The Brief with Maya Plentz

Maya Plentz

Hear first hand from the diplomats, tech executives, investors, UN and EU officials that are changing the world through dialogue and are using emerging technologies for good. theunbrief.substack.com

  1. 3h ago

    Weekend Edition | Who Will Be the Next UN Secretary-General? | UNECE Puts Forth Policies to Address Ageing | UN Charter Signed in San Francisco on 26 June 1945

    How is the UN Secretary-General selected? The UN Secretary-General is not directly elected by the public or freely chosen by the General Assembly. Under Article 97 of the UN Charter, the Secretary-General is appointed by the General Assembly on the recommendation of the Security Council. In practice, the Security Council decides first, and the General Assembly normally appoints the candidate recommended to it. The decisive political filter is therefore the Security Council. A candidate needs sufficient support among the 15 Council members and must avoid a veto by any of the five permanent members: China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States. Substantive Council decisions require nine affirmative votes and no veto by a permanent member. Since the reforms around the 2016 selection process, the procedure has become more transparent, but not fully democratic. Member States may nominate candidates; candidates submit CVs and vision statements; the General Assembly holds informal dialogues; and civil society and Member States can ask questions. However, the decisive bargaining and straw polls still take place behind closed doors in the Security Council. Resolution 69/321 was important because it created the expectation of informal dialogues and a more transparent nomination process. Still, the General Assembly has almost always received only one candidate from the Council. Legally, the Assembly appoints; politically, it rarely challenges the Council’s recommendation. The race is therefore less an election than a diplomatic elimination process. The successful candidate must be acceptable to Washington, Moscow, Beijing, London and Paris, while also gathering support from elected Council members and satisfying regional and political expectations. Dag Hammarskjöld is the classic example of a compromise candidate. In 1953, after Trygve Lie’s resignation, better-known figures such as Lester B. Pearson of Canada, Carlos P. Romulo of the Philippines, Nasrollah Entezam of Iran and Luis Padilla Nervo of Mexico were considered. Pearson was blocked by the Soviet Union. Hammarskjöld, then a Swedish economist, civil servant and diplomat, emerged as a low-profile figure acceptable to both Cold War blocs. He was recommended by the Security Council and appointed by the General Assembly, serving from April 1953 until his death in 1961. Kofi Annan’s selection in 1996 followed a different path. Boutros Boutros-Ghali sought a second term, but the United States vetoed his reappointment. The Council then turned to African alternatives. Annan, from Ghana, was then Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations and a long-serving UN insider. He became the compromise candidate, was recommended by the Security Council on 13 December 1996, and was appointed by the General Assembly for a term beginning on 1 January 1997. Other races show the same pattern. In 1961, U Thant of Burma was chosen as an interim compromise after Hammarskjöld’s death. In 1971, Kurt Waldheim emerged after vetoes and miscalculations among the permanent members. In 1981, Javier Pérez de Cuéllar was selected after a long deadlock in which China blocked Waldheim’s attempt at a third term and the United States opposed Salim Ahmed Salim of Tanzania. That race helped consolidate the norm of two five-year terms and reinforced the practice of regional rotation. Several past Secretaries-General were career diplomats, including Kurt Waldheim of Austria, Javier Pérez de Cuéllar of Peru and Ban Ki-moon of South Korea. Pérez de Cuéllar was a lawyer and career diplomat who joined Peru’s foreign ministry. Ban had a 37-year diplomatic career before becoming South Korea’s foreign minister. Waldheim was an Austrian diplomat and later foreign minister. Dag Hammarskjöld and U Thant were diplomatic figures, but not career diplomats in the same strict sense. Hammarskjöld came from Sweden’s senior civil service and foreign-policy establishment. U Thant had been an educator, civil servant and Burma’s Permanent Representative to the UN. Kofi Annan was not a national career diplomat. He was the first Secretary-General chosen from the ranks of UN staff, making him a career international civil servant rather than a foreign-ministry diplomat. Trygve Lie was primarily a Norwegian lawyer, Labour politician and foreign minister. Boutros Boutros-Ghali was an international-law scholar and Egyptian minister of state for foreign affairs. António Guterres was primarily a politician, former Portuguese prime minister and later UN High Commissioner for Refugees. For the current succession, the same architecture applies. The next Secretary-General is due to take office on 1 January 2027. The process formally began in November 2025, with Member States invited to nominate candidates and renewed pressure for gender equality, as no woman has ever held the post. However there is a greater number of women in leadership positions at the UN in the last five years. WMO, ITU, IOM, UNAIDS, UN Women, WTO, UNCTAD, to name a few, are all UN System agencies led by a woman. Is a woman necessarily better? Of course not. It all depends on her background and her track record supporting the careers of other women at the UN and elsewhere. What are the current candidates’ background? Rafael Mariano Grossi (Argentina) Rafael Mariano Grossi is widely viewed as one of the strongest contenders in the 2026 UN Secretary-General race. A career diplomat, he has served as Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency since 2019 and previously represented Argentina as ambassador to Austria and to the international organizations in Vienna. Grossi is considered a frontrunner largely because of his extensive engagement with Security Council powers and his high-profile diplomacy on Iran, Ukraine and nuclear security. Among diplomats, he is generally regarded as highly capable, energetic and politically skilled. He has significantly raised the profile of the IAEA through constant shuttle diplomacy, direct engagement with world leaders and efforts to increase women’s representation within the agency. Even critics usually acknowledge his effectiveness as a negotiator and crisis manager. His reputation is especially strong among many Western countries, states that prioritize nuclear non-proliferation and arms control, governments looking for a more managerial and operational UN leader, and diplomats who believe the next Secretary-General must be comfortable operating in major geopolitical crises. Although Security Council voting remains confidential, analysts generally see Grossi as potentially attractive to several of the Permanent Five members. Through the IAEA, he has worked extensively with Washington, Moscow, Beijing, Paris and London. He is viewed as a pragmatic technocrat rather than an ideological figure, and he has experience managing one of the UN system’s most politically sensitive agencies. He may also draw support from parts of Latin America, European governments familiar with his Vienna-based work, and states seeking a strong administrator. Grossi’s main strengths are crisis diplomacy, institutional management, reform messaging and familiarity with the P5. His frequent missions to Ukraine during the war, his negotiations on Iran’s nuclear programme and his direct dealings with major powers have given him unusually visible experience in high-stakes diplomacy. He also leads a large international organization with a technical mandate and global field operations, which strengthens his claim to managerial competence. His reform message may also appeal to governments concerned about the UN’s financial and institutional pressures. Grossi has advocated a leaner and more focused UN, with less duplication and greater efficiency at a time when the system is facing severe budgetary strain. Perhaps more than any other candidate, Grossi already works routinely with all five permanent members of the Security Council. If the Council prioritizes managerial competence, crisis diplomacy, relations with major powers and institutional reform, he is arguably among the strongest candidates. At present, many diplomats in New York and Geneva continue to regard Grossi as one of the most viable contenders from a Security Council electability perspective. His candidacy combines UN system experience, geopolitical credibility, technical-management expertise and familiarity with the P5 — all central factors in a race that is ultimately decided less by public campaigning than by private diplomatic acceptability. María Fernanda Espinosa Garcés (Ecuador) The domestic controversy surrounding María Fernanda Espinosa Garcés stems primarily from her high-profile roles under the deeply polarizing leftist administration of former Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa. While international bodies viewed her as an accomplished diplomat, politicians in Ecuador saw her as a fierce political opponent. The Correa Legacy: Espinosa served as Foreign Minister (twice) and Defense Minister under Rafael Correa. Correa’s administration was marked by a dramatic shift toward authoritarian socialism, crackdowns on local media, and major corruption scandals. Because she was a core member of his cabinet, the Ecuadorian right wing and centrist opposition heavily associate her with his controversial legacy. The Julian Assange Case: As Foreign Minister in 2017 and 2018, Espinosa was tasked with handling Julian Assange, who was taking refuge in Ecuador’s London embassy. She attempted to grant Assange Ecuadorian citizenship and official diplomatic status to smuggle him out of the UK. The plan backfired, drawing immense anger from domestic lawmakers who accused her of mismanaging national security and international relations. The Impeachment Attempt: In 2018, shortly before she left for her UNGA presidency, opposition lawmakers in Ecuador’s National Assembly launched an o

    5 min
  2. Week in Review | Ukraine Enters Fifth Year of War | UN Human Rights Chief Warns Against Normalizing Conflict | Torture Victims Must Have a New Way of Claiming Reparations

    Mar 6

    Week in Review | Ukraine Enters Fifth Year of War | UN Human Rights Chief Warns Against Normalizing Conflict | Torture Victims Must Have a New Way of Claiming Reparations

    THE WEEK IN REVIEW ​Human Rights Council UN Torture Expert Puts Sharper Focus on What Happens After Abuse is Documented At a Geneva press conference on 3 March, Alice Jill Edwards, the UN Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, presented her report on a “Charter of Rights of Victims and Survivors of Torture.” The ​report shifts attention from the prohibition of torture alone to the rights, protection and recognition owed to those who have endured it. The report suggests a survivor-centred intervention at a time when accountability debates are increasingly expected to deliver not only legal condemnation but also meaningful redress. ​It places victims and survivors more squarely within the architecture of implementation, not just documentation. This is an effort to articulate a rights-based framework for people subjected to torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, and to push states and institutions to think more concretely about obligations toward rehabilitation, dignity, remedy and recognition. ​The report adds weight to a broader trend within the UN human rights system: a move toward survivor-informed policy language and a sharper focus on what happens after abuse is documented. Listen to her intervention at the UN Human Rights Council: Watch her intervention: Thank you for reading THE BRIEF. To support our work consider becoming a paid subscriber. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit theunbrief.substack.com/subscribe

    5 min
  3. Feb 2

    Histoire de la Diplomatie | French Edition | Cultural Diplomacy

    Histoire de la Diplomatie Française Dans la géographie politique française, Meudon occupe une position singulière : à l’ombre de Château de Versailles et aux portes de Paris, sur un relief dominant la Seine, la ville a longtemps servi de “seconde scène” du pouvoir. Elle n’est pas seulement un décor de villégiature aristocratique : son histoire croise directement celle de la diplomatie d’État, au moment où la France invente (ou, du moins, systématise) ses instruments de puissance — résidences, courtisans, réseaux de négociateurs, et production administrative. Le premier lien fort entre Meudon et la diplomatie moderne passe par un nom aujourd’hui moins connu du grand public mais central au XVIIe siècle : Abel Servien. C’est l’un des négociateurs français de la paix de Westphalie, l’ensemble de traités de 1648 qui met fin à la guerre de Trente Ans et consolide l’émergence d’un nouvel ordre européen fondé sur des compromis juridiques et territoriaux. Les Archives diplomatiques rappellent qu’à Münster et Osnabrück, la France participe à la construction d’un système international durable qui remodèle l’Europe. Or, quelques années après cette séquence fondatrice, Abel Servien acquiert Meudon (1654), ancrant physiquement, sur ces hauteurs, une figure directement associée à la naissance de la diplomatie de congrès. Meudon devient ainsi, très tôt, un territoire où s’inscrivent dans la pierre les trajectoires des bâtisseurs de l’État négociateur. Sous Louis XIV, cette articulation entre résidence et pouvoir franchit un seuil : la monarchie absolutiste transforme l’espace en instrument politique. À Meudon, l’épisode le plus emblématique est celui du Le Grand Dauphin, héritier de la Couronne. Le site prend alors une dimension quasi institutionnelle : il devient “son” château, un lieu où s’organisent sociabilités, patronages, et circuits d’influence parallèles à Versailles. Le Grand Dauphin y mène de grands travaux et confie notamment des aménagements à Hardouin-Mansart, signe que Meudon est intégré à l’architecture politique du règne. Le Château de Versailles souligne un fait à forte portée symbolique : Le Grand Dauphin meurt à Meudon en avril 1711, au cœur même de ce dispositif résidentiel qui devait incarner la continuité dynastique. Dans une monarchie où la succession et les alliances sont des paramètres diplomatiques majeurs, la résidence de l’héritier n’est jamais neutre : elle est un théâtre où se fabriquent réputations, coalitions et accès au souverain. Ce système ne fonctionne pas sans une machine administrative et financière. Ici, la figure de Jean-Baptiste Colbert est incontournable : au-delà du cliché du “grand argentier”, Jean-Baptiste Colbert incarne l’État organisateur — commerce, marine, industrie, sciences — c’est-à-dire la base matérielle d’une politique de puissance. Le Château de Versailles rappelle l’ampleur de ses charges et son rôle dans le développement de la Marine royale et l’essor des sciences, briques essentielles d’une influence extérieure durable. Meudon, comme Versailles, s’inscrit dans cette même grammaire : le prestige résidentiel, l’art, les collections, les jardins et les travaux ne sont pas seulement du décor, mais une forme de langage diplomatique interne et externe — la mise en scène d’un État capable de mobiliser ressources, talents et savoir-faire. Au XVIIIe siècle, Meudon continue de servir de laboratoire d’influence, mais avec d’autres acteurs et une autre tonalité : celle du “gouvernement de cour” où l’accès et l’intimité comptent autant que les fonctions. C’est ici que s’insère Madame de Pompadour, dont l’empreinte sur Meudon passe notamment par le château de Bellevue, conçu comme résidence de plaisance et espace de réception. Ce lieu n’est pas qu’une fantaisie architecturale : il illustre la manière dont une favorite, devenue confidente, peut créer des espaces de décision “hors protocole”, capables de peser sur certaines affaires politiques. Plus directement encore, des travaux historiques sur “Pompadour and Diplomacy” documentent des rencontres diplomatiques à Bellevue, dans le cadre plus souple des jardins et pavillons, loin des rigidités officielles. Autrement dit : Meudon devient, via Bellevue, un nœud discret où se rencontrent conversation, influence et négociation — une diplomatie de l’ombre, adossée au paysage. Il faut replacer cette dynamique dans un temps long : celui qui va de Westphalie à l’Europe “classique” des congrès et alliances. Westphalie n’est pas “une affaire de Meudon” au sens géographique strict (les traités sont négociés en Allemagne), mais Meudon se relie à cet héritage par deux lignes : d’abord par Abel Servien, négociateur puis propriétaire ; ensuite par la consolidation, sous Louis XIV, d’un État qui comprend que la diplomatie est aussi une affaire de dispositifs — résidences, cérémonial, patronage, et centralisation administrative. Sur ce point, les synthèses historiques rappellent que Westphalie (1648) clôt un cycle de guerres majeures et installe un cadre de négociation qui marque durablement l’Europe. Meudon, dans la proximité immédiate de Versailles, devient l’un des espaces où ce nouvel art de gouverner — entre représentation, secret, et administration — se matérialise. Enfin, Meudon ne s’arrête pas à l’Ancien Régime. Son patrimoine technique et scientifique prolonge, autrement, la logique d’influence : l’industrialisation, l’aéronautique, la culture scientifique et la mise en récit du progrès. Le Hangar Y, construit à partir d’éléments liés à l’Exposition universelle de 1878, rappelle que Meudon s’inscrit aussi dans la diplomatie de l’innovation et des expositions, ces vitrines internationales où les États se comparent et se projettent. ( Ce n’est plus la diplomatie des traités et des favorites, mais celle des technologies, des réseaux et de la réputation. En somme, Meudon agit comme un condensé : un lieu où se superposent la diplomatie des négociateurs (Westphalie et Abel Servien), la diplomatie dynastique (le Le Grand Dauphin et son château), la diplomatie de cour (Madame de Pompadour à Bellevue), et la diplomatie de puissance matérielle (l’État colbertien et, plus tard, l’imaginaire industriel et scientifique). L’intérêt est précisément là : lire Meudon non comme une simple banlieue patrimoniale, mais comme un poste d’observation sur la fabrication française de l’influence — celle qui se joue autant dans les salons et les jardins que dans les traités et les administrations. THE BRIEF is supported by paid subscribers. Become a paid subscriber. Interview with the Maire de Meudon, Denis Larghero Denis Larghero est maire de Meudon, une ville dont l’histoire est étroitement liée aux dynamiques du pouvoir et, par ricochet, à la diplomatie française. Située aux portes de Paris et dans l’orbite de Versailles, Meudon a longtemps été un espace stratégique où se sont croisés résidence, influence et décision politique, notamment à l’époque moderne. Dès les XVIe et XVIIe siècles, ce territoire s’inscrit dans l’environnement des grandes familles, des cercles de cour et des réseaux administratifs qui structurent l’action extérieure du royaume, avant de prendre une place plus nette au XVIIe siècle avec la présence d’acteurs associés à la naissance de la diplomatie de congrès et à la consolidation de l’État (puis, sous l’Ancien Régime, avec l’installation de figures proches du pouvoir et la fonction de “contre-scène” de Versailles). Cette continuité se prolonge, sous d’autres formes, jusqu’à aujourd’hui : Meudon demeure un point de contact entre patrimoine institutionnel, attractivité territoriale et projection d’image, dans une région-capitale où se concentrent administrations, ambassades, grandes entreprises, lieux de mémoire et scènes internationales. Dans cette perspective, la ville incarne un fil historique — celui d’une France qui a toujours articulé architecture du pouvoir, réseaux d’influence et capacité à peser sur l’ordre européen — et qui continue, au présent, de faire de son patrimoine et de son positionnement géographique un levier de rayonnement. Sur Denis Larghero Son parcours est étroitement lié à la vie politique des Hauts-de-Seine, où il est également conseiller départemental du canton de Meudon et, au sein du Conseil départemental des Hauts-de-Seine, 5e vice-président en charge de l’attractivité du territoire et du développement numérique. Né en novembre 1968, Denis Larghero s’est formé aux disciplines juridiques et à la science politique : il est indiqué comme licencié en droit public et titulaire d’une maîtrise ainsi que d’un DEA en science politique. Avant d’accéder à la fonction de maire, il occupe des responsabilités au sein de l’équipe municipale, notamment comme adjoint délégué à la culture et au développement numérique, ce qui éclaire deux axes récurrents de son positionnement : d’une part, la valorisation de l’offre culturelle et patrimoniale comme levier d’identité urbaine et d’attractivité ; d’autre part, l’accélération de la transformation numérique de la collectivité (services aux usagers, modernisation des outils de gestion, innovation territoriale). À l’échelle départementale, ses attributions officiellement mentionnées (attractivité du territoire et développement numérique) le placent à l’interface de sujets à forte visibilité : promotion économique, image territoriale, politiques d’innovation, et articulation avec les dynamiques métropolitaines. Son ancrage territorial est souvent décrit comme double : so

    14 min
  4. From the Archives | UNICEF: Learning Passport Initiative Supports Teachers and Students Inclusion in the Digital Economy in Developing Countries, Refugee Camps, and Post-Conflict Zones

    06/19/2025

    From the Archives | UNICEF: Learning Passport Initiative Supports Teachers and Students Inclusion in the Digital Economy in Developing Countries, Refugee Camps, and Post-Conflict Zones

    UNICEF and Microsoft Partner-up The UN Brief interviewed Mac Glovinsky to speak about the Learning Passport, a partnership with Microsoft and Cambridge University to accelerate onboarding of children and adolescents in the digital economy, through educational tools. Glovinsky is the Principal Global Program Manager of the Learning Passport, and is based at the UN headquarters in New York. The Learning Passport is an educational tool that allows for learning on-and-offline. They have rolled-out at post-conflict areas, and in developing countries, helping children to continue their education and allowing them to carry their curriculum wherever they are, as they will eventually move out of refugee camps and thanks to these tools will be able to continue their studies at the appropriate grade level.These are one of the many ways that new technologies are supporting the continuity of education in what are very trying situations for these children and their families.We cover emerging technologies and how they impact international cooperation. Subscribe to The UN Brief for exclusive interviews with UN officials, diplomats, business leaders and academics for insights in the digital transformation of multilateral organizations, and the emerging technologies that are impacting international cooperation.Subscribers have:1. Early access to exclusive content, videos and podcasts, with insights and analysis of current affairs topics.2. Invitation to talks (virtual now) with the key players in Foreign Policy and Tech.3. Participation in round-tables on the future of multilateralism.4. A monthly update, closed to members-only, video call to discuss trends with diplomats, academics, government, and tech leaders.And much more to come in the coming months. Stay tuned. Looking forward to interacting with you all,Maya PlentzEditor in Chief Subscribe to our newsletter This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit theunbrief.substack.com/subscribe

    1 min
  5. 06/15/2025

    Weekend Edition | Bourgogne in the Spotlight | Maison Louis Picamelot | More VivaTech | Looking for a Job? There is a Cybersecurity Talent Shortage | Presented by EVO Green Village

    On this edition: * A weekend in Bourgogne. * Discover the history of Cremant de Bourgogne. * Sustainability in wine production. THE BRIEF is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a paid subscriber. Bourgogne in the Spotlight Pondering what to do during the sweltering days of Summer in Geneva? No vacation time left? I suggest you go visit Bourgogne and discover its many food and wine offers. It is paradise for very affordable high-quality wines to wines for special occasions and to, above all, educating your senses. Did you know that Bourgogne wines that can be kept for several years are also a good investment? As an asset class Burgundy wines beat some traditional categories, not to say the investment in pleasure, as the British wine critic Steven Spurrier used to say. “Fine wine is also an investment in pleasure.” We had the pleasure of visiting three wine producers from the region last month. Keep your eyes pricked for the stories and interviews with the winemakers that are representing the best of sustainability and quality from the region at a global scale. Wines from Bourgogne are becoming better known in Brazil, this past month the BIVB, the Bureau Interprofessionel des Vins de Bourgogne, visited Brazil for the first time. Their latest research shows growing exports to the region, in fine restaurants, and by the recommendations of experts in gastronomy. Pairing the delightful Cremant de Bourgogne with Brazilian exquisite seafood and prime-cut barbecues is becoming a thing, with importers realizing the price/quality value and its potential with consumers and restaurateurs alike. In a country where prosecco and champagne reign supreme, given its tropical weather, as a refreshing, celebratory drink, and increasingly in cocktails by renowned bartenders at the Copacabana Palace and Fasano’s (the French architect Philippe Starck designed luxury hotel) Cremant de Bourgogne has already a market in Brazil expecting bubbly happiness drinks, that just needs to be developed to gain market share. One of our visits was to the Maison Louis Picamelot. We interviewed Louis Picamelot’s grandson, now producer and CEO of the Maison, Philippe Chautard. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit theunbrief.substack.com/subscribe

    1 min
  6. 05/15/2025

    Presented by EVO Green Village | WTO: Cabo Verde Trade Policy Review | UN Ministerial Reaffirms Multilateral Commitment Amid Global Fracture

    Presented by EVO Fitness Geneva Get THE BRIEF special May offer with promo code 9NY Sign up here. 7-Day Free Trial – No Commitment & No Joining Fee Find out more about EVO Fitness philosophy. A great place to work out, open 7 days from 6 AM to 11 PM. UN Ministerial Reaffirms Multilateral Commitment Amid Global Fracture The 2025 United Nations Peacekeeping Ministerial, held in Berlin from 13–14 May, convened by the German government and attended by representatives from over 130 UN Member States and partner organizations. Peacekeeping missions, once symbols of collective resolve, now operate under increasingly constrained mandates, diminished legitimacy in host countries, and growing exposure to asymmetric threats. Germany pledged €82 million in new commitments while encouraging others to match ambition with substance. “We want to tailor future missions to the exact needs of the host countries and increase their acceptance and effectiveness,” said Johann Wadephul, Germany’s Foreign Minister, echoing what has become a leitmotif in Western diplomatic discourse: local ownership, global partnership. Defense Minister Boris Pistorius emphasized innovation, announcing German investment in renewable energy for field operations, medical drones, and counter-IED technologies. While 74 countries made formal pledges—including 88 military and police units and support for women, peace and security initiatives—the subtext of the conference revealed fissures in political will and coherence. The geographic and political diversity of the pledging states obscures the uneven distribution of actual deployment. It is countries from the Global South—Bangladesh, Rwanda, Nepal—that continue to provide the bulk of troops, while the industrialized North often positions itself as financier and advisor. Meanwhile, the thematic emphasis on technological modernization and “data-driven peacekeeping” betrays an uncomfortable truth: the impulse to technocratize peacekeeping may be a response to deeper political paralysis. Rather than confront the structural drivers of conflict—economic inequality, climate displacement, neocolonial resource extraction—the international community risks outsourcing peace to algorithms and AI-powered surveillance. Berlin was also a staging ground for long-standing, unresolved debates: How to reform command structures to avoid past failures in Mali, the DRC, and South Sudan? How to ensure accountability in cases of abuse by peacekeepers? How to harmonize competing interests within the Security Council? Eleven states pledged action on accountability and conduct, including support for victims of sexual exploitation, but mechanisms for independent oversight remain weak. Furthermore, the commitments to “strategic communications” and countering disinformation reflect a growing awareness that peacekeeping missions are not merely military deployments but contested narratives in the information sphere. Yet the risk remains that this concern for “information integrity” may prioritize reputation management over transparency and local engagement. The Berlin Ministerial was laden with symbolism: it coincided with the 80th anniversary of the United Nations and the 10-year mark since the 2015 Leaders’ Summit on Peacekeeping. But anniversaries can conceal as much as they reveal. Today, over 61,000 military and police peacekeepers are deployed across 11 missions—often in settings where the UN is simultaneously viewed as indispensable and insufficient. Whether the Berlin pledges mark a renaissance or merely a rhetorical reaffirmation depends not on declarations made in conference halls, but on the lived realities in places like Abyei, Beni, or Gao. Peacekeeping, once imagined as the moral arm of a rules-based order, now treads a narrow path between relevance and retreat. The next chapter, as always, will be written in the field. And for that, political courage—not just strategic planning—remains in shortest supply. Cabo Verde at a Crossroads: Resilient Recovery or Structural Dependence? A small island developing state in the Atlantic with fewer than half a million inhabitants, Cabo Verde has long stood as a symbol of political stability and democratic governance in West Africa. Yet behind its pro-democracy credentials lies a fragile economy dependent on tourism, remittances, and a narrow export base. The latest Trade Policy Review by the World Trade Organization (WTO) offers a glimpse into the country’s mixed progress—a cautious recovery on the surface, with deeper structural dependencies beneath. After suffering a dramatic 20.8% contraction in GDP in 2020, Cabo Verde posted an impressive 15.8% rebound in 2022, stabilizing at 5.5% in 2023. Much of this recovery is credited to the revival of international tourism, which alone brought in over USD 468 million in 2023. Remittances—constituting nearly 11% of GDP—further buoyed domestic demand. However, these gains are precarious. The country’s trade-to-GDP ratio, a telling indicator of openness and vulnerability, peaked above 105% before the pandemic, only to drop to 75% and gradually recover to 95% by 2023. The merchandise trade deficit remains steep: USD 1.76 billion in imports against just USD 383 million in exports. More than 80% of the country’s food is imported. A Narrow Base: Tourism, Re-Exports, and Fish The backbone of Cabo Verde’s economy is services, particularly tourism and transport. Strategic geography has also turned the archipelago into a logistical hub for re-exports—especially fuels and vehicles. Exports of mineral products (largely re-exports of fuels) accounted for 61% of all merchandise trade in 2023. Meanwhile, processed seafood, mostly tuna, now makes up over 84% of domestically produced exports, highlighting the country’s limited industrial and agricultural capacity. Despite repeated calls for export diversification, Cabo Verde’s export concentration index remains four times the global average, exposing it to significant external shocks. Structural Bottlenecks and Bureaucratic Drag Trade facilitation has improved on paper: a foreign trade portal launched in 2023, customs costs have decreased, and legislative transparency has advanced. Still, businesses face lengthy customs clearance (averaging over six days in Praia), high import compliance costs (19% of goods value), and complex licensing systems that deter small traders. The absence of an Authorized Economic Operator (AEO) scheme, persistent tariff inconsistencies with WTO commitments, and cumbersome tax exemptions only deepen inefficiencies. Almost a third of surveyed firms cite customs procedures as a severe constraint—well above African and global averages. An Unequal and Concentrated Economy Women remain clustered in low-tech sectors with limited access to credit and trade networks, despite a 2019 parity law. Market monopolies continue to plague key sectors: one tour operator dominates the industry, and domestic flights are held by a single carrier. A newly created competition authority in 2022 has yet to dismantle these entrenched positions. State-owned enterprises remain prominent, accounting for over 17% of GDP in revenue—but also dragging public finances, with the three largest SOEs posting losses equal to a quarter of GDP in 2021. The Illusion of Openness Cabo Verde is a signatory to both the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) and several WTO agreements, including the Fisheries Subsidies Agreement (2024). It also enjoys preferential market access to the EU (GSP+) and the U.S. (AGOA). Yet trade under these schemes remains limited, raising doubts about the country's actual capacity to capitalize on global opportunities. The promise of integration into global digital and renewable energy markets looms large, with the government aiming for 50% renewable energy production by 2030. But these ambitions contrast with ongoing infrastructure challenges and high dependency on refined oil imports. Tourism’s Double-Edged Sword Tourism remains the economic engine—but also the Achilles heel. Most tourists come from Europe, and disruptions such as pandemics, climate shocks, or geopolitical instability could once again halt growth. The government’s Strategic Tourism Plan (2018–2030) seeks to address sustainability, but the sector remains ecologically intensive and socioeconomically uneven. Cabo Verde's story is one of cautious optimism. Its political stability, gradual reforms, and external partnerships offer promise. But its economic model—built on tourism, remittances, and a narrow export base—remains vulnerable. Without diversifying production, streamlining governance, and tackling monopolies, the nation risks being trapped in a cycle of dependency. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit theunbrief.substack.com/subscribe

    28 min

About

Hear first hand from the diplomats, tech executives, investors, UN and EU officials that are changing the world through dialogue and are using emerging technologies for good. theunbrief.substack.com