Dr. Corneliu Bjola on the Future of Statecraft Interview by Maya Plentz | 16 September 2026 Support THE BRIEF. Become a paid subscriber. How Diplomats Are Adopting AI Artificial intelligence is part of the daily work of foreign ministries, but its major impact may not be the automation of diplomatic work. It may be the transformation of the environment in which diplomacy itself is practiced. In my interview with Dr. Corneliu Bjola, Professor of Digital Diplomacy at the University of Oxford and head of the Oxford Digital Diplomacy Research Group, we discussed AI as a tool, and as a medium, and the wider geopolitical environment where these changes in digital diplomacy are happening. “A lot of the discussion is about AI as a tool. But behind this tool there is also a medium—and there is the bigger picture of AI as an environment.” At the level of tools, diplomats already use generative AI for translation, summarization, audience analysis, pattern detection and content production. As a medium, however, AI begins to shape how officials perceive information, formulate messages and engage increasingly segmented publics. At the environmental level, the issue expands beyond software to the infrastructure that makes AI possible: semiconductors, critical raw materials, energy, water and data centres. Listening before broadcasting Much of the excitement around AI-powered public diplomacy has centred on personalization. Foreign ministries can tailor messages to specific audiences and communicate at far greater speed and scale. Bjola argues that the more valuable capability may be the reverse: listening. AI can help ministries monitor how issues are developing across languages and platforms, identify emerging concerns and distinguish meaningful signals from the flood of online noise. But the system cannot eliminate the need for diplomatic experience. Officials must interrogate where information comes from, how a conclusion was reached and what alternative explanations may fit the evidence. The danger is automation bias: inexperienced users can become impressed by fluent outputs and follow them uncritically. Bjola therefore sees continuous training as essential. The tools used in 2026 are already substantially different from those launched in 2022, and diplomatic education cannot treat AI literacy as a one-off course. AI is lowering the cost of influence operations The same systems that can strengthen diplomatic analysis can also make manipulation cheaper. Influence campaigns that once required sizeable teams can increasingly be run by a few people—or potentially one operator working with multiple agents. This changes the economics of disinformation and cyber-enabled influence. A couple of people—one person even—can engage in influence operations on a large scale, using agents. Sometimes for good, sometimes for evil. For foreign ministries, the challenge is to counter a handful of organized adversaries. They may face hundreds or thousands of state, commercial and individual actors operating at machine speed. Institutions built around slow procedures, annual budgets and hierarchical approvals risk responding with what Bjola called “one hand behind your back.” Diplomacy and the imponderables To explain what machines cannot resolve, Bjola drew on the findings of the book by Peter C. Grace, The Intelligence Intellectuals: Social Scientists and the Making of the CIA, which explores how elite academics—most notably Yale historian Sherman Kent—transformed reactive gut instinct into systematic, predictive strategic intelligence, one of the architects of modern intelligence analysis. “Imponderables” are factors that resist reliable measurement: political intentions, surprise, adaptation and chance. More data can reduce some uncertainty, but never all of it. This is where Bjola brings in the French philosopher Henri Bergson’s distinction between intelligence and intuition. Analytical intelligence classifies and connects evidence; intuition helps people perceive a dynamic reality while it is still unfolding. In a volatile crisis, diplomats need both. Teaching statecraft on shifting ground Bjola has introduced an Oxford course on diplomacy and emerging technologies that covers AI, virtual reality, quantum technologies and synthetic biology. His curriculum separates three speeds of change. Tools such as ChatGPT, Claude, DeepSeek, Mistral and newer agents change fastest. Capabilities—translation, segmentation, pattern recognition and crisis analysis—change more slowly. Strategic problems such as persuasion, deception, signalling, ambiguity and escalation are the most enduring. That structure allows students to examine new systems without mistaking each product release for a new theory of international relations. It also explains why Bjola draws on philosophy, psychology, anthropology, mathematics and literature. Henri Bergson illuminates intuition; Hannah Arendt raises questions about bureaucracy and dehumanization; Ernst Cassirer helps explain how AI models become symbolic filters through which reality and national images are understood. The future diplomatic workforce The diplomat of the AI era still needs expertise in trade, international law, security, climate or development. But domain expertise must now be combined with technical literacy, source criticism and the ability to work with—and challenge—AI systems. Foreign ministries will need people who understand both policy and the digital environment in which policy is negotiated. Bjola’s message is neither utopian nor alarmist. AI can improve diplomatic listening, intelligence and decision-making. It can also intensify manipulation, fragment the information environment and concentrate power in the companies and states that control the technology stack. The decisive variable is whether diplomatic institutions adapt quickly enough while preserving the human capacity for judgement. Listen or read my interview with Dr. Bjola. Subscribe to our newsletter THE BRIEF, to our YouTube channel, Apple and Spotify Podcasts and leave a review. We would love to hear from you. Transcript The following transcript has been slightly edited for clarity. Corneliu Bjola 00:00 Thanks you for inviting me again to the brief, I’m more than happy to discuss with you about new developments in the field, as you suggested. Maya Plentz 00:10 There’s so much happening, in terms of AI, I think when we spoke last with it was before the launch of ChatGPT that made this huge change in terms of how people are using these technologies in diplomacy, and how diplomats are adopting it and, and so on. And I’ve seen that you have been very, of course, following this very closely. Didn’t miss a beat in a sense, because you’ve been always looking into it and writing papers and analyzing and examining all these issues. Your work highlights how the grammar of digital space changes international statecraft. As public diplomacy shifts from basic social media broadcasting to a hyper personalized AI driven engagement, what do you see as the most significant operational gain for foreign ministries trying to project soft power today, and what are the pitfalls? Corneliu Bjola 01:14 Things are moving very fast. That creates a challenge for those both who try to use these tools in various diplomatic areas, but also for those who study how people use AI in the new environment. Starting with the first question you asked about the challenges. When I follow what is happening in terms of this fast acceleration of this digital tools and also the proliferation is actually fragmentation of the AI digital field. I find it quite interesting to go back to some political theories that one of them which I found it particularly inspiring for this moment. It’s a French philosopher, Henri Bergson. And I’m going to explain very briefly why do I think it’s quite relevant in this context to make sense of what is happening. Bergson received the Nobel Prize in 1927 for literature. It’s important because he makes an interesting distinction between intelligence and intuition. With intelligence is what we do all the time. We try to classify things. We try to make connections, try to look at reality and make sense of what is happening. And I think intelligence is quite important in this case. We develop analytical categories for what we see. We try to make a connection between these analytical categories. We try to see how they can be optimized for various functions. But what Bergson insisted is that reality is not static. And we see that happening, especially with the AI in the past two years, three years, quite well. So reality is dynamic, it’s becoming, it’s evolving. So he has this interesting concept, the French concept, duration, that you have to look at how things unfold in particular sequences of time. And I think this duration is interesting because this is where intuition kicks in. It’s trying to understand a little bit, you know, how this process unfolds before our eyes. So intelligence is the analytical part, but then there is this kind of intuitive sense of what we see before we can apply for analytical categories. Intelligence, in many cases, requires confirmation, requires validation, requires empirical evidence. And that takes a little bit of time to make sense, right? When you talk about GPT and agents, to what extent are we going, as OpenAI announced last week, into the age of AGI. Are we there yet? Do we have evidence? So what, on the other hand, if we apply this Bergsonian model, can we have an intuition, whether this is indeed, you know, the right process? So I think this is something that I found particularly interesting to follow. What is intelligence? What is intuition in the way in which we try to understand what is happening? Now, going back to the pitfalls that you mentioned. I think what we see nowadays, again, maybe a little bit of intelligence, maybe a little bit of