Thoughts on the Market

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Short, thoughtful and regular takes on recent events in the markets from a variety of perspectives and voices within Morgan Stanley.

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U.S Consumer Spending Meets Caution

Our U.S. Thematic and Equity Strategist Michelle Weaver breaks down the results of a new survey on U.S. consumer spending and confidence. Read more insights from Morgan Stanley. ----- Transcript ----- Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I’m Michelle Weaver, Morgan Stanley’s U.S. Thematic and Equity Strategist. Today, we’re bringing you an update on the U.S. consumer as we try and understand the outlook for the economy. It’s Thursday, April 9, at 10 AM in New York. You’ve probably noticed shopping these days feels like a mixed bag. You spend money on your everyday staples like groceries, personal care or clothes. But you might be second-guessing those big ticket items like a new piece of furniture or a new TV. And you're not alone. Our newest AlphaWise survey of U.S. consumers reveals a pretty mixed signal. On the surface, things look solid. Consumers are still spending. We’ve seen that borne out in some of the recent economic data. And our survey work reveals around 34 percent expect to spend more next month, compared to just 15 percent who expect to spend less. That leaves us with a net spending outlook of +18 percent, which is actually above the long-term average. But when we start to dig in and look beneath the surface, the story shifts. Confidence is deteriorating. Nearly half of consumers expect the economy to get worse over the next six months, while only 32 percent expect an improvement. This results in a net outlook of -17 percent, a meaningful drop from what we saw last month. So how do we reconcile that? That spending with that deterioration in confidence. It’s really a balance of timelines. Consumers are spending today, but they’re increasingly worried about tomorrow. And these worries are grounded in very real concerns. Inflation remains the dominant issue, with 57 percent of consumers citing rising prices as a key concern – reversing what had been a fairly short-lived improvement on consumers' view on prices. At the same time, of course, with the tensions in the Middle East, geopolitical concerns are increasing quickly. They’ve jumped to 33 percent from 22 percent just last month. And concerns around the U.S. political environment remain elevated at 43 percent. When you combine all these pressures, it’s not surprising that consumers are becoming more cautious in how they plan to spend. We’re also seeing that caution show up in the mix of expenditures. In the near term, consumers are still increasing spending across most categories – especially the essentials like groceries, gasoline, and household items. But when we look over a longer horizon, the outlook becomes more selective. Discretionary categories are weakening. Apparel spending expectations have dropped to -16 percent, domestic travel to -11 percent, and international travel to -14 percent. That shift – from discretionary to essentials – is something we tend to see when consumers are bracing for a more uncertain environment. Now, one factor that’s supporting the near-term – a brighter spot here – is tax season. This year, 46 percent of consumers expect to receive a larger tax refund compared to last year. And what’s interesting about that is where people are going to put the money. About half of consumers plan to save at least a portion of the refund. About a third plan to pay down debt. And only around 30 percent intend to spend it on everyday purchases. So even when people receive a cash boost, the instinct isn’t to spend freely. It’s to shore up finances. Putting it all together, the picture of the U.S. consumer today is one of resilience but also rising caution. Spending is holding up in the near term, supported by income and tax refunds. But confidence is weakening, savings behavior is increasing, and discretionary demand is softening. These divergent trends are important. We’ll continue to watch them closely and bring you updates. Thanks for listening. If you enjoy the show, please leave us a review wherever you listen and share Thoughts on the Market with a friend or colleague today.

4 min
HACE 1 DÍA

U.S.-Iran Truce: What’s Next?

While a tentative ceasefire in the Middle East holds, the Strait of Hormuz continues to be a sticking point in diplomatic efforts. Our Deputy Global Head of Research Michael Zezas and Head of Public Policy Research Ariana Salvatore walk through some scenarios that could play out. Read more insights from Morgan Stanley. ----- Transcript ----- Michael Zezas: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Michael Zezas, Deputy Global Head of Research for Morgan Stanley. Ariana Salvatore: And I'm Ariana Salvatore, Head of Public Policy Research. Michael Zezas: Today we're discussing the U.S.-Iran ceasefire's key uncertainties, consequences and what we're watching for next. It's Wednesday, April 8th at 11am in New York. Okay. Let's start with the current situation. The U.S. and Iran have agreed to a provisional ceasefire, two weeks tied to follow on talks and the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz. Markets so far, treating this as a deescalation but not a clear resolution… Ariana Salvatore: That's right. And I think the key framing here is this is a pause, not a peace deal. And in the near term, I would not assume things are suddenly stable. We still have some key uncertainties around how the ceasefire deal is going to be implemented, as well as how negotiations will begin to take shape. Michael Zezas: Right. And that's important. It seems like Iran's reported 10-point plan for the ceasefire includes some elements that might be non-starters for the U.S., some things around sanctions and unfreezing of assets. And so, there's lots of ways that there could be some re-escalation in the near term. Ariana Salvatore: Okay. So that's the near term – fragile, noisy, and still pretty headline driven. But let's try to think about this a little bit further out. How are we thinking about the medium term? Michael Zezas: Yeah. So, thinking a little bit further out, it seems to us that ceasefire and Strait of Hormuz reopening should continue to progress because the incentives are widely shared across the key actors involved. So, the U.S.’s incentive to effectively be done with the conflict is pretty well understood. There's domestic political incentives and economic incentives. There's ways to potentially explain away some of the compromises the U.S. might have to make around the Strait of Hormuz, around sanctions. And maybe point to some incentives to work with partners in the region over time to diminish the importance of the Strait of Hormuz as a choke point. Iran's incentive is pretty clear – to preserve its regime. And another actor here, which appears to be increasingly important, is China, which has reportedly been involved in expressing its preference for deescalation. And that's pretty important because China has a lot of leverage on Iran given its economic relationship with the country. Ariana Salvatore: So, starting with these negotiations, it seems like, as you mentioned before, there's still a lot of gaps between what the U.S. side and what the Iranian side is asking for. But let's put that in the context of the ceasefire. Even if it were to hold – that doesn't necessarily translate to stability, right? Michael Zezas: Yeah, I think that's right. So, if Iran were to start rebuilding its military assets, in particular its nuclear program, at some point in the future, we'd probably come back to a similar point where Israel and the United States might find their ability to project that power to be intolerable. And what we don't know right now is if any type of deal is possible that can mitigate those very long-term concerns. So, even if commodities start flowing through the Strait of Hormuz at a rate that is similar to what it was before the conflict started, it seems like there will be this overhang. Of concern that that could shut down at any moment's notice, if the U.S. and Israel and other actors in the area become concerned again with Iran's power. Ariana Salvatore: So, that overhang you're talking about actually does have some real economic impacts. One way to frame this is kind of like a lingering tax on the global system. We see that through the oil market, right? So, we think of this as a structural risk premium on oil. Our strategist, Martijn Rats, thinks that even in a deescalation scenario, you're not getting back to that world of $65-$70 oil. This Strait of Hormuz will continue to be a critical choke point that doesn't necessarily go away overnight. And maybe over time you could see some mitigation, construction of new pipelines, alternative routes, et cetera. But in the interim, that risk premium feeds through to energy prices, shipping costs, and ultimately food and broader supply chains, which is something that Chetan Ahya has been flagging in Asia for quite some time. Michael Zezas: I think that's right. And so, in highlighting that the Strait of Hormuz is a critical choke point for the global economy and for supply chains generally, it's a reminder of a problem that's been on display for the last 10 years. Just that there are supply chain choke points all over the place when you start thinking about the security needs of the U.S. and other actors throughout the globe. And so, it underscores this dynamic where multinationals are going to have to rethink – and are already starting to rethink – their supply chains. And whether or not they need to build in what our investment bankers have been calling an anti-fragile supply chain strategy. So, we can't just solve for the cheapest cost of goods and cheapest transit. You have to wire up your supply chains in a way that can survive geopolitical conflicts. And while there's some extra embedded costs that comes along with that, well, they're more reliable, so it's more efficient over the long run. Of course, it costs a lot of money to rewire your supply chains, and so that's tied into this opportunity around capital expenditures going into proving this out. And so, investors should be aware that there are plenty of sectors which will have to participate in effectively being part of rebuilding those supply chains. Ariana Salvatore: Yeah, so the way we're framing this is, this is another data point kind of in that trend toward a multipolar world. We've seen certain geopolitical events accelerate that transition. Russia-Ukraine, for example, the pandemic; and this is just sort of another example in that same direction. And some of the sectors that we think are structural beneficiaries here: obviously defense, in particular in Europe, and industrials here in the U.S. Chris Snyder's been doing a lot of work on reshoring, how we're seeing that pick up – and we think that probably continues. But as we're speaking about the U.S. and what this could mean, let's bring this back to the AI angle. Because I think that's where this all really connects in maybe a less obvious way. Near term, we're thinking about the financing implications here as pretty modest. Unless we get a major re-escalation or a rupture of the ceasefire, it shouldn't really change capital availability in a meaningful way. But this could affect where capacity gets built. Michael Zezas: Yeah, that's right. And over the past year, there's been a lot of news about the U.S. engaging in the Middle East with partners to build AI capacity via data center capacity – because there's also plenty of energy in the area to fuel those data centers. But those data centers as an infrastructure asset, and an economically valuable one at that, potentially become military targets when they're built. So, there is a consideration here after this conflict about whether or not those things can be built or be relied upon. And it is a critical part of the U.S.' strategy to build compute capacity in the aggregate with allies. And increasingly they've been looking to the Middle East as allies in an AI build out. Ariana Salvatore: So, if that becomes more challenging and you see persistent instability, for example, in the Middle East, you're probably going to see more demand push toward domestic U.S. data centers. And something that we've been highlighting has been not only the kind of pressures on the capital side. But also, you know, the bottlenecks that are very real – like power, permitting, labor, equipment and political resistance, which we've talked about on this podcast as well. We're seeing a lot of constraints. So, it's not really feasible that the U.S. is going to be able to fully substitute that Middle East capacity. Michael Zezas: So, I think the read through here is that the U.S. is still on track to build the compute capacity that it needs. The CapEx that's going into that – that is helping the U.S. economy grow this year – is still very much intact. It raises some potential future questions about how quickly the U.S. can build out, but it's unclear if that matters in the near term to (a) both the build out and (b) the productivity that can come from the current build out. Ariana Salvatore: And I think a really important consequence of what you're describing has to do with the U.S. China dynamics. So, if the U.S. is, for example, seen as a less reliable security guarantor, then you may see some of the Gulf countries potentially deepen their economic alignment with China at the margin. And that's something that could be really relevant for the upcoming U.S.-China Summit next month. Remember that was postponed from – initially it was towards the end of March. Now it seems to be around the middle of May. So, that's a really important catalyst that we're keeping an eye on for now. That's a little bit further out. Near term, of course, we'll be watching things like military buildup in the region. Any indications on how exactly the Strait of Hormuz will be managed from here. And how these negotiations progress over the next two weeks. As far as the equity market is concerned, it appears that the worst of this risk is behind us from a

10 min
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The Real Risks of Oil Price Spikes

A supply-driven oil shock may start with inflation, but Morgan Stanley’s Senior Global Economist Rajeev Sibal discusses why investors need to understand the second-order hit to growth, policy and markets. Read more insights from Morgan Stanley. ----- Transcript ----- Rajeev Sibal: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Rajeev Sibal, Senior Global Economist at Morgan Stanley. Today, economic risk from an oil shock isn't the price of oil itself – but really what happens next? It's Tuesday, April 7th at 3pm in Dubai. An oil shock doesn't stop at the gas pump. It ripples through inflation, growth, central bank policy, and ultimately markets. As you've heard from my colleagues over the past several weeks, this time may be different. We're not just dealing with a temporary price spike. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz is historically unprecedented. We're well over a month now, and we're looking at the implication of a supply shock that could last many quarters. This could evolve into something far more complex. This is a tricky mix of rising inflation and slowing growth, and the sequence matters greatly. At Morgan Stanley, a collaboration between the economists and the strategists globally looked at a wide range of scenarios of where oil prices may go. If the Strait of Hormuz were to reopen rapidly, we would see oil prices probably decline rather quickly. That doesn't mean that the problems from the oil shock are going to go away very quickly. But it does mean that the price of oil may move down more quickly. Conversely, if we see a complete closure and an escalation in the conflict, the oil price is probably going to go much, much higher. And in a world where oil moves past $125, which is usually the level at which demand starts to destruct in the economy, i.e. people have to reduce their consumption of oil because of the price, we would see a much more dramatic impact in the global economy. Right now, we're in the in-between scenario. We see oil hovering between $100 and $125 for a number of weeks now, and this creates a lot of questions and confusions and modeling problems for many central banks. I want to go through some of the key regions of the world to talk about how they are reacting to what is happening right now. Asia is a little bit unusual. Asia is the most exposed to what's happening in the Middle East. Most oil and gas that leaves the Middle East goes to Asia in terms of physical volumes. The challenge is that many Asian economies have huge buffers in place or reserves. They also use fiscal policy to help subsidize and smooth the price of oil so that the consumer does not experience the shocks as dramatically as they would otherwise. As a result, there is a mix of countries in Asia that are grappling with figuring out how much support they should continue to provide but also making sure they have physical volumes in place because of the closure. This creates a rather mixed effect from central bank policy and a mixed effect from inflation and growth. In some economies, you're seeing prices move very rapidly and growth being affected very rapidly, whereas in other economies it's been delayed. We expect this mix to continue for the next few quarters. The euro area is a contrast to Asia because in the euro area inflation passes through very quickly. Historically, inflation reacts not only at the headline level, but also at core. As a result of this, the ECB has indicated that they are likely to raise interest rates in the near future because they don't want inflation expectations to become unanchored. They're more concerned about the speed of inflation than the growth risk right now. This is a big contrast to the Federal Reserve. In the United States, actually, oil supply shocks do not move core inflation as much as they do in many other regions of the world. The effect is on headline inflation and on consumption, but not necessarily on core inflation. We have to remember; the U.S. is primarily a services-based economy. As a result, the Fed is more likely to look through the effects of the supply shock and be focused on growth simply because the core inflation pass through is far less than it is in many other economies. As a result, the Fed is thinking more about the growth risks from higher prices of the pump than they are about the price risks – and what that transmission means to inflation in the United States. This is a big contrast to many other regions in the world, but I think the important thing to remember is that in every economy, in every region, there's a different reaction. Inflation will always lead in terms of oil supply shocks with growth following. But the way that that passes through in each domestic economy is very different. And that means that central banks have to react differently. It also means that potentially, if this lasts for a couple more quarters, fiscal policy will also react differently. The challenge for market participants, economists, and strategists will be figuring out the exact scale of disruption from the oil shock. For now, we know that we're talking about quarters and not months. And that in and of itself means that we expect growth downside risks to outweigh inflation upside risks. Thanks for listening. If you enjoy Thoughts on the Market, please leave us a review wherever you listen; and share the podcast with a friend or colleague today.

5 min
HACE 3 DÍAS

Riding the Final Innings of the Market Correction

Our CIO and Chief U.S. Equity Strategist Mike Wilson talks about risks in this late stage of the equity market pullback, how investors should position and what could come next. Read more insights from Morgan Stanley. ----- Transcript ----- Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Mike Wilson, Morgan Stanley’s CIO and Chief U.S. Equity Strategist. Today on the podcast I’ll be discussing what investors should be doing as we enter the final innings of this equity market correction. It's Monday, April 6th at 11:30 am in New York. So, let’s get after it. For the past several months, my view has been very consistent. In short, I continue to believe we’re in a bull market that began last April, coming out of what I’ve described as a rolling recession between 2022 and 2025. That recovery remains intact despite recent threats from AI disruption, private credit and a new war in Iran while the war between Russia and Ukraine persists. Markets have not been complacent with stocks correcting since last fall. In fact, it’s well advanced with the S&P 500’s forward price earnings multiple declining by 18 percent, a rare move outside of a recession or a Fed tightening cycle – neither of which is likely in my view. Meanwhile, earnings growth isn’t rolling over. Instead, it’s accelerating to multi-year highs and that’s a key difference versus past periods when oil shocks led to a recession. And, in the absence of that outcome, I see a market that’s discounted a lot of bad news. Beneath the surface, the damage has been even more significant with over half of stocks down at least 20 percent from their highs, and many down 30-40 percent. Resets of this scale usually occur near the end of corrections, not the beginning. The S&P 500 bounced last week off the 6300 to 6500 range of support that I have been highlighting. Could we re-test those levels? Sure – especially if rates push higher or geopolitical risks escalate further. However, I don’t see a meaningful breakdown. If anything, what’s still missing – and what I’d actually like to see – is a bit more de-risking in crowded trades like semiconductors and memory stocks, in particular. That kind of repositioning reset is often required to seal a durable bottom. So, if we are in the later innings, the next question is: where do you want to be? For me, it’s about balance and I think the right approach is a barbell of cyclicals, and quality growth. On the cyclical side, I like Financials, Consumer Discretionary, and Industrials. These are the areas where earnings momentum remains strong and valuations have come down meaningfully. It’s also what was leading prior to the start of the Iran conflict and reflects our core view that we are still in the early stages of a recovery from the rolling recession. Last week’s jobs report supports that view with private payrolls increasing by [$]186 000, one of the largest rises in three years. On the growth side, I’m focused on the hyperscalers as a very good risk reward at this point. These companies are trading at roughly the same multiple as defensive sectors like Staples, but with more than three times the earnings growth. Meanwhile the sentiment and positioning is as bad as it’s been since 2022’s bear market when these companies were showing negative earnings growth. So, what could go wrong? The main risk to equities is still rates and central bank policy, not the war. We know this because we just flipped back into a regime where stocks and yields are negatively correlated where higher rates put pressure on valuations. 4.5 percent on a 10-year Treasury bond continues to be a key threshold where stock valuations are likely to get worse before they rebound durably. Furthermore, bond volatility and Fed expectations are driving tighter financial conditions—and that’s been the real source of market stress lately. But here’s the irony: that tightening is also what ultimately sets up a more dovish pivot from the Fed and other central banks. If financial conditions tighten too much, the Fed has the flexibility to respond—and we have plenty of evidence that there’s willingness to do that over the past several years. Bottom line? The market has already done a lot of the hard work. It has priced in geopolitical risk, private credit concerns and even negative side effects from AI, which is ultimately a productivity enhancing technology. What we’re dealing with now is the final hurdle – policy, rates levels and volatility. And once we get through that, I think the path forward becomes a lot clearer. But remember, markets don’t wait for certainty – they move ahead of it. You should, too. Thanks for tuning in; I hope you found it informative and useful. Let us know what you think by leaving us a review. And if you find Thoughts on the Market worthwhile, tell a friend or colleague to try it out!

5 min
2 ABR

How the Oil Shock Is Reshaping Markets

Our Chief Cross-Asset Strategist Serena Tang discusses why the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and its impact on oil prices could define the entire market cycle. Read more insights from Morgan Stanley. ----- Transcript ----- Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I’m Serena Tang, Morgan Stanley’s Chief Cross-Asset Strategist. Today: how the latest energy shock is rippling across every major asset class. It’s Thursday, April 2nd, at 10am in New York. Right now, the markets aren’t just reacting to oil – they’re being shaped by it. The path of energy prices is quickly becoming the lens through which investors interpret everything else: growth, inflation, policy, and ultimately risk appetite. And depending on where oil settles, the market story could look very different from here. The starting point is simple: the baseline for energy prices has shifted higher. If tensions ease, our Chief Commodities Strategist, Martijn Rats, expects oil to settle around $80 to $90 per barrel in 2026, quite a step up from what we saw in 2025. If constraints persist, that rises to $100 to $110 per barrel. And in a more extreme scenario – where supply disruptions intensify – oil can reach $150 to $180 per barrel. Now, at those higher levels, the impact becomes nonlinear. Oil stops being just an inflation story and starts weighing directly on demand and growth. That’s why we see the current environment as binary: markets either revert to their pre-shock trajectory, or they begin pricing in a much tougher mix of tighter policy and weaker growth. To make sense of this, we frame the outlook through three scenarios. In a de-escalation scenario, supply disruptions ease quickly and oil stabilizes in that $80 to $90 per barrel range. Markets effectively breathe a sigh of relief. Investors refocus on growth drivers like earnings resilience and AI investment. And equities outperform, particularly cyclical sectors like consumer discretionary, financials, and industrials, while defensives lag. Bond yields fall, as inflation expectations decline. All in all, in plain terms, this is a classic risk-on environment. The second scenario – ongoing constraints – is a little bit more complicated. Oil stays elevated around $100 to $110 per barrel. Markets can absorb that, we think, but it creates friction. Equities still perform, but with more volatility and less conviction. The S&P [500] is likely to move within a wide 6400 and 6850 range in the near term. Leadership shifts toward higher-quality companies – those with steadier earnings and stronger balance sheets – along with select defensives like healthcare. At the same time, credit markets start to really feel the strain with spreads widening in general under performance. The third scenario – effective closure – is where the backdrop really changes. With oil above $150 per barrel, the focus shifts from inflation to growth risk. Investors will move into what we call a ‘recession playbook,’ dialing back equity exposure and increasing allocations to government bonds and cash. Defensive sectors like utilities, telecoms, and energy take the lead, as markets begin to price in a higher risk to the earnings cycle. Credit conditions tighten sharply, with high-yield spreads potentially widening materially. What makes this environment especially challenging is how everything connects. In a typical cycle, bonds help offset equity losses. But in an oil shock, that relationship can break down because inflation is rising at the same time growth is slowing. That’s what we usually call a stagflationary setup, and it makes diversification harder just when investors need it most. Currencies are reacting as well. In a more severe shock, the U.S. dollar strengthens, with EUR/USD potentially falling toward 1.13, while safe-haven currencies like the Swiss franc outperform. In a de-escalation scenario, EUR/USD could move back above 1.17 as risk sentiment improves. Importantly, markets have adjusted over the past month. Equity valuations at one point was down about 15 percent on a forward price-to-earnings basis, suggesting in a large part of the risk was being priced in. At the same time, sentiment has improved from deeply negative levels, especially over the last few days, even as volatility remains closely tied to oil. Thanks for listening. If you enjoy the show, please leave us a review wherever you listen and share Thoughts on the Market with a friend or colleague today.

5 min
1 ABR

Oil Markets Ahead: Pricing In More Risk

As the Strait of Hormuz continues to be a chokepoint for oil, our Global Head of Fixed Income Research Andrew Sheets and our Head of Commodity Research Martijn Rats discuss possible outcomes for the interconnected market. Read more insights from Morgan Stanley. ----- Transcript ----- Andrew Sheets: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Andrew Sheets, Global Head of Fixed Income Research at Morgan Stanley. Martijn Rats: I'm Martijn Rats, Head of Commodity Research at Morgan Stanley. Andrew Sheets: And today in the program: Oil flows through the Strait of Hormuz remain restricted. The implications for global energy markets and what may lie ahead. It's Wednesday, April 1st at 2pm in London. So, Martijn, it's great to sit down with you again. Three weeks ago, we were having this conversation; a conversation that was a little bit alarming about the scale of the disruption of the oil market with the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, and how that could have ripple effects through the global economy. Three weeks later, oil is still not flowing. What is happening? And what has maybe surprised you? Or been in line with expectations over the last couple of weeks? Martijn Rats: Yeah. Many things have been in line with expectations, in the sense that we're seeing the effects of the closure of the strait the earliest in regions that are physically the closest to the strait. So, we saw the first examples of physical shortages in, say, the west coast of India. Then we saw examples from the east coast of India From there on it's reverberated throughout Asia, where now governments have announced a whole host of. Effectively, energy demand, uh, management measures, uh, work from home, kids staying at home from school, um, cancellation of flights. There are quite many through, through Asia Also in Asia, we're seeing the type of prices that you would expect with this situation. Bunker fuel for shipping, somewhere between $150 to $200 a barrel. Jet fuel over $200 a barrel. Naphta going into Japan; naphta normally trades well below the headline price of Brent. Now $130 a barrel, that's more than double what it was in February. So, those things tell the story of this historic event. What has been surprising on the other end is how slow the reaction has been in many of the oil prices that we track the most. Like… Andrew Sheets: The numbers people will see on the news. You know, it's $100 a barrel maybe as we're talking. Martijn Rats: Yeah. It's strange to see jet fuel cargoes in Rotterdam more than $200 a barrel, but then the front month Brent future only trading at [$]100. That spread is historically wide and very surprising. But look, there are some reasons for it. The crude market had more buffers. There are a few other things. But how slow Brent futures have rallied? That has been somewhat surprising. Andrew Sheets: But you know, from those other prices you mentioned, those prices in Asia, those prices in Rotterdam that are maybe higher than the numbers that people might see on the news or on a financial website. Is it fair to say that in your mind that's sending a signal that this is a market that really is being affected by this? And being affected maybe in a larger way than the headline oil price might suggest? Martijn Rats: Oh, clearly. Look, the oil market is full with small price signals that tell the story of the underlying plumbing of the oil market. So, you can look at price differential. So, physically delivered cargoes versus financially traded futures. West African oil versus North Sea oil. Brazilian oil versus North Sea oil. Oil for immediate physical delivery versus the futures contract that trades a month out. And many of those spreads have rallied to all time highs. That is no exaggeration. And so, in an underlying sense, the stress in the market is clearly there. It is just that in front of Brent futures, which is the world's preferred speculative instrument to express a financial view on oil. Yeah, there the impact has been slower to come. But you're now seeing a lot of Asian refineries bidding for crudes that are further away in the Atlantic basin. So, demand is spreading to further away regions. And that should over time still put upward pressure on Brent. Andrew Sheets: In our first conversation, you know, you had this great walkthrough of both just putting the scale of this disruption in the Strait of Hormuz into the global context. How many barrels we're talking about, how that's a share of the global market. Maybe just might be helpful to revisit those numbers again. And also, some of the mitigation factors. You know, we talked about – well maybe we could release reserves, maybe some pipelines could be rerouted. Based on what you're currently seeing on the ground, what is this disruption looking like? Martijn Rats: Yeah, so to put things in context, global oil consumption is a bit more than 100 million barrels a day. That number lives in a lot of people's heads. But if you look at the market that is critical for price formation, that's really the seaborne market. You can imagine that if, say you're in China, and you have a shortage. But there is a pipeline from Canada into the United States – that pipeline's not really going to help you. What you need is a cargo that can be delivered to a port in Shanghai. So, the seaborne market is where prices are formed. That is roughly a 60 million barrel a day market, of which 20 million barrels a day flows through the Strait of Hormuz. So, for the relative market, the Strait of Hormuz is about a third. It's very, very large. Now, out of that 20 million barrel a day that is, in principle, in scope, there is still a little bit of Iranian oil flowing through. That continues. They let their own cargo through. Then Saudi Arabia has the East-West pipeline. They can divert some oil from the Persian Gulf to the Red Sea. That's about 4 million barrels a day, incremental on top of the flow that already exist on that pipeline. The UAE has a pipeline that can divert half a million barrel a day. But you are still left with a problem that is in the order of 14-ish million barrels a day. You're going to have some SPR releases to offset that a little bit. But global SPRs can flow maybe 1 to 2 million barrels a day. You're very quickly left with a double digit shortage – and that is historically large… Andrew Sheets: And just to take it to history, I mean, again, if we were placing a 14 million barrel a day disruption in the context of some of these historical oil disruptions that people might have a memory of – what is the relative scale? Martijn Rats: Yeah. This is at the heart of why this is such a difficult period to manage. Like, normally we care about imbalances of 0.5 to 1 million. That gets interesting for oil analysts. At a million, you can expect prices to move. If you have dislocations in supply and amount of, say, 2 to 3 million barrels a day, you have historically epic moves that we talk about for decades, literally. Like in 2008, oil fell from $130 a barrel to [$]30 on the basis of two to three quarters of 2 million barrel a day oversupply. In 2022, around the Ukraine invasion, oil went from 60-70 bucks to something like [$]130 at the peak on the basis of the expectation, but not realized. This was just an expectation that Russia would lose 3 million barrels a day of productive capacity. And so, 2 to 3 million barrels a day normally already gets us to these outsized moves. And so, this event is four, five times larger than that. That means we don't have historical reference for what's currently happening. Andrew Sheets: I guess I'd like to now focus on the future and maybe I'll ask you to summarize two highly complex scenarios in a[n] overly simplified way. But let's say tonight we get an announcement that hostilities have ceased, that the strait is open, that oil can flow again. Or a second scenario where it's another three weeks from now, we're having this conversation again, and the strait is still closed. Could you just kind of help listeners understand what the energy market could look like under each of those scenarios? Martijn Rats: Yeah. So maybe to start off with the latter one. Because from an analytical perspective, that one is perhaps a bit easier. Look, if the Strait stays closed, at some point, consumption needs to decline. Andrew Sheets: Significantly. Martijn Rats: Yeah, significantly. We need demand destruction. Now that's easier said than done. Who gets to consume in those type of environments – are those who are willing to pay the most. And that means that certain consumers need to be priced out of the market. We tried to answer this question in 2022, and the collective answer that we all came up with is that you need prices for Brent – in money of the day – $150 or something thereabouts. That is not an exaggeration. Now, let's all hope we can avoid that scenario because that is… You know, that looks like a spectacular price. But that is not a beneficial scenario for anybody in the economy. The other scenario is more interesting, and it can actually be split in sort of two sub scenarios… Andrew Sheets: And this is the scenario where actually stuff starts flowing tomorrow. Martijn Rats: Exactly, exactly. If it completely flows like it always did – sure, we go back to the situation we had before these events. Brent can fall substantially – 70 bucks. Before these events we thought the oil market would be oversupplied. Who knows? True freedom of navigation may be even lower. But, at the moment, that doesn't quite look like that will be the scenario that's in front of us. What seems to be emerging is an outcome whereby this could deescalate but leave the Iranian regime structurally in control of the flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz. And if the Iranian regime continues to manage the flow as they currently do – cargo by cargo. Because th

13 min
31 MAR

A New Test for Private Credit

Our Chief Fixed Income Strategist Vishy Tirupattur and Morgan Stanley Investment Management’s Global Head of Private Credit & Equity David Miller discuss the recent pressure on the private credit market, potential risks and opportunities that remain in that space. Read more insights from Morgan Stanley. ----- Transcript ----- Vishy Tirupattur: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Vishy Tirupattur, Morgan Stanley's Chief Fixed Income Strategist. David Miller: And I'm David Miller, Global Head of Private Credit and Equity within Morgan Stanley Investment Management. Vishy Tirupattur: Today – the evolving risks and opportunities in private credit. It's Tuesday, March 31st at 10 am In New York. Until recently, private credit was among the fast-growing parts of the financial system. In just over a decade, it went from a niche strategy to a market that's well worth over a trillion dollars. After years of outsized inflows and unusually smooth return, private credit is now in focus, and investors are asking tough questions about liquidity, transparency, and valuation. David, you manage private credit and equity portfolios within Morgan Stanley Investment Management. Do you think the industry is facing its first real stress test? And how do you think the industry is faring? David Miller: So, I think private credit has been tested before, you could go back to the GFC. And I know that was a long time ago and the industry was quite a bit smaller. But you could certainly look to the pandemic and the rate shocks of [20]22 - [20]23 as a stress test. And I think private credit performed, you know, quite well through that, despite the initial volatility. We saw some of that recently last year with Liberation Day; and the current environment from a fundamental perspective doesn't feel as bad as those times, and the industry does not feel under that stress. I think the current situation is more of a test of the non-traded BDC structure where roughly 20 percent of direct lending assets sit. And the liquidity provisions in those vehicles are designed to provide some liquidity, but not total liquidity. And so, while I think the vehicles are working as intended, obviously there's been a lot of noise. Vishy Tirupattur: So, I totally agree with you, David. The liquidity provisions that are in these structures are there for a reason; are designed to be that. It’s part of the feature and not a bug, precisely to prevent a fire sale of assets. And that really would hurt the overall system. So, we think that there’s a greater understanding of this is very much required. David Miller: I think that's right. The limitations on liquidity are there so that the vehicles can operate properly over the long run. When you have illiquid assets, you maintain some liquidity. But clearly those protections are in place so that the vehicle continue to run in ordinary fashion. I think there is a bit of a disconnect, you know, in the media between the sentiment and the fundamentals that are underlying private credit. And yeah, there are concerns about software, and macro, and unseen future risks. But right now, private credit portfolios are performing pretty well. And actually, if you look at 2025 versus [20]24, the metrics were actually improving… Vishy Tirupattur: Absolutely. I mean, we look at across various metrics, you know, in leverage and coverage metrics, we see overall trends are actually improving. Software [is] very much in focus. Fitch reported, yesterday that, uh, in the last, uh, you know, year to date there have been no software defaults. Another point I would make is there are about 5 percent defaults in – generally speaking – in the private credit space. And the default rates within the software sector is a little bit less than half of that. So, that's an important distinction to make. David Miller: Yeah, I think software is a very interesting and long topic. But generally, our view is: we think that AI is going to be a net tailwind overall for software over time. You know, even factoring in some of the erosion to the SaaS business models, I think well positioned incumbents will get their share of the upside. And so there will be some losers. We think that'll be pretty narrow. But overall, we feel very good about our software book. We've been looking at AI risk for at least three years, when we made loans. And we think that a lot of the embedded enterprise software platforms are going to be net beneficiaries of AI. Vishy Tirupattur: I have slightly different take on the software exposure and all the discussion points on this. The way I think about it is the market assumption is that AI disruption is necessarily going to disrupt all of software companies. And that disruption is imminent. I would push back on both of those points. You know, you could easily imagine that AI will lead to some disruption at some point in the future. But a necessary thing for that to happen is a significant amount of CapEx related to infrastructure to enable AI from innovation to adoption that needs to take place. That will take some time. So, this potential disruption is not imminent. It's potentially coming in the future. But all in, disruption is also not going to be negative. You know, we will have some companies whose business models, who don't have the moats and may not be able to benefit. But on the other hand, as you point out, there will be a number of business models which will actually flourish because of AI adoption and see their margins expand. So, I think I would push back on this notion that's prevalent in the media narrative here. That all AI disruption is imminent and it is all bad. David Miller: I think that's a very good point, and we do believe that there will be dispersion and outcome in private credit portfolios because of some of those facts. And it's really important for managers to have deep experience, not just in software, but any industries that they participate in. And really do very strong credit selection. Vishy Tirupattur: So, another thing that's happening in the private credit space is really the advent of the retail investor into the private credit. What do you think the advent of retail investors had done to the portfolio selection, portfolio construction and credit selection in your portfolios? David Miller: So, for us, we haven't changed our portfolio construction or credit selection process for retail portfolios. They're virtually the same as our institutional portfolios. And that's, you know, based on a lot of diversification, limiting borrower concentration, avoiding cyclicals, et cetera. The one difference that's important for our non-traded BDC is we do have about 10 percent of the portfolio in broadly syndicated loans, to add a little bit more liquidity to the portfolio. But otherwise, they're pretty much the same. I think the biggest impact that we've witnessed over the past few years, where there's been a large inflow of retail capital, has been to push spreads tighter. And weaken some of the terms than they would've otherwise been. There was a lot of capital that needed to be deployed quickly, so we saw that and we're quite cautious. You're seeing that trend reverse now as flows have moderated, and we expect that those trends will result in better pricing and better terms going forward. So, Vishy, how are you thinking about risk in the system now? Are you seeing signs of systemic risk? Or is the pressure more isolated? Vishy Tirupattur: I think the pressure is really more isolated, more focused on the software sector. As we just discussed, it will take time to figure out the winners and losers coming out of this. But that process is really; we think will result in some pickup in default rates. But we think it'll be very concentrated within the software sector. So, when I look back at the systemic risks, the echoes of the financial crisis of 2008 come back, you know. We both have gone through that in different roles, you know. I used to be tall and good looking is before the financial crisis. So, the scars of financial crisis are clearly on upon me now. But I compare these two time periods – and I say in any metric, the risks in the system today are nowhere comparable to the kind of systemic risk that existed back then. You look at the risks, the leverage at the company level. You look at the leverage; the vehicles where credit risk is sitting. Look at the risks and the leverage within the banking system. And the links of the non-banks to banks. All of them put together make us think that the systemic risks are very, very contained. And any allusion to that ‘We are back in 2008,’ I would very strongly push back against that illusion. So, David, let me ask you one final question here. If we had to highlight one risk or one opportunity in private credit for investors over the next year, what would it be? David Miller: I think the headlines have covered most of the risks, so I'll go with an opportunity. So, we believe spreads on private credit loans have widened quite a bit for direct lending. Both for non-software and software names. So, for investors looking to deploy new capital or investors who are underweight their target allocations, we think it's an interesting time. But we believe there's also a really nice opportunity in opportunistic or hybrid private credit. And that's coming from borrowers who need more flexible solutions, and that can come from M&A activity, non-dilutive growth capital. Or balance sheet rationalizations where one can inject junior capital to good businesses that have over-levered balance sheets. And you can get paid well for the flexibility and the optionality that's providing equity holders. There's been far less capital raised for these types of opportunities over the last few years, and they're pretty favorable dynamics going forward as demand increases. Vishy Tirupattur: That's

9 min
30 MAR

A Bull Market May Be Closer Than It Looks

The stock market has already discounted many disruptions, including geopolitics, oil and AI. Our CIO and Chief U.S. Equity Strategist Mike Wilson explains why investors are now focused on one thing: whether monetary policy stays too tight for too long. Read more insights from Morgan Stanley. ----- Transcript ----- Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Mike Wilson, Morgan Stanley’s CIO and Chief U.S. Equity Strategist. Today on the podcast I’ll be discussing why the balance between the upside and the downside is actually better than at the start of the year. It's Monday, March 30th at 11:30 am in New York. So, let’s get after it. Everyone I’ve been speaking with lately is focused on the same things: the conflict in Iran, oil prices, and of course, AI—whether it’s CapEx, disruption of labor markets, and efficiency. When I look at how markets are trading, I come away with a different conclusion than the consensus. First, the U.S. equity market is far less complacent about growth risks than people think. Consider this: more than half of the Russell 3000 stocks are down at least 20 percent from their highs, while the S&P 500’s Price/Earnings multiple is down 17 percent. That’s not complacency. That’s a well advanced correction consistent with prior growth scares, if not an outright recession. Second, let’s talk about oil, everyone’s top concern. Historically, oil spikes have often ended business cycles. However, recessions only occurred when earnings growth was decelerating or outright negative. Today, it’s accelerating and running close to 14 percent while forward earnings growth is north of 20 percent. Meanwhile, the magnitude of the oil move, on a year-over-year basis, is only about half of what we saw in the recession outcomes. In other words, the market isn’t pricing in a recession because the odds of that happening appear low. Instead, we believe it’s pricing in continued uncertainty about oil and other key resources until there is ultimately a resolution where tanker flows resume and prices stabilize or come back down. From my observations, I think interest rates are weighing more heavily on U.S. stocks rather than oil. Specifically, the correlation between equities and yields has flipped deeply negative. Stocks are extremely sensitive to moves in higher yields—more so than they’ve been in years. This is mainly due to the recent hawkish pivot by the Fed and other central banks. As a result, we’re also approaching the 4.5 percent level on 10-year Treasury yields, a point where we typically observe further equity valuation compression. Finally, bond volatility is also rising, and equity valuations are always sensitive to that. The good news is that the Fed is more sensitive to bond than stock volatility and any further rise could likely lead to a Fed pivot back to a more dovish stance. In short, the tightening in financial conditions driven by rates and bond volatility is the bigger near-term risk, not the geopolitical backdrop. Ironically, it’s also what could provide relief. At the end of the day, I still think we’re getting closer to the end of this correction; and when I look at the next 6 to 12 months, the risk-reward looks better today than it did at the start of the year. On the positioning side, I’m also seeing some interesting shifts. Defensive stocks and Gold had a strong run from early January right up until tensions in the Middle East began at the end of February. But they have underperformed significantly since. Meanwhile, some of the better-performing sectors recently have been the more cyclical ones. That tells me the market got ahead of these concerns and may be ready to look past it, sooner than most investors. As for AI, there’s still a lot of focus on disruption, but I think the near-term story is more about efficiency and margin expansion. We’re not seeing a demand shock that would trigger a traditional labor cycle. Instead, we’re seeing companies use AI to right-size costs and improve productivity. Bottom line, the market has already done a lot of the heavy lifting of this correction by discounting the war, higher oil prices, AI, and credit risks. What it’s wrestling with now is the risk of a monetary policy mistake with central banks staying too tight for too long. If that hawkish bent starts to ease, which it probably will if bond volatility rises much further, the resumption of the bull market is likely to arrive faster than most expect. Thanks for tuning in; I hope you found it informative and useful. Let us know what you think by leaving us a review. And if you find Thoughts on the Market worthwhile, tell a friend or colleague to try it out!

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Welcome to Thoughts on the Market

A quick preview of what you'll hear on the Thoughts On The Market podcast, which features short, thoughtful and regular takes on recent events in the markets from a variety of perspectives and voices within Morgan Stanley.

20/12/2021

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1 min