Reviewing Chinese history with systems analysis

Vincent Yuanyi Chang
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Understand the big picture for the sake of ourselves email：vychang@alumni.ucdavis.edu B.A. in History and Political Science, University of Claifornia, Davis, 2003 PMP, Project Management I institute， since2007 MBA， Fu-Jen Catholic University， 2008 Powered by Firstory Hosting

  1. The Tragic Destiny of the Cao Family: Sentimentality and the Inevitable Fall of the Wei Dynasty

    2D AGO

    The Tragic Destiny of the Cao Family: Sentimentality and the Inevitable Fall of the Wei Dynasty

    My reflection on reading the Zizhi Tongjian (資治通鉴), which chronicles the Three Kingdoms era of ancient China, leads me to appreciate how fortunate we are today. We live in a republic with a democratic system, division of labor, and balance of power—things that simply didn't exist in ancient times. Today I want to discuss the inevitable collapse of the Wei (魏) dynasty, which traces back to its very foundation. The Paradox of Cao Cao's Genius Cao Cao (曹操) formally established the empire's foundation, enabling his son Cao Pi (曹丕) to force the emperor to abdicate. But here lies the tragedy: both father and sons were multi-talented geniuses, and therein lay their fatal flaw. Geniuses excel at multiple things simultaneously, which becomes extremely difficult to balance. Cao Cao was an excellent statesman, outstanding literary figure, skilled in martial arts, and possessed remarkable leadership. His son Cao Pi inherited these gifts—brilliant in politics and literature—while his other son Cao Zhi (曹植) was perhaps the most tragic figure, a literary genius trapped by political circumstance. The Fatal Flaw: Sentimentality The Cao family's greatest contradiction was being both rational statesmen and deeply sentimental artists. How could someone write such beautiful poetry without profound sentiment? Yet this very sentimentality proved fatal. Compare Cao Cao with Sima Yi (司馬懿), who later established his own dynasty and unified the nation. Sima Yi was educated but utterly unsentimental—historical records show no poetry from him. He could order massacres without hesitation, as when he eliminated Gongsun Yuan (公孫淵) in the northeast, killing thirty thousand people to create terror that would prevent future rebellions. A sentimental person could never order such killings. But to maintain power in feudal times, ruthlessness toward everyone—including family members—was essential. Cao Pi's Burden After Cao Pi claimed the throne, he faced enormous tragedy. Drawn into political conflicts while still pursuing his writing, he became overburdened and died young, around his forties. Though he gave his brother Cao Zhi cruel tests (like the famous "seven-step poem"), he ultimately gave him opportunities—revealing his own sentimental nature despite his political acumen. This emotional side caused problems: he would get drunk before important events, sometimes not even showing up. The Pattern of Decline This contradictory characteristic—excelling at both rational politics and emotional literature—created an impossible tension. Even with intentions to unify the nation, at critical moments they couldn't stand firm and act decisively. This allowed the Sima family to gradually seize control. The Sima family understood that in those chaotic times, there was no right or wrong—only power. They would do anything to maintain control. Meanwhile, though Cao Pi forced the emperor down and ruled for decades, and his son became emperor for thirty years, they couldn't capitalize on their strength. Perhaps there's truth in the Chinese saying: "Born in hardship, die in comfort" (生於憂患,死於安樂). Cao Cao wanted to unify the nation; his son probably wanted it less; his grandson perhaps didn't care at all. Despite being the largest and most powerful kingdom, they lacked the ruthless ambition of the Sima family. The Inevitable Conclusion Perhaps another tragedy was that successive generations no longer maintained the balance or remembered the ordinary people—abandoning Cao Cao's original plan. They became too sentimental compared to the Sima family's calculated ruthlessness. Even if later Cao descendants wanted to act, they lacked the talent and ability. Eventually, they were replaced by the Sima family. In the end, as the saying goes: "The beginning determines the end" (始已註定終). The Cao family's fate was sealed from the very start—their greatest strength, their humanity and sentimentality, became the weakness that destroyed them.   Powered by Firstory Hosting

    31 min
  2. Zhuge Liang and Liu Shan: Idealism Versus Pragmatism in the Shu Han Kingdom

    12/26/2025

    Zhuge Liang and Liu Shan: Idealism Versus Pragmatism in the Shu Han Kingdom

    This analysis examines two pivotal figures of the Shu Han kingdom: Zhuge Liang and Emperor Liu Shan (劉禪). Popular understanding of these figures has been heavily influenced by the novel Romance of the Three Kingdoms, which often distorts their true historical characters. Zhuge Liang: The Uncompromising Idealist Zhuge Liang was undeniably a remarkable figure with an admirable yet ultimately impractical vision: to revive the Han Empire. He devoted himself completely to this goal from a collectivist perspective, willing to sacrifice anything—lives, resources, and the welfare of his people—to achieve his dream of restoring an empire that had fallen eight hundred years prior. While his principles might have been acceptable by first-century standards, his approach was fundamentally flawed. The Brutal Reality of Northern Campaigns During the cold weapon era, numerical superiority was crucial. As Sun Tzu wrote, if your forces are ten times the enemy's, surround them; if five times, attack them. Zhuge Liang launched multiple northern expeditions against Wei, despite Shu Han's severe disadvantages: Territory: Wei controlled six parts of the land, Wu controlled two parts, and Shu Han held only one partPopulation: Wei had approximately 4.5 million people with 1.03 million households; Wu had 2.3 million people with 520,000 households; Shu Han had merely 940,000 people with 200,000 householdsMilitary burden: Shu Han conducted eleven northern campaigns, imposing an enormous burden on its small populationThe campaigns devastated agricultural production. Men were conscripted as soldiers, women were forced into military service and support roles, and the brutal practice of burning enemy fields after victories meant no crop production for years. This created a vicious cycle of resource depletion that Shu Han could not sustain. Liu Shan: The Pragmatic Ruler In contrast, Emperor Liu Shan demonstrated greater wisdom and practicality. He understood the impossible odds and showed remarkable courage in his decisions. When faced with inevitable defeat, he surrendered without resistance to save his people's lives—a decision requiring tremendous courage despite damaging his own reputation. Liu Shan also maintained a delicate balance of power between Zhuge Liang's faction and local interest groups, preventing internal conflicts that could have destroyed the kingdom even sooner. He tolerated criticisms and kept a low profile, showing political acumen that is often underestimated. Conclusion: The Struggle Between Idealism and Reality From both geographical and strategic perspectives, Zhuge Liang's vision was impractical and idealistic, while Liu Shan was pragmatic and realistic. The fall of Shu Han was inevitable given the resource disparity and the changing nature of loyalty after nearly two hundred years of chaos. The kingdom's story exemplifies the eternal struggle between noble ideals and harsh reality—and serves as a reminder that even the most admirable goals cannot overcome insurmountable practical obstacles. Powered by Firstory Hosting

    29 min
  3. The Fall of Guan Yu and the Breakdown of the Sun-Liu Alliance

    12/20/2025

    The Fall of Guan Yu and the Breakdown of the Sun-Liu Alliance

    Summary This reflection examines a critical period in Three Kingdoms history following the Battle of Red Cliffs (208 CE). The analysis focuses on how Cao Pi's ascension to power in 220 CE—after forcing Emperor Xian to abdicate—destabilized the regional balance of power and ultimately led to the collapse of the alliance between Liu Bei's Shu Han and Sun Quan's Eastern Wu (Dongwu). Key Events: Strategic Maneuvering: Cao Pi's advisers suggested granting Sun Quan an official title to legitimize his territory, aiming to prevent him from supporting Liu Bei. Despite initial humiliation, Sun Quan's acceptance of this title demonstrated pragmatic leadership—he recognized the strategic value of nominal recognition from the north. The Jingzhou Problem: The root of conflict lay in longstanding territorial disputes over Jingzhou. Liu Bei had promised to return this region to Sun Quan years earlier but never honored this agreement. Instead, he appointed Guan Yu as governor, creating an unstable situation with competing claims. Guan Yu's Weaknesses: While Guan Yu excelled as a warrior in one-on-one combat, he proved inadequate as a regional administrator. His arrogance, poor treatment of subordinates, and lack of political acumen made him vulnerable. His decision to attack the north while leaving Jingzhou poorly defended was a critical tactical error. Sun Quan's Calculated Strike: Eastern Wu forces, led by Lü Meng, recaptured Jingzhou with minimal casualties while Guan Yu was engaged in the north. When Guan Yu rushed back exhausted, he was captured and faced execution. Sun Quan's dilemma—whether to kill Liu Bei's sworn brother—was resolved when Guan Yu died, though the exact circumstances remain historically ambiguous. Liu Bei's Response: Liu Bei's subsequent attack on Eastern Wu appeared to be revenge for Guan Yu's death, but the analysis suggests deeper motivations. Liu Bei may have allowed Guan Yu's fall deliberately, as Guan Yu's insubordination had become problematic. The campaign served to maintain Liu Bei's reputation for loyalty while eliminating a troublesome subordinate. Historical Reassessment: The analysis challenges traditional portrayals (particularly from Romance of the Three Kingdoms) that depict Sun Quan as weak or incompetent. Instead, it argues that Sun Quan demonstrated exceptional wisdom and leadership by knowing when to yield and when to strike—qualities that enabled him to rule for the longest period of any Three Kingdoms emperor. Conclusion This episode illustrates how personal relationships, territorial disputes, and political pragmatism intersected during the Three Kingdoms period. Sun Quan's recapture of Jingzhou not only eliminated a powerful general and reclaimed ancestral territory but also exposed the limitations of Liu Bei's brotherhood rhetoric, revealing the harsh political realities beneath idealistic appeals to loyalty.   Powered by Firstory Hosting

    39 min
  4. The Transformation of Chinese Society During the Three Kingdoms Period (220-280 CE)

    12/14/2025

    The Transformation of Chinese Society During the Three Kingdoms Period (220-280 CE)

    This reflection examines the Three Kingdoms era as a pivotal transitional period in Chinese history, marking approximately 400 years of profound change from the late Han Dynasty through the early Jin Dynasty. Three Major Shifts: First, the decline of Confucianism's monopoly on governance and education. While Confucian learning had been the sole pathway to government positions since the first century BCE, this exclusivity began eroding during the Three Kingdoms period. Liu Bei's defeat in 221 CE symbolized a turning point—despite the Han Dynasty formally ending nearly 200 years earlier, many still supported restoration. However, by the late third century (270s-280s CE), people no longer believed one family could rule perpetually. The competition among multiple leaders demonstrated that family lineage alone couldn't guarantee the imperial mandate. Second, the rise of pragmatism over idealism in leadership. The contrast between Zhuge Liang and Sima Yi illustrates this shift perfectly. Zhuge Liang pursued the noble but impractical goal of restoring the Han Empire, despite Shu Han being significantly weaker than its rivals—facing opponents six to seven times larger in territory and five times greater in population. Sima Yi, conversely, prioritized his family's survival and was willing to compromise principles for practical success. This pragmatic approach ultimately prevailed, with the Sima family establishing the Jin Dynasty, though internal rivalries quickly undermined it. Third, the troubling transformation of intellectual culture. The elite classes, particularly those in government during the Northern and Southern Dynasties era, became absorbed in abstract philosophical debates rather than practical governance. This intellectual indulgence produced no tangible contributions to society and may have stagnated China's development for centuries, contributing to weakness that allowed northern invasions by the mid-ninth century (850s CE). Paradoxically, this chaotic era also represented the last time ancient Chinese society experimented with diverse political systems, producing remarkably educated individuals across different regions who freely expressed varied perspectives. This intellectual diversity, despite its flaws, marked the end of an era of political pluralism in Chinese history. Powered by Firstory Hosting

    27 min
  5. Why the North Always Wins: Climate, Psychology, and the Pattern of Power

    12/06/2025

    Why the North Always Wins: Climate, Psychology, and the Pattern of Power

    This reflection, inspired by reading Mr. Baoyan's "Comprehensive Mirror for Aid in Government," explores a striking historical pattern: northern states consistently defeat southern states in territorial conflicts, driven by geographical and psychological factors. The Chinese Historical Pattern The author begins with the Three Kingdoms era, noting how the Battle of Red Cliffs established territorial divisions along natural boundaries like the Yangtze River. The political intrigue—Liu Bei borrowing Jingzhou from Sun Quan but refusing to return it—illustrates the territorial tensions of the period. More significantly, examining Chinese history from the Three Kingdoms until today reveals that virtually no southern state has successfully defeated a northern power and unified the territory. This pattern began with Liu Bang (northern) defeating Xiang Yu (southeastern) after the Qin Dynasty's collapse and continued through subsequent dynasties. The Sui Emperor Yang Jian had northern connections, Song Dynasty founder Zhao Kuangyin was a northern military leader, and even when the Song fled south, they were eventually destroyed by the Mongols—another northern power. The Ming Dynasty provides a particularly interesting case: Emperor Zhu Yuanzhang, aware of the Mongols' continued strength in Central and West Asia, moved the capital to Beijing for better defense and prohibited ocean-going ships, fearing Mongol return by sea. This explains why he sent Zheng He on maritime reconnaissance missions despite the general prohibition. The Geographical-Psychological Explanation The author attributes this pattern to how climate and geography shape human psychology. The harsh, resource-poor north creates populations willing to risk everything for gain—scarcity breeds aggression and ambition. Conversely, the warm, fertile south provides abundance, making people less willing to gamble their comfortable lives on military ventures. This was evident in the Three Kingdoms' Wu Kingdom, where the four great families of Jiangdong preferred maintaining their prosperity over risky territorial expansion. When you're starving, you'll do anything for more; when you have plenty, why risk losing it? Western Historical Examples This pattern appears in Western history too, though with exceptions. The Dutch became a naval power despite their northern location and Spain's overwhelming numerical and resource advantages. However, the British (Anglo-Saxons who fled to the islands after defeat by the French) eventually defeated the Spanish, exemplifying the tougher northern mentality overcoming southern abundance. The American Civil War provides the clearest modern example. The North's victory was predictable because southern soldiers preferred staying home tending farms rather than fighting, while the industrialized North had populations already adapted to regimented factory work similar to military service. Southern reliance on slave labor for fieldwork created psychological conditions ill-suited for sustained combat, whereas northerners were psychologically prepared for organized, physical labor. Modern Relevance The author concludes that modern society, with its advanced technology and weakened connection to nature, may underestimate how geography and climate continue shaping human psychology and historical outcomes. By examining historical power shifts—from Chinese dynasties to the American Civil War—we see that environmental factors remain powerful forces influencing human motivation, behavior, and the rise and fall of nations, even in our technologically advanced age.   Powered by Firstory Hosting

    29 min
  6. Three Political Systems, One Era: Power Structures in the Three Kingdoms Period

    11/28/2025

    Three Political Systems, One Era: Power Structures in the Three Kingdoms Period

    This discussion focuses on the eighth book of Mr. Bo Yang's Comprehensive Mirror to Aid in Government (通鑒記事本末), specifically covering the Battle of Red Cliffs during the Three Kingdoms era (late 2nd to late 3rd century CE). The analysis examines three key aspects: political systems, north-south relationships, and the power dynamics between major leaders—Cao Cao (曹操), Sun Quan (孫權), and Liu Bei (劉備). By the end of the Han Dynasty, the empire fractured into three major factions, plus minor states in northern regions near modern-day Liaoning Province and the Korean Peninsula. Three Distinct Political Systems: Cao Wei (曹魏) - Cao Cao established a meritocracy that prioritized ability over aristocratic lineage. Though from the elite class himself (his father Cao Song was adopted by a eunuch, which brought social stigma), Cao Cao recruited talented individuals from common backgrounds, including Sima Yi and other capable advisers. His government balanced elite families like the Xiahou clan with commoners, using the latter to counterbalance aristocrats who weren't completely loyal. Emperor Xian remained a figurehead during this period. Eastern Wu (孫吳) - Sun Quan's regime was essentially an oligarchy controlled by eight major families (the "Four Great Families": Zhu, Zhang, Gu, Lu, plus four northern families who fled south). These educated elites looked down on the Sun family as military protectors but needed their troops for security. All major decisions required consensus from all families, not just majority rule, which significantly slowed development and created factional conflicts between northern and southern family groups. Shu Han (蜀漢) - Liu Bei claimed descent from Emperor Jing of Zhongshan, though this lineage was unverifiable. Starting as a commoner without resources, he was forced to cooperate with elites from Yi Province (modern Sichuan) and Jing Province. His government divided into two groups: locals from Yi Province and transplants from Jing Province. Liu Bei favored commoners and Jing Province elites to control local powers, though he relied more heavily on aristocrats than Cao Cao due to his lack of initial resources and connections.   Historical Significance: The Three Kingdoms era is unique in Chinese history because three entirely different political systems coexisted simultaneously and competed against each other. This period also produced exceptional talent in military strategy, politics, and literature, fostering remarkable creativity and innovation.   #Three Kingdoms era#Battle of Red Cliffs#Cao Cao political system#Han Dynasty collapse#Chinese meritocracy vs aristocracy#Sun Quan Liu Bei power structure   Join as a free member to stay updated with the latest information: https://open.firstory.me/join/ckeiik73n1k6i08391xamn9ho Make a small donation to support this program: https://open.firstory.me/user/ckeiik73n1k6i08391xamn9ho Leave a comment to tell me your thoughts on this episode: https://open.firstory.me/user/ckeiik73n1k6i08391xamn9ho/comments   Powered by Firstory Hosting

    33 min
  7. The Chaotic Warfare of 2nd & 3rd Century China

    11/19/2025

    The Chaotic Warfare of 2nd & 3rd Century China

    Today, I’d like to talk about the second major event described in the 7th book of Mr. Bo Yang’s Tongjian Jishi Benmo—the turbulent struggle for power in the late Eastern Han dynasty. Many of you may already be familiar with the wars, the rivalries, and the rise of various warlords during that period. So rather than retelling the same historical stories, I’d like to approach this event from a different angle—the perspective of mindset and psychological dynamics. To help us better understand what truly shaped this era, I will discuss it from three interconnected viewpoints. 1. The Court Environment and the Fall of Dong Zhuo Let us begin with the political atmosphere inside the capital before Dong Zhuo entered. Although the eunuchs appeared to wield enormous power, in reality they had neither armies nor real influence—only proximity to the emperor. Their situation was much like the Chinese idiom “a fox pretending to be a tiger,” creating an illusion of strength. Dong Zhuo, however, was fundamentally different. He commanded more than two hundred thousand soldiers. Even when he marched toward the capital, he brought with him only ten to twenty thousand troops—yet this was already more than enough to overshadow the eunuchs entirely. For nearly two centuries, the scholar-officials had resisted the idea of letting military strongmen interfere with imperial authority. But from Dong Zhuo’s standpoint, loyalty to a warlord felt more tangible than loyalty to the emperor. This mindset eventually drove him to attempt not only to dominate the court but to replace the emperor altogether. Naturally, the ministers could not accept such ambition. They bribed Lü Bu—Dong Zhuo’s own adopted son—to assassinate him. Although Dong Zhuo was eliminated, the capital fell into chaos, countless factions emerged, and trust within the political center completely collapsed. 2. The Emperor’s Mindset and His Wandering Journey Next, let us consider the psychological condition of the emperor and the imperial family. Forced to flee in the midst of political turmoil, they wandered from one regional governor to another, hoping someone would shelter them. For generations, imperial family members had lived in comfort and were accustomed to being served. Suddenly deprived of security, they had no knowledge of how to survive on their own. As a result, they lived in constant fear—unsure whom to trust, unsure even where they could safely rest. Eventually, one official accompanying the emperor suggested seeking refuge with Cao Cao. Why Cao Cao? Because his foster father, Cao Teng, had been the last respected eunuch of the Eastern Han—kind, restrained, and widely trusted. This connection offered a psychological anchor. The emperor believed Cao Cao might feel a sense of responsibility or sympathy toward the imperial family. At that time, Cao Cao was already a complex figure—part statesman, part military strategist, and certainly a rising political force. Yet he was also someone who retained personal emotions and a sense of duty. Having grown up near the capital and visited the palace with his grandfather, he felt a familiarity with the royal household. His father had risen to high office thanks to Cao Teng, giving him yet another reason to protect the dynasty. Because of all these emotional and psychological factors, Cao Cao made his crucial decision: to escort the emperor to his base at Xuchang, safeguard him, and restore the legitimacy of the Han court. Only many years later was the capital finally moved back to Luoyang. 3. The Mindsets of the Warlords Lastly, let us examine the warlords themselves. Those who had already built power through their own efforts were reluctant to bow to the emperor again. To them, submitting to imperial authority meant lowering themselves. Many preferred autonomy rather than surrendering the right to make their own final decisions. However, simply holding the emperor without using his legitimacy was also pointless. Cao Cao’s advisers understood something crucial: whoever controlled the emperor would hold the moral and political high ground when dealing with other warlords. Many warlords hesitated between principle, pride, and self-interest. But Cao Cao—guided by both emotional understanding and political calculation—acted decisively. His mindset allowed him to seize an opportunity others were too hesitant to grasp. And that single decision reshaped the direction of Chinese history. Conclusion What I hope to highlight is this: Behind every historical event, beyond the battles and written records, lie deep psychological forces—personal fears, ambitions, loyalties, and beliefs that shape human behavior. By understanding the mindsets of historical figures, we can also reflect on our own. Before making any important decision—especially in the workplace—it helps to pause and consider not only our own psychological state, but also that of the people we interact with. When we understand these underlying factors, we make wiser, more grounded choices. Thank you for listening.   #Power dynamics psychology#Decision-making under uncertainty#Learned helplessness#Machiavellianism leadership psychology#Psychological manipulation authority#Gratitude motivation behavior   Join as a free member to stay updated with the latest information: https://open.firstory.me/join/ckeiik73n1k6i08391xamn9ho Make a small donation to support this program: https://open.firstory.me/user/ckeiik73n1k6i08391xamn9ho Leave a comment to tell me your thoughts on this episode: https://open.firstory.me/user/ckeiik73n1k6i08391xamn9ho/comments   Powered by Firstory Hosting

    34 min
  8. When Trust Collapsed: The Psychology of Loyalty and Power in Late Han China's Gradual Fall

    11/11/2025

    When Trust Collapsed: The Psychology of Loyalty and Power in Late Han China's Gradual Fall

    Hello, friends. Today I want to discuss the Seven Masters of Jian'an period and make comparisons between the past and contemporary times—or rather, the modern age. Historical Context: The Late Eastern Han Empire The background is the late Eastern Han Dynasty, from roughly the 170s CE until just before its end. The empire experienced a clear three-way division of power. There's a Chinese saying: "三尺冰,非一日之寒" (Three feet of ice doesn't form in a single day). The meaning is that significant developments take considerable time to unfold. Consider this parallel: In 1985, most Americans still believed the Soviet Union was stronger than the United States. Just six years later, in 1991, the world realized the Soviet Union had never been as powerful as it claimed, and it collapsed. However, this collapse shouldn't have been surprising—it was gradual and inevitable, with the seeds of self-destruction probably planted in the 1970s or even earlier. The Power Structure: Eunuchs vs. Local Leaders Now let me discuss what I believe was a critical dynamic in late Han China: the competition between eunuchs and relatives of imperial family members. The ultimate winners were the eunuchs. The eunuchs occupy a tragic place in history. As castrated men, they were acutely aware of their incomplete masculinity. Interestingly, because they were considered part of the extended imperial family, they could move freely throughout the country, building up their power bases and factions. The eunuchs, however, could only control the capital—there weren't many of them, and they had no legitimate excuse to travel around the country. Moreover, they knew that ordinary people recognized they weren't complete men but weren't entirely women either. Because of this awareness and the stigma of their physical condition, they tried to remain as mysterious as possible, rarely venturing outside the capital. This became an unspoken agreement or mutual understanding: the eunuchs would send messages to local leaders—governors, generals, or powerful families—indicating they had no interest in seizing their power and benefits, as long as these leaders showed loyalty to them and the puppet emperor. This created a de facto division: inside the capital versus outside the capital. Each region operated almost independently, with its own leader having control over local affairs. The nation became fractured. Gradual Collapse vs. Sudden Collapse If we say the Soviet Union collapsed suddenly, I would argue that the Eastern Han Empire did not collapse suddenly. It took 20-30 years to be certain that the nation had been divided and would not be reunified in the short term, even though the emperor still nominally existed. My conclusion is that the Eastern Han Empire collapsed gradually and slowly. The eunuchs seemed very powerful, but that was only in appearance. In fact, they only controlled the capital. Their actual power was limited—they could use moralistic pressure against local leaders, and the emperor commanded respect only by words, not through real authority. Dong Zhuo Breaks the Balance The person who destroyed this careful balance was Dong Zhuo (董卓). Originally just a local warlord, he was required to visit the palace to greet the emperor several times a year. After several such visits, Dong Zhuo realized the eunuchs weren't scary at all—they didn't even know how to command troops. So he decided to control the capital himself instead of letting the eunuchs control it. This marked the end of the power-sharing arrangement between eunuchs and local leaders. What happened next—who governed with dominant power—I'll discuss next week. Impact on Society and Loyalty Now let's discuss the effects on ordinary people. In the past, members of the imperial family would travel around the nation to show themselves to the public as delegates of the emperor. But during the eunuch era, they couldn't do this because they probably weren't brave enough to show their faces to the masses. They would need heavily guarded carriages instead of riding horses and facing people directly. This erosion of loyalty had profound consequences. When people realized the emperor was merely a puppet exercising symbolic power, they experienced confusion about authority: Whom should they obey? Officially, they still had to maintain the appearance of loyalty, but local leaders increasingly acted like emperors themselves. Eventually, local officials, bureaucrats, and civilians transferred their loyalty to local leaders. They no longer cared who the emperor was or who controlled the capital—they only cared whether their local leader would maintain their basic living standards. Philosophical and Religious Shift This confusion extended to philosophy. Officially, the emperor was still supreme, but practically speaking, he was useless and insignificant. The Confucian school of thought that emphasized loyalty to the emperor became unattractive, especially to the educated and literate classes. On the other hand, Buddhism and Daoism—which offered ultimate truths and comforting teachings—helped people cope with reality and internal conflicts. This is one reason why, starting in the later part of the second century, more of the population turned to schools of thought like Buddhism and Daoism. The positive aspect was spiritual exploration. The negative aspect was that people interpreted these philosophies in self-serving ways, shifting loyalty from the emperor to local leaders, and then to an even narrower circle: close relatives, extended family members sharing the same surname, or even just the nuclear family. Mutual trust collapsed or decreased seriously—a very serious impact from this era that continued for a very long time. Comparison to Modern America Now, to compare with today: I've mentioned the Soviet Union; now let me discuss the United States. I truly believe Americans are very lucky that their Founding Fathers learned from past differences and either invented or created a federal system based on republic and liberty. They established a clear division of power—not just separation of administration, legislature, and judiciary, but also between federal, state, and local levels. From my understanding (forgive me if I'm wrong), the President's authority is primarily over foreign affairs and national security. For internal affairs, the President doesn't have authority to make orders—it's more like a coordination role. If there's conflict, the President can mediate and resolve it. State governors deal mostly with issues involving other states, while the rest falls to local authority—mayors or county commissioners handle local matters. Even the federal government, though the President is the chief, has many departments, and department heads have quite high authority to make their decisions. When there's interdepartmental or intercity conflict, the county council chairman can intervene. Why Centralization Is Dangerous The power and authority are widespread and separated. Looking at the past—not just ancient history but even today in Taiwan and certainly in China—it's still a mess because power is always centralized and unified. Now you can see why Dong Zhuo, the warlord and general, wanted to be the dominator himself instead of remaining just a local leader—he would gain far more power. Remember that many governors and generals never attempted this. Of their previous positions over nearly two hundred years, only a few had the ambition or the ability to run for supreme power. Many probably retired because they knew they couldn't win such a contest. But here's my key point: The President of the United States doesn't have that much more power than a governor of a major state. So Americans know what they should do and when they should step back. The Enduring Problem in Chinese History Looking at Chinese history, because it's a centralized system, that position represents ultimate power and ultimate authority. Everyone interested in obtaining that position will do whatever it takes to seize it. The only thing that sometimes kept people in their place was fear. After the eunuchs' era in the Eastern Han Dynasty—something that occurred over 1,800 years ago in the second century, well before our current 21st century—a pattern emerged: Once someone became a governor or general and believed he had enough resources to challenge the emperor, he would do so. There's no modesty at all, only greed. Conclusion This may be the worst, longest-lasting impact of the first era of eunuchs in ancient Chinese history, which occurred in the second half of the second century. This is something that resonates even today—we still need to find a way to fix it. Thank you all for listening. That's it for today.   #Eunuchs in Chinese History#Fall of empires comparison#Loyalty shift psychology#Trust erosion#Identity confusion#Coping mechanisms   Join as a free member to stay updated with the latest information: https://open.firstory.me/join/ckeiik73n1k6i08391xamn9ho Make a small donation to support this program: https://open.firstory.me/user/ckeiik73n1k6i08391xamn9ho Leave a comment to tell me your thoughts on this episode: https://open.firstory.me/user/ckeiik73n1k6i08391xamn9ho/comments   Powered by Firstory Hosting

    37 min
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Understand the big picture for the sake of ourselves email：vychang@alumni.ucdavis.edu B.A. in History and Political Science, University of Claifornia, Davis, 2003 PMP, Project Management I institute， since2007 MBA， Fu-Jen Catholic University， 2008 Powered by Firstory Hosting

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