitability with differentiated growth. Both are needed to sustainably outperform: profitability AND growth. The challenge in mature, cyclical sectors is that corporate over-enthusiasm for growth usually erodes profitability to the point where investors demand a disavowal of growth in favor of profitability and returning capital to shareholders. To be sure, if structural demand growth for a given commodity is something like 1%-2% per year, the expected growth rates for the largest companies within that sector is
