The Brief with Maya Plentz

Maya Plentz
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Hear first hand from the diplomats, tech executives, investors, UN and EU officials that are changing the world through dialogue and are using emerging technologies for good. theunbrief.substack.com

  1. Jun 28

    UN Secretary-General Race: 1 for 8 Billion is a Misnomer | UN Report Urges Countries to Truly Support Mothers | UN Charter: Do Countries Care?

    1 for 8 Billion Campaign is a Misnomer * Who bankrolls the 1 for 8 Billion Campaign? UNA-UK is a steering committee member and co-founder of the earlier 1 for 7 Billion campaign, and part of the campaign’s institutional support structure. Publicly visible support/funding includes Robert Bosch Stiftung for this report and Open Society Foundations seed funding for campaign support. The Problem With “1 for 8 Billion”: The UN Secretary-General Is Not a Global President A new report by the 1 for 8 Billion campaign, Backroom Deals: The Trade in Promises for Support Between Member States and Candidates for UN Secretary-General, raises a legitimate issue: the opacity of the UN Secretary-General selection process and the long-standing practice of powerful states seeking influence over senior UN appointments. The report is right to scrutinise “ringfencing” — the informal reservation of top UN posts for nationals of particular powerful countries — and it is right to argue that the next Secretary-General should have greater latitude to appoint a senior team on merit, geography, gender balance and competence. But the campaign’s own name exposes a deeper conceptual flaw in how parts of civil society discuss the office. “1 for 8 Billion” may work as a slogan. As constitutional analysis, it is wrong. The UN Secretary-General is not elected by the world’s population. The office-holder is not a global president, not a popular sovereign, and not a democratic delegate of eight billion people. Under the UN Charter, the Secretary-General is appointed by the General Assembly on the recommendation of the Security Council and serves as the chief administrative officer of the Organization. The role is politically important, but it is not executive authority over humanity. It is an international civil-service office embedded in an intergovernmental system. This distinction is important. The Secretary-General does not govern the world. The Secretary-General works through mandates approved by Member States, budgets approved by Member States, agencies and departments staffed by international officials, and political access granted — or denied — by governments. Even the moral authority of the office depends on a difficult equilibrium: independence from individual governments, but confidence from the membership collectively. The 1 for 8 Billion report itself implicitly acknowledges this. It notes that Secretaries-General work “in partnership with states, according to rules and systems established by states.” That sentence undercuts the campaign’s branding. If the office depends on partnership with states, then the idea of “one” person “for” eight billion people overstates the office and risks importing a presidential campaign logic into an institution that was deliberately designed not to be a world government. There is a valid argument that the Secretary-General must be independent. Article 100 of the Charter states that the Secretary-General and staff should not seek or receive instructions from governments or outside authorities, and that Member States should not seek to influence them in discharging their responsibilities. But independence is not the same as personal rule. It is institutional independence within a Charter-based system, not charismatic authority above it. That is where the report’s critique of backroom deals is strongest — and also where it needs more discipline. The report draws on histories, memoirs and more than 40 interviews, many with former diplomats and senior UN officials. It compiles alleged or reported examples of candidates being pressured to appoint nationals from powerful countries to senior posts. It points to recurring patterns involving the P5 and to long-standing monopolies over key UN jobs. These are serious issues. They deserve attention. Yet the report also relies heavily on politically sensitive, partly anonymous testimony, and it acknowledges that many of the practices it describes are difficult to document. That does not make the claims false. It does mean they should be treated with evidentiary care. Alleged bargains, plausible patterns, historical rumours and documented quid pro quos should not all be collapsed into one category. A report about opacity should be especially precise about its own evidentiary thresholds. The campaign also raises a transparency problem of its own. 1 for 8 Billion asks candidates to disclose campaign financing, endorsements, conflicts of interest and commitments. That is a reasonable standard. But NGOs making these demands should meet a comparable standard of disclosure. The report is marked as supported by the Robert Bosch Stiftung. The campaign’s own public materials show that Open Society Foundations provided seed funding for support to the campaign, and that UNA-UK has played a significant institutional role, including as a steering committee member and co-founder of the previous 1 for 7 Billion initiative. None of this is improper in itself. Civil society campaigns need money, staff, networks and institutional homes. But it should be stated plainly. When a campaign positions itself as the public-interest watchdog of the UN Secretary-General selection process, its funders, host arrangements, steering committee roles and advocacy objectives should be easy to identify. If candidates are expected to disclose their backers, so should campaigners. The role of UNA-UK is particularly relevant. UNA-UK says it sits on the campaign’s steering committee alongside CIVICUS, GQUAL, Plataforma CIPÓ, Southern Voice and WomanSG, and that these groups “drive advocacy efforts” with Member States, NGO supporters and individuals. The campaign’s governance document gives the steering committee responsibility for strategy, policy, communications, outreach and fundraising. UNA-UK also appears in campaign materials as a safeguarding and complaints contact. This is not a neutral observer role. It is an advocacy role. That does not discredit the campaign. But it should temper the language of moral authority. A civil society coalition, however well-intentioned, does not stand in for “we the peoples” in any formal constitutional sense. Nor does it substitute for the political legitimacy of the 193 Member States that constitute the United Nations. Civil society has a necessary role in scrutiny and public debate. It should not imply that it speaks directly for eight billion people. A better name for the campaign would reflect the reality of the institution: “193 for the Charter,” “Member States for an Independent Secretariat,” or “For a Transparent Secretary-General Selection.” Such names would be less catchy, but more accurate. The current name suggests that the Secretary-General is a singular tribune of humanity. In practice, the Secretary-General is a senior international official, leading a Secretariat, working with a Deputy Secretary-General, Under-Secretaries-General, agencies, country teams, envoys, resident coordinators and — above all — Member States. This is not a semantic quibble. Language shapes expectations. When campaigners describe the Secretary-General as “one for eight billion,” they encourage the public to imagine a figure who can independently solve wars, climate breakdown, humanitarian crises and institutional dysfunction. That makes for good advocacy, but poor institutional literacy. It also risks personalising a much deeper structural problem: the imbalance of power between Member States, especially the P5, and the wider UN membership. The report is right that opaque bargaining over senior UN jobs damages legitimacy. It is right that national monopolies over top posts should be challenged. It is right that candidates should be asked whether they will resist inappropriate pressure. It is right that journalists should pay attention to capital visits, straw-poll shifts, senior appointment promises and post-election negotiations. But the remedy is not to pretend the Secretary-General derives authority from eight billion people. The remedy is to strengthen the Charter-based process: clearer criteria, open hearings, serious General Assembly scrutiny, transparent nominations, an end to informal monopolies over senior posts, and fuller disclosure by both candidates and the civil society campaigns seeking to shape the race. The next Secretary-General will not be “one for eight billion.” She or he will be one Secretary-General, appointed through Member States, constrained by the Charter, dependent on a senior team, and accountable to the Organization as a whole. The UN Charter establishes the Secretary-General as appointed by the General Assembly on Security Council recommendation, chief administrative officer, and bound by Articles 97–101 on Secretariat functions and independence. That is precisely why the process matters — and why criticism of backroom deals should be anchored in institutional reality, not campaign branding. Note: 1 for 8 Billion’s steering committee includes CIVICUS, Plataforma CIPÓ/CIPÓ Inc, Southern Voice, UNA-UK, WomanSG and GQUAL. Who funds these NGOs? Become a paid subscriber. *A misnomer is an incorrect, unsuitable, or misleading name or term applied to a person, object, or concept. It occurs when something is named inappropriately based on its true nature or function. Everyday Examples Misnomers are surprisingly common in everyday language and science. Often, they arise because something was named before its exact nature was understood, or because of colloquial habits. * Koala bear: Often called koala “bears,” they are actually marsupials, not bears. * Dry cleaning: Because clothes are soaked in liquid chemical solvents rather than washed dry, it is a misnomer. * Jellyfish: They are aquatic invertebrates, not fish. * French fries: The popular deep-fried potatoes actually originated in Belgium, not Fr

  2. Jun 27

    Weekend Edition | Who Will Be the Next UN Secretary-General? | UNECE Puts Forth Policies to Address Ageing | UN Charter Signed in San Francisco on 26 June 1945

    How is the UN Secretary-General selected? The UN Secretary-General is not directly elected by the public or freely chosen by the General Assembly. Under Article 97 of the UN Charter, the Secretary-General is appointed by the General Assembly on the recommendation of the Security Council. In practice, the Security Council decides first, and the General Assembly normally appoints the candidate recommended to it. The decisive political filter is therefore the Security Council. A candidate needs sufficient support among the 15 Council members and must avoid a veto by any of the five permanent members: China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States. Substantive Council decisions require nine affirmative votes and no veto by a permanent member. Since the reforms around the 2016 selection process, the procedure has become more transparent, but not fully democratic. Member States may nominate candidates; candidates submit CVs and vision statements; the General Assembly holds informal dialogues; and civil society and Member States can ask questions. However, the decisive bargaining and straw polls still take place behind closed doors in the Security Council. Resolution 69/321 was important because it created the expectation of informal dialogues and a more transparent nomination process. Still, the General Assembly has almost always received only one candidate from the Council. Legally, the Assembly appoints; politically, it rarely challenges the Council’s recommendation. The race is therefore less an election than a diplomatic elimination process. The successful candidate must be acceptable to Washington, Moscow, Beijing, London and Paris, while also gathering support from elected Council members and satisfying regional and political expectations. Dag Hammarskjöld is the classic example of a compromise candidate. In 1953, after Trygve Lie’s resignation, better-known figures such as Lester B. Pearson of Canada, Carlos P. Romulo of the Philippines, Nasrollah Entezam of Iran and Luis Padilla Nervo of Mexico were considered. Pearson was blocked by the Soviet Union. Hammarskjöld, then a Swedish economist, civil servant and diplomat, emerged as a low-profile figure acceptable to both Cold War blocs. He was recommended by the Security Council and appointed by the General Assembly, serving from April 1953 until his death in 1961. Kofi Annan’s selection in 1996 followed a different path. Boutros Boutros-Ghali sought a second term, but the United States vetoed his reappointment. The Council then turned to African alternatives. Annan, from Ghana, was then Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations and a long-serving UN insider. He became the compromise candidate, was recommended by the Security Council on 13 December 1996, and was appointed by the General Assembly for a term beginning on 1 January 1997. Other races show the same pattern. In 1961, U Thant of Burma was chosen as an interim compromise after Hammarskjöld’s death. In 1971, Kurt Waldheim emerged after vetoes and miscalculations among the permanent members. In 1981, Javier Pérez de Cuéllar was selected after a long deadlock in which China blocked Waldheim’s attempt at a third term and the United States opposed Salim Ahmed Salim of Tanzania. That race helped consolidate the norm of two five-year terms and reinforced the practice of regional rotation. Several past Secretaries-General were career diplomats, including Kurt Waldheim of Austria, Javier Pérez de Cuéllar of Peru and Ban Ki-moon of South Korea. Pérez de Cuéllar was a lawyer and career diplomat who joined Peru’s foreign ministry. Ban had a 37-year diplomatic career before becoming South Korea’s foreign minister. Waldheim was an Austrian diplomat and later foreign minister. Dag Hammarskjöld and U Thant were diplomatic figures, but not career diplomats in the same strict sense. Hammarskjöld came from Sweden’s senior civil service and foreign-policy establishment. U Thant had been an educator, civil servant and Burma’s Permanent Representative to the UN. Kofi Annan was not a national career diplomat. He was the first Secretary-General chosen from the ranks of UN staff, making him a career international civil servant rather than a foreign-ministry diplomat. Trygve Lie was primarily a Norwegian lawyer, Labour politician and foreign minister. Boutros Boutros-Ghali was an international-law scholar and Egyptian minister of state for foreign affairs. António Guterres was primarily a politician, former Portuguese prime minister and later UN High Commissioner for Refugees. For the current succession, the same architecture applies. The next Secretary-General is due to take office on 1 January 2027. The process formally began in November 2025, with Member States invited to nominate candidates and renewed pressure for gender equality, as no woman has ever held the post. However there is a greater number of women in leadership positions at the UN in the last five years. WMO, ITU, IOM, UNAIDS, UN Women, WTO, UNCTAD, to name a few, are all UN System agencies led by a woman. Is a woman necessarily better? Of course not. It all depends on her background and her track record supporting the careers of other women at the UN and elsewhere. What are the current candidates’ background? Rafael Mariano Grossi (Argentina) Rafael Mariano Grossi is widely viewed as one of the strongest contenders in the 2026 UN Secretary-General race. A career diplomat, he has served as Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency since 2019 and previously represented Argentina as ambassador to Austria and to the international organizations in Vienna. Grossi is considered a frontrunner largely because of his extensive engagement with Security Council powers and his high-profile diplomacy on Iran, Ukraine and nuclear security. Among diplomats, he is generally regarded as highly capable, energetic and politically skilled. He has significantly raised the profile of the IAEA through constant shuttle diplomacy, direct engagement with world leaders and efforts to increase women’s representation within the agency. Even critics usually acknowledge his effectiveness as a negotiator and crisis manager. His reputation is especially strong among many Western countries, states that prioritize nuclear non-proliferation and arms control, governments looking for a more managerial and operational UN leader, and diplomats who believe the next Secretary-General must be comfortable operating in major geopolitical crises. Although Security Council voting remains confidential, analysts generally see Grossi as potentially attractive to several of the Permanent Five members. Through the IAEA, he has worked extensively with Washington, Moscow, Beijing, Paris and London. He is viewed as a pragmatic technocrat rather than an ideological figure, and he has experience managing one of the UN system’s most politically sensitive agencies. He may also draw support from parts of Latin America, European governments familiar with his Vienna-based work, and states seeking a strong administrator. Grossi’s main strengths are crisis diplomacy, institutional management, reform messaging and familiarity with the P5. His frequent missions to Ukraine during the war, his negotiations on Iran’s nuclear programme and his direct dealings with major powers have given him unusually visible experience in high-stakes diplomacy. He also leads a large international organization with a technical mandate and global field operations, which strengthens his claim to managerial competence. His reform message may also appeal to governments concerned about the UN’s financial and institutional pressures. Grossi has advocated a leaner and more focused UN, with less duplication and greater efficiency at a time when the system is facing severe budgetary strain. Perhaps more than any other candidate, Grossi already works routinely with all five permanent members of the Security Council. If the Council prioritizes managerial competence, crisis diplomacy, relations with major powers and institutional reform, he is arguably among the strongest candidates. At present, many diplomats in New York and Geneva continue to regard Grossi as one of the most viable contenders from a Security Council electability perspective. His candidacy combines UN system experience, geopolitical credibility, technical-management expertise and familiarity with the P5 — all central factors in a race that is ultimately decided less by public campaigning than by private diplomatic acceptability. María Fernanda Espinosa Garcés (Ecuador) The domestic controversy surrounding María Fernanda Espinosa Garcés stems primarily from her high-profile roles under the deeply polarizing leftist administration of former Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa. While international bodies viewed her as an accomplished diplomat, politicians in Ecuador saw her as a fierce political opponent. The Correa Legacy: Espinosa served as Foreign Minister (twice) and Defense Minister under Rafael Correa. Correa’s administration was marked by a dramatic shift toward authoritarian socialism, crackdowns on local media, and major corruption scandals. Because she was a core member of his cabinet, the Ecuadorian right wing and centrist opposition heavily associate her with his controversial legacy. The Julian Assange Case: As Foreign Minister in 2017 and 2018, Espinosa was tasked with handling Julian Assange, who was taking refuge in Ecuador’s London embassy. She attempted to grant Assange Ecuadorian citizenship and official diplomatic status to smuggle him out of the UK. The plan backfired, drawing immense anger from domestic lawmakers who accused her of mismanaging national security and international relations. The Impeachment Attempt: In 2018, shortly before she left for her UNGA presidency, opposition lawmakers in Ecuador’s National Assembly launched an o

  3. Mar 6

    Week in Review | Ukraine Enters Fifth Year of War | UN Human Rights Chief Warns Against Normalizing Conflict | Torture Victims Must Have a New Way of Claiming Reparations

    THE WEEK IN REVIEW ​Human Rights Council UN Torture Expert Puts Sharper Focus on What Happens After Abuse is Documented At a Geneva press conference on 3 March, Alice Jill Edwards, the UN Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, presented her report on a “Charter of Rights of Victims and Survivors of Torture.” The ​report shifts attention from the prohibition of torture alone to the rights, protection and recognition owed to those who have endured it. The report suggests a survivor-centred intervention at a time when accountability debates are increasingly expected to deliver not only legal condemnation but also meaningful redress. ​It places victims and survivors more squarely within the architecture of implementation, not just documentation. This is an effort to articulate a rights-based framework for people subjected to torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, and to push states and institutions to think more concretely about obligations toward rehabilitation, dignity, remedy and recognition. ​The report adds weight to a broader trend within the UN human rights system: a move toward survivor-informed policy language and a sharper focus on what happens after abuse is documented. Listen to her intervention at the UN Human Rights Council: Watch her intervention: Thank you for reading THE BRIEF. To support our work consider becoming a paid subscriber. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit theunbrief.substack.com/subscribe

    Week in Review | Ukraine Enters Fifth Year of War | UN Human Rights Chief Warns Against Normalizing Conflict | Torture Victims Must Have a New Way of Claiming Reparations

  4. Feb 2

    Histoire de la Diplomatie | French Edition | Cultural Diplomacy

    Histoire de la Diplomatie Française Dans la géographie politique française, Meudon occupe une position singulière : à l’ombre de Château de Versailles et aux portes de Paris, sur un relief dominant la Seine, la ville a longtemps servi de “seconde scène” du pouvoir. Elle n’est pas seulement un décor de villégiature aristocratique : son histoire croise directement celle de la diplomatie d’État, au moment où la France invente (ou, du moins, systématise) ses instruments de puissance — résidences, courtisans, réseaux de négociateurs, et production administrative. Le premier lien fort entre Meudon et la diplomatie moderne passe par un nom aujourd’hui moins connu du grand public mais central au XVIIe siècle : Abel Servien. C’est l’un des négociateurs français de la paix de Westphalie, l’ensemble de traités de 1648 qui met fin à la guerre de Trente Ans et consolide l’émergence d’un nouvel ordre européen fondé sur des compromis juridiques et territoriaux. Les Archives diplomatiques rappellent qu’à Münster et Osnabrück, la France participe à la construction d’un système international durable qui remodèle l’Europe. Or, quelques années après cette séquence fondatrice, Abel Servien acquiert Meudon (1654), ancrant physiquement, sur ces hauteurs, une figure directement associée à la naissance de la diplomatie de congrès. Meudon devient ainsi, très tôt, un territoire où s’inscrivent dans la pierre les trajectoires des bâtisseurs de l’État négociateur. Sous Louis XIV, cette articulation entre résidence et pouvoir franchit un seuil : la monarchie absolutiste transforme l’espace en instrument politique. À Meudon, l’épisode le plus emblématique est celui du Le Grand Dauphin, héritier de la Couronne. Le site prend alors une dimension quasi institutionnelle : il devient “son” château, un lieu où s’organisent sociabilités, patronages, et circuits d’influence parallèles à Versailles. Le Grand Dauphin y mène de grands travaux et confie notamment des aménagements à Hardouin-Mansart, signe que Meudon est intégré à l’architecture politique du règne. Le Château de Versailles souligne un fait à forte portée symbolique : Le Grand Dauphin meurt à Meudon en avril 1711, au cœur même de ce dispositif résidentiel qui devait incarner la continuité dynastique. Dans une monarchie où la succession et les alliances sont des paramètres diplomatiques majeurs, la résidence de l’héritier n’est jamais neutre : elle est un théâtre où se fabriquent réputations, coalitions et accès au souverain. Ce système ne fonctionne pas sans une machine administrative et financière. Ici, la figure de Jean-Baptiste Colbert est incontournable : au-delà du cliché du “grand argentier”, Jean-Baptiste Colbert incarne l’État organisateur — commerce, marine, industrie, sciences — c’est-à-dire la base matérielle d’une politique de puissance. Le Château de Versailles rappelle l’ampleur de ses charges et son rôle dans le développement de la Marine royale et l’essor des sciences, briques essentielles d’une influence extérieure durable. Meudon, comme Versailles, s’inscrit dans cette même grammaire : le prestige résidentiel, l’art, les collections, les jardins et les travaux ne sont pas seulement du décor, mais une forme de langage diplomatique interne et externe — la mise en scène d’un État capable de mobiliser ressources, talents et savoir-faire. Au XVIIIe siècle, Meudon continue de servir de laboratoire d’influence, mais avec d’autres acteurs et une autre tonalité : celle du “gouvernement de cour” où l’accès et l’intimité comptent autant que les fonctions. C’est ici que s’insère Madame de Pompadour, dont l’empreinte sur Meudon passe notamment par le château de Bellevue, conçu comme résidence de plaisance et espace de réception. Ce lieu n’est pas qu’une fantaisie architecturale : il illustre la manière dont une favorite, devenue confidente, peut créer des espaces de décision “hors protocole”, capables de peser sur certaines affaires politiques. Plus directement encore, des travaux historiques sur “Pompadour and Diplomacy” documentent des rencontres diplomatiques à Bellevue, dans le cadre plus souple des jardins et pavillons, loin des rigidités officielles. Autrement dit : Meudon devient, via Bellevue, un nœud discret où se rencontrent conversation, influence et négociation — une diplomatie de l’ombre, adossée au paysage. Il faut replacer cette dynamique dans un temps long : celui qui va de Westphalie à l’Europe “classique” des congrès et alliances. Westphalie n’est pas “une affaire de Meudon” au sens géographique strict (les traités sont négociés en Allemagne), mais Meudon se relie à cet héritage par deux lignes : d’abord par Abel Servien, négociateur puis propriétaire ; ensuite par la consolidation, sous Louis XIV, d’un État qui comprend que la diplomatie est aussi une affaire de dispositifs — résidences, cérémonial, patronage, et centralisation administrative. Sur ce point, les synthèses historiques rappellent que Westphalie (1648) clôt un cycle de guerres majeures et installe un cadre de négociation qui marque durablement l’Europe. Meudon, dans la proximité immédiate de Versailles, devient l’un des espaces où ce nouvel art de gouverner — entre représentation, secret, et administration — se matérialise. Enfin, Meudon ne s’arrête pas à l’Ancien Régime. Son patrimoine technique et scientifique prolonge, autrement, la logique d’influence : l’industrialisation, l’aéronautique, la culture scientifique et la mise en récit du progrès. Le Hangar Y, construit à partir d’éléments liés à l’Exposition universelle de 1878, rappelle que Meudon s’inscrit aussi dans la diplomatie de l’innovation et des expositions, ces vitrines internationales où les États se comparent et se projettent. ( Ce n’est plus la diplomatie des traités et des favorites, mais celle des technologies, des réseaux et de la réputation. En somme, Meudon agit comme un condensé : un lieu où se superposent la diplomatie des négociateurs (Westphalie et Abel Servien), la diplomatie dynastique (le Le Grand Dauphin et son château), la diplomatie de cour (Madame de Pompadour à Bellevue), et la diplomatie de puissance matérielle (l’État colbertien et, plus tard, l’imaginaire industriel et scientifique). L’intérêt est précisément là : lire Meudon non comme une simple banlieue patrimoniale, mais comme un poste d’observation sur la fabrication française de l’influence — celle qui se joue autant dans les salons et les jardins que dans les traités et les administrations. THE BRIEF is supported by paid subscribers. Become a paid subscriber. Interview with the Maire de Meudon, Denis Larghero Denis Larghero est maire de Meudon, une ville dont l’histoire est étroitement liée aux dynamiques du pouvoir et, par ricochet, à la diplomatie française. Située aux portes de Paris et dans l’orbite de Versailles, Meudon a longtemps été un espace stratégique où se sont croisés résidence, influence et décision politique, notamment à l’époque moderne. Dès les XVIe et XVIIe siècles, ce territoire s’inscrit dans l’environnement des grandes familles, des cercles de cour et des réseaux administratifs qui structurent l’action extérieure du royaume, avant de prendre une place plus nette au XVIIe siècle avec la présence d’acteurs associés à la naissance de la diplomatie de congrès et à la consolidation de l’État (puis, sous l’Ancien Régime, avec l’installation de figures proches du pouvoir et la fonction de “contre-scène” de Versailles). Cette continuité se prolonge, sous d’autres formes, jusqu’à aujourd’hui : Meudon demeure un point de contact entre patrimoine institutionnel, attractivité territoriale et projection d’image, dans une région-capitale où se concentrent administrations, ambassades, grandes entreprises, lieux de mémoire et scènes internationales. Dans cette perspective, la ville incarne un fil historique — celui d’une France qui a toujours articulé architecture du pouvoir, réseaux d’influence et capacité à peser sur l’ordre européen — et qui continue, au présent, de faire de son patrimoine et de son positionnement géographique un levier de rayonnement. Sur Denis Larghero Son parcours est étroitement lié à la vie politique des Hauts-de-Seine, où il est également conseiller départemental du canton de Meudon et, au sein du Conseil départemental des Hauts-de-Seine, 5e vice-président en charge de l’attractivité du territoire et du développement numérique. Né en novembre 1968, Denis Larghero s’est formé aux disciplines juridiques et à la science politique : il est indiqué comme licencié en droit public et titulaire d’une maîtrise ainsi que d’un DEA en science politique. Avant d’accéder à la fonction de maire, il occupe des responsabilités au sein de l’équipe municipale, notamment comme adjoint délégué à la culture et au développement numérique, ce qui éclaire deux axes récurrents de son positionnement : d’une part, la valorisation de l’offre culturelle et patrimoniale comme levier d’identité urbaine et d’attractivité ; d’autre part, l’accélération de la transformation numérique de la collectivité (services aux usagers, modernisation des outils de gestion, innovation territoriale). À l’échelle départementale, ses attributions officiellement mentionnées (attractivité du territoire et développement numérique) le placent à l’interface de sujets à forte visibilité : promotion économique, image territoriale, politiques d’innovation, et articulation avec les dynamiques métropolitaines. Son ancrage territorial est souvent décrit comme double : so

  5. 07/31/2025

    From the Archives | The Digital Transformation of Government Institutions in Sub-Saharan Africa

    In this edition Ian Richards on Digital Government This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit theunbrief.substack.com/subscribe

  6. 06/19/2025

    From the Archives | UNICEF: Learning Passport Initiative Supports Teachers and Students Inclusion in the Digital Economy in Developing Countries, Refugee Camps, and Post-Conflict Zones

    UNICEF and Microsoft Partner-up The UN Brief interviewed Mac Glovinsky to speak about the Learning Passport, a partnership with Microsoft and Cambridge University to accelerate onboarding of children and adolescents in the digital economy, through educational tools. Glovinsky is the Principal Global Program Manager of the Learning Passport, and is based at the UN headquarters in New York. The Learning Passport is an educational tool that allows for learning on-and-offline. They have rolled-out at post-conflict areas, and in developing countries, helping children to continue their education and allowing them to carry their curriculum wherever they are, as they will eventually move out of refugee camps and thanks to these tools will be able to continue their studies at the appropriate grade level.These are one of the many ways that new technologies are supporting the continuity of education in what are very trying situations for these children and their families.We cover emerging technologies and how they impact international cooperation. Subscribe to The UN Brief for exclusive interviews with UN officials, diplomats, business leaders and academics for insights in the digital transformation of multilateral organizations, and the emerging technologies that are impacting international cooperation.Subscribers have:1. Early access to exclusive content, videos and podcasts, with insights and analysis of current affairs topics.2. Invitation to talks (virtual now) with the key players in Foreign Policy and Tech.3. Participation in round-tables on the future of multilateralism.4. A monthly update, closed to members-only, video call to discuss trends with diplomats, academics, government, and tech leaders.And much more to come in the coming months. Stay tuned. Looking forward to interacting with you all,Maya PlentzEditor in Chief Subscribe to our newsletter This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit theunbrief.substack.com/subscribe

    From the Archives | UNICEF: Learning Passport Initiative Supports Teachers and Students Inclusion in the Digital Economy in Developing Countries, Refugee Camps, and Post-Conflict Zones

  7. 06/15/2025

    Weekend Edition | Bourgogne in the Spotlight | Maison Louis Picamelot | More VivaTech | Looking for a Job? There is a Cybersecurity Talent Shortage | Presented by EVO Green Village

    On this edition: * A weekend in Bourgogne. * Discover the history of Cremant de Bourgogne. * Sustainability in wine production. THE BRIEF is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a paid subscriber. Bourgogne in the Spotlight Pondering what to do during the sweltering days of Summer in Geneva? No vacation time left? I suggest you go visit Bourgogne and discover its many food and wine offers. It is paradise for very affordable high-quality wines to wines for special occasions and to, above all, educating your senses. Did you know that Bourgogne wines that can be kept for several years are also a good investment? As an asset class Burgundy wines beat some traditional categories, not to say the investment in pleasure, as the British wine critic Steven Spurrier used to say. “Fine wine is also an investment in pleasure.” We had the pleasure of visiting three wine producers from the region last month. Keep your eyes pricked for the stories and interviews with the winemakers that are representing the best of sustainability and quality from the region at a global scale. Wines from Bourgogne are becoming better known in Brazil, this past month the BIVB, the Bureau Interprofessionel des Vins de Bourgogne, visited Brazil for the first time. Their latest research shows growing exports to the region, in fine restaurants, and by the recommendations of experts in gastronomy. Pairing the delightful Cremant de Bourgogne with Brazilian exquisite seafood and prime-cut barbecues is becoming a thing, with importers realizing the price/quality value and its potential with consumers and restaurateurs alike. In a country where prosecco and champagne reign supreme, given its tropical weather, as a refreshing, celebratory drink, and increasingly in cocktails by renowned bartenders at the Copacabana Palace and Fasano’s (the French architect Philippe Starck designed luxury hotel) Cremant de Bourgogne has already a market in Brazil expecting bubbly happiness drinks, that just needs to be developed to gain market share. One of our visits was to the Maison Louis Picamelot. We interviewed Louis Picamelot’s grandson, now producer and CEO of the Maison, Philippe Chautard. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit theunbrief.substack.com/subscribe

  8. 05/31/2025

    Bonus Episode: Peter Bakker, CEO of WBCSD | WTO: Cabo Verde Trade Policy Review | UN Ministerial in Berlin Reaffirms Multilateral Commitment Amid Global Fracture

    Subscribe for news on the UN and international organisations, and how emerging tech is changing the paradigms. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit theunbrief.substack.com/subscribe

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Hear first hand from the diplomats, tech executives, investors, UN and EU officials that are changing the world through dialogue and are using emerging technologies for good. theunbrief.substack.com

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