Ideas Untrapped

Tobi Lawson

a podcast about ideas on growth, progress, and prosperity www.ideasuntrapped.com

  1. Big Ideas with Robin Hanson

    11/06/2025

    Big Ideas with Robin Hanson

    Welcome to Ideas Untrapped podcast. In this episode, I talk with economist Robin Hanson. This episode is about an everyday exploration of some of Robin's biggest ideas. We discussed the hidden motives behind our everyday behaviours and how they shape institutions like education, healthcare, and government. We explore his ideas on signalling, innovation incentives, and alternative governance models like futarchy. Robin also discussed his latest idea of Culture Drift: how humanity's superpower of cultural evolution can tend towards a maladaptive direction. Robin thinks this explains worrying trends like persistent low fertility at a time of material abundance, and he also explains why we are reluctant to confront this problem despite our common practice of cultural entrepreneurship. Robin Hanson is a professor of economics at George Mason University. He has written two fantastic books, Age of Em and The Elephant in the Brain (co-authored with Kevin Simler). You can find all of the ideas discussed in Robin's books (linked above) and on his popular and immensely brilliant blog Overcoming Bias. TRANSCRIPT Tobi: Welcome Robin, to the show. It's an honour to talk to you, and I look forward to our conversation. Robin: Let's get started. Tobi: Okay. So I'd like to start with your book, with Kevin Simler, The Elephant in the Brain. You argue that much of our supposedly noble behaviour from charity to healthcare to politics is actually driven by hidden self-serving motives like signalling and status seeking. If so much of human activity is essentially about showing off or gaining social points, what does that imply for how we should design or reform institutions? Robin: Well, the key idea of the book is that in many areas of life, our motives aren't what we like to say. And this fact is well known to psychologists, but not so well known to the people who do policy in each of these areas, like say education or medicine or politics. The people who do policy in those areas tend to take people at their word for their motives and they analyse those areas in terms of stated motives, and our claim is that you are misunderstanding these areas if you take people at their word and you'll get a better sense of what's going on there and therefore what you can do if you would consider that people might not be honest about their motives. Tobi: Yeah, I mean, for example, schools, hospitals, and other public or perhaps even private institutions that we interact with openly acknowledge or accommodate our signalling drives rather than pretend that we're always pursuing high-minded ideals. What are the hard parts to reconcile about these facts of the human nature? Robin: Uh, well, for example, people in the United States are most surprised by our medicine chapter, where we say that in fact on average people who get more medicine aren't any healthier and therefore they're spending way too much on medicine for the purpose of getting healthier. That's very surprising to people and it, of course, suggests that we don't need to spend as much as we do. Instead of subsidising it, maybe we should even tax it. But it also helps understand why we are doing as much as we're doing because we're using it as a way to show we care about each other rather than a way to get healthier. And so if you want to spend less on medicine, you'll have to ask, how can we find other ways to show that we care about each other instead of overspending on medicine? Tobi: On a personal level, has recognising these uncomfortable hidden motives changed how you live your own life or conduct research? Do you ever catch yourself in acts of self-deception or signalling and you then consciously adjust your behaviour? Robin: I think many people are tempted to try to look inside themselves to figure out what their hidden motives might be, and I don't think that's going to work very well. So my approach is just to look at how people on average are, and ask what motives best explain typical human behaviour and then just assume I'm like everybody else. So, I have come to terms with accepting that my behaviour is driven by motives that are probably not too different from the motives that drive most people, most of the time. So if other people are going to the doctor to show they care. I probably do too. If other people are going to school to show off how conscientious and intelligent they are, then that may be what I'm doing as well. And I'm just going to accept that I'm just not going to be that different from other people. Tobi: Over the past, I would say six years or so, particularly with the rise of what is generally termed as woke, the phrase virtue signalling became quite popular. And this is something that you have been writing about before it gained that currency. You've noted that humans, when times are good, devote more energy to visibly displaying values either through charity, moral causes, patriotic posturing, as a way to boost our social standing. How do your theories of hidden motives and signalling help explain the way people behave online? And how does that affect the rise of political polarisation in the US perhaps? Robin: So the term virtue signalling is usually used to describe behaviour that the speaker doesn't think is very virtuous. Um, so when we signal in general, typically our signals are effective and that we are actually showing the thing we claim to have. So if by going to school you show that you are smart and conscientious and conformist, then typically if you go to more school than other people, you are in fact more conscientious and conformist and intelligent than other people. You are successfully showing that. So the analog, if you took it literally for virtue signalling, would be that you are showing that you are virtuous. And that should be good. Maybe it's not so great that you are so eager to show it, but it is a good thing about you that you'd be showing. So the phrase virtue signalling is instead a criticism of people who are trying to appear virtuous without actually being very virtuous. That's, I think, the implication of the claim. And so that certainly could be happening and we should certainly wonder whether people who are claiming to be virtuous actually are virtuous. So certainly a lot of what's happened on the internet in the last ten years is what they call cancel culture and so that's where a particular person is accused of being bad or doing bad and then a mob, you know, jumps all over them and maybe gets them fired, gets them, uh, you know, thrown out of an organisation, gets people to quit their YouTube channel, et cetera, because they have been accused of being bad. Then the question is, well, if in fact they are bad, and if in fact these sort of responses are the appropriate response to someone who is bad in the way they are claimed to be bad, this wouldn't be such a terrible thing. Uh, the claim is that in fact they are accusing people of things they aren't guilty of or vastly exaggerating their guilt. And then it's bad if people are going way overboard to cause them harm without good cause. So certainly one of the things that's going on in the world is the difference between gossip and law. So, uh, law didn't really exist until, say, 10,000 or so years ago. Before that, for maybe a million years, we had gossip. And the way we managed people doing bad things and dealing with that was by gossiping about it. And we mostly lived in pretty small groups who knew each other pretty well, so it wasn't that hard for people to gossip and figure out what's really going on and then react by whatever way they chose to do when they talked about it together. But in much larger societies that we've created in the last 10,000 years, gossip doesn't work so well. Because there's this incentive to a rush to judgment. When somebody comes to you with a complaint about somebody else, your main incentive is to agree with this person in front of you who you know better than the other person being complained about. And so in gossip, people tend to believe whatever they're told and they don't get the whole story. They don't ask for the other side of the dispute. And law was invented substantially to overcome this problem with gossip wherein there's a central place that you take an accusation to and that central place's job is to hear all the evidence before they make a decision. And then that overcomes the rush to judgment. But when we have things people disapprove of that aren't illegal, then we revert back to gossip and then we have the problems of gossip wherein people are too quickly agreeing with an accusation before they've looked at the full, um, evidence from the other side. That's something that's going on lately with new social media when there are many accusations that many sympathize with that are things that aren't and not, in fact, illegal. But these are all relatively minor variations on the basic thesis of our book, which is that people are trying to look good and they do many things in order to look good, but when they do, they are actually good. On average, they are showing things that are actually good in order to look good. Tobi: An idea that also become quite popular first in scholarly circles, but I mean, I see it almost everywhere now, maybe that's not a statistical fact, but it's the idea that evolutionarily, humans are not truth-seeking, we are coalition-seeking and our reasoning is basically to get people on our side. Looking at social media and how people use it, would you say that it's fundamentally amplified our worst signalling instincts by rewarding outrage and performative statements? And do you think it can somehow be a harnessed to improve honesty and information sharing? Robin: So the thing I can be the most sure about is just looking overall at human behaviour across the world, across history, and roughly describing the middle of the distribution of that human behaviour and what's going on there. That

    1h 16m
  2. Power to the People

    27/05/2025

    Power to the People

    Welcome to Ideas Untrapped podcast. In this episode, I speak with economist Sugandha Srivastav about the hidden political economy of electricity in developing countries. Using examples from her study of Pakistan's electricity market, we explored how opaque power purchase agreements, regulatory capture, and poor procurement practices drive high costs and unreliable supply in many developing countries that are in desperate need of energy. Sugandha also shares bold insights on how competitive markets and renewable energy, especially solar, can transform the power sector and deliver affordable electricity for all. Dr Sugandha Srivastav is a Lecturer in Environmental Economics and a Senior Research Associate at the University of Oxford - and a Fellow at Energy for Growth Hub. Transcript Tobi: Welcome to Ideas Untrapped. It's nice to have you on the show. I've been looking forward to this, so thank you so much for doing this with me. Sugandha: Yeah, thanks for having me, Tobi. Tobi: Yeah. So, why I wanted us to have this conversation was I read your paper on power. By power, I mean electricity, and the corruption, and basically surrounding power purchasing agreements in Pakistan last year. So briefly, can you just summarise what that paper was about, what you found, and what were the general lessons that we can draw from that? Sugandha: Yeah, sure, so basically about two years ago, we started looking into contracts in the power sector. And as all of your listeners know, electricity is so important to all of our lives. It's very important for businesses. It is hard to overstate how critical electricity is to our lives, so we were just really curious about how is electricity being procured by the government? What are the contracts that underpin this electricity? And, um, can we learn something about how much we are paying for electricity? So we wanted to dig into these power purchase agreements, which is what the contracts are called, but we very quickly realised that they're not disclosed most of the time. So even though this is government money, which is going towards paying for something as basic as electricity. The public has very, very little information on what these contracts are and one of the few places in the world where we could find information about power purchase agreements was Pakistan because they actually released a law which said that tariff agreements have to be disclosed. So what we then did was we spent, many, many months actually downloading all of these agreements and contracts and, in the end, I think it was over 6000 PDFs with very detailed contract information and we put together a database. And that's when we started discovering a lot of very interesting things. It became very obvious to us that some of these contracts seemed extremely generous and that raised some questions on why electricity is being procured with these particularly generous terms and conditions. And whether that means that the electricity sector is enabling transfers from the public to a certain groups of vested interests. So the long and short of it is that we think that these contracts are really important to study, and what we found from our investigative work is that a lot of these contracts are extremely lopsided and, you know, there isn't any competitive procurement, and we know when there isn't competitive procurement, you have no idea whether you're getting value for money, whether you're getting the best product. They're just being solicited bilaterally through these very, very opaque contracts. Tobi: So, I mean, in that situation, and reading through your paper. After going through all the details and all, did you find out whether that was specific to Pakistan or is there a pattern across poor countries who have no power generally. Sugandha: It's definitely a pattern. So one of the striking things is that across so many parts of the world electricity is not procured competitively and by competitively I just mean the normal process of firms submitting bids and choosing the least cost bid. You know, that seems like an obvious way to do this, but that isn't what's happening. To give examples of countries where there are these very opaque power purchase agreements, um, Indonesia has them. Ghana has them. I think Nigeria, by the way, also has them. Mozambique has had them. And till date, we have just had very limited evidence. So what typically happens is that some journalist goes out there and finds a very specific scandal related to this power purchase agreement. And they report that. So, for example, in Pakistan, journalists have said that the cost of coal being used by these power plants is much more than the market rate. Sometimes it's 50% higher than the market rate. And that's a very strange thing to observe. You know, why aren't power plants using cheaper coal? It turns out that power plants get reimbursed for the cost of coal. So if they say it's more expensive, they get a bigger reimbursement and that is the incentive behind lying. We've also seen that happen in India. So, to answer your question, this type of rent-seeking behaviour in the power sector is not unique to one country. We have seen it across the developing world. And one of the reasons it's there is that there isn't competitive procurement and a symptom is that the price of electricity becomes higher. And it also becomes more unreliable. And in general, you have this situation where public money is not being used efficiently. Unfortunately, yeah, it is a common story. Tobi: Yeah. to use Nigeria example, not that I want you to respond to that specifically. Um, so in Nigeria, all sides of the bargain in the electricity market is complaining. Uh, the government complained about the fiscal burden of the subsidies. Consumers, citizens complaining because the electricity supply is not stable and the power companies do complain that they are not charging market rates, they are not making money, they are heavily indebted. What is it about the structure of the electricity market that creates this kind of dysfunction? So, for example, some will argue that power purchase agreements are so structured because electricity is capital incentive and hence you need these lopsided contracts as an incentive for people who are willing to invest that kind of money. So what is it about the structure of that market broadly? Sugandha: Yeah, so you do need risk reduction to incentivise entry in developing countries. I mean, that is a feature of developing countries. The question is how much risk reduction do you need? So you want enough so that people invest in your electricity sector, but if you give too much, then you'll create a debt crisis. And so there's a sweet spot in the middle where you allow entry into your electricity sector, but you're not going to create a debt crisis which creates havoc for your government. This is where we think that some of these power contracts have gone too far on the other side. They're creating way too much burden on the government, and to put some numbers here, you know, often like the return on equity that is offered in these contracts, at least in Pakistan, we've seen can be up to 30%. But when you account for the corruption and cheating, so for example, as I mentioned before, power producers can get reimbursed for input costs. So sometimes they lie about their input costs and say that they're higher than in reality because they get reimbursed. So once you factor that in, we've seen some power plants making a return on equity of 83%. Which is much, much higher than the contracted value of 30%. So in that case, what we're documenting is actually explicit cheating. Now to go back to your question of why this causes dysfunction in the entire power sector? If you think about it, essentially each step of the system is breaking and you know, so the power producers are making super normal profits in some cases. Then the utility, which is in between the power producer and the customers, they often can't charge higher tariffs because they're politically constrained. So they are buying this expensive electricity, but at the same time they can't pass on the higher cost. So they're making a loss. Then because they're making a loss, what they do is that they cut off power. So, because they make a loss per unit, they don't want their total losses to go above a certain threshold. So then their option is to simply switch off the power. That's something called economic load shedding. So to your listeners, you can have load shedding for many reasons. Sometimes it's because of technical losses. Sometimes it's because you don't have electricity supply. But other times it can be just because your utility turns it off. Because they're not making a profit or in fact they're probably making a loss per unit of power, so they just turn it off. And that's a very under-appreciated reason why electricity is unreliable because it has nothing to do with supply. It has to do with the economics of it. And then you go to the government side because now that the utility is making a loss, eventually this utility has to be bailed out and the government does the bailing out. So then the government fiscally is in a bad position. This is how the entire system starts basically breaking down and the solution is simple. I mean, we need to have a meritocratic electricity system. So if an electricity generator can provide good quality, low cost electricity, they should be able to enter the market, sell and outcompete the old generation. It's as simple as that. And if that's risky, then you can provide risk hedging mechanisms that don't fundamentally distort the market the way they are doing now. Because right now it's a broken market, which is happening over and over again across the world. Tobi: Yeah, so suppose I'm a developing country that is democratic. And I happen to inherit these contracts, uh, as problematic as they are. We also know that they are a

    52 min
  3. Free Markets in Africa

    20/03/2025

    Free Markets in Africa

    Hello, everyone, and this is Ideas Untrapped podcast. In this episode, I explored the challenges of acceptance of free market ideas in Africa with my guest, Tinashe Murapata. We talked about how the struggles of free market ideas can be traced back to historical misinterpretations that link capitalism with colonial oppression. We also discussed the weaknesses of Africa’s electoral politics in prioritizing economic issues and emphasised the need for cultural change to embed economic freedom in public discourse. The conversation concludes with a vision for localized, community-driven solutions to reduce state dependency and encourage market-driven development. Tinashe Murapata is the Chief Executive Officer of Leon Africa, an investment holding company in Zimbabwe. he is also a former executive at Barclays Bank and host of a popular Youtube show called Friday Drinks about economics and policy. Episode Summary Introduction Tobi:Welcome to Ideas Untrapped. It's fantastic to speak to you. I love what you do so much—I’m a huge follower of your YouTube channel. It's nice to speak to a fellow ideas merchant on the continent. So, welcome to the show. Tinashe:Thank you very much. I really appreciate this. The Paradox of Free Markets in Africa Tobi:A couple of weeks ago, I was speaking to an Indian economist on the show, and he said something fascinating. He observed that in America, when he speaks to his colleagues about free markets, they claim the U.S. doesn’t have free markets. Instead, he tells them, “Come to Africa—where you can be in traffic for five minutes, and there are vendors all around trying to sell you one thing or another. That’s the real free market.” I found that interesting. But later that day, ironically—or unironically—I saw a news report that Nigeria’s communication agency was petitioning Elon Musk’s Starlink for increasing prices without government approval. And I laughed—so much for free markets! This got me thinking. Price control and general illiberalism in economic policy are deeply embedded across Africa. You’re from Zimbabwe, I’m from Nigeria, and we see this pattern across the continent. So, my first broad question is: What do you think is holding back the acceptance—or even tolerance—of free market ideas, particularly among the elites and economic policymakers? Historical Misconceptions and African Economic Thought Tinashe:That’s a very good question, Tobi. And thank you again for having me. The answer, I believe, predates us. It’s rooted in Africa’s transition from colonialism to independence. There were two ideological sides at play—the West and the East. Colonialism was associated with the West, which championed capitalism. Meanwhile, the East, which supported African independence, was viewed as the antithesis of capitalism, embracing socialism and communism. This led to the flawed perception that capitalism was the ideology of the colonizer, while socialism was the ideology of liberation. However, this is historically inaccurate. Both socialism and capitalism originated in the West. Karl Marx himself was European, and socialism predates him—it was fervently supported by Europeans. Unfortunately, the narrative that communism and socialism “freed” Africa while capitalism “oppressed” it became ingrained in our political and intellectual culture. That misconception remains a significant obstacle today. To move forward, we need to disentangle ourselves from these historical misinterpretations and critically evaluate which economic system actually leads to human flourishing. And without a doubt, capitalism—particularly from the 18th and 19th centuries—played a key role in advancing global civilisation. The Role of Economics in African Elections Tobi:My next two questions are related. Sometimes, it feels like the economic well-being of Africans isn’t a central issue in electoral politics. Electoral competition on the continent is still more about politics in the traditional sense—identity, ethnicity, and power struggles—rather than economic policies that affect people's lives. For example, look at the recent U.S. elections. Donald Trump won, and all post-mortem analyses suggest it was largely due to voters' perceptions of inflation. People didn’t feel the economic boom in their pockets, so they voted for change. Now, in Nigeria, we are suffering from high inflation—especially food inflation, which has reached over 40%. People complain about it, yet when it comes to elections, they don’t express the same anger at the polls. Economic issues do not seem to drive political competition the way they do elsewhere. So, is this part of the problem? And does the way Africa’s economic challenges are portrayed in international media—where we are always framed as victims—affect how we think about holding our leaders accountable? Understanding Africa’s Young Democracies Tinashe:I see your point, but I think we need to be kinder to African nations. We are young democracies. Zimbabwe has been independent for just 44 years; Nigeria, around 60 years. In the life of nations, that is still infancy. Meanwhile, colonialism lasted much longer. In South Africa, it was close to 400 years. Our democratic institutions and political culture are still evolving. Many of our governance systems were built within a history of disenfranchisement, where political competition wasn’t based on broad economic accountability. That legacy lingers. This is not to excuse bad policies. Inflation is effectively a tax on the poor, and we should demand better governance. But we must recognize that political maturity takes time. Sometimes, societies learn through bad policies. There are two ways to build a great society: * The Meritocratic Approach – You start with the best people in leadership, ensuring competence from the outset. * The Competitive Ideas Approach – You allow different ideas to compete over time, and eventually, society discards what doesn’t work. Africa has largely followed the latter path. Socialist and paternalistic ideas are seductive, so people are often drawn to them. But over time, as failures become evident, they start to reconsider. This means free-market ideas may take longer to gain traction. But our job is to keep advocating and ensuring these ideas are in the public square. Even if we don’t see the change in our lifetime, it will happen eventually. The Free Market and the Battle of Ideas Tobi:I view politics as a battle of ideas. Even identity-based politics is ultimately a form of idea competition. Political actors present their vision, and electorates choose. Yet, in Africa, the marketplace of ideas seems weak when it comes to free markets. Civil society is filled with advocates for democracy and governance reforms, but very few champion economic freedom. Even in academia, free-market thought is largely absent. Why is this? Is it just a matter of being “too young,” as you said, or has our education and civic discourse gone astray? Changing the Culture, Not Just the Politics Tinashe:This is a crucial issue. Politics is downstream from culture. Politicians do not create ideas—they simply pick up what is already popular in society. If free-market ideas are not resonating in the culture, politicians will not advocate them. So, our focus should not be on convincing politicians. Instead, we must embed these ideas in the culture—in conversations, in media, and in everyday interactions. Historically, ideas spread not through institutions but through cultural discourse. That’s why platforms like Ideas Untrapped are important. We need to ensure these ideas are part of the public conversation. Over time, as they gain traction, politicians will naturally follow. Final Thought: A Vision for Localised Solutions Tobi:One final question—it's a tradition on the podcast. What is the one idea you’d love to see spread everywhere? Tinashe:Local provision of essential goods and services—such as water, streetlights, and electricity—organised at the community level rather than by the state. If communities own their schools, manage their waste collection, and control basic infrastructure, they become self-reliant. This reduces dependence on government and proves that the state is not always necessary for progress. If this idea spreads, more people will recognise the power of markets and decentralised decision-making.. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit www.ideasuntrapped.com

    47 min
  4. America's New Deal

    07/03/2025

    America's New Deal

    Welcome to another episode of Ideas Untrapped podcast. My guest on this episode is Raymond Fisman, who is the Slater Family Professor in Behavioural Economics at Boston University. He is one of the foremost researchers on corruption and institutional behaviour in the last three decades, and I have been looking forward to talking to him. The main theme of our conversation was the re-election of Donald Trump as the new U.S president and his swift embrace of corporate oligarchs as his new inner circle and power proxies. We also discussed why corporate America is rushing to fall in line and "kiss the ring". This was an enlightening conversation for me, and I do hope you find it useful as well. I also hope to have Raymond back on the podcast for a more global exploration of the topics he covered. Transcript Tobi: Hi, everybody. This is Ideas Untrapped Podcast. My guest today is Professor Raymond Fisman. He's the Slater Family Professor in Behavioral Economics at Boston University. He's a brilliant, brilliant economist that I've been looking forward to talking to for a while. It's a pleasure to have you, Raymond. Raymond Fisman: It's a pleasure to be here. I'll tell my children that someone said I was brilliant. They'll find that very funny. Tobi: I think the interesting place I would say to start is what was your reaction to the inauguration two days ago? [This conversation was recorded on January 22, 2025 two days after Donald Trump was inauguarated for a second time as the President of the United States of America] I mean, in some kind of mildly amusing horror, like, I would say I was at the open blatant embrace of the core of American government of oligarchy and downstream of that, corruption. What were your thoughts? Raymond Fisman: Yeah, I think it's a little hard to know where to begin because there is so much to say and literally relevant news and so far as self-dealing is concerned, as well as obsequiousness of business elites in the U.S. is coming so quickly that if we had this conversation six hours from now, there'd probably be yet more to say about it. On the one hand, I would say that it was horror, not mildly amused, except that it does almost transcend satire, what's going on, like, you can't make it up sort of thing. But something that I want to be very careful to emphasise throughout is that I really don't want to pin this on a particular party or make this about partisanship, as opposed to we have an individual who has been elected to the highest office in the land, that I think is doing a lot that runs counter to good government. And those are the issues I want to emphasise. And I do think that we've seen a lot of troubling signs. I did not watch the inauguration. I'm following the advice of my friend, Marianne, who said that to stay sane, she just reads the news in a physical newspaper. Otherwise, it just comes at you too often and too fast. But some of the things that have emerged in recent days that are really quite troubling are signals that the U.S. is moving towards a much more, if you like, personalistic approach to policymaking. And there's always been a role for connections in the way the U.S. is governed. But it does feel like it's just going to a different scale. The most recent and high profile example is that of TikTok, where Trump had been in favour of a ban of the app, he met with the CEO and before that, a billionaire Republican mega donor, and he flipped his position on it. Now he is going to be TikTok's saviour. So that's on the one side. On the other side, you see TikTok entirely aware that they need to engage in flattery. So, you know, they personally thanked Trump for his intervention Monday morning after it was brought back from a very brief ban and now has a 90 day extension. But again, Trump has sworn to save it. So it's this kind of very personalised, very public favour trading is clearly sending a message to business that they need to fall in line in order to remain profitable in Trump's America. And you can easily, or I shouldn't say easily, you can imagine sliding into a system in which we have something closer to what's termed competitive authoritarianism, where you do hold elections, but the media, as well as the levers of government, are so commanded by the party in power that oppositions are playing from such a disadvantage. We've seen this emerge to some degree in India. We've seen it emerge in Hungary. We've seen it with X. We've seen it with other sites. We've seen it, to some extent, with Facebook very recently. You can see it potentially emerging in the U.S. So I do see a lot of troubling signs, and it is certainly a collective project to push back against these trends. Tobi: One thing that I was surprised, you might not be, given that do work in this area is how quickly people fell in line once Trump won or it looked like he was going to be the next president and you know you had this scrambling for people to get face time in Mar-a-lago to book hotels and to basically make deals and then it does make me wonder that, yeah, like you said, the U.S. is shifting to a more personalistic type of governance. But do you think that the quickness or the way that this shift is rapidly happening before our eyes has something to do with perhaps grievances in whatever form with good governance generally or impersonal bureaucracies? You know, because there's so much gripe about the elites or the deep states and how they have failed. And this is how the people are getting the power back. But of course, we know that's not what it really is. But what exactly about the status quo stopped working to give us this shift we are seeing to a new equilibrium? Raymond Fisman: I'm sure there are many things and one always runs the risk of naming the thing that you think is most important, or even worse, the first thing that comes to mind, and presenting kind of a monocausal case. So I'll say that I'm going to name the thing that I think is most important. It's the first thing that comes to my mind. I'm sure there are many factors that are pushing in this direction, including what you described, people being perhaps dismayed - that it's going to be related to what I say, including what you say about the seeming gridlock of the U.S. government. But what troubles me most and what I think is perhaps enabling the most is increased polarisation, which is more extreme in America than elsewhere, but is also a global phenomenon. It shows up very clearly in the data. The extent to which people identify as left versus right has been steadily widening over the past few decades. And somehow it tinges everything, including people's views of good governance, with a partisan lens. So somehow all that has come to matter is, is he my guy or is he not my guy? As opposed to, is this an honest, competent guy or a dishonest, incompetent one? So somehow people's views, people's attention is entirely drawn to partisan questions, rather than good versus bad government questions. The fact that businesses fell in line so quickly, it is kind of hard to fault them, given the opening example of TikTok. That seems to have already reaped tremendous dividends for the company. If I take at face value, the stock price of Tesla as some summary measure of how valuable it is to have the president's sympathies. It went up by around 30% in the week following the election. There are lots of companies that appreciated in value for reasons that can easily be tied to policies. For-profit prison companies went up by a lot. That's because of anticipated immigration policies. Other carmakers, and especially electric carmakers, did not do so well. So what's special about Tesla, that's not like a big secret. It's that its biggest shareholder, Elon Musk, was a tremendous financial and personal backer of Trump. So if you say, well, being well-connected to this government is worth 30%, that's a pretty good incentive to fall in line. I will note as an aside, or maybe not as an aside, something that's very directly related. So my PhD thesis was on the value of political connections in Suharto's Indonesia in the mid-1990s. And my thesis looked at what happened to the value of well-connected companies when there were threats to Suharto's health. And if you take the results of my PhD thesis at face value, connections in America now are worth something comparable to what they were worth back in mid-90s Indonesia, which at the time was viewed as one of the most corrupt countries in the world. Tobi: I mean, a recent example in Nigeria is a particular oil company that was in trouble for a while, running to about five years, was on the edge of bankruptcy and could not even publish its annual reports. And after the the last election, we've had a new government now for 18 months. After the last election, due to the perceived closeness - I mean, it's an open secret - of this same company to the new president, it's recovered tremendously. Its financial fortunes have recovered tremendously to the point that during the Christmas party last December, this same nearly bankrupt company hosted the three biggest musical artists in Nigeria to its annual Christmas party. So I read the Indonesia paper a long time ago, and one thing I want to draw your attention to, maybe with a bit more of an international lens, is the role of ideas here. I know you talked about partisanship, and I hope we'll get to unpack that a little later. So there is a general acceptance now, especially in the subfield of what we call development economics or international development scholarship generally, that some form of corruption is not so bad, right? Since you… I don't know how much you followed that field, but a lot has happened since your paper. You know, there's this subfield of political science meshed with economics that talks about political settlements. Scholars like Mushtaq Khan have said that, well, some corruption can be beneficial to growth and not all corrupti

    39 min
  5. 08/02/2025

    Global Value Chains

    Happy New Year to our listeners. This is the first episode of the year, and I had a conversation with Oliver Harman about global value chains (GVCs), foreign direct investment (FDI), and regional governance in economic development. Oliver and I discussed how GVCs have evolved, the crucial role of multinational enterprises in knowledge transfer, and why regional governments—rather than national ones—are often better positioned to shape policies that maximize benefits from global trade. The conversation highlights the importance of GVC-sensitive policies, investment promotion agencies, and upgrading strategies to help economies move up the value chain and develop their economy. Oliver Harman is an economist. He specialises in spatial economics and economic geography. He is a Senior Policy Economist for the International Growth Centre at the London School of Economics and Political Science. He is also a Research Associate at the Blavatnik School of Government, University of Oxford. His book with Ricardo Crescenzi, which was the subject of this podcast, can be found here. Transcript Introduction Tobi:Welcome, Oliver, to Ideas Untrapped Podcast. It's wonderful to have you here. I have to say that your work, along with Riccardo Crescenzi, is one of the most refreshing things I've read in the last couple of years on global value chains. It's a wonderful book. I'll put up links to how people can access it in the show notes, and I think everyone should read it. I want to start with the basics. The phrase global value chain is frequently used in economic discourse, particularly in discussions about geopolitics. But what exactly are global value chains? How would you describe them? What are Global Value Chains? Oliver:Thank you for having me, Tobi, and for your kind words on the book—it is much appreciated. I can provide you with an open-access overview of the book for your listeners who may not be ready to purchase the e-book but want a taste of its content. To answer your question, global value chains (GVCs) have gained prominence academically since the 2000s. Before then, there was little academic literature on them, and even less in policy discussions. This book emerged from that gap. A useful way to conceptualize GVCs is through an evolution of economic thought. Traditionally, economists described trade in terms of final goods—like the classic example of England producing cloth and France producing wine, and then trading them. GVCs, however, break down final goods into intermediate parts. Take the bicycle as an example. Many think of it as a single product, but a Canadian photographer once disassembled one and found 571 intermediate components, all researched, designed, produced, packaged, and marketed in different regions across the world. The same applies to more complex products like smartphones, where an iPhone or Samsung device contains thousands of parts sourced globally. GVCs have completely reshaped how we think about trade—moving beyond final goods to the intricate networks of intermediate goods and services that contribute to production. Evolution of Global Value Chains Tobi:How have global value chains evolved over time? What key events have shaped their trajectory over the past 20 to 30 years? Oliver:That’s a great question. GVCs have gone through different stages of transformation. * 1990s-2000s Boom: Trade became more fragmented, and participation in GVCs surged. Nearly every industry saw increased participation, with 40-50% of trade occurring through GVCs. * Post-2008 Financial Crisis: GVC expansion plateaued. The crisis led to economic restructuring, stabilizing GVC participation at previous levels. * Recent Trends (COVID-19 and Beyond): The pandemic disrupted global supply chains, causing temporary shocks. While GVCs held steady, they are now evolving in response to technological advancements and geopolitical changes. This makes it more critical for economies to find the right GVC for their development, rather than just benefiting from an overall expansion of trade. Multinational Enterprises and Governance in GVCs Tobi:Your book highlights three key aspects of GVCs: * Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) * Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) * Regional Governance As a Nigerian, I’m particularly interested in MNEs. We've seen many multinationals exit the country in the past six or seven years. Some policymakers argue that local investors can replace them, so it's not a big deal. But can you elaborate on the governance role that MNEs play in GVCs? Oliver:Absolutely. Multinationals are the governing arm of GVCs. They control and structure value chains by determining how production and trade flow across different regions. For regional policymakers, engaging with MNEs is crucial. They are at the frontier of technology and knowledge, and when properly integrated, they can transfer expertise to local firms. This is particularly important for emerging economies—it allows them to leapfrog to higher-value production. However, MNEs can also be extractive if not managed properly. So, it’s important for governments to structure policies that maximize benefits while minimizing exploitative practices. Governance Policies for Maximizing Benefits from GVCs Tobi:How can governments and policymakers structure governance around MNEs to ensure they enhance local economic growth? Oliver:We argue for Global Value Chain-Sensitive Policies, which explicitly consider how policies interact with GVCs. Some examples: * Investment Promotion Agencies (IPAs): * These agencies attract the right investors suited for the local economy. * Evidence shows that subnational IPAs (e.g., at the state level) are often more effective than national ones. * Skills Development Aligned with GVCs: * Training programs should be customized based on industry needs. * Example: The Penang Skills Development Centre in Indonesia worked with MNEs to align workforce skills with global industry demands, leading to economic transformation. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and Upgrading in GVCs Tobi:Some countries like Vietnam, Poland, and Malaysia have effectively used FDI to upgrade their economies. What are the general lessons from their success? Oliver:The key takeaway is that quality of FDI matters more than quantity. * Traditional Thinking: Measure FDI by the sheer amount of money coming in. * More Effective Thinking: Assess what type of FDI is being attracted. For example: * $100 million in basic assembly work adds less value than * $10 million in high-tech R&D investment, which has long-term benefits. Upgrading within GVCs involves moving from low-value tasks (e.g., assembling phones) to higher-value tasks (e.g., designing microchips). This is the essence of economic transformation. Regional Governments and GVC Policy Tobi:You emphasize regional (subnational) governments as key players in GVC policy. Why focus on regional rather than national governments? Oliver:There are two reasons: * Granularity of Data: * National policies aggregate data, ignoring local variations. * For instance, a port city has different needs from an inland capital city. * Local Expertise: * The people of Lagos understand their economic strengths better than the national government in Abuja. Empowering subnational governments allows for more tailored, effective policies. Challenges in GVC Data Collection Tobi:How can regional governments access reliable data to guide policy? Oliver:Data is crucial but often lacking in emerging markets. Solutions include: * GVC Mapping Exercises: Identify key industries and their global connections. * Global Datasets: * Inter-Country Input-Output Tables * OECD’s Trade in Value Added (TiVA) database * Firm-to-firm transaction data Final Question: One Idea Worth Spreading Tobi:What is one idea you’d like to see widely adopted? Oliver:The value of global trade and specialization. Many policymakers today are pushing for economic nationalism—wanting everything made domestically. But different regions have comparative advantages, and trade creates mutual benefits. We must resist mercantilist policies and embrace efficient global cooperation. Closing Remarks Tobi:That’s a fantastic idea. Hopefully, we move past the current mercantilist mindset. Thank you, Oliver, for being on Ideas Untrapped. Oliver:Thank you, Tobi. I appreciate the opportunity to discuss these ideas with you and your listeners This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit www.ideasuntrapped.com

    48 min
  6. 29/11/2024

    Moving from Promise to Progress

    In this episode of Ideas Untrapped we discussed the challenges and complexities of education, economic growth, and public health systems in developing countries with two brilliant guests James Habyarimana and Jishnu Das. We started off with an example on the rapid expansion of tertiary education in India and its unmet promise of better jobs, which led to discussions on similar dynamics in African contexts. The conversation explored the balance between market-driven growth and government intervention, emphasizing the need for robust processes and inclusive dialogues to address inequality, improve infrastructure, and shape a collective vision for the future. James Habyarimana is the Provost Distinguished Associate Professor at the McCourt School of Public Policy. His research is focused on identifying low-cost strategies to address barriers to better health and education outcomes in developing countries. Jishnu Das is a distinguished professor of public policy at the McCourt School of Public Policy and the Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. Jishnu’s work focuses on health and education in low and middle-income countries. Transcript Tobi: Welcome to both of you. This is actually the first time on the podcast that i'll be hosting two guests at the same time and i feel so lucky that it's both of you, so welcome to Ideas Untrapped it's fantastic talking to you. Jishnu: Great to be here, Tobi. Glad we're doing this. James: I feel privileged to be sharing this time with both of you. Tobi: Okay, thank you. You can take turn to answer as you choose. What inspired me to do this episode primarily was a very powerful article by Jishnu talking about (00:00:33): college education and how young people may have been shortchanged by the promises (00:00:40): and what the evidence suggests. (00:00:43): So briefly, (00:00:44): if you can just summarise for us, (00:00:48): Jishnu, (00:00:49): what inspired you to write that piece and what were the major findings? (00:00:54): Jishnu: Yeah, sure, Tobi. (00:00:55): And I'll ask James to talk about the African context. (00:00:58): I mean, I know India fairly well. (00:01:00): And one of the things that's so surprising and, you know, when people in the U.S. (00:01:05): or people elsewhere hear it, (00:01:07): they don't realise just how fast college education and college enrolment has (00:01:12): increased in the country. (00:01:14): Right. (00:01:15): So one of the statistics that I got wrong because I couldn't believe it is between 2003 and 2016, (00:01:22): India was building a new college every eight hours, right? (00:01:27): And you think about a number like that and you say, what happened here, right? (00:01:31): It's completely out of the experience that any of us has ever seen. (00:01:36): There's a real, real thirst for education among young people. (00:01:41): And it's not just a certain group. (00:01:44): We are seeing it in all kinds of socioeconomic status, girls, boys, men, women. (00:01:51): And it's interesting, (00:01:52): like in a country like Pakistan, (00:01:54): which is traditionally thought to be very patriarchal than it is, (00:01:58): there are more women in college now than men. (00:02:01): So there's this huge upsurge, (00:02:03): maybe a huge demand for college education that's being met by all kinds of places. (00:02:08): And, you know, education is a bit like looking at the stars. (00:02:11): You're going to see what happened in the past in terms of, OK, all these guys came into college. (00:02:16): What's going to happen to their lives after that? (00:02:18): And that part is not clear. (00:02:21): So India has grown a lot. (00:02:23): It's a huge success story on some fronts, kind of. (00:02:27): But really, more than 90 percent of the jobs are still informal. (00:02:31): And we keep thinking BPO, you know, business process outsourcing. (00:02:34): They're taking a lot of outsourcing jobs. (00:02:36): You know, (00:02:37): there's so little of that in actual numbers that it supports less than a percent of (00:02:42): the population. (00:02:43): So the question, (00:02:44): the big question that comes is, (00:02:46): OK, (00:02:46): all these guys who are going into college, (00:02:49): they're going in with the expectation that their lives are going to be a lot better. (00:02:53): And are we going to be able to meet that expectation? (00:02:56): And the phrase that people use is, you know, we have the so-called demographic dividend. (00:03:01): where we have lots of young people and fewer older people. (00:03:05): And the right way to think about it is how do we make sure that that demographic (00:03:11): fraction which we call a low dependency ratio is a dividend and doesn't turn into a (00:03:16): nightmare when you suddenly have these tons of people who are like, (00:03:20): look, (00:03:20): you sold us a dream. (00:03:21): You told us that if we make it through the schools, (00:03:24): which are not great, (00:03:25): and we go to college and we finish our college, (00:03:28): We'll get a decent job. (00:03:29): Where is that job? (00:03:32): That's why I called my blog a coming of rage story, because our college education has come of age. (00:03:38): And the big question now is whether it's going to come of rage as well. (00:03:42): And that's kind of, you know, where I left it. (00:03:45): But I don't know. (00:03:46): I mean, (00:03:46): James, (00:03:46): do you find kind of similar patterns in Uganda or in Tanzania where you work or (00:03:52): other countries? (00:03:53): James: Right. (00:03:53): I guess I want to start by saying, yes, I mean, Africa is in some ways pretty, pretty diverse place. (00:03:57): And so I'm going to focus a lot of my comments on the places that I'm familiar with, (00:04:01): which would be East and Southern Africa. (00:04:03): Tobi: Yeah. (00:04:04): James: But I fully expect, (00:04:05): as I was saying to Tobi, (00:04:06): I've done some work both in Lagos and in northern Nigeria on education. (00:04:09): So even though this is a little bit a while ago, (00:04:11): so I don't quite understand the long run trends and, (00:04:14): say, (00:04:14): demand for college. (00:04:16): But, you know, Africa is a very young continent. (00:04:18): In many parts of Africa, the share of the population is under 30, you know, is close to two thirds. (00:04:23): And so, yes, there is the same dynamics in terms of expectations of a better life. (00:04:29): And of course, I think this is the challenge for politicians. (00:04:31): So (00:04:31): So earlier when Tobi was saying maybe, (00:04:33): you know, (00:04:34): infrastructure projects get more attention than, (00:04:36): say, (00:04:37): education, (00:04:37): I actually think in the places where I work that, (00:04:39): in fact, (00:04:40): education gets much more attention because politicians are concerned about this rage, (00:04:45): right? (00:04:45): They're concerned about this gap between people's aspirations and essentially kind (00:04:50): of the opportunities that are available when they finish school. (00:04:53): I think that is a huge problem. (00:04:54): Even in places, (00:04:55): actually, (00:04:55): the northeastern Nigeria, (00:04:57): where I started to do some work on kind of apprenticeship programs, (00:05:00): there's a lot of attention being paid to addressing essentially kind of this gap. (00:05:04): Because I think ultimately, (00:05:06): and I think most political scientists have suggested that essentially kind of the (00:05:09): share of males between the age of 15 to 29 who are not engaged in school or active work, (00:05:15): in some ways can be a major source of instability. (00:05:17): And so I do see the same concerns. (00:05:21): There's certainly been an explosion in (00:05:22): in terms of tertiary institutions outside of government. (00:05:25): And so there are many more private institutions in East Africa than exist, (00:05:29): say, (00:05:29): you know, (00:05:30): 20 or 30 years ago. (00:05:31): I don't think people are building universities or colleges at the same rate as they are in India. (00:05:36): But there's certainly kind of an attempt to respond to the exploding demand (00:05:40): And I think ultimately the question for whether there's a demographic dividend or not, (00:05:45): I mean, (00:05:45): I've certainly made the case in other fora where I've said, (00:05:48): look, (00:05:48): we need to essentially kind of take advantage of this opportunity and we need to (00:05:52): give these young people the skills to be effective in the world. (00:05:56): But I think ultimately there is kind of a bigger question about sort of can these (00:06:00): places produce the jobs and find the markets to really deploy these people? (00:06:05): Yeah, (00:06:05): so I hope we won't start the conversation by essentially kind of talking about rage (00:06:09): as opposed to the high hopes. (00:06:11): But yeah, (00:06:11): I think many places where I work are facing the similar sort of challenge of, (00:06:16): you know, (00:06:16): how do we convert this opportunity into prosperity as opposed to civil conflict? (00:06:22): Tobi: So I think for me, the rage... (00:06:25): question is sort of unavoidable. (00:06:29): Perhaps the evidence might tell us differently, but at least on some level of perception. (00:06:35): Certainly, it's a story that resonates with me. (00:06:39): I mean, (00:06:40): I live in Lagos, (00:06:41): Nigeria, (00:06:42): and I can certainly tell from my observation that you see an army of young men from, (00:06:50): say, (00:06:51): 18 to 25 with (00:06:53): absolutely nothing to do, you know, just walking the streets, standing on the corner. (00:06:59): So what I want to tease out with my next question is the intersection of skills and jobs, you know. (00:07:08): So on the one hand, there's been this great expansion. (00:07:12): I think it's certainly true, also of Nigeria, the expansion in

    1h 12m
  7. 25/11/2024

    Learning from East Asia

    In this episode of Ideas Untrapped, I sit down with economist Oliver Kim to explore the complexities of African economic growth and the challenges surrounding industrialisation. We discuss why Africa has struggled to replicate the manufacturing successes of East Asia, touching on issues such as labour costs, political economy, and the global market environment. Oliver also shares his thoughts on the importance of state capacity and regional integration and how to rethink GDP statistics in development research. Oliver Kim is an economic historian and a research fellow at Open Philanthropy. He also writes excellent blog Global Developments. Transcript Tobi:Welcome, Oliver, to the show. I've been a fan for a while, and it's fantastic talking to you. So thank you so much for coming on Ideas Untrapped. My first question to you involves something you wrote a couple of months ago where you talked about African prices, which is always a puzzle that I've been interested in. So, to restate it as simply as possible, we know that manufacturing in Africa has not grown as much, at least relative to other sub-regions in the world. And there are some theories or findings that suggest that it’s because labour cost is too high. And there's a bit of back and forth in the debates about how unique that is to Africa as a continent. So can you shed more light [on that]? Because you see a lot of comparisons, maybe Ethiopia and Bangladesh…the unit labour cost and how high it is. So, is that really the constraints? What are the nuances based on what you discussed in that blogpost? Oliver:Yeah. Just to quickly summarise. Africa has kind of missed out on the manufacturing revolution that, for instance, propelled East Asia…so when you think of the East Asian tigers, China, to rapid rates of growth and poverty alleviation. And, i think in some countries, actually, the share of manufacturing value-added or the share of manufacturing employment is the same or lower than where it was in the 1970s immediately after independence. So, from a developmental standpoint, this is a bit of a puzzle and from a poverty alleviation standpoint, it's a tragedy because this is the only sort of way that we know how to lift large numbers of people out of poverty in a rapid sort of fashion. That’s how China did it; that's how earlier, Korea, Taiwan, and Japan did it. From a prices standpoint, the problem that economists have identified is that labour costs are too high relative to the level of productivity. That's an important qualified statement to make. So most developing countries are poor [and] as a feature of a developing country, one thing that's true is that incomes are relatively low, wages are relatively low, and so labour is relatively cheap. It's also true that if you're a foreign firm deciding where to site a factory, you don't just care about the labour cost. You also care about the productivity of the workforce. And so it works out that what you care about is like the amount of productivity divided by the cost of hiring additional worker. And on that metric, which is typically measured in something that's called a unit labour cost (the amount that it costs to produce one unit of output), a lot of sub-Saharan African countries turn out looking relatively poor, especially compared to their peers [at] similar sort of income levels. So there's sort of two dimensions of this problem. One is the productivity side, and then the other is the cost side. On average, it appears basically that African countries have wages that are actually relatively high for their level of development. And so this becomes a further mystery, like why is this the case? One hypothesis that's been put forward in a couple of papers by the folks at the Center for Global Development is that it's because prices are too high. So this is like one step up the causal chain. If prices are high and the goods and services that are to buy cost too much, then you have to pay people a higher wage basically to afford that. Of course, the sort of factors behind this, I think, are incredibly complex. I think one major, sort of, historical and fundamental feature that I would point to is that historically labour in Africa, sub-Saharan Africa has been relatively scarce. So this is the contrast I guess, with East Asia and potentially South Asia, where population density is incredibly high and labour is constantly in surplus. So historically, you know, China, East Asia is like one of the most densely populated regions of the world. The opposite is kind of true in Africa. Now the population has grown a lot, but historically you just had actually a lot more land than people. And if you look at the deep history of African sort of polities, a lot of them were trying to economise more on people than on land. So like in East Asia and Western Europe, you know, you had states with very clearly defined boundaries and political control was defined by control over land. In Africa, there are states, but there are also instances basically where political control was defined more by control over people. And so there was more fluidity in terms of like territorial boundaries. And so control basically of labour, potentially through slavery also, was a way of a political state to assert power. That's a bit of a digression, but historically speaking, you had relatively low population density. I think that's part of the factor into capitalism. why labour was relatively scarce and maybe why wages are low. So in the present day, maybe that's starting to change a little bit. But looking at the sort of deep fundamental factors, it appears that maybe wages are potentially, quote unquote, “too high to enable a sort of African manufacturing revolution.” Tobi:Yeah, maybe I read that wrong. But one of the things you discussed in that particular essay was the Assam non-linear model or something like that. It was a U-shaped relationship between GDP and price levels, which, again, maybe I'm wrong about this, the conclusion that sort of came out of that, that this might not necessarily be a problem that is unique to Africa. So can you shed more light on that? Oliver:Yeah. So let me talk about what I talked about in the blog post. So economists have this relationship. It's a purely like empirical one. So if you go out in the world and you observe things, it's called the Balassa-Samuelson relationship, where basically it appears that as countries get richer, prices of things like haircuts and services seem to go up almost more than proportionally, right? So like, you know, if I go to Switzerland, which is a very rich country, a haircut costs like $30 or something, something ridiculous. Actually, it's probably more than that. It's like $50 or something, 50 Swiss francs versus, you know, if I go to a Kenyosi in Kenya or whatever to go to a barber, that same haircut, which effectively is not that differentiated in terms of quality. Like a haircut is a haircut. Like if I ask for a buzz cut, it's the same thing. It's the same product, but that product in Kenya probably costs a dollar or possibly less. And so this sort of weird differential where richer places seem to have higher prices is known as the Balassa-Samuelson effect. And if you think about like the sort of underlying theoretical mechanism here, basically richer countries have higher productivity. Higher productivity shows up in like higher productivity in let's say like the manufacturing sector or higher tech kind of sectors. For like service sectors, which everybody needs, right? So everybody needs like barbers, everybody needs janitors, teachers, things that basically don't increase that much in productivity. Even these sectors need to face higher wages in these rich countries in order for them to be able to compete with the manufacturing sector where productivity has gone up a lot, right? So like people can switch jobs, people can move between different sectors of the economy. And so the price basically of these service sector goods where productivity actually hasn't gone up that much have to sort of keep pace. And that's how you end up with this phenomenon where - the same haircut, essentially the same quality, costs the same amount across two places with very different incomes. Now, the way that economists typically have thought about this is that there's a linear relationship. So if you drew like a scatterplot of countries by their income levels and their price levels, you'd just get something like a line. That's like the theorised kind of relationship, a linear Balassa-Samuelson relationship. By that logic, if you put African countries on that scatterplot, it looks like basically that their prices are too high. So they're lying above this line on the scatterplot between GDP and price levels. What I was arguing in this piece is there's some research, in particular a paper from the Journal of International Economics by Hassan, I forget his first name, I think from like 2017 or so, basically arguing that maybe this Balassa-Samuelson relationship is not actually linear. Maybe it's actually nonlinear, right? There's no actually like really strong reason that this thing has to be linear. It's just like it's the easiest model to write down. And this is like a common flaw amongst economists is that you go with the first thing that's like easiest mathematically to do. And then you forget that it's just a simplification and you start to treat it like a feature of reality. But so he writes out a more complicated model where, you know, as is true in the real world, there's not just like a service sector and a non-service sector, as I laid out just a minute ago. There's agriculture, there's manufacturing, there's services. Countries basically shift between these three things as they vary in their stages of development, right? Agriculture for a lot of developing countries is actually mostly non-traded. Think of subsistence farmers, people who grow maize or soybean

    46 min
  8. 11/09/2024

    Trade-offs and Tensions

    In the episode, Tobi talks to Dmitry Grozoubinski about the politics and complexities of global trade, emphasizing the tension between free trade and protectionism. Dmitry explains how trade policy decisions involve difficult choices that impact both producers and consumers, using Nigeria's food inflation as an example. They explore the balance between national interests and global commitments, highlighting how protectionist policies are often rooted in political concerns rather than economic efficiency. The conversation also touches on the challenges of multilateral trade agreements like the WTO and AfCFTA. Dmitry served as an Australian diplomat and trade negotiator at the World Trade Organisation and beyond. He has negotiated complex agreements in Geneva, at WTO and UN Ministerial Conferences in Kenya, and as part of the MH17 task force in Kyiv, Ukraine. Before joining the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, he was a lecturer and tutor at the Monash Graduate School of Business and with the Australian trade consultancy TradeWorthy. He is the lead trainer of ExplainTrade and a Visiting Professor at the University of Strathclyde’s School of Law. Transcript Tobi: The complexity of trade agreements, the bargaining, the negotiation, and everything that surrounds the politics of trade generally does not get covered so much. It's always about the economics of it. And that's what I love about what you do, your project, your book, and everything. So my first question to you is that I know you wrote this basically from the perspective of global trade, and with everything that has been happening, I would say, basically, since the Trump presidency, which, like, brought trade into the headlines, particularly with the US-China “trade war”, quote unquote. And, of course, COVID is what we see with supply chains, decoupling, and so forth. But, I would also say to you that in development, the sub-field of economics that we call development, which is what we try to cover here on the show, trade is also a huge deal. I'll give you a bit of a background. In Nigeria, currently, one of the biggest policy issues is the government trying to decide whether or not to allow the importation of food, basically rice, wheat, and all this other basic stuff. Primarily because food inflation is way above 40%. There's basically a cost of living crisis that has been going on for a few years. People are hungry, people are starving, people are angry because their incomes can no longer even feed them, you know? And so it generates this intense debate because on the other side of that, you have the producer class - the farmers and various lobby groups and political interests who say that, “oh, you really can't import, you're going to turn the country to a dumping ground, we're going to de-industrialise and so many other things.” So one practical question I'll start with you is, if I were a politician, for example, and you know, with the title of your book, let's say that I am an honest politician. Let's assume that I'm an honest politician and I'm asking you that, Dmitry, how do I make this decision? What practical advice would you give me when considering trade policies generally? How do I make trade policy? Dmitry: I think that's a really good question, and I think it kind of goes to the heart of what trade policy is. Anytime you're doing trade policy, you're making choices, and they're often hard choices. You just laid it out perfectly there. You have farmers and other producers of food in Nigeria that are benefiting from very high prices. And you have consumers that are effectively suffering because a substantial part of their weekly budget is going to food, and more than was going before. You mentioned inflation at 40%. That is hugely unsustainable. So as a politician, when you are talking about the choice of bringing in more food, the first thing to do is you have to be honest. And you have to say that, yes, if you allow more food into Nigeria, you will hurt the interests of producers. One reason I wrote the book is that politicians will often try to gloss over this and pretend it's some kind of win-win. They'll talk about competition. They'll talk about greater efficiencies. And that's all true to an extent. But in the short term, if currently you're locking out foreign rice, which is considerably cheaper than Nigerian rice, and you allow that rice in, you are going to hurt Nigerian rice producers. There's absolutely no way around it. So the first thing is to be honest about that choice you're making. The second point is to be honest about what you're trying to do versus what you're not trying to do. So one of the ways that this particular debate often gets twisted into an uncomfortable alley is people will start talking about the notion of food security. So they'll say it's important that Nigeria be able to feed itself. And if we allow foreign food in, that will degrade our ability to be self-sufficient on food, right? To my mind, that's a way of basically misleading the public. It's very, very, very, very few countries are food secure in the sense that if trade were cut off tomorrow, they would produce enough food domestically to feed everyone in the country. Countries like the United Kingdom import something like 65% of their food. Why? Because it's far more efficient that way. And global trade supplies what people need. The amount of work it would take to convert the United Kingdom, for example, into being able to feed itself would mean you have to stop doing everything else in the country and prices would go through the roof. So it's important to be realistic about that. It's also, I think, really important to say we live in an era of climate change. And one of the real problems we are going to face moving forward is that extreme weather events are going to become more common. So you are going to have parts of let's focus just on Africa, you are going to have in coming years parts of Africa that are in drought or flood, while parts of Africa are having a phenomenal crop. And those parts will shift around over and over. Our ability to feed people consistently moving forward is going to rely on us being able to move food from the places that are having a really good year to places that are having a really bad year. And I think any politician who is trying to say that if we just keep the walls around like the tariff walls, the barriers to importing food high enough, Nigeria will be able to feed itself forever every year without sky-high inflation, I think maybe is skipping over just the reality of where we live. Tobi: So, as you know, in places like Washington and the like, which gives advice to poorer countries on how to make policy and what will make them rich, you know that for about three decades, the orthodoxy has more or less been free trade. You know, you need to be more open. You need to allow more trade. You need to allow more goods into your country. Protectionism doesn't work. Which economically seems to be true, but right now, you have some of the richest countries in the world who have been advocates of open trade regimes, actually more or less going back to the mercantilist protectionist policies of the past. Which I think you sort of touched upon, especially the history of this in the second chapter of your book. So can you just give me a brief rundown on some of the shifts that we've gone through historically? And, like, what moves the needle on the dominant thoughts on trade policy? Dmitry: Sure. So when economists talk about free trade being the optimal path forward, what they're actually saying is, if you don't have tariffs, if you don't have trade barriers, we can maximise the efficient use of resources. So the free market will sort of allow and everyone will produce things in the most efficient way. And so overall, as a planet, we will be maximising our labor and our resources. And that's the benefit of that. They also suggest that having competition in your market pushes your own producers to work harder and having free trade can attract more capital. So inflows of capital from abroad that can make investments in your country. With the confidence that if they build a factory in Nigeria, if you've got free trade, if you've locked that in with treaties, they know that that factory will always be able to get the inputs it needs from abroad and always be able to sell whatever it produces to buyers outside of Nigeria. So that makes Nigeria a more attractive investment destination, for example. So that's kind of the logic for a long time. And you mentioned Washington, Brussels, you know, the big economies generally tended to push that line and tended to believe it. Now, I would say straight away, it's important to note that they didn't universally believe it. So, for example, Europe is like, yeah, free trade's great unless you want to sell us certain agricultural commodities. So if you want to sell beef to Europe, suddenly free trade is not so great. And they protect their beef farmers or their lamb farmers or even their wheat and sugar producers. Ditto, America loves free trade when it comes to certain things. But if you try to sell America a light truck, you're paying a 25% tariff at the border. It's virtually impossible to sell certain kinds of services into the U.S. If you want to get a visa into the U.S., you sometimes have to do a job, you sometimes have to wait two years for an interview at a U.S. embassy. So even the rich countries that were preaching free trade were preaching free trade asterisk. So what they were basically saying is, we believe that this is the optimal way to arrange the global economy, except on the things that we care about, the things that we're really sensitive on, where we think what's important isn't efficiency, but keeping the French farmer employed or protecting the US insurance market. What we're seeing now is that that asterisk is growing. So the US, Europe, China

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