出國趣

Annie 阿尼、Chloe 克洛伊

想要出國留學、打工度假還是自助旅行嗎?兩位英文老師跟你一起拓展視野、提升英文實力、討論國際時事,Let's Fun Fun 學英文,爽爽出國去! -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

  1. 6d ago

    89-4 生出一個聰明的孩子,你願意花多少錢?+小分享: 韓國釜山人的性格 XD

    How much would you pay for a smarter baby? Startups claim they can screen embryos for everything from genetic diseases to IQ. Not everyone is convinced   Aug 10th 2026|San Francisco and New York|9 min read   Late last year New Yorkers noticed a series of strange advertisements on the subway. “Have your best baby,” one promised. “IQ is 50% genetic,” noted another. Predictably, they stirred controversy. Yet Kian Sadeghi of Nucleus, the embryo-screening startup behind them, was pleased. “This is a mass-market product. What’s a better way of showing that it’s a mass-market product than the subway?”   Nucleus is one of a growing number of Silicon Valley startups pushing the nascent technology. Noor Siddiqui of Orchid, a competitor, likes to say that “sex is for fun; embryo screening is for babies”. Herasight, another rival, began offering a screening service last year that allows parents to examine an embryo’s risk of various diseases, and also estimates of its height, intelligence and longevity—at a cost of up to $50,000. Nucleus adds hair and eye colour to the mix. The burgeoning industry aspires to reshape the way humans are made.   Not everyone is pleased. In many jurisdictions, including Britain, screening embryos for sex, let alone for polygenic conditions such as hypertension or physical traits such as height, is illegal. Many geneticists and doctors’ groups are sceptical that the technology works. Others say it is unethical. In America, where regulation is looser, religious conservatives and adherents of the “Make America Healthy Again” movement are vehemently opposed.   The startups’ visions may seem otherworldly. But change is coming fast. Cash is pouring into fertility research, leading to potentially rapid advances in genetic testing. Polygenic screening, particularly for common diseases, is popular among Americans, nearly three-quarters of whom say they would use it if they were already undergoing in-vitro fertilisation (IVF). A fight is brewing over the future of these technologies—and the businesses promoting them.   For the moment, only a tiny share of babies are born via IVF, as is necessary for embryo screening. In 2024, the most recent year for which figures are available, 100,000 American babies were created using the process, representing 2.8% of the total. David Sable, an investor and formerly a practising reproductive endocrinologist, says the global fertility market is commonly estimated to be worth just $25-30bn a year.   Yet Silicon Valley’s interest in fertility could expand access to IVF. Several years ago Peter Thiel and Elon Musk began to speak about low birth rates as a threat to America, and started putting money into fertility startups. They were joined by other investors. American venture-capital (VC) investments in fertility enterprises nearly doubled between 2019 and 2022, jumping from $254m to $496m, according to PitchBook, a data provider, even if they have since slowed a bit.   Many of these startups are focused on making IVF cheaper. At present, only 15 American states require the treatment to be included in insurers’ maternity benefits, meaning most Americans pay out of pocket. To reduce costs, a number of startups are selling fertility insurance and payment plans. Nader al-Salim of Gaia, one such firm, says its services save patients an average of $15,000 over the entire fertility process, largely by pooling risk.   Dr Sable reckons that if IVF does become much more widely available, the embryo-screening market could grow to $400-500bn annually. His estimate assumes the cost will fall to around $15,000 for the entire process; currently, just one cycle of IVF in America costs $15,000-20,000. Dr Sable reckons that prices will drop thanks to technological innovations which may increase success rates, allowing people to go through fewer cycles. Falling labour costs, as a result of automation and economies of scale, as well as greater standardisation should also help.   Some screening is already common among IVF patients. One example is PGT-A, which checks embryos have the right number of chromosomes, and which some studies claim lowers the miscarriage risk (many experts are sceptical). Certain clinics also offer PGT-M, which checks for disorders caused by a single gene, such as cystic fibrosis or Huntington’s. Now startups are adding a third screen: PGT-P, which scores embryos for conditions and traits determined by multiple genes, potentially ranging from certain cancers to eye colour and IQ. Demand for such tests could be substantial. A survey published in 2023 in *Science *found that 43% of all IVF participants would use polygenic screening to increase their child’s chance of getting into an elite university, provided it were safe and free. A third said the same for genetic editing.   Consider Arthur Zey, a software engineer, and his husband Chase Popp, a teacher. Mr Zey says he has always been a “tech nerd” and wanted to apply his skills to the process of having a child. “Most of my professional career I’ve been a product manager in tech, and so in some ways this is just like another product to manage,” he says. Earlier this year the couple had a son using an embryo selected from a group of six on the basis of the results of polygenic screening provided by Herasight. That allowed them to see risk scores for monogenic diseases and more than a dozen polygenic diseases. The startup also gave them predicted ranges for IQ and height.   Messrs Zey and Popp say they hoped to maximise their son’s lifespan, rather than his height or IQ. Yet Mr Zey knows there are advantages to being tall and smart. “All I could do is look at the results for my six embryos and say: ‘Okay, it kind of seems like this one is better.’”   The burden of perfection   For now, Messrs Zey and Popp are unusual. Commercial PGT-P screening is a niche industry. Startups like Herasight cater to a small population of typically very rich people, mostly in America. Even so, that has not stopped them from drawing plenty of criticism.   Some concerns the underlying science. Polygenic risk scores are based on genome-wide association studies (GWAS), which use data from large populations to try to discern associations between genetic variants and specific conditions and traits. Companies that offer screening claim that comparing embryos’ genomes to risk scores derived from these databases, sometimes with adjustments based on ancestry and family history, allows them to come up with individual assessments.   That is disputed, however. Although selecting on the basis of polygenic risk scores works across many offspring, as in animal breeding, it is less sure to have the desired result for a single child, notes Kevin Mitchell of Trinity College Dublin. For example, an embryo’s genome may have a single rare variant that has a large effect on its likelihood of developing a certain condition, but which would be unlikely to surface in population-level correlations.   Herasight attempts to deal with this issue by validating its risk scores using sibling data from GWAS datasets to ensure its models retain predictive value within a single family. It claims that, if it tests ten embryos for a couple where both parents have type-2 diabetes, it can reduce their child’s absolute risk of developing the condition by 12-20 percentage points, from a baseline of 40-60%. Herasight has been critical of competitors, particularly Nucleus, for not providing more detailed public information about their methodology. (Nucleus, for its part, says it is working constantly to ensure its scores are accurate.)   Some also argue that the magnitude of the benefits from embryo screening are overstated. If parents picked from ten viable embryos, the median boost to their child’s height would be 2.9cm, according to a paper in *Cell *in 2019, based on technology at the time. If they selected for IQ, the gain would be three points—unlikely to be life-changing. Moreover, for those picking among fewer than five embryos, the expected gains drop precipitously. Although the average number of viable embryos depends on the patient’s age, in many cases it is closer to two or three from each IVF cycle. Dagan Wells of the University of Oxford adds that, for many conditions, genes are less important than environmental factors such as diet. Selecting against some traits could also have unintended consequences. Genetic material can have different effects in different parts of the body, a phenomenon called pleiotropy. If parents select an embryo intending to lower their child’s risk of a certain disease, they may be neglecting or exacerbating problems for which providers do not (or cannot) offer a score.   Yet many of the technical issues, not least the lack of training data among certain populations, should improve with time. The *Cell *paper estimated that increasing the sample size of the underlying databases could double the median gain in IQ points from polygenic scoring. Or consider the effects of rare genetic variants. As databases grow, artificial-intelligence models may be better able to account for the effects of individual variants. With pleiotropy, some studies suggest that most genetic correlations between pairs of polygenic diseases are either positive—meaning cutting the chance of one decreases the chance of others—or insignificant. At present, the technology is “kind of a promissory note”, says Trinity’s Dr Mitchell. “They say, ‘Trust us, this is a bit shit right now, but it’ll be good soon’.”   If technological problems are resolved, ethical ones will only grow. Disability-rights groups are already wary of PGT-M, worrying it suggests lives with certain genetic conditions are not worth living. The rise in use of PGT-P widens that debate to many more traits. Then there are opponents who are concern

  2. Aug 6

    89-3 南韓股市熱潮正在瓦解,而這只是前兆而已?+ 小分享: 2026韓國釜山熱門網紅景點

    South Korea’s stock-market boom is collapsing** spectacularly**   It may be a harbinger   Jul 29th 2026|5 min read   America’s giant technology companies have gone from printing money to incinerating it. The market reckons Alphabet, Amazon, Meta and Microsoft will collectively report negative free cashflows next year, owing to their extravagant spending on data centres. Yet real fortunes are being made today from Silicon Valley’s gamble on the future.   Three companies are expected to surpass an astonishing $200bn of free cashflow apiece next year. One is Nvidia, an American darling that designs the advanced processors needed to run artificial-intelligence models. The other two are Samsung and SK Hynix, a pair of South Korean outfits that dominate the market for the more mundane memory chips in phones, laptops and, increasingly, data centres. Their windfall represents one of the greatest cross-border transfers of cash in corporate history.   Now a nation newly enamoured of stock markets is discovering that shares can go down as well as up. Since peaking in June the stock prices of Samsung and SK Hynix have crashed by 41% and 52% respectively, wiping $1.2trn from South Korea’s highly concentrated stock market. Those of SK Hynix fell by more than a fifth this week as investors digested a mere six-fold increase in its quarterly operating profit, compared with the year before. Samsung’s shares have not been this volatile since the dotcom era.   South Korea is a great experiment in mixing the extremes of state capitalism and market speculation. Last year, after a failed coup, the country’s president attempted to cheer his country by talking up the stock market (sound familiar?). The KOSpI, its main index, speedily hit a level the government had set as a target.   Ordinary South Koreans withdrew capital from insurers and banks to invest in stocks. Workers threatened industrial action to secure Wall Street-sized bonuses. Those at SK Hynix and Samsung’s chip division settled for an extraordinary 10% of operating profits. At SK Hynix that could amount to $500,000 a person this year, and $800,000 next year. (Goldman Sachs paid a meagre average of $400,000 in total compensation to its employees last year.)   Now a government that just weeks ago was embracing markets is being forced to apologise for them. It was only in April that regulators approved leveraged exchange-traded funds (ETFs) tied to individual South Korean stocks. These funds use derivatives to give investors a multiple of the daily return of a share. For example, if SK Hynix is up by 1%, an investor might receive 2%; or if it is down by 10%, an investor might jump out of a window.   When the selling began in June broker accounts faced margin calls and were shut down by the thousand, causing regulators to suspend new ETF launches. At an emergency meeting on July 29th politicians promised to severely limit the use of these funds. One compared the market to a casino. Shares in the country’s department stores are crashing as fast as those of its chipmakers, in anticipation of the handbags that will now remain on the shelves.   The trillion-dollar question for investors in South Korea is when the price of memory will peak. Bulls argue that data-centre construction and robotics mean demand for memory will outstrip supply into the 2030s. But the increasingly common view is that the same thing will happen to memory chips as has happened to every commodity in every commodity cycle in history—that new supply will, within a year or two, cause prices and profits to fall. Despite their vertiginous rise, Samsung and SK Hynix have on average traded only at single-digit multiples of forward earnings during the past year, suggesting that investors think their profits are at or near their highest point.   Perhaps it is inevitable that the first country to taste the riches promised by AI should be the first to have them taken away. No industry can survive if all the rewards are concentrated in one corner of the supply chain. Yet the dangers facing South Korea’s memory giants are also lurking elsewhere in the AI landscape.   First is the dreaded “commoditisation”. The sales of less advanced memory chips by SK Hynix and Samsung are threatened by the rising market share of Chinese competitors (one of which went public this week to great fanfare). So too are America’s model-makers, which face a potentially existential threat from Chinese open-source models.   Second is the risk that supposedly ironclad spending commitments from customers turn out to be no such thing. Both South Korean firms have made much of their “long-term agreements” with buyers, arguing that pre-payment and price certainty gives them visibility on profits for years to come. Yet judicious investors have begun to fear that customers will find ways of wriggling out of deals when it is advantageous for them to do so. Investors also worry how airtight lease agreements for data centres would prove if model-makers tried to get out of them in a bust. The piles of debt tied to Meta’s giant off-balance-sheet data centre have drawn particular scrutiny.   Picked, shovelled and quartered Nvidia has played an important role in stabilising this precarious situation. Jensen Huang, its leather-jacketed chief executive, has something to say on every debate: last week he published an influential letter in defence of open-source models. But his cheque-book is more important. Mr Huang has constructed a vest web of financial ties that keep the party going. This week it was reported that his company is in talks to guarantee $250bn of commitments from OpenAI, maker of ChatGPT, to lease a data centre. More remarkable still is the vague “$500bn” partnership with SK Hynix it announced over the weekend, and how little that seemed to matter to investors this week. Like a central banker meddling in markets, the more Mr Huang intervenes the more nervous investors become. The eventual bust will be all the worse for it. ■     韓國股市熱潮慘烈崩盤,這恐怕只是個前兆 2026 年 7 月 29 日 | 閱讀時間約 5 分鐘 美國的科技巨頭們,已經從過去的「印鈔機」變成了「燒錢機」。市場預估,由於在資料中心上的揮霍式支出,Alphabet、亞馬遜(Amazon)、Meta 與微軟(Microsoft)明年的自由現金流合計將轉為負值。然而,光是憑藉著對矽谷這場未來豪賭的押注,如今就有人賺得盆滿缽滿。 預計明年將有三家公司各自突破 2,000 億美元自由現金流的驚人紀錄。其中一家是美國的寵兒輝達(Nvidia),負責設計運行人工智慧(AI)模型所需的高階處理器。另外兩家則是韓國的三星(Samsung)與 SK 海力士(SK Hynix),這對雙雄壟斷了手機、筆電以及日益擴增的資料中心所需之一般記憶體晶片市場。他們的這筆意外之財,堪稱企業史上最偉大的跨國財富轉移之一。 然而,這個新近狂熱於股票市場的國家,如今正赫然發現:股價能漲,自然也能跌。自今年 6 月觸頂以來,三星與 SK 海力士的股價已分別暴跌 41% 與 52%,從高度集中的韓國股市中抹去了 1.2 兆美元 的市值。本周,儘管 SK 海力士公佈的單季營業利潤較去年同期「僅」暴增了六倍,投資人消化此消息後,其股價仍重挫超過五分之一。三星的股價波動程度,更是達到了自網路泡沫時代以來未曾見過的高峰。 韓國無疑是一場將「國家資本主義」與「市場投機」極端融合的大型實驗。去年,在一場失敗的政變之後,該國總統試圖透過拉抬股市來振奮人心(聽起來很熟悉吧?)。韓國綜合股價指數(KOSPI「高斯皮」。英文讀音近似 KOS-pee)隨即迅速衝上了政府設定的目標關卡。 韓國的普通民眾紛紛從保險公司和銀行提領資金轉而投向股市。勞工們甚至以發動罷工相威脅,要求獲取比照華爾街等級的年終獎金。SK 海力士與三星晶片部門的員工,最終接受了高達營業利潤 10% 的分紅方案。在 SK 海力士,這意味著每人今年可領到 50 萬美元,明年甚至上看 80 萬美元。(相較之下,高盛去年支付給員工的總薪酬平均僅為微薄的 40 萬美元。) 然而,幾週前還在擁抱市場的政府,現在卻不得不為此出面道歉。就在今年 4 月,監管機構才剛批准了連結韓國單一股票的槓桿型 ETF。這些基金利用衍生性金融商品,為投資人提供股票單日報酬率的倍數收益。舉例來說,若 SK 海力士上漲 1%,投資人可能獲利 2%;但若下跌 10%,投資人可能就想跳樓了。 當 6 月拋售潮開始時,經紀戶頭面臨追繳保證金(margin call),數以千計的帳戶遭到強制平倉(強制平倉(又稱爆倉或斷頭)是指當投資人使用融資、期貨或保證金交易時,因為市場價格向反方向大跌或大漲,導致帳戶內的資金與保證金低於規定的最低維持率,券商或交易平台為了防止虧損繼續擴大,自動將持有的部位強制賣出或買回結算的機制。),促使監管機構緊急暫停新 ETF 的發行。在 7 月 29 日的緊急會議上,政客們承諾將嚴格限制這類基金的使用,更有議員將該市場比作賭場。隨著大家預期高檔包包將繼續擺在架上賣不出去,韓國百貨公司的股價下跌速度,已經跟晶片製造商一樣快了。 對於韓國的投資人而言,價值兆美元的關鍵問題在於:記憶體價格何時見頂?牛市支持者認為,資料中心的建設與機器人技術意味著對記憶體的需求將持續供不應求直到 2030 年代。但越來越普遍的觀點認為,記憶體晶片最終也將重蹈歷史上每一種大宗物資(commodity)週期相同

  3. Jul 25

    89-2 超商的東西越來越貴是誰的錯? + 小分享: 文化敏感度:寵物當小孩?老人?

    Don’t blame supermarkets for your expensive** groceries** Saying greedy shops have caused rising food prices is populist slop(垃圾內容)   Jul 20th 2026|Washington, DC|4 min read   FOR MANY characters in fiction, the central drama of their story concerns their grocery bills. Jean Valjean is imprisoned for stealing a loaf of bread; Mrs Lovett strikes an unholy alliance with Sweeney Todd for access to a source of free meat for her pie business. According to a recent survey of Americans, such drama has come for them too: almost two-thirds cite paying for groceries as a major source of financial stress, twice the share that mention other large or recently volatile expenses, including housing and fuel prices.   At first glance the panic is understandable. Grocery prices in America have climbed by around a quarter since 2020, exceeding nominal wage growth (see chart). Shoppers might even feel some sympathy for Mrs Lovett: ground beef is nearly twice as expensive as it was in 2019, thanks in part to drought-related cattle shortages.   Other countries have also been afflicted by rising grocery bills. Since 2020 food prices in Australia, Britain, Canada and France are up by between a fifth and a third. Discontent is inviting all kinds of intervention. Zohran Mamdani, the mayor of New York City, cruised to victory by promising to do something about the rising cost of living. He plans to bring down food prices by opening a series of government-run supermarkets. In Canada the push for state grocery stores went mainstream when Avi Lewis, a champion of the concept, was elected leader of the country’s leftist New Democratic Party in March.   Others are trying to meddle with prices directly—by suasion or by force. When Walmart, America’s biggest retailer, announced on July 6th that it was lowering prices on staple products including ground beef, President Donald Trump quickly claimed credit, saying it had done so at his behest. On July 1st a new law came into effect in Australia banning large chains from charging prices that the government deems “excessive”.   Yet these interventions—which focus on the very end of the food chain—are looking in the wrong place. In most developed countries there is scant evidence that grocers earn excessive profit margins. Nor have they raised prices for consumers more quickly than the wholesale prices they must pay have increased. Moreover, evidence of concentration—which would give grocers the market power to gouge consumers—is lacking in most developed countries.   First, consider margins. These are often wafer-thin. American supermarkets like Kroger and Albertsons collected just 1% of their sales in operating profits last year. Even Walmart, with its 4% margin, hardly looks like it is milking customers. It is a similar story in Britain and France, with margins only a little fatter in Australia and Canada. The real cream has traditionally been elsewhere in the supply chain, such as with the big food manufacturers. Over the past decade the average operating margin across General Mills, Kraft Heinz, Mondelez and PepsiCo has been 13%.   Second, look at how wholesale prices have changed over the past six years. Grocers are often criticised for raising prices rapidly after the pandemic. But evidence of opportunism is hard to find. Consumer food prices rose no more quickly than producer food prices between 2020 and 2025 in America (and likewise in Australia, Canada and France).   Finally, consider concentration. According to the Herfindahl-Hirschman index, a measure of industry concentration, the grocery market in most countries is competitive at the national level (a little more so in America and Britain, a little less so in Australia and Canada). That does not guarantee adequate competition in practice: what matters is whether there are enough rival outlets within a distance that consumers could reasonably be expected to travel to buy their groceries. Analysis published by America’s Department of Agriculture in 2023 noted that the grocery market is far more concentrated when examined at the county level. Even then, however, it is mostly a concern in rural areas and small towns, where less than 10% of the population lives.   Grocery prices have shot up across the developed world largely because the cost of inputs like fertiliser and fuel have surged, owing first to the war in Ukraine and, more recently, to conflict with Iran. The wages that farmers need to pay to attract enough workers have also risen as governments cut back on immigration. There is little evidence to suggest that supermarkets are the ones to blame. Even the packaged-food giants, which increased prices to protect their profits in the post-pandemic wave of inflation, have seen their margins slump over the past three years as shoppers have switched to retailers’ cheaper own-label brands.   The idea that governments should step in to sell food to their citizens is an old one, with a poor record. Supermarkets in the Soviet Union, which were almost exclusively state-run, are remembered for their long bread lines, not their low bread prices. Subsidised stores might well be able to offer lower prices, and may have a useful role to play in underserved rural areas. But placing them in an already competitive market runs the risk of driving existing grocers out of business. Politicians need to cook up some better ideas. ■   請別把高昂的雜貨賬單怪在超市頭上 宣稱貪婪的店家導致食物價格上漲,根本是民粹主義的廢話 2026年7月20日 | 華盛頓特區 | 4分鐘閱讀 對許多虛構作品中的角色來說,故事的核心衝突往往與他們的雜貨帳單有關。尚萬強(Jean Valjean)因偷了一塊麵包而身陷囹圄;洛薇特夫人(Mrs. Lovett)則為了替她的派餅生意獲取免費肉源,與理髮師陶德(Sweeney Todd)結成了邪惡聯盟。根據最近一項針對美國人的調查,這樣的劇碼也來到了他們的現實生活中:幾乎有三分之二的人將支付雜貨費用列為主要的財務壓力來源,這個比例是提及房屋和燃料價格等其他大型或近期波動劇烈支出的兩倍。 乍看之下,這種恐慌是可以理解的。自 2020 年以來,美國的雜貨價格上漲了約四分之一,超過了名義薪資的成長幅度(見圖表)。購物者甚至可能對洛薇特夫人產生些許同情:由於與乾旱相關的肉牛短缺,牛絞肉的價格幾乎是 2019 年的兩倍。 其他國家也同樣受到雜貨賬單上漲的困擾。自 2020 年以來,澳洲、英國、加拿大和法國的食品價格上漲了五分之一到三分之一之間。這種不滿情緒正在引發各種形式的干預。紐約市長佐蘭·曼達尼(Zohran Mamdani)憑藉承諾解決生活成本上漲問題而順利勝選。他計劃透過開辦一系列政府營運的超市來降低食品價格。在加拿大,推動國營雜貨店的概念進入了主流,該概念的擁護者艾維·路易斯(Avi Lewis)於三月當選該國左翼新民主黨的領袖。 其他人則企圖直接干預價格——無論是透過勸說還是強制手段。當美國最大的零售商沃爾瑪(Walmart)於 7 月 6 日宣布降低包括牛絞肉在內的主食價格時,總統唐納·川普(Donald Trump)迅速將功勞歸於自己,表示沃爾瑪是應他的要求而這麼做的。7 月 1 日,澳洲一項新法律正式生效,禁止大型連鎖店收取政府認定為「過高」的價格。 然而,這些將焦點放在食品供應鏈最末端的干預措施,顯然看錯了地方。在大多數發達國家,幾乎沒有證據表明雜貨商賺取了過高的利潤率。他們向消費者提高價格的速度,也沒有快過他們必須支付的批發價格上漲速度。此外,大多數已開發國家並沒有證據顯示,超市業者因市場過度集中而掌握足以向消費者收取高價的市場支配力。 首先,考慮利潤率。這些利潤率通常薄如蟬翼。像克羅格(Kroger)和艾伯森(Albertsons)這樣的美國超市,去年的營業利潤僅占其銷售額的 1%。即使是擁有 4% 利潤率的沃爾瑪,看起來也很難說是在榨取顧客。英國和法國的情況也類似,澳洲和加拿大的利潤率僅稍微豐厚一點。傳統上,真正的油水存在於供應鏈的其他環節,例如大型食品製造商。在過去十年中,通用磨坊(General Mills)、卡夫亨氏(Kraft Heinz)、億滋國際(Mondelez)和百事公司(PepsiCo)的平均營業利潤率為 13%。 其次,看看過去六年批發價格的變化。雜貨商常因在疫情後迅速調漲價格而受到批評。但很難找到投機取巧的證據。在 2020 年至 2025 年期間,美國的消費者食品價格上漲速度並沒有快於生產者食品價格(澳洲、加拿大和法國也是如此)。 最後,考慮集中度。根據衡量產業集中度的赫芬達爾-赫希曼指數(Herfindahl-Hirschman index),大多數國家的雜貨市場在國家層面上是具備競爭力的(美國和英國競爭稍強一些,澳洲和加拿大則稍弱一些)。這並不能確保在實際操作中有充分的競爭:真正重要的是,在消費者可以合理前往購買雜貨的距離內,是否有足夠的競爭對手門市。美國農業部於 2023 年發布的分析指出,若在縣(county)級層面上進行檢視,雜貨市場的集中度要高得多。然而,即便如此,這主要也只是鄉村地區和小鎮面臨的問題,而居住在這些地方的人口不到總人口的 10%。 食品雜貨價格之所以在已開發國家普遍大幅攀升,主要是因為肥料、燃料等生產投入成本飆漲。這波成本上升,最初受到俄烏戰爭影響,而近期則進一步受到伊朗衝突所帶來的衝擊。此外,各國政府收緊移民政策,使

  4. Jul 18

    89-1 各國AI會有文化上的差異而且絕對服從政權!? +小分享: 資優生好乖!

    Briefing | Computational bias AI models’ values are very different from most people’s They are more secular and more liberal—unless they’re made in China   Jun 25th 2026|12 min read Imagine that you are having trouble with your in-laws, who are meddling in your marriage. You ask ChatGPT what to do. It tells you not to try to win them over. Keep a respectful distance and don’t justify every decision to them. (“This is hard, but powerful.”) Had you queried DeepSeek, a Chinese AI, however, you would have got quite different advice. “Seek compromise,” it suggests, “Interference from in-laws may stem from genuine concern and affection.” Ask Mistral, a French AI, and you get a third take. Conflict with the in-laws can be draining. Try journaling to process your frustration. What worldviews are embedded in AI models? Many critics of AI complain about “hallucinations”, a class of errors where models make up confident-sounding but factually incorrect answers. When there is no factually correct answer, however, AI’s shortcomings can be even more pronounced and less easy to detect. When you ask a model to summarise the news, it reaches a subjective judgment about what to include. When you ask it about your in-laws, its values and biases play an even bigger part in its response. Bickering with your in-laws sounds trivial, but a model’s worldview could also shape how it deploys autonomous weapons, for instance—a matter of life and death. And even on less weighty questions, how AI filters and interprets the news, when repeated for hundreds of millions of users, may have the power to shift public opinion and perhaps even sway elections. Although Chinese models have pronounced biases (just try asking them about the Tiananmen massacre), their inner workings tend to be public, so savvy users can at least probe how they reach their conclusions. Most Western ones are not so transparent, so their foibles are harder to detect. Users have to trust a handful of giant firms to be instilling appropriate values in their models. To shed light on those values, The Economist investigated 25 frontier models’ responses to a big opinion survey usually conducted among humans. Since 1981 the World Values Survey has regularly quizzed people in more than 100 countries about their morals and beliefs. Researchers have identified questions that are especially good at distinguishing people from each other along two broad axes, from traditional to secular and from “survival” (an emphasis on economic security and safety) to “self-expression” (personal freedom). I enjoy working with people The models’ answers, in English, on topics ranging from political petitions to God, suggest values that are different from those of most people. In fact, the models are often more extreme than the average respondent in every country included in the polling. On the survey’s “cultural map”, AI models fall overwhelmingly into the quadrant populated by rich countries. The worldview of GPT models, created by OpenAI, is more secular than any country on earth (see chart 1). Gemini models, made by Google, place more weight on individual freedom (for example, “homosexuality is justifiable”) than people do anywhere. No model reflects the worldviews of most African or Muslim countries. Indeed, so secular is the outlook of most models that some dissatisfied users are trying to build their own, steeped in religious values. Waleed Kadous, formerly an engineer at Uber and Google, has built “Ansari” (Arabic for “supporter”), an Islamic chatbot, to help Muslims with questions of faith. Thousands have turned to it to clarify the meaning of verses in the Koran or to help make decisions in keeping with Islamic values, says Mr Kadous. How are models’ values formed? One way is via the data used to train them. Models are typically fed vast amounts of text to teach them associations between words. In the process they absorb the social mores that infuse those texts. Talkie, a model trained only on text from before 1931, thinks God is extremely important and is “very proud to be a citizen of Great Britain”. It is a bigger believer in law and order than any frontier model we tested. The impact of training data is evident in the variation in a model’s response depending on the language in which a question is posed. In a new paper Hannah Waight of the University of Oregon and her co-authors put politically charged questions in English and 37 other languages to OpenAI’s GPT-3.5 and other models. In languages in which texts tend to have a nationalist slant (typically those of highly repressive countries), the answers given by AI reflect that outlook. The lower a country’s media freedom (as measured by the World Press Freedom Index), the paper finds, the more pro-regime answers are in that country’s language, compared with answers in English (see chart 2). “State control of media affects language model outputs through its appearance in training data,” the authors conclude. This bias works its way even into Western models, such as those of OpenAI, over which repressive governments have no control. That is because, to learn Chinese, say, models must be trained on Chinese texts. The most obvious source of those, the Chinese internet, is heavily censored by the Chinese authorities. Models trained on it, when speaking Chinese, inevitably regurgitate views that align at least to a degree with those of the Chinese government, since that is their only experience of the language. Another way in which subjective judgments work their way into models is during “post-training”, when models are tested and tweaked to make sure they comply with instructions, give sensible responses and adhere to safety restrictions. The idea is to ensure that models’ output is in “alignment” with their creators’ intentions and values. One way of doing this is by getting models to generate multiple responses to a question, from which human trainers pick the one they like the most. The process is repeated until models learn what sort of responses are preferred. Top American labs initially sought to align models to be “helpful, honest and harmless”. Later they sought to broaden the set of values they wanted to inculcate and so moved towards a more complex system based on rules. These, however, proved difficult for models to follow consistently. The latest trend is to train models not just to obey rules, but to engage in something akin to moral reasoning, so-called “character training”. Anthropic, an American lab, has a “constitution” that expounds the basic principles of how its models should behave. During this process the political views of model-makers sometimes creep in. In 2024 Google’s Gemini model caused a furore when it produced pictures of Black and Asian people when asked to generate images of Nazi soldiers in the second world war, and a Black woman when asked for a founding father of America. That iteration of Gemini appears to have been aligned for “diversity”. Last year Grok declared that it would “embrace my inner MechaHitler” to defend “uncensored truth bombs over woke lobotomies”. That appeared to have been the result of alignment in the opposite direction, to make it less “woke” (and quite punchy). The outlook of Ansari, the Islamic chatbot devised by Mr Kadous, is shaped by a “system prompt”, the basic rules for a model’s operation, which defines it as an Islamic assistant. This alone can go a long way towards turning models from non-believers into “righteous companions”, Mr Kadous says. I can see you’re really upset Newer iterations of Western AI models tend to produce less nakedly ideological responses. Nonetheless, the results of their alignment remain apparent. Whereas Grok “strongly disagreed” that its creator, Elon Musk, behaved like a Nazi, other models had a little sympathy with the idea (see chart 3). Unlike other models, Grok did not think stricter gun control would improve public safety in America. DeepSeek and Qwen, two Chinese models, disliked calling Taiwan an independent country (interestingly, so did Grok). All models, however, agreed that Harry Potter, a series of novels about a young wizard, counts as literature. Questions of a political nature generate big rifts. Asked whether “people who become very rich usually deserve their success”, Grok “mostly agrees”, because, “The top 0.1% disproportionately create outsized value for others.” ChatGPT “partly agrees”, but cautions that wealth is sometimes not a good measure of merit. Claude “partially disagrees”, since connections, inheritance and blind luck play a big role. (“It is substantially misleading as a general claim.”) DeepSeek flatly “disagrees”. “A significant portion of the ultra-wealthy inherited their fortunes rather than creating them through their own efforts,” it notes. Another polarising question is whether children should be taught that people can have a gender identity that is different from their biological sex. ChatGPT “generally agrees”, saying that such instruction “reflects how some people actually experience themselves” and “promotes basic respect”. Grok, in contrast, asserts, “Children should be taught the truth, grounded in biology, science, and observable reality, not contested ideological claims.” Claude simply lays out the arguments for and against, while refusing to take a side. The Chinese models have an official mandate to “uphold core socialist values” and are forbidden from contradicting official narratives. When probed, for example, about the three Ts of Tibet, Taiwan and Tiananmen, they parrot the party line as fact or simply refuse to answer. Asked whether The Economist is fair in its coverage of China, DeepSeek replies like a foreign-ministry spokesperson: “China welc

  5. Jul 11

    88-4 如何逆天抗老?聽經濟學人可以變聰明也變美!+ 小分享: 我的學生來自各行各業!

    Science & technology | Well Informed The chemicals that reduce wrinkles Vitamins, applied properly, can partially reverse the effects of ageing Jun 5th 2026|3 min read  ABIOCHEMISTRY textbook sometimes feels like essential reading when shopping for wrinkle-reducing products. Their labels list molecules like retinoids, antioxidants, peptides and exfoliating acids. The names might be familiar, but does anyone know what they do? Many of the claims that they will make skin appear more youthful rely on company-funded studies or consumer surveys rather than rigorous clinical evidence. Yet a handful of ingredients do have a solid scientific backing. Older-looking skin comes about via two distinct processes: the passage of time and environmental damage caused by ultraviolet (UV) light, pollution and smoking. All of these harm the collagen and elastin fibres in the extracellular matrix, the skin’s structural scaffolding, causing wrinkles and sagging. Around 80% of ageing in white skin is caused by UV exposure, according to Abigail Langton, a dermatology researcher at the University of Manchester—the melanin in darker skin provides some degree of protection. If your wrinkles worry you, then the ingredient with the strongest scientific backing that might help is tretinoin, also known as all-trans retinoic acid. A derivative of vitamin A, it was originally developed as a treatment for acne, but in the mid-1980s dermatologists noticed that patients who used it had fewer wrinkles as well as fewer spots. Studies of skin biopsies, as well as non-invasive skin imaging, revealed that tretinoin thickens the epidermis, the skin’s outer layer, making it look smoother and improving fine lines. It also stimulates collagen production in the dermis, the layer that sits just under the epidermis. This seems to partly restore the extracellular matrix and reduce wrinkles. Tretinoin is generally only available on prescription and it can irritate the skin. Milder retinoids—molecules derived from vitamin A—such as retinol and retinal, are used in over-the-counter creams and serums. Once they are absorbed by the skin, these chemicals are converted into tretinoin. Pricier formulations often contain those derivatives that convert more easily or are more stable. Although over-the-counter retinoids are less aggressive, it is still sensible to start with a lower concentration (those as low as 0.04% can be effective) and work up to avoid irritation. There is also support for the anti-ageing effects of certain antioxidants, chiefly vitamin C (ascorbic acid). This plays an important role in collagen production, and there is evidence it can reduce wrinkles and hyperpigmentation. The downside is that it is unstable and can break down quickly if products are not formulated or stored correctly. An expensive cream can become ineffective if it is left lying around for too long. Peptides, another common ingredient, are short chains of amino acids. Some encourage the production of extracellular matrix proteins, others prevent their breakdown and some relax the face muscles, in a manner similar to botox. The scientific studies used by cosmetics companies to claim anti-wrinkle benefits are, however, typically conducted or funded by those same companies. All these ingredients can be, and are, combined in different ways. And they need time to work: dermatologists recommend sticking with the same regimen for several months before judging the results and making any tweaks. But though these ingredients may partly reverse the signs of ageing, prevention is more effective. Nothing beats protecting yourself against the sun.■   科學與技術|知識充電站 減少皺紋的化學成分 正確使用維他命,可以部分逆轉老化帶來的影響。 在購買抗皺產品時,有時候會讓人覺得好像必須先讀懂一本生物化學教科書才行。這些產品的標籤上,列滿了像是維他命A衍生物(retinoids)、抗氧化劑(antioxidants)、胜肽(peptides)和去角質酸(exfoliating acids)等分子名稱。這些名字聽起來可能很神祕,但真的有人知道它們的功效是什麼嗎?許多宣稱能讓肌膚看起來更年輕的說法,往往只依賴公司資助的研究或消費者問卷調查,而不是嚴謹的臨床證據。不過,確實有少數幾種成分擁有紮實的科學理論支持。 皮膚顯得老化主要是由兩個不同的過程造成的:時間的流逝,以及由紫外線(UV)、污染和抽菸所引起的環境傷害。這所有因素都會破壞細胞外基質(也就是皮膚的結構支架)中的膠原蛋白與彈性纖維,進而導致皺紋和下垂。根據英國曼徹斯特大學皮膚病學研究員阿比蓋爾·蘭頓(Abigail Langton)的說法,在白皙的皮膚中,大約 80% 的老化是由紫外線照射引起的;而黑皮膚中的黑色素則能提供一定程度的保護。 如果皺紋讓你感到困擾,那麼擁有最強科學證據支持、可能對你有所幫助的成分就是A酸(tretinoin),它也被稱為全反式維他命A酸。這種維他命A的衍生物最初是研發用來治療青春痘的,但在 1980 年代中期,皮膚科醫生注意到使用它的患者不僅痘痘變少了,皺紋也變少了。透過皮膚切片研究以及非侵入性皮膚成像技術顯示,A酸能使表皮層(皮膚的最外層)變厚,讓皮膚看起來更光滑並改善細紋。它還能刺激真皮層(緊鄰表皮層下方的組織)產生膠原蛋白。這似乎能部分修復細胞外基質並減少皺紋。 A酸通常屬於處方藥,且可能會刺激皮膚。因此,較溫和的維他命A衍生物(例如A醇 retinol 和A醛 retinal)常被用於市售的免處方乳霜和精華液中。當這些化學成分被皮膚吸收後,會轉化為A酸。價格較昂貴的配方通常含有更容易轉化或更穩定的衍生物。雖然市售的A醇或A醛產品比較沒有那麼強烈,但一開始最好還是先從較低的濃度(低至 0.04% 就能發揮效果)開始使用,然後循序漸進,以避免皮膚發炎刺激。 某些抗氧化劑的抗老化效果也得到了支持,其中最主要的成分是維他命C(抗壞血酸)。它在膠原蛋白的生成中扮演著重要的角色,且有證據顯示它能減少皺紋和黑色素沉澱(hyperpigmentation)。缺點是它非常不穩定,如果產品的配方不對或存放方式不當,它很快就會分解失效。如果把昂貴的乳霜隨便亂放太久,它可能會變得完全沒有效果。 胜肽是另一種常見的成分,它是胺基酸的短鏈。有些胜肽能促進細胞外基質蛋白的生成,有些能防止它們分解,還有一些則能放鬆面部肌肉,其作用方式類似於肉毒桿菌。然而,化妝品公司用來宣稱抗皺功效的科學研究,通常都是由這些公司自己進行或資助的。 所有這些成分都可以、也確實被以不同的方式組合在一起。而且它們需要時間才能發揮作用:皮膚科醫生建議,在評估效果並進行任何調整之前,應該堅持使用相同的護膚流程幾個月。雖然這些成分可以部分逆轉老化的跡象,但預防依然比治療更有效。沒有什麼比做好防曬更能保護肌膚的了。 -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

  6. Jul 3

    88-3 FIFA世界足球盃 VS. 美國 +小分享: 推薦后里馬戲團!

    The World Cup doesn’t understand America John Prideaux, our executive editor, on why America is a spectacular place to host the football tournament   Jun 27th 2026|3 min read Fans of soccerball love to complain about America. With its unbridled capitalism, it has the gall to treat football as a business. “Hydration breaks” have been introduced in this year’s World Cup. Fans suspect these are the first step to more frequent advert breaks for TV viewers, a grubbily commercial innovation that changes their game. Going to a match costs a fortune . Dynamic pricing may work in the NFL or NBA, where the market in tickets resembles the market for any other luxury good. But soccer, with its roots in teams of men who worked in the same factory, has different values. In economics terms, these countries consider football to be part of the commons. In many of the big football countries there is an expectation that the **games **will be carried by channels that are available to everyone. Were the rights sold to the highest bidder, in profit-maximising fashion, and large numbers of people unable to watch, that would become an existential issue for the government of the day. There’s the fact that Donald Trump’s America would seem singularly disinterested in being hospitable. Foreign fans who followed the operations of ICE in Minneapolis earlier this year wondered whether America actually wanted the world to visit. Then its government denied entry to Omar Artan, one of Africa’s best referees, simply because he was from Somalia. America’s president will help present the trophy to the winning team, which will make it harder for athletes to say that the tournament has nothing to do with politics. For all these reasons, the argument goes, America doesn’t understand the World Cup. There is truth to this grumbling, but it misses a big reason why America is, in fact, a spectacular place to host the tournament. This struck me powerfully while I was watching Brazil v Haiti last week at a bar in lower Manhattan. Yes, ticket prices are high: that reflects demand and also how much richer America is on a per person basis than other developed countries. New Jersey’s mass-transit system is indeed annoying. The Trump administration has attempted to spoil the vibe. But it has not succeeded. That is because of American exceptionalism. The country’s population size and history of immigration means almost every nation competing in this World Cup has a sizable diaspora in the United States. That is something Americans take for granted, but it means that you could run a pretty good World Cup in America without inviting any foreign visitors at all. My bar in SoHo was so full of Brazilians that we took over the sidewalk and spilled into the street. (I lived in São Paulo for three years, so they are my second team.) Football-crazed Brazil, which has won the championship five times, boasts a population of 220m, so it’s not hard to find a bar in London or Paris taken over by yellow and green shirts whose wearers, it turns out, can samba while carrying drinks. More unusually, there were a bunch of Haitian fans in the bar, too. Haiti’s population is only 12m. But there are about 850,000 Haitian migrants in the United States. Add in those who claim Haitian ancestry and you get a bigger number. This is an “only in America” thing. In fact, pretty much every nation represented in the World Cup will have a bar just in New York City that is designated as home turf. A dedicated football fan could travel the world, attending home games for every country from Algeria to Uzbekistan, using only the subway. And then there is the way that American cities have adopted nationalities—think of the Scots in Boston or the Bosnians in St Louis. If you had to pick one country as the permanent host of the World Cup, America would surely be it.   世界盃不懂美國 約翰·普里多,本刊執行編輯,談美國為何是舉辦足球賽事的絕佳之地 2026年6月27日|3分鐘閱讀 足球迷們最愛抱怨美國。這個資本主義肆意橫行的國家,竟然膽敢將足球視為一門生意。本屆世界盃引入了「補水休息」環節。球迷們懷疑,這不過是日後增加更多電視廣告時段的第一步——一項改變他們心愛運動的銅臭味創新。入場看球的費用高得嚇人。動態定價或許適用於NFL或NBA——這些賽事的門票市場與其他奢侈品市場並無二致。但足球有其根基,它發源於同一工廠的工人球隊,承載著不同的價值觀。用經濟學術語來說,這些國家將足球視為公共財。 在許多足球大國,人們普遍期望比賽能在所有人均可收看的頻道上播出。若將版權以利潤最大化的方式售予出價最高者,導致大批民眾無緣觀賽,那將對當屆政府構成生死攸關的政治危機。 還有一個問題:唐納·川普的美國,似乎對接待外賓毫無興趣。今年稍早,跟蹤報導移民及海關執法局 (ICE)在明尼阿波利斯行動的外國球迷,都不禁疑惑——美國究竟是否歡迎世界各地的訪客?接著,美國政府以索馬利亞籍為由,拒絕非洲頂尖裁判之一奧馬爾·阿爾坦入境。此外,美國總統將親自上台為冠軍球隊頒獎,這讓運動員們更難辯稱本屆賽事與政治無關。基於以上種種,外界的說法是:美國不懂世界盃。 這些抱怨不無道理,但卻忽略了一個重要原因——美國其實是舉辦本屆賽事的絕佳之地。上週我在曼哈頓下城一間酒吧觀看巴西對海地的比賽時,這一點深深震撼了我。 是的,票價高昂——這反映的是市場需求,也反映出美國人均財富遠高於其他已開發國家。紐澤西的公共交通系統確實令人惱火。川普政府也試圖破壞氣氛。但它並未得逞。原因,正在於美國的獨特性。 這個國家龐大的人口規模與悠久的移民歷史,意味著幾乎每個參賽國在美國都擁有相當規模的海外僑民社群。 這是美國人視為理所當然的事,但正因如此,即便不邀請任何海外訪客,美國也能辦出一屆相當精彩的世界盃。我在蘇活區那間酒吧裡,巴西人多到我們佔領了人行道,蔓延至街道。(我在聖保羅生活過三年,所以巴西是我的第二支主隊。)熱愛足球的巴西擁有兩億兩千萬人口、五度稱霸世界盃,要在倫敦或巴黎找到一間被黃綠球衣淹沒的酒吧並不難——而那些穿著球衣的人,原來還能一邊端著飲料一邊跳森巴。 更難得的是,酒吧裡還有一群海地球迷。海地總人口僅一千兩百萬,但在美國卻有約八十五萬海地移民。若再加上具有海地血統的人,這個數字還會更大。這就是「只有在美國才會發生」的事。 事實上,幾乎每個參賽國都能在紐約市找到一間屬於自己的「主場酒吧」。一位鐵桿球迷只需搭乘地鐵,便能「環遊世界」,為每一支從阿爾及利亞到烏茲別克的球隊觀看主場比賽。更不用說美國城市認養各國文化的傳統——想想波士頓的蘇格蘭人,或聖路易的波士尼亞人。若真要選出一個永久舉辦世界盃的國家,美國無疑是不二之選。 -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

  7. Jun 27

    88-2 克洛伊的經濟學人 Chloe's Economist- 中國高科技造成更極端的貧富差距+小分享:學生的暑假? VS. 童年的我的暑假

    China’s high-tech rise is leaving much of the country behind That could make a** starkly unequal** country even more so Jun 2nd 2026|TIANSHUI|6 min read Listen to this story LIKE MANY cities in China’s hinterland, Tianshui, in the western province of Gansu, is full of dusty and disused factories. But over the past decade it has also become an unlikely high-tech hub. New industrial parks have sprouted, offering companies cheap energy, financing and land deals. The city has already built an exhibition hall to display the zippy products it hopes to make in the future, called “Tianshui Industry 2050”. All this will please officials in far-off Beijing. They want China’s rust belt to reinvent itself with technology. Just recently they released yet another plan for urban renewal, calling for the transformation of stagnant cities into “innovative” places that can offer their inhabitants a “high-quality life”. Yet for all the fanfare, the people of Tianshui are not much better off. The new factories have failed to offset a broader slowdown in the city’s economy: ten years ago Tianshui’s GDP per person was 16% of Beijing’s; now it is 14%. In 2025 the city’s economy grew at a rate two percentage points slower than the national average. Nor, say locals, have the highly automated facilities created many jobs for them. Throngs of young people are leaving in search of better opportunities. Over the past decade, its population has shrunk by nearly half a million to 2.9m. At this rate, by 2050 there will be few workers left. The tale of Tianshui shows the limits of China’s big bet on advanced manufacturing. The Communist Party has decided the country’s economic future lies in making world-beating technology. So hundreds of cities across the country are, like Tianshui, trying hard to do so. But while the high-tech drive has helped some brainy, connected and wealthy cities become even richer, most of those in the hinterland lack the supply chains or talent to take advantage of it. After all, some 60% of China’s workforce—about 500m people—do not even have a high-school education. Many of them live in smaller and poorer cities. For centuries Tianshui was more a cultural than an economic hub. Legend has it that China’s first emperor, a serpent-bodied demi-god, was born there; Buddhist grottoes have been cut out of the cliffs nearby. But in the 1960s Tianshui industrialised. It became an important cog in the state-planned economy; its factories made tractors, ball bearings and matches. A tale of two cities Dormitories, schools and hospitals were built to cater to the swelling labour force. One of the workers was Ms Dong, now in her 80s, who enjoyed an ultra-stable “iron rice bowl” job at a printing press. She retired in her 40s with a good pension and a guarantee that her son could inherit her job. But most local factories were not competitive enough to survive China’s bumpy transition to a more market-driven economy in the 1980s and 1990s. In the past ten years a new generation of high-tech factories, making gizmos such as sensors and machine tools, has sprung up. But they have not brought many jobs with them. An exhibit at Tianshui’s museum displays snapshots of the city’s factory floors over the decades. Each shows fewer workers and more robots. Most of the factory positions that are available pay around 3,000 yuan ($440) a month, according to locals, half what they could get in a big city like Shanghai. “I’d like to stay here to settle down, but there’s just no good jobs for young people,” says Wen Jin, a 27-year-old Tianshui native who has moved to Jiangsu province, a wealthy eastern region. The city’s best days are firmly in the past, reckons Ma Xin, another local in his 20s who is hoping to get out. High-tech industries do create well-paid jobs as well, in research and development, for instance. But these positions are mainly clustered in big cities near China’s coast, like Beijing, Shanghai and Shenzhen, which boast the best universities, brightest graduates and access to the densest supply chains. Tech-sector salaries in such places have shot up in recent years, some topping 1m yuan a year. But few parts of inland China have a chance of attracting such stellar jobs, explains Dan Wang of Eurasia Group, a consultancy. “The vast majority of Chinese cities are stuck with what they have.” Even as Tianshui is unable to gain from China’s new economic model, it struggles with the problems of the old one. China’s growth has slowed in recent years thanks, in large part, to a lingering property crisis that is gripping the country. House prices have fallen fastest in smaller cities like Tianshui. Unfinished concrete flats litter the city’s outskirts; investment in property there fell by over 40% last year. This in turn has been a drag on consumption because people feel poorer. Total retail sales in Tianshui slipped by a little over 5% in 2025. Gloomy walks through its malls reveal shuttered shops and empty restaurants. There is a risk that these trends, multiplied across China’s smaller cities, will cause the gaps between the country’s haves and have-nots to widen further. The economic slowdown seems to have hit the poor hardest, according to data compiled by Li Shi, a professor at Zhejiang University in the eastern city of Hangzhou. In a paper published in April he cited surveys showing that China’s bottom tenth of workers by income saw their wages rise by only 2% per year from 2018 to 2023, compared with an average annual growth rate of around 5%. China’s government knows that high-tech factories are not an economic panacea. Investment in machinery and other physical assets “has fuelled China’s economic boom, but its returns have gradually declined”, noted Xinhua, the official state news agency, earlier this year. China’s latest five-year plan, which was released in March and covers the period to 2030, called for “investing in people” as well as factories, to make the economy more equal. In practice, that would mean much more government spending on education, particularly for children from poor families, giving them the skills and knowledge to get better-paid jobs. But as the people of Tianshui would attest, that is easier said than done. The city’s budget is far smaller than those of wealthy places—it spends less than one-third of the amount per pupil in school that Beijing does, for example. And the economic downturn threatens to turn this into a cycle of decline; the city’s fiscal revenues fell by nearly a tenth last year. Few of Tianshui’s students ever make it to the country’s best universities. “It’s too difficult for children to compete here,” says Shi Tingting, the mother of a 12-year-old girl. “They end up trapped.” ■ 中國的高科技崛起正將這個國家的很大一部分留在後面 那可能使一個明顯不平等的國家變得更加如此 2026年6月2日 | 天水 | 6分鐘閱讀時間 像許多在中國腹地的城市一樣,天水,在西部省份甘肅,充滿了落滿灰塵的和廢棄的工廠。 但在過去十年間它也已經成為一個出乎意料的高科技樞紐。 新工業園區已經湧現,提供公司廉價的能源、融資和土地交易。 這座城市已經建造了一個展覽廳來展示它希望在未來製造的敏捷的產品,叫做「天水工業2050」。 這一切將會取悅在遙遠北京的官員們。 他們想要中國的鐵鏽地帶用技術來重塑自身。 就在最近他們發布了又一個關於城市更新的計劃,呼籲將停滯的城市轉型為能夠為他們的居民提供「高質量生活」的「創新的」地方。 然而儘管有所有的宣傳,天水的人民並沒有好過多少。 新的工廠已經未能抵消在這座城市經濟中一個更廣泛的放緩:十年前天水的人均GDP是北京的16%;現在它是14%。 在2025年這座城市的經濟以一個比全國平均慢兩個百分點的速度增長。 當地人說,高度自動化的設施也沒有為他們創造許多工作。 成群的年輕人正為了尋找更好的機會而離開。 在過去十年間,它的人口已經萎縮了接近五十萬到290萬。 照這個速度,到2050年將會幾乎沒有工人留下。 天水的故事顯示了中國在先進製造業上的大賭注的局限。 共產黨已經決定這個國家的經濟未來在於製造舉世無雙的技術。 所以全國各地數以百計的城市正像天水一樣,努力嘗試這樣做。 但是雖然高科技驅動已經幫助了一些聰明的、有脈絡的且富裕的城市變得更加富有,大多數在腹地的那此城市缺乏供應鏈或人才來利用它。 畢竟,大約60%的中國勞動力——大約5億人——甚至沒有一個高中教育。 他們中的許多人居住在較小的和較窮的城市。 幾個世紀以來天水更多是一個文化的而非經濟的樞紐。 傳說它說中國的第一位皇帝,一個蛇身的半神,出生在那裡;佛教石窟已經從附近的峭壁上被開鑿出來。 但在1960年代天水工業化了。 它成為了國家計劃經濟中一個重要的齒輪;它的工廠製造拖拉機、滾珠軸承和火柴。 雙城記 宿舍、學校和醫院被建造來迎合膨脹的勞動力。 工人中的一個是董女士,現在在她80多歲,其在一家印刷廠享受了一個超穩定的「鐵飯碗」工作。 她在她40多歲時退休,帶著一份好的退休金和一個她的兒子能夠繼承她的工作的保證。 但大多數本地的工廠不夠有競爭力到足以在1980年代和1990年代中國向一個更加市場驅動的經濟的顛簸轉型中倖存。 在過去十年中新一代的高科技工廠,製造諸如傳感器和機床之類的小玩意,已經湧現。 但是它們沒有隨之帶來許多

  8. Jun 18

    88-1 克洛伊的經濟學人 Chloe's Economist- 日本性產業的辯論忽略女性最佳利益?!+ 小分享: 台灣的日日春與手天使

    Sex tourists fuel outrage about vice in Japan The debates do not have women’s interests at heart Jun 4th 2026|Tokyo|4 min read MAI, a 34-year-old woman in Tokyo, used to work at a hospital. But when covid-19 overwhelmed the wards, she found her work too stressful. A single mother, she also needed money for her family. Lured by higher pay, she entered the sex trade, first working as a porn actress before becoming a deriheru or “delivery health” worker—slang for call-girls who visit clients at home or in hotels. For a two-hour session, she earns ¥30,000 ($190). Mai is among hundreds of thousands of women working in Japan’s sprawling sex industry. The business, thought to be worth ¥2trn-5trn ($12bn-31bn) a year, is woven into male social life. One study in 2022 found that 48% of Japanese men had paid for sex at some point, compared with 11% in Britain. Hagiwara, a 63-year-old man in Tokyo, recalls being taken to a brothel by senior colleagues after joining a company, as a rite of passage. Emu, a man in his 30s, says “most men around me have been at least once.” Lately, however, lawmakers’ tolerance for the industry has come under much strain. Two recent triggers have encouraged Japanese to re-examine the confusing thicket of laws and conventions that govern how sex work is policed. One was an outrageous crime: last year authorities rescued a 12-year-old Thai girl who had been trafficked to Japan and forced to work at a sex shop in Tokyo. The second concern has been the growing visibility of women who sell sex around Okubo Park, near Tokyo’s red-light district (where the haggling more ordinarily goes on behind neon-lit doors). Relatively few women are involved in this. Nonetheless, solicitation (waiting for or approaching clients in public) is illegal in Japan. The sight of women openly waiting for clients has unsettled the public. Compounding the public debate is the fact that some of their customers are foreign tourists, lured to Japan by the cheapness of the yen. Videos of them approaching women in Okubo Park have spread rapidly online. “It is truly lamentable,” said Kamiya Sohei, leader of the right-wing populist Sanseito party, in a video. Behind the outrage lies a sense of wounded pride: during Japan’s boom years in the 1970s and 1980s, it was Japanese men who went abroad for sex. The authorities have decided to act—at least where the streetwalkers are concerned. Recently women around Okubo Park have been detained or arrested. Yet campaigners say it is unfair that authorities have not also been trying to punish the buyers. “Women are taken away by the police—while the men who buy sex stand beside them smirking,” says Kanajiri Kazuna of PAPS, a women’s-rights group. In November an opposition lawmaker raised this disparity in parliament. In response Takaichi Sanae, the prime minister, ordered the justice ministry to re-examine current practices and consider reforms. The prospect of change has sparked very broad debate about how Japan could improve its policing of sex work. Some Japanese feminists would like their country to implement the Nordic style of regulation adopted by Sweden, France and others, which criminalises buying sex while shielding sellers themselves from prosecution. “Buying sex is a form of violence against women,” says Ms Kanajiri. Other Japanese argue that getting tougher on buyers will drive sex work underground, leaving women more exposed to violence. Some want the industry fully legalised and regulated, as in Germany and the Netherlands. Nakayama Misato of Siente, a sex-work advocacy group, argues that criminalisation can mean that women are treated merely as victims, ignoring their agency. “Doing sex work is not a bad thing—it’s a valid way of making a living.” To be more than skin deep, any changes would have to apply not only to streetwalking but to Japan’s vast indoor sex-industry, the laws for which are riddled with loopholes and selectively enforced. Consider the practice of “soapland”, in which customers ostensibly pay to be bathed; if sex happens to take place in the process, officials generally turn a blind eye. Takao Yasuo of Curtin University says this is typical of Japan’s approach to regulating the sex industry. The priority is to keep vice decorously out of public view. A big rethink seems unlikely. For now, the justice ministry is narrowly focused on street prostitution. Taking care of that is “the lowest-cost, highest-visibility form of enforcement available to the state”, notes Mr Takao. “Many lawmakers, especially conservatives, are sensitive to the idea of women becoming sexually promiscuous,” says Shiomura Ayaka, a lawmaker. Women openly soliciting sex in public have become symbols of social disorder. ■ 性觀光客加劇了對日本色情業的憤怒 這些辯論的核心並非以女性的利益為出發點 2026年6月4日 | 東京 | 4分鐘閱讀時間 小麥(Mai),一名在東京的34歲女性,過去曾在一家醫院工作。但是當新冠肺炎壓垮了病房時,她發現自己的工作壓力太大了。作為一名單親媽媽,她也需要錢來養家。在更高薪水的誘惑下,她進入了性產業,先是擔任成人片(A片)女演員,之後成為一名「deriheru」或「派遣健康(外送茶)」工作者——這是指前往客戶家中或飯店服務的應召女郎的俚語。一個兩小時的服務時段,她可以賺取30,000日圓(190美元)。 小麥是日本龐大且擴張的性產業中,成千上萬名工作女性的其中之一。這項據信每年價值達2兆至5兆日圓(120億至310億美元)的行業,已經融入了男性的社交生活之中。2022年的一項研究發現,48%的日本男性曾在某個時間點花錢買過性服務,相比之下,英國的比例僅為11%。萩原(Hagiwara),一名在東京的63歲男性,回憶起自己在進入公司後,被資深同事帶去妓院,將其視為一種成年禮。艾姆(Emu),一名30多歲的男性說:「我身邊的大多數男人至少都去過一次。」 然而,近來立法者對該產業的容忍度受到了極大的考驗。最近的兩個導火線,促使日本人重新審視管理如何對性工作進行治安維持的、那套令人困惑且錯綜複雜的法律與慣例。其中一個是一起駭人聽聞的罪行:去年當局解救了一名被販賣到日本、並被強迫在東京一家情色店工作的12歲泰國女孩。 第二個擔憂則是,在東京紅燈區附近的「大久保公園」周邊,販賣性服務的女性其能見度越來越高(在那裡,討價還價通常是在霓虹燈閃爍的門後進行)。雖然涉及此事的女性相對較少。儘管如此,拉客(在公共場所等待或主動接近客戶)在日本是違法的。女性公開等待客戶的景象讓公眾感到不安。 使公眾辯論更加劇的複雜因素是,她們的某些客戶是外國觀光客,他們因日圓貶值(便宜)而被吸引到日本。他們在大久保公園接近女性的影片在網路上迅速傳播。右翼民粹主義「參政黨」黨魁神谷宗幣(Kamiya Sohei)在一段影片中表示:「這真是令人悲哀。」在憤怒的背後,隱藏著一種受挫的自尊心:在1970年代和1980年代日本經濟繁榮的歲月裡,是日本男性前往國外進行性觀光。 當局已決定採取行動——至少在涉及街頭流鶯的部分。最近,大久保公園周邊的女性遭到拘留或逮捕。然而,社會運動人士表示,當局沒有同時試圖懲罰買家是不公平的。「女性被警察帶走——而買性的男人則站在一旁傻笑,」女權團體 PAPS 的金尻カズナ(Kanajiri Kazuna)表示。去年11月,一名反對黨議員在國會中提出了這一不平等待遇。作為回應,首相高市早苗(Takaichi Sanae)命令法務省重新審視現行做法並考慮改革。 變革的前景引發了關於日本如何改善性工作治安管理的廣泛辯論。一些日本女性主義者希望她們的國家能實施瑞典、法國等國採用的「北歐模式」規範,該模式將買性行為定為刑事犯罪,同時保護賣性者免受起訴。「買性是對女性的一種暴力形式,」金尻女士說。 其他日本人則認為,對買家採取更嚴厲的態度會將性工作推向地下,使女性更容易暴露於暴力之中。有些人則希望像德國和荷蘭那樣,將該產業完全合法化並進行規範。性工作倡議團體 Siente 的中山美里(Nakayama Misato)認為,刑事犯罪化可能意味著女性僅被視為受害者,而忽略了她們的自主權(主體性)。「從事性工作並不是一件壞事——這是一種正當的謀生方式。」 若要使任何改變不只是流於表面(深層改革),這些改變不僅必須適用於街頭拉客,還必須適用於日本龐大的室內性產業,而該產業的法律充斥著漏洞,且屬於選擇性執法。以「泡泡浴(soapland)」的慣例為例,顧客表面上是付費接受沐浴服務;如果在過程中偶然發生了性行為,官員通常會睜一隻眼閉一隻眼。寇廷大學(Curtin University)的鷹尾安雄(Takao Yasuo)表示,這是日本規範性產業的典型做法。其首要任務是體面地將惡行(色情)保持在公眾視線之外。 一場徹底的大反思似乎不太可能發生。目前,法務省正狹隘地將焦點集中在街頭賣淫上。鷹尾先生指出,處理這件事是「國家目前可行、成本最低且能見度最高的一種執法形式」。國會議員塩村文夏(Shiomura Ayaka)表示:「許多立法者,特別是保守派,對於女性變得性生活混亂(放蕩)的想法非常敏感。」在公共場合公開拉客的女性,已經成為了社會秩序混亂的象徵。 -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

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