Judgement: Learning Resources, Inc., et al v Trump, President of the United States, et al, No 24-1287 decided on 20 February 2026 Guest: Andriy Shalennyy - Associate, Floyd Zadkovich Luke and Andriy discuss the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Learning Resources, Inc., et al v Trump, President of the United States, et al, No 24-1287. The dispute arose from President Trump’s decision to impose sweeping import tariffs shortly after he took office in 2025 in reliance on the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). By a 6 to 3 majority, the Supreme Court ruled that IEEPA did not give the US President a power to impose tariffs. The result of the ruling is to invalidate the “drug trafficking tariffs” imposed on most Mexican, Canadian, and Chinese imports and the “trade deficit (or “reciprocal”) tariffs” imposed “on all imports from all trading partners”. IEEPA gives the US President economic tools to address significant foreign threats. When acting under IEEPA, the President must identify an “unusual and extraordinary threat” to American national security, foreign policy, or the economy, originating primarily “outside the United States” and he must declare a national emergency. He may then take a number of actions to deal with the threat. One of such actions available to the President is to “regulate… importation”. President Trump considered the drug trafficking and the trade deficits to be “unusual and extraordinary” threats, and therefore, declared a national emergency as to both. Import tariffs ranging between 10% and 25% followed. The majority decided that the words “regulate” and “importation” (separated by 16 other words in the relevant provision of IEEPA) simply did not bear the weight that the President argued they did. In summary, the reasoning of the Court is as follows: (1) the power to impose taxes is vested by the US Constitution in the Congress alone, (2) trade tariffs are, by nature, taxes levied on imported goods and services, and as such, the President has no inherent authority to impose tariffs during peacetime, (3) the “distinct and extraordinary” power to impose tariffs can only be delegated by clear words (a requirement of the so-called “major questions” doctrine), (4) the words “regulate” and “importation” do not cross that high threshold, (5) this “common sense” approach is supported by legislative practice: when Congress wishes to delegate its taxation powers, it does so in explicit terms. Congress has consistently used words like “duty” in statutes delegating authority to impose tariffs. It is worth pausing at the “major questions” doctrine mentioned above. It is a potent tool used by the judiciary to keep the executive branch in check, when the latter tries to claim that it possesses some extraordinary power. A striking example cited by the Supreme Court related to an attempt by the Biden administration to cancel USD 430 billion (!) in student loan debt in reliance on a statute which authorised the Secretary of Education to “waive or modify” statutory or regulatory provisions applicable to financial assistance programs. The Supreme Court decided that the Secretary could cancel the student debt of a single borrower satisfying certain conditions, but not every borrower in the country. Luke and Andriy focus their discussion on the leading judgement given by Chief Justice Roberts that addresses in detail the questions of separation of powers and the specific statutory language of IEEPA. They then turn to a consideration of the reasons given by the President and echoed by the dissenting justices, and why the majority found those reasons unconvincing. The last item on the agenda is the practical impact of the decision. An interesting feature of the judgement is that it does not spell out whether approximately the USD 175 billion worth of import tariffs are reimbursable – that is the question. We expect that further litigation will ensue to clarify this issue.
