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  1. 3d ago

    92-3 中國經濟的另一個警訊: 信貸+小分享: 把不動產變成投資資本!?

    Another warning sign for China’s economy: falling consumer credit A crackdown on aggressive debt collectors is good news and bad news Oct 14th 2026|Shanghai|4 min read CHINA’s FRUGAL citizens are getting more so. Lending to households has been shrinking for most of the year. Short-term loans to consumers fell by 8.3% in September compared with the year before, the steepest drop on record. In August the stock of consumer loans was the lowest since China’s harsh “zero-covid” lockdowns (see chart). During a public holiday at the start of October the typical merrymaker spent 2% less than in the same festive period in 2025. China’s retailers have the right to feel disappointed. So does the government, which has been trying to loosen households’ purse-strings since the pandemic. The Chinese are borrowing less in part because of the prolonged property crash. A collapse in house sales means fewer mortgage applications. Many homebuyers pay back their mortgages early if they can. Given that a home loan is the biggest that most people take out, this prudence has put paid to a rise in households’ indebtedness that had lasted for decades. The ratio of their debt to GDP hit 60% in 2020 and stayed flat until last year, when it declined slightly. (In rich countries as a whole, the ratio is just shy of 70%.) Yet that does not explain the decline in consumer credit. This may have little to do with shoppers’ frugality—or with the government’s. In a belated effort to boost domestic consumption, last year the ministry of finance began handing out subsidies to banks that let them charge lower interest on consumer loans for big-ticket items such as new cars and home renovations. Even so, banks are growing more reluctant to extend such loans. And who can blame them? Chinese borrowers appear to be getting riskier. More than 10% of adults may have had unpaid debts last year, up from less than 8% the year before, calculates Gavekal, a consultancy. The subsidy may be making lenders even warier. When the average Zhou struggles to pay back loans, interest rates on consumer credit should rise, to offset the higher risk to banks, rather than fall. Since refusing the government’s largesse is unwise in China, banks end up underpricing the risk to their loan books. To keep that risk in check, they are screening out more borderline borrowers. Another reason for banks’ increased risk-aversion is the difficulty of offloading bad consumer debts. They often seek to free up their balance-sheets by selling such sour assets to investors with a higher risk tolerance. These investors pay the banks a fraction of the loans’ face value and then try to recover the full amount from borrowers, which often involves pestering them until they cough up. In early 2021 the average price banks could fetch for overdue consumer loans was around 30% of face value, decent for debts already known to be troubled. By early 2026 that figure had collapsed to 5%. This is a worrying trend. It seems to indicate that once consumer loans are delinquent, fewer borrowers have any intention of paying them back. And that, in turn, may be the unintended consequence of a government policy that is otherwise welcome—a crackdown on gang-like debt-collection agencies that have been terrorising debtors for years. China’s debt collectors are certainly a fearsome bunch. With few rules or industry guidelines, small collection companies have often resorted to what the Chinese refer to as “soft violence” in order to retrieve overdue consumer loans and credit-card debts. Common tactics include “calling you to death”, shorthand for ringing debtors, their families and friends hundreds of times a day; releasing credit histories to loved ones or employers; and even creating obscene images that are sent to debtors’ acquaintances. Collectors would often show up on debtors’ doorsteps in the middle of the night. Such intimidation can have tragic consequences. Stories of debtors who have taken their own lives as a result of it have become common in recent years. The authorities have previously tried to curb loan collectors’ excesses with lawsuits against the worst offenders. This year they went a step further, putting in place national rules to stop bad behaviour. Starting in August the collectors can place no more than six phone calls a day to debtors. They are also barred from contacting family and friends, and from making home visits in the small hours. All interactions between the collectors and debtors must be recorded. Some analysts have started to connect the steep discounts on consumer-debt sales with the crackdown on collections. The new regulations are meant to protect borrowers from harassment. A side-effect may be fewer borrowers for the collectors to harass in the first place. ■ 中國經濟的另一個警訊:消費信貸下降 針對暴力催收的打擊行動,既是好消息,也是壞消息 2026年10月14日 | 上海 | 4分鐘閱讀 中國勤儉的公民變得更加節儉了。今年大部分時間裡,對家庭的放貸一直在縮減。9月份向消費者發放的短期貸款與去年同期相比下降了8.3%,這是史上最劇烈的跌幅。8月份的消費貸款總額降至中國實施嚴格「清零」封控政策以來的最低點(見圖表)。在10月初的國定假期期間,典型的遊客消費支出比2025年同期的假期減少了2%。 中國的零售商有理由感到失望。政府也是如此,自疫情以來,政府一直試圖放鬆家庭的腰包。中國人減少借貸的部分原因,在於持續的房地產崩盤。房屋銷售的萎縮意味著房貸申請的減少。許多購屋者只要能力許可,就會提早還清房貸。鑑於房屋貸款是大多數人承擔的最大筆貸款,這種謹慎態度終結了持續數十年的家庭債務上升趨勢。家庭債務佔GDP的比率在2020年達到60%,並維持平穩直到去年才略有下降。(在整體發達國家中,該比率僅略低於70%。) 然而,這並不能解釋消費信貸下降的原因。這與消費者或政府的節儉關係可能不大。為了提振國內消費,財政部去年開始向銀行提供補貼,讓銀行能夠對用於購買新車和房屋裝修等大額商品的消費貸款收取較低的利息。 即便如此,銀行對於擴大此類貸款仍變得越來越謹慎。又有誰能怪他們呢?中國借款人的風險似乎正在上升。諮詢公司 Gavekal 計算,去年可能有多達 10% 以上的成年人背負未償還債務,高於前一年的不到 8%。 補貼甚至可能讓放款人變得更加警惕。當普通的「老周」(普通百姓)難以償還貸款時,消費信貸的利率應該上升以抵消銀行承擔的高風險,而不是下降。由於在中國拒絕政府的惠民政策是不明智的,銀行最終低估了其貸款帳本的風險。為了控制這種風險,他們正在篩選掉更多處於臨界點的借款人。 銀行風險趨避程度增加的另一個原因,是難以處置不良消費債務。 他們通常試圖透過將此類不良資產出售給風險承受度較高的投資者,來釋放資產負債表。這些投資者向銀行支付貸款面值的一小部分,然後試圖向借款人收回全額款項,這通常涉及不斷騷擾借款人直至其掏錢。 在 2021 年初,銀行處置逾期消費貸款平均能取得面值約 30% 的價格,對於已知有問題的債務來說算是不錯了。但到了 2026 年初,這一數字已暴跌至 5%。 這是一個令人擔憂的趨勢。這似乎表明,消費貸款一旦逾期,意圖償還的借款人就變得更少了。而這反過來,可能是一項在其他方面備受歡迎的政府政策所帶來的副作用——打擊多年來一直恐嚇債務人的黑幫式催收機構。 中國的催收人員確實是一群令人聞風喪膽的人。 在幾乎沒有規則或行業指南的情況下,小型催收公司往往訴諸中國人所稱的「軟暴力」來收回逾期消費貸款和信用卡債務。常見的手段包括「呼死你」(即每天給債務人、其家人和朋友打幾百個電話的簡稱);向親友或雇主公開信用記錄;甚至製作淫穢照片發送給債務人的熟人。催收人員還經常在深夜出現在債務人的家門口。 這種恐嚇可能帶來悲劇性的後果。近年來,因遭受恐嚇而自殺的債務人故事屢見不鮮。官方此前曾試圖透過起訴情節最嚴重的違法者來遏制催收人員的過激行為。今年他們更進了一步,出了全國性法規來制止不良行為。 自 8 月起,催收人員每天向債務人撥打的電話不得超過六次。他們還被禁止聯繫家人和朋友,以及在深夜進行家訪。催收人員與債務人之間的所有互動都必須進行錄音。 一些分析師已開始將消費債務出售的大幅折扣與對催收行動的打擊聯繫起來。新規旨在保護借款人免受騷擾。但其副作用可能是,從一開始供催收人員騷擾的借款人就變少了。■ -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

  2. Oct 24

    92-2 半導體產業會泡沫化嗎?+ 小分享: 臺灣光復節小故事Taiwan Restoration Day

    Is the semiconductor industry headed for an almighty crash? There are reasons to believe a bust, if it comes, will be less vertiginous than the boom Oct 15th 2026|5 min read For more than four decades the semiconductor industry has been governed by two laws as dependable as any in physics. The first is that the number of transistors, the tiny switches etched onto a chip, keeps rising. The second is that every boom ends in a bust. The first, which makes chips more powerful, is in rude health. Leading processors for artificial intelligence contain more than 200bn transistors, and the industry reckons it can cram in a trillion by the end of the decade. The second is stirring unease about how long the good times will last. The industry is used to booms, but not one like this. AI has created an insatiable appetite for the chips used to train and run AI models. In the first half of 2026 semiconductor sales grew faster, year on year, than at any time since the 1980s (see chart). This month TSMC, the world’s biggest contract chipmaker, reported its sixth consecutive quarter of record profits; Samsung Electronics, a South Korean chip heavyweight, reported its fourth. Yet investors are growing jittery. Despite blowout results and rosy forecasts, an index of leading semiconductor firms has fallen by over 10% since October 6th. Their fears were not helped when on October 12th Hock Tan, boss of Broadcom, a big chip designer, likened many investors in the AI trade to gamblers in a casino who “have no clue” what they are investing in. Nearly all of the industry’s expected growth hinges on chips for AI, making it a giant bet on the technology. If that bet sours—and the “supercycle”, as some have taken to calling it, comes to an end—will chipmakers suffer a bust as vertiginous as the boom? There are reasons to think not. Even as the semiconductor industry has grown, manufacturing has become far more concentrated. Most chip designers, such as Nvidia, whose graphics-processing units have powered the AI boom, do not make their own silicon. Nor do software firms such as Google and OpenAI, which have also taken to designing AI processors. Instead they rely on foundries—and one in particular. In the early 2000s some 25 firms could make the most advanced processors. Today four can, and TSMC makes nearly all of the high-end ones. Memory chips, which are also vital for AI, have gone the same way. More than 20 firms made advanced memory chips in 1990. Now only three—Samsung, SK Hynix and Micron—make almost all of them. China has produced new entrants in both processors and memory chips, but without access to the most advanced chipmaking tools, they remain behind the frontier. Consolidation has allowed a few dominant chipmakers to set the pace of expansion and dictate the terms on which they sell. They are investing heavily to capitalise on the boom. TSMC’s capital expenditure is expected to hit roughly $62bn this year, more than one and a half times as much as in 2025. Next year analysts expect it to be around $76bn. The memory-makers have also boosted their investments. Even so, their outlays are modest in comparison with the windfall from AI. As a share of revenue, TSMC’s capital spending is expected to fall from 44% in 2023 to 36% this year. Moreover, investments are being paid for from the cash that chipmakers are generating, rather than borrowing. This year TSMC’s capacity expansions will use up a little more than half of its operating cashflow, and Samsung’s barely a fifth. The debts of these chipmakers look modest next to their swelling cash piles. Manufacturers are enjoying a “very good pricing environment”, according to Bill Wiseman of McKinsey, a consultancy, and have every reason to pace their expansion to preserve it. DRAM, a type of memory used in nearly all electronics, costs about six times what it did in early 2023. TSMC has not cut the price of its three-nanometre manufacturing process, which it launched in late 2022, even though a process normally gets cheaper after a couple of years. The speed of capacity expansion has also been impeded by the fact that many new chipmaking facilities are being built in America, where construction takes “about twice as long”, according to Mr Wiseman. Consolidation has also given chipmakers more bargaining power, shifting who will bear the burden of any slowdown. Until recently, memory was sold mostly on the spot market or through short-term contracts. When demand slackened, customers were not obliged to keep buying and prices therefore collapsed. Now, with capacity scarce and only a few suppliers to choose from, buyers are signing up years in advance, and on the sellers’ terms. Nvidia has committed more than $250bn to securing supply and components until January 2029. In September Micron said that “take-or-pay” agreements, under which customers must buy the agreed volumes or pay anyway, had locked in 35% of its revenue through to 2030, with $32bn-worth of commitments, most of which involve cash deposits. Such prepayments help fund new factories. They also shift at least part of the risk of a bust onto buyers. An end to the AI boom would still bring chipmakers plenty of pain. If spending stalls, prices will drop, profits will shrink and stratospheric stock prices will come back down to earth. Customers will look to renegotiate contracts that were signed at the top of the market. The second law of the semiconductor industry still applies. This time, however, customers will share the hangover. ■ 四十多年來,半導體產業一直受制於兩條如同物理學規律般可靠的定律。第一條是:刻在晶片上的微型開關——電晶體——的數量會持續增加。第二條是:每一次繁榮最終都會以衰退告終。第一條定律讓晶片變得更加強大,目前依然蓬勃發展;用於人工智慧的頂級處理器包含超過 2,000 億個電晶體,而業界估計到了本世紀末,晶片上能塞入一兆個電晶體。至於第二條定律,則引發了大家對於榮景還能持續多久的不安。 半導體產業對榮景早已習以為常,但從未見過像這次一樣的情形。AI 對於用來訓練和運行 AI 模型的晶片產生了無窮無盡的需求。2026 年上半年,半導體的銷售額年增率創下了自 1980 年代以來的最快紀錄(見圖表)。本月,全球最大的晶片代工製造商台積電,公布了連續第六個季度創紀錄的利潤;韓國晶片巨頭三星電子則公布了連續第四個季度創紀錄的利潤。然而,投資者卻變得越來越不安。儘管業績表現亮眼、前景看好,但自 10 月 6 日以來,領先的半導體企業指數已下跌了超過 10%。大型晶片設計公司博通(Broadcom)的大老闆陳福陽(Hock Tan)在 10 月 12 日時,將許多 AI 交易的投資者比作賭場裡「完全不知道」自己在投資什麼的賭客,這讓他們的擔憂雪上加霜。 該產業幾乎所有的預期增長都取決於用於 AI 的晶片,這使其成為對該技術的一場豪賭。如果這場豪賭落空——而且正如某些人所稱的「超級週期」走向終結——晶片製造商是否會遭受與繁榮時期一樣劇烈的崩盤?我們有理由認為不會。 即使半導體產業不斷成長,製造業也變得更加集中。大多數晶片設計公司,例如以圖形處理器推動 AI 榮景的輝達(Nvidia),並不自己製造矽晶片。像 Google 和 OpenAI 這樣也開始設計 AI 處理器的軟體公司同樣不自己製造。相反地,他們依賴晶圓代工廠——尤其是其中特定的一家。在 2000 年代初期,大約有 25 家公司能夠製造最先進的處理器;如今只剩下四家,而台積電幾乎承包了所有高階晶片的製造。 對 AI 同樣至關重要的記憶體晶片,也走上了相同的道路。1990 年有超過 20 家公司生產先進記憶體晶片,現在只剩下三家——三星、SK 海力士和美光——包辦了幾乎所有的產量。中國在處理器和記憶體晶片領域都出現了新進業者,但在無法取得最先進晶片製造工具的情況下,他們依然落後於技術前線。 產業整合讓少數幾家佔據主導地位的晶片製造商能夠掌控擴產的節奏,並主導銷售條款。他們正在大量投資以利用這次的榮景。台積電今年的資本支出預計將達到約 620 億美元,是 2025 年的一倍半以上;分析師預計明年的資本支出將達到 760 億美元左右。記憶體製造商也增加了他們的投資。 即便如此,與 AI 帶來的意外之財相比,他們的支出其實相當保守。作為營業收入的比重,台積電的資本支出預計將從 2023 年的 44% 降至今年的 36%。此外,這些投資是用晶片製造商自己產生的現金來支付,而不是透過借款。今年,台積電的產能擴張將消耗其營運現金流的半數多一點,而三星則僅占五分之一左右。與這些晶片製造商日益膨脹的現金儲備相比,他們的債務顯得微不足道。 諮詢公司麥肯錫的比爾·威斯曼(Bill Wiseman)表示,製造商正享受著「非常良好的定價環境」,並且有充足的理由來控制擴展速度以維持這種環境。DRAM 是一種幾乎用於所有電子產品的記憶體,其價格大約是 2023 年初的六倍。台積電並未調降其於 2022 年底推出的 3 奈米製程價格,儘管製程通常在推出幾年後會變得便宜。威斯曼先生指出,許多新的晶片製造設施正建於美國,而那裡的施工時間「大約需要兩倍長」,這也阻礙了產能擴張的速度。 產業整合也給了晶片製造商更多的議價能力,從而改變了誰將承擔任何放緩所帶來的負擔。直到最近,記憶體主要還是在現貨市場或透過短期合約進行銷售。當

  3. Oct 17

    92-1 AI讓我們寫作能力反而更糟了!?+ 小分享: Gen Z世代的16種人格分析

    AI often makes writing worse. (Even if it makes it better) Why is complicated. But it’s not about the damn em-dash Sep 24th 2026|4 min read Writing using artificial intelligence is everywhere. It has crept into elite newspapers (the* Wall Street Journal* ran an op-ed drafted by it) and elite publishing houses (Grasset in France finds itself defending a star author accused—falsely, he claims—of using it in a prize-winning novel). It is in the speeches of British politicians, in the homework of British students and abundantly there in LinkedIn posts (41% of longer ones, according to a study by Pangram, a detector, use it). Ask Gmail to draft a love letter to your partner and it will instantly offer up “My Dearest [Husband’s Name]…”. It is quick. It is not quite Keats. Who cares? The reactions show that people do care. AI-spotting has become a mania. Prose is being scrutinised with the attention, and jargon, once reserved for Latin literature. Arcane rhetorical terms like antithesis and epanorthosis (the “not X, but Y” construction) and tricolon (threefold things, like “veni, vidi, vici”) are bandied about by social-media users with the verve of Ciceronian scholars. Literary criticism has rarely been so hot. The em-dash, the most notorious AI “tell”, seems to be acting as—another rhetorical word—a synecdoche, the term for when writers use a part for the whole, like “wheels” for “car” or, perhaps, “em-dash” for “the intellectual obsolescence of the human race”. This, says Maryanne Wolf, an emeritus professor of neuroscience at UCLA, is not a battle over punctuation. It is a “battle for our minds”. AI is so “unprecedented”, says Steven Pinker, a professor at Harvard, that we cannot tell how, or whether, it will affect the English language. Happily there is a body of evidence dating back a few years (about 1,300) on what good writing is. It is called “English literature”. The first thing that a millennium of English writing shows is that most people are terrible at it. They find it painful to do (“like a long bout of some painful illness”, as George Orwell had it) and produce words that are almost as painful to read. AI can be bad; humans are often worse. Dan Brown offered: “His eyes went white, like a shark about to attack.” William Wordsworth offered an ode to a spade (it began “Spade!”). Lee Child offered the phrase: “It was about as distinctive as the most distinctive thing you could ever think of.” AI, by contrast, writes with the ease of the easiest thing you could ever think of. It can write a sonnet in half a second, a 1,000-word article in ten seconds, an Austen-length novel in half an hour. And though it can be bad, it often isn’t. In a recent** blind tasting** of two short stories, one human-written and one AI-written, researchers from Villanova University found that respondents rated the AI story as “higher quality and more absorbing”. Yet English literature also shows that writing is not just the act of spewing words onto a page. Writing, as writers point out, is no more merely words on the page than a smile is joy, or a tear is sorrow. Real writing is not writing at all. It is thinking; specifically it is thinking: “What do I think?” Often “you only really know what you think by writing it,” says Emma Smith, a professor of English at Oxford. For how, as a character quoted by E.M. Forster puts it, “can I tell what I think till I see what I say?” When Michael Gove, the editor of the Spectator and an ex-MP, was in the cabinet he told his underlings to “Think in ink.” To make a good argument you need to have followed its logic “step by step”—in writing. Those who use AI to write speeches are, he says, using “counterfeit currency”. But counterfeit currency is always disliked; AI writing is not. Few would object to someone using AI to contest a parking fine, fill in a tax return or for a second-language speaker to polish their English. If a company uses AI to announce a new parking policy, few care. But, says Colleen Kirk, a professor at the New York Institute of Technology, if that policy was problematic and the company apologised using AI—then “You’ve got a big problem.” You risk activating “moral disgust”. In 1970 a Japanese robotics expert, Mori Masahiro, noted that the more human a robot looks, the more** affinity **humans feel for it—until it becomes too human, whereupon affinity turns to revulsion: the *“uncanny valley”. If you shook someone’s hand in a darkened room and, unexpectedly, clasped a prosthetic hand you would, Mori wrote, “shriek*”. AI writing—bland, plasticky, human-ish—seems to sit in the “uncanny valley” of prose. It certainly makes social media shriek. So here is the AI paradox. AI prose is easier to produce and often better than human prose. Yet humans do not like it; they may** impair **their ability by using it and they often loathe its use by others. This may be ridiculous but is encouraging. As humanity destroys its intellectual dominion with its own intellect—as it is beaten back in chess, in Go, in coding—we retain one last advantage: we are human. And, for now, humans (often) prefer to read humans. So make the most of that and, as E.M. Forster also said, *“Only connect”*. And probably write personal emails yourself. Especially to your “[Dearest Husband]”. ■ 使用人工智慧來寫作無所不在。它已經悄悄溜進了頂尖報紙(《華爾街日報》刊登了一篇由它起草的專欄文章),也滲透進了頂尖出版社(法國的格拉塞出版社發現自己不得不為一位明星作家辯護,該作家被指控——但他聲稱這是誣陷——在一本獲獎小說中使用了 AI)。它出現在英國政治人物的演講稿中、英國學生的作業裡,更大量充斥於 LinkedIn 的貼文中(根據檢測工具 Pangram 的研究,較長的貼文當中有 41% 使用了 AI)。如果你要求 Gmail 給你的伴侶寫一封情書,它會立刻為你呈現出:「我最親愛的[丈夫姓名]……」。它非常快速。但它並不太像濟慈(Keats)(英國著名詩人)的詩句。 誰會在意呢?人們的反應顯示出,大家其實非常在意。尋找 AI 的痕跡(AI-spotting)已經變成了一種狂熱。人們正在用過去專門留給拉丁文學的專注力與專業術語,來嚴格審視這些散文內容。諸如「對照法」(antithesis)、「更正修正法」(epanorthosis,即『不是 X,而是 Y』的句型結構)以及「排比法」(tricolon,即三重疊句,例如『我來,我見,我征服』)等晦澀的修辭術語,被社群媒體用戶以宛如西塞羅學者般的熱情隨口引用 (西塞羅--馬庫斯·圖利烏斯·西塞羅(Marcus Tullius Cicero,西元前106年-前43年)是古羅馬共和國晚期的哲學家、政治家、律師、作家與雄辯家。他奠定古典拉丁文學風格)。文學批評很少像現在這樣紅火過。 破折號(em-dash)作為最惡名昭彰的 AI「辨識特徵」(tell),似乎正充當著——這裡又是另一個修辭學詞彙——「提喻法」(synecdoche),也就是創作者用局部來代表整體的用語,比如用「輪子」代表「汽車」,或者也許是用「破折號」代表「人類智力的過時」。加州大學洛杉磯分校(UCLA)的神經科學榮譽教授瑪莉安·沃爾夫(Maryanne Wolf)表示,這並不是一場關於標點符號的爭奪戰。這是一場「爭奪我們心智的戰鬥」。 哈佛大學教授史蒂芬·平克(Steven Pinker)表示,AI 是如此「前所未有」,以至於我們無法預測它將如何影響、或是否會影響英語這門語言。幸運的是,關於什麼是好文章,我們擁有追溯至好幾年前(大約 1,300 年)的大量證據。那被稱為「英國文學」。 上千年來的英語寫作所揭示的第一件事,就是大多數人其實都極度不擅長寫作。他們覺得寫作是一件痛苦的事(正如喬治·歐威爾所說的,『就像經歷了一場某種痛苦重病的長期發作』),而且寫出來的文字讀起來也同樣令人痛苦。AI 可以寫得很爛;但人類往往更爛。丹·布朗(Dan Brown)曾寫過這樣的句子:「他的雙眼翻白,就像一條即將發動攻擊的鯊魚。」威廉·華茲華斯(William Wordsworth)寫過一首獻給鏟子的頌歌(開頭竟是『鏟子啊!』)。李·查德(Lee Child)則寫出了這樣的短語:「這大概跟你所能想到的最特別的事物一樣特別。」 相比之下,AI 寫起文章來,簡直就像你能想到的最輕鬆的事物一樣輕鬆自如。它可以在半秒鐘內寫出一首十四行詩,在十秒鐘內寫出一篇 1,000 字的文章,在半小時內寫出一本珍·奧斯汀體量的小說。而且雖然它可能會寫得很爛,但通常並不會。在維拉諾瓦大學(Villanova University)的研究人員最近進行的一項針對兩篇短篇小說的盲測中(一篇由人類撰寫,一篇由 AI 撰寫),受訪者評定 AI 寫的小說具有「更高的品質且更吸引人」。 然而,英國文學也表明了,寫作不僅僅是把文字噴吐到頁面上的行為。正如作家們所指出的,寫作絕不僅僅是頁面上的文字,就像微笑不單純等同於喜悅、眼淚不單純等同於悲傷一樣。真正的寫作根本不是寫作本身。它是思考;具體來說,它是去思考:「我到底具體是怎麼想的?」 牛津大學的英語教授艾瑪·史密斯(Emma Smith)說,通常「你只有透過把想法寫下來,才能真正知道自己到底在想什麼。」因為正如 E.M. 佛斯特(E.M. Forster)作品中的一個角色所說的:「在我看到自己說了什麼之前,我怎麼知道自己是怎麼想的?」當《

  4. Oct 8

    91-4 中國在美國的留學生下降;而習近平希望中國五年內會有十萬美國留學生!? 小分享:台灣國慶日的由來居然來自一個搞笑的意外!?

    Chinese students abroad are more liberal than at home They see faults in China’s system as well as in democracies, surveys show Oct 1st 2026|4 min read America should expect that educating China’s young people will give it “moral, intellectual and commercial influence”, wrote Edmund James, a university president, in 1906. In subsequent years, dozens of China’s brightest went to study at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology on scholarships funded by the American government. Back then, American officials and teachers displayed a confident, missionary liberalism. They thought that educating young Chinese would help mould China in America’s image. But in recent years America has become less welcoming. The number of Chinese enrolled in American universities fell by nearly a third between 2019 and 2025, to 265,000. China, however, is feeling confident. Its leader, Xi Jinping, wants more young Americans to visit and stay for their studies. On September 24th, while at the White House, Mr Xi said he hoped 100,000 young Americans would visit China or study there in the next five years. That is a far cry from the mere 350 American students resident there in 2022, amid the covid-19 pandemic and at a low point in bilateral relations. Mr Xi says that such exchanges could create “a new generation of ambassadors” to sustain the relationship between the two powers. Visiting China “breaks down cognitive barriers”, notes Xinhua, an official news agency. But does experience of a different political environment change people’s thinking? New research by Fan Yingjie of Princeton and co-authors explores whether it does among Chinese in America. The researchers enlisted almost 1,000 Chinese freshmen for their research in 2019. Nearly 400 of them were in America and the rest—a control group—at public universities in China. Over the next four years, Ms Fan and her colleagues regularly put questions to the students to gauge their political leanings, as well as what they thought of China and its government. The work is remarkable because research that involves asking Chinese citizens in China for their views on sensitive political matters has become increasingly rare under Mr Xi’s rule. The ability to compare the answers of such a group with those of Chinese students in America gives the research unusual empirical heft. Mr Xi would surely be disappointed by the results. Ms Fan found that students’ ideological views were remarkably stable throughout their time in America—there was neither a backlash against Western liberalism nor a newfound zeal for it. Yet students (and presumably their families) who decide to study in America in the first place are much more liberal than their homebody peers (see chart 1). They are more likely to support free markets, are less socially conservative and are less nationalistic. One possible reason is that Chinese women** **tend to outnumber men in studying in the West. Fran Martin of the University of Melbourne finds that some young women go overseas because of gender bias in China’s society and job market, and so are less traditional in their outlook. Among Chinese students in America, ideological views did not change much while abroad, says Jennifer Pan of Stanford, a co-author of Ms Fan’s study. But they did update their views of how well the Communist Party is running China. Support for it started lower among those studying in America, and fell sharply during China’s draconian “zero-covid” lockdowns of 2020-22 (see chart 2). Approval for the regime, and general patriotic feeling, fell among undergraduates in China also, but more slowly. Being educated abroad, however, can highlight the West’s shortcomings. Ms Martin’s research shows that as life in China has become technologically advanced, offering many conveniences, some young Chinese studying in the West feel they are living “in a bit of a backwater”. Although most of the cohort followed by Ms. Martin moved back to China after graduation, some have since returned to Australia after experiencing the competitive pressures of China’s work culture and high youth unemployment. In the American study, the share of students planning to move home after graduation dropped from 40% in 2020 to just over 10% by 2023. As for Americans studying in China, vanishingly few stay. Study abroad may not reshape either country’s politics, or even the students themselves, but it does give some Chinese more choices. ■ 民調顯示,他們不僅看到了中國體制的缺點,也看到了民主體制的缺陷。 2026年10月1日 | 閱讀時間約 4 分鐘 美國伊利諾大學校長愛德蒙·詹姆斯(Edmund James)在 1906 年曾寫道,美國應該期待,教育中國的年輕一代將能帶來「道德、知識與商業上的影響力」。在隨後的歲月中,數十位中國最頂尖的優秀人才,憑藉著美國政府資助的獎學金赴麻省理工學院深造。當時,美國的官員與教師展現出一種自信且帶著傳教熱忱的自由主義信念。他們認為,教育中國年輕人將有助於按照美國的形象來塑造中國。然而,近年來美國卻變得不再那麼歡迎他們了。在 2019 年至 2025 年間,入讀美國大學的中國學生人數下降了近三分之一,減少至 26.5 萬人。 相反地,中國現在卻感到信心十足。中國國家領導人習近平希望有更多美國年輕人前來訪問並留學。9 月 24 日,習先生在白宮時表示,他希望在未來五年內能有 10 萬名美國年輕人訪問中國或在當地留學。這與 2022 年新冠疫情期間、以及雙邊關係陷入低谷時僅有 350 名美國留學生常駐中國的情況相比,可謂天壤之別。習先生表示,這樣的交流可以培養出「新一代的大使」,以維護這兩個大國之間的關係。官方媒體新華社也指出,前往中國訪問能夠「打破認知障礙」。但是,體驗不同的政治環境真的會改變人們的思想嗎? 普林斯頓大學的范英傑(Fan Yingjie,音譯)及其合作著者發表的一項新研究,探討了這種現象是否會發生在赴美留學的中國學生身上。研究人員在 2019 年招募了近 1,000 名中國大一新生進行研究。其中近 400 人在美國,其餘的人——也就是對照組——則在中國的公立大學就讀。在接下來的四年裡,范女士和她的同事們定期向這些學生提問,以評估他們的政治傾向,以及他們對中國及其政府的看法。 這項研究非常難能可貴,因為在習先生的領導下,詢問中國境內中國公民對敏感政治議題看法的研究已經變得越來越罕見。而能夠將這組學生的答案與在美中國留學生的答案進行比較,更賦予了這項研究極高的實證份量。 習先生對研究結果肯定會感到失望。范女士發現,學生們的意識形態觀點在整個赴美留學期間都非常穩定——既沒有出現對西方自由主義的反彈,也沒有對它產生新的狂熱。然而,當初就決定選擇赴美留學的學生(以及他們的家庭),本身就比留在國內的同齡人要自由派得多。他們更有可能支持自由市場、在社會觀念上較不保守,而且國家主義傾向也比較低。 其中一個可能的原因是,在西方留學的中國女性數量往往多於男性。墨爾本大學的法蘭·馬丁(Fran Martin)發現,有些年輕女性選擇出國,是因為中國社會與求職市場中存在著性別偏見,因此她們在觀念上也相對沒那麼傳統。 這項研究的共同作者、史丹佛大學的潘潔(Jennifer Pan)指出,在赴美留學的中國學生當中,他們的意識形態觀點在出國期間並沒有太大的改變。然而,他們對於中國共產黨治理中國成效的看法,確實出現了變化。對該政權的支持度,在選擇赴美留學的人群中原本就比較低,而在 2020 年至 2022 年中國實施嚴厲的「清零」封控政策期間,更是急遽下降)。雖然在中國就讀的大學生對該政權的認同感以及整體愛國情緒也有所下降,但下降的速度相對較為緩慢。 不過,在國外接受教育,同時也會放大西方的缺點。馬丁女士的研究顯示,隨著中國的生活在科技上變得十分先進並提供許多便利,一些在西方留學的中國年輕人反而覺得自己生活在「有點落後的地方」。** ** 雖然馬丁女士所追蹤的這群學生中,大多數人在畢業後都搬回了中國,但在經歷了中國職場文化的激烈競爭壓力與居高不下的青年失業率之後,部分學生後來又回到了澳洲。而在關於美國的那項研究中,計畫在畢業後回國的學生比例,從 2020 年的 40% 大幅降至 2023 年的略高於 10%。至於在中國留學的美國人,留在當地的則是屈指可數。 出國留學或許無法重塑任何一個國家的政治走向,甚至無法改變學生本人,但它確實給了部分中國年輕人更多的選擇。 -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

  5. Oct 3

    91-3 在歐洲的穆斯林: 該遵循回教規範還是歐洲自由作風?+小分享: 我與穆斯林的互動

    The truth and the lies about Islam in Europe Islam poses no serious danger. But Islamism and the fear of Islam do   Sep 10th 2026|6 min read   PANIC ABOUT Islam in Europe is spreading. In several European countries half the population now thinks it is incompatible with Western values. On September 6th the populist-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) won 44% of the vote in Saxony-Anhalt, its largest state-election tally yet, warning about “Islamisation” and promising forced deportations. The same weekend in Britain hundreds of balaclava-clad thugs occupied Dover, chanting “Stop the boats” and “Christ is King”. In France Marine Le Pen's call to ban Islamic headscarves from public places is backed by 60% of voters.   The obsession has also taken root in America. The fear is less of terrorists, as it was after September 11th 2001, than of an Islamic plot to take over Europe from within. Members of the Trump administration warn of “civilisational erasure”.   This perception is harming transatlantic relations. It is also wrong. Europe faces no Islamic takeover, no mass radicalisation of Muslims and no erasure of its culture. As our reporting shows, it does not have “no-go zones”, sharia is not creeping into national law and nowhere is a demographic “great replacement” under way.   The real danger to Europe is different: of extremism fuelled by Islamism (the belief that the state should enforce Islamic principles) and by social-media-driven right-wing paranoia. The left makes this worse by denying the modest but real threats Islamism poses. So do politicians in the centre, by keeping quiet lest they attract accusations of racism. This dynamic could indeed harm Europe’s liberal democracies—not by replacing them with a caliphate, but by slowing integration and favouring policies that would do lasting harm to their freedoms.   The most extreme fears are easily debunked. Even after record migration from majority-Muslim countries, Muslims now make up just 6% of Europe’s population of well over 500m. Although new arrivals typically have more children than the native-born do, fertility rates tend to converge within two generations. That is a long way from civilisational erasure.   In fact, most Muslim immigrants want to get on in their new home, not impose on it a version of the societies they have just left. Their children tend to do better than their parents at school. In Britain 67% of Bangladeshis who sat standard tests in 2021 were enrolled in university by age 19, compared with 38% of white Britons. Many Muslims are involved in mainstream politics: witness Britain’s home secretary and London’s mayor. In important ways Muslim attitudes can resemble those of other Europeans. In polling we commissioned among British Muslims, we found little resistance to women working.   What, then, is setting so many Europeans against Islam? Plenty of Muslims hold illiberal views—we report in this issue on the killing of an openly gay imam in South Africa. In Britain, our polling finds, 52% of Muslims think homosexuality is wrong, and young Muslims (41% of under-35s) are more likely than their elders (25%) to believe violence can be justified if someone insults the prophet.   Holding socially conservative views does not in itself make people a threat—some of Europe’s defenders on the right are just as anti-gay as the Muslims they decry. But some of these attitudes should trouble liberals who have long assumed that open societies eventually make people more tolerant. And if the state is too pusillanimous to confront wrongs committed by minorities, as when gangs of Muslim men abused young girls in several English cities, it rightly causes outrage.   Just as important is the conflation of Islam, a religion, with Islamism, a political ideology. Islam isn’t a problem; Islamism can be. Unlike the jihadis of 9/11, most Islamists do not advocate violence. But many practise “entryism”—infiltrating democratic institutions to promote an illiberal agenda. Well-connected Islamist groups might lobby for sweeping hate-speech laws or against counter-extremism programmes. The main danger of entryism is local. Small, well-organised networks can capture a school, a mosque, a council or a charity and use such institutions to discourage integration and impose religious conformity on other Muslims who live nearby. Concern about these non-violent Islamists has grown among Europe’s security services. In France authorities fret about** covert entryism by the Muslim Brotherhood. An official report released last year warned that Islamism could, in time, threaten secular rules and women’s rights**. But that seems unlikely. France’s interior ministry estimated that just 139 of 2,800 Muslim places of worship were linked to the Brotherhood.   Instead, the main victims are other Muslims. Half of the 12 council wards in Blackburn, in northern England, are over 60% Muslim; two are over 80%. In such areas women can feel pressure to let sharia councils govern their family lives. Gay and liberal Muslims face intimidation. Non-conformist Muslims complain that Western authorities—scared of being seen as racist—do not extend the same protections to them as they do to non-Muslim citizens.   There is broader harm, too. Islamists stir up antisemitism, not least over Gaza. They demand curbs on free speech about their beliefs. They scare politicians, comedians, academics and journalists into self-censorship. They can bully schools, student unions, charities and councils.   What turns these local threats into a continental danger is how they are exploited. It suits Islamists to claim that any criticism of their political project is an attack on Islam itself. The populist left, including Unsubmissive France and the Greens in Britain, tends to treat questions about migration, crime or Islamism as racist.   And the populist right often whips up fear by claiming that all Muslims pose a threat and accusing the state of a “woke cover-up” and “two-tier treatment”. Few have been more vehement than Elon Musk, who has used his social-media platform to shape views of Islam around the world and to boost Europe’s anti-Muslim right, from the AfD to Tommy Robinson, a British agitator whom we feature in a three-part podcast series starting this weekend.   The populist right’s remedies are as illiberal as the Islamists they claim to be protecting Europe from. Promises of mass deportation, segregation and dress bans all terrify Muslims, inhibiting integration and driving them into the arms of extremists. Any country that enacted such policies would find that the hatred they unleashed would cause enduring damage.   That is why Europe’s mainstream politicians need to offer an alternative. Violence and threats of it should be prosecuted. But there should be no taboos for the sake of cultural sensitivity. Free speech is not the enemy of tolerance but its precondition. Entryism should be called out, as should bigotry. Governments nervous about collecting, or releasing, data leave a vacuum to be filled by speculative hyperbole.   Tackling all this will not be easy or quick, but there is hope. Europe’s Muslims are assimilating, as did earlier waves of Catholic, Jewish and Caribbean migrants in the countries where they settled. The arrival of all those previous groups sparked moral panics about whether they would ever fit in. All eventually found a place. Muslims will, too—if division and paranoia are not allowed to get in the way. ■   主旨: 歐洲對伊斯蘭的真相與謊言:伊斯蘭本身並無危險,真正的威脅來自伊斯蘭主義與群眾恐慌 日期: 2026年9月10日 【第一段:群眾恐慌與政治亂象】 針對歐洲伊斯蘭教的恐慌,正在各地迅速蔓延。 在好幾個歐洲國家,已經有一半的人口認為,伊斯蘭教與西方核心價值完全無法相容。9月6號,極右翼的「德國另類選擇黨」(AfD)在薩克森-安哈特邦的選舉中,拿下了高達 44% 的選票,創下該黨在邦選舉中的歷史新高。他們在競選中不斷警告「伊斯蘭化」的危機,並承諾要實施強制驅逐出境。 同一週末,在英國,數百名戴著巴拉克拉法頭套的暴徒佔領了多佛港,高喊著「阻止難民船」和「基督為王」的口號。而在法國,瑪琳.勒龐(Marine Le Pen)主張要在公共場所禁止佩戴伊斯蘭頭巾,這個提議獲得了高達六成選民的支持。 這種執念甚至跨越了大西洋,在美國扎根。人們現在擔心的不再是像 2001 年「911 事件」那樣的外在恐怖份子,而是害怕伊斯蘭勢力正在從內部暗中掌控歐洲。川普政府的成員甚至警告,這是一場「文明的消亡」。 【第二段:事實釐清與真正的危險】 這種觀感不僅正在傷害跨大西洋的盟友關係,而且它根本是錯的。 歐洲並沒有面臨被伊斯蘭接管的危險,沒有出現大規模的穆斯林極端化,也沒有所謂的文化消亡。正如我們的調查報導所顯示,歐洲根本沒有所謂的「治安禁區」(No-go zones),伊斯蘭教法沒有滲透進國家法律,各地更沒有發生人口結構上的「大換血」(Great Replacement)。 歐洲面臨的真正危險其實另有原因:第一,是「伊斯蘭主義」(也就是主張國家應強制施行伊斯蘭教義的政治主張)所引發的極端主義;第二,則是社群媒體所推波助瀾的右翼疑神疑鬼。 左派把情況搞得更糟,因為他們選擇無視伊斯蘭主義所帶來的溫和但實質的威脅。而中間派政客則保持沉默,深怕被扣上種族歧視的帽子。這種政治動態確實會傷害歐洲的民主體制——但並不是因為歐洲會被「哈里發國」取代,而是因為它會拖慢社會融合,並促成那些對人民

  6. Sep 24

    91-2 中國若要攻打台灣會陷入地獄般的慘況 Hellscape +小分享: 我們的歸屬-台灣民主國?

    China would face a “hellscape” in a war over Taiwan New tech may give America an edge Sep 15th 2026|TAIPEI AND HONOLULU|7 min read   IN AN OFFICE block on the outskirts of Taipei, Chan Hsiang-chih opens a workshop door and offers a glimpse at the future of warfare in the Taiwan Strait. Inside sit two torpedo-shaped undersea drones, prototypes for Taiwan’s navy. “That’s where the bomb goes,” he says, nodding to the rear of one. It can identify targets and drop its payload or launch a kamikaze strike, alone or in a swarm. Dr Chan started his business, AwareOcean, in 2015 to supply offshore windfarms. Now he builds the kind of low-cost autonomous weapons that Taiwan and America need for their new plan to thwart a Chinese invasion.   Dubbed “Hellscape”, the plan draws on lessons from Ukraine and Iran in using large numbers of low-tech drones, combined with artificial intelligence, to frustrate a far more powerful adversary. It envisions flooding the Taiwan Strait with relatively cheap aerial, sea-surface and underwater drones just as Chinese forces launch an attack. Assuming that China jams communication links with these weapons, they will strike Chinese ships using inertial guidance, image recognition or on-board AI that prioritises targets, evades counter-measures and co-ordinates attacks with other drones. That will not stop an invasion. But it would raise the costs and buy time and space for American warships and planes to reach Taiwan.   Whether America would actually intervene is an open question, especially since Donald Trump’s return to the White House. Visiting Beijing in May, he questioned the logic of fighting so far from America and said he would use arms sales to Taiwan as a bargaining-chip with Mr Xi. Sure enough, in the run-up to Mr Xi’s visit to Washington on September 24th, Mr Trump has held off approving a $14bn arms package for Taiwan that was cleared by Congress in January. Taiwanese officials worry that more concessions to China may follow to secure deals on trade and technology. And they fear that deliveries of earlier American arms packages could be delayed by shortages due to the war against Iran.   Yet American and Taiwanese military commanders are quietly forging ahead with Hellscape, a plan originally conceived when Joe Biden was president. They think China is unlikely to attack before the end of the decade, when America will have a new leader. And they believe their odds of success have improved in the light of the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, even accounting for China’s growing capabilities. American strategists have long taught that an attacking force needs three times the firepower of a defender to secure victory. They now think the attacker needs an advantage of more like 20 or even 30 to one.   “Uncrewed systems are to today’s conflicts what the machine gun was in World War I and the tank in World War II: a game-changing technology that redefines the battlefield,” Raymond Greene, America’s de facto ambassador in Taipei, told a conference there on September 9th. Taiwan could easily exploit the lessons from Ukraine and Iran because of its world-leading semiconductor industry, strong manufacturing base and booming economy. It also has access to battle-tested American aerial drones (of which Taiwan bought 2,000 in August). And it is collaborating with America on sea drones and AI-enabled swarming technology, he said. The problem is not the lack of a good plan. It’s that to make it work, America needs the political will and all the drone and missile capacity it can get. Proponents of the plan are looking beyond Mr Trump, banking on bipartisan congressional support for Taiwan (which remains strong) and the island’s importance to America’s AI industry. But some fear the influence within the Republican Party of a “restrainer” camp that favours abandoning Taiwan. Others worry that Mr Trump has deepened public opposition to overseas wars and done lasting damage to relations with Asian allies, whose support they would hope to have to make Hellscape work.   America’s efforts to build more low-cost drones have borne some fruit. It reverse-engineered an Iranian aerial-strike drone in 18 months. And the Pentagon plans to buy 200,000 cheap UAVs by 2027. But progress has been slowed by testing backlogs and shortages of non-Chinese components. Hellscape needs far fewer sea drones: a single successful strike can sink or cripple a warship, as Ukraine showed in the Black Sea. Some American models designed for a war over Taiwan have been used against Iran. And American troops tested a Ukrainian kamikaze boat in the Philippines in April. Still, these are still mostly experimental systems, produced in negligible numbers, says Professor Michael Horowitz of the University of Pennsylvania, who led the Pentagon’s drone drive under the Biden administration.   He and others also warn that such drones cannot replace bigger, older and more expensive weapons. The plan is for drones to exhaust China’s missile interceptors and damage its invasion flotilla sufficiently to make it easier for American aircraft-carriers, submarines and other platforms to hit their targets. The worry is that the Iran war has diverted America’s forces from the Pacific and depleted its weapons stockpiles, especially of precision missiles and missile interceptors. Restocking America’s magazines will take years. Some worry that Mr Xi might try his luck before then, possibly as soon as 2028, when Taiwan holds its next presidential election—about 10 months before Mr Trump leaves office.   “The other thing to keep in mind”, says one former Pentagon official, “is that it would not be consistent with American policy…to put large quantities of American weapons in Taiwan that we would then come in and use.” Changing that policy would invite an unholy row with China. That is why, says the former official, “it is all the more important to sufficiently train and equip Taiwanese forces.”   Taiwan presents other challenges. Chief is its capacity to produce enough drones. Soon after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Taiwan launched a programme to develop a drone industry free of Chinese components. It aims to buy 208,000 locally produced aerial-attack drones and 1,320 suicide boats by 2032. Output and exports have grown in the past two years. But the plan has been delayed by squabbling over funding, which was only approved in August. The main obstacle was the Kuomintang, Taiwan’s biggest opposition party, which favours closer ties with China. Should it return to power in 2028, there could be further delays. “If a real crisis hits, the timeline would probably be compressed significantly, just like in Ukraine,” says Chen Ping-hei, a professor at Taiwan National University who works on the drone programme. But as of now “the manpower and funding is clearly insufficient.” He thinks Taiwan needs 4m UAVs and 10,000 marine drones.   There are also sceptics within Taiwan’s armed forces. They worry that investment in drones could come at the expense of bigger-ticket items, such as Patriot missiles for a new air-defence system. Some also want fighters and warships to help counter Chinese actions that fall short of an invasion, such as a blockade. (Chinese customs vessels recently began regular patrols east of Taiwan.) Others place more emphasis on striking the Chinese mainland early and preserving Taiwanese forces for a counter-attack.   China’s response raises troubling questions too. It initially mocked Hellscape, with one official military outlet branding it a “psychotic plan” and calling America a paper tiger unable to produce the necessary drone swarms. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) still enjoys an overwhelming advantage in drone numbers and production capacity. It has been testing its own unmanned systems in drills around Taiwan, while studying developments in Ukraine and the Middle East. It has also sent officers to Russia to train with Russian counterparts in drone and counter-drone operations and to gain access to relevant data from the front lines. Recently, however, there have been signs of concern within the PLA. Mr Xi’s purges have made it harder to meet his order for it to be ready to execute an invasion, if instructed, by 2027. Some Chinese military experts now suggest that Hellscape requires the PLA to update its invasion plans, and to invest more in shipborne weapons that could identify and destroy drones.   Hellscapers concede that the obstacles are daunting. But to deter conflict, its proponents say, Taiwan and America do not need to demonstrate that they could defeat China outright. They just need to convince Mr Xi that he would struggle to achieve the quick and relatively cost-free victory that he hopes for. ■   在台北郊區的一棟辦公大樓裡,詹翔智打開工作坊的大門,讓人窺見台灣海峽未來戰場的一角。房間裡擺著兩艘雪茄狀的水下無人機原型,正準備交付給台灣海峽的海軍。「炸彈就是裝在這裡,」他點頭指向其中一艘無人機的後方說道。這款無人機可以自動辨識目標、投放彈藥,或者以單機、群飛的方式發動自殺式襲擊。詹博士在 2015 年創立了「智海科技」(AwareOcean),原本是為了服務離岸風電產業;如今,他轉而製造這類低成本的自律型武器,而這正是台灣與美國為了挫敗中國入侵計畫,所急需的關鍵配備。 這項名為「地獄景觀」(Hellscape)的戰略計畫,汲取了烏克蘭與伊朗的實戰經驗,主張利用海量低成本無人機結合人工智慧,來反制實力懸殊的強大對手。它的核心構想是:一旦中國發動進攻,美台將立即在台灣海峽鋪天蓋地投放大量相對便宜的空中、水面及水下無人機。考量到中國屆時必然會進行電磁

  7. Sep 19

    91-1 你對公司&部門&小團體有多大的認同感?+ 小分享: 人生第一份工作的小圈圈 @~@"

    Are you committed to your company or your team? Employees have overlapping identities at work. That’s a challenge for bosses   Sep 10th 2026|4 min read Humans are conditioned to form allegiances extremely quickly, a type of behaviour sometimes called the “minimal group effect”. In a famous series of experiments, a social psychologist called Henri Tajfel found that you can divide strangers into groups on totally arbitrary grounds—how good they are at estimating the number of dots on a chart, say, or how much they like a certain type of abstract art, or even just on the basis of a coin toss—and they will immediately start to favour members of their own group when then asked to distribute rewards. If people are prepared to start dividing the world into “us” and “them” based on whether someone likes Mondrian, it’s no surprise that they form strong identities and loyalties based on where they go to work every day. One of the small diversions of office life is watching to see how quickly joiners start using the word “we” to refer to their new employer: it’s usually instantaneous and occasionally takes place during the interview. But if you work for a large enough company, you do not belong only to the organisation. You have “nested identities”: you are also a member of a department, and of a team within that department, and perhaps of smaller groups as well. These other in-groups can really matter. A research meta-analysis by Michael Riketta of the University of Tübingen and Rolf van Dick of Goethe University finds that on average employees identify more strongly with their work group than with their organisation. That ought not to be a huge surprise. Proximity, familiarity and shared routines bind people from a specific team together. Identities at work also depend largely on which department you are in. If you are at a staff event for Widget & Sons and a colleague asks what you do, you don’t say “I work for Widget & Sons” but tell them which group you work in. Identifying with a sub-group is not necessarily bad. It makes perfect sense for organisations to divide labour up among departments. A bit of friendly competition between teams can be useful. But a strong sense of group identity can also impede co-operation across the wider organisation. It becomes natural to blame the general uselessness of other departments if things go wrong. Budget allocations are framed as victories and losses. Information may well be hoarded in silos rather than shared. A paper by Jeanine Pieternel Porck of Oklahoma State University and her co-authors finds, for example, that a strong sense of group identification is associated with reduced understanding of an organisation’s strategy. For executives, therefore, the challenge is to reconcile strong bonds within teams with a sense of commitment to the organisation as a whole. An example from outside the office helps explain how to go about this. A long long time ago, when Manchester United was a dominant football club, a group of researchers wondered whether being a fan of the team would affect someone’s willingness to help a supporter of a rival outfit. Mark Levine of Lancaster University and his co-authors ran an experiment in which self-identified fans were first reminded of their allegiance to Man Utd and later encountered a jogger who deliberately slipped and fell in front of them. The participants were more likely to offer help if the stranger was wearing a Man Utd football shirt than if they were sporting a Liverpool one or a plain top. The thought-provoking part came next. The researchers ran the same experiment with another group of United supporters, but this time the participants were primed to think of themselves as fans of the beautiful game rather than of a specific club. Now, when they saw someone appear to injure themselves, they were equally likely to offer help to anyone wearing a football shirt, their own or Liverpool’s. It’s not a watertight experiment. Nor is it a heart-warming story: whatever happens, some poor soul in a plain top is left hurt and unaided. But it is an instructive one. Employees will naturally form in-group relationships with their closest team-mates. Bosses often have to work harder to ensure that people also feel like members of the wider organisation. That might mean making efforts to bring people from different teams into contact with each other, through project-based work or social events or the physical layout of the office. It definitely means explaining to members of departments how their work contributes to the health of the overall organisation. People are quick to divide into “us and them”. “Us and us” takes a bit more thought. ■   你忠於公司,還是忠於團隊? 員工在職場中擁有重疊的身份認同,這對管理者的領導能力是一大考驗。 2026年9月10日|閱讀時間:4分鐘 人類天生具備極快建立陣營的傾向,這種行為有時被稱為「最小分組效應」(minimal group effect)。著名社會心理學家亨利·泰菲爾(Henri Tajfel)在一連串經典實驗中發現,即使根據完全隨機的標準將陌生人分組——例如估算圖表上點數的能力好壞、對某種抽象藝術的喜好程度,甚至只是丟硬幣——一旦要求他們分配獎勵,人們就會立刻開始偏袒自己組內的成員。 如果人們只因對方是否喜歡蒙德里安(Mondrian)的畫作,就準備好把世界劃分為「我們」與「他們」,那麼他們根據每天上班的場所建立強烈的身份認同與忠誠度,也就不足為奇了。辦公室生活的一大樂趣,就是觀察新進員工有多快開始用「我們」來稱呼新雇主:這種轉變通常是立竿見影的,有時甚至在面試過程中就已發生。 然而,如果你在一間規模夠大的公司上班,你所屬的絕不單單只有這家企業本身。你擁有「嵌套身份」(nested identities):你同時屬於某個部門、該部門裡的某個團隊,甚至更小的群體。這些部門與小團體(內群體)影響至關重大。圖賓根大學的麥可·里凱塔(Michael Riketta)與法蘭克福大學的羅爾夫·範·迪克(Rolf van Dick)在一項後設分析中指出,平均而言,員工對自己「工作團隊」的認同感,遠強於對「公司整體」的認同感。 這其實並不令人意外。近距離的接觸、熟悉感以及共同的工作日常,緊密地將特定團隊的成員凝聚在一起。此外,職場上的身份認同很大程度上取決於你所在的部門。如果在 Widget & Sons 公司的員工活動中,有同事問你是做什麼的,你不會說「我在 Widget & Sons 上班」,而是會直接告訴對方你在哪個部門或團隊工作。 認同次級群體未必是一件壞事。企業將勞動分工落實到各部門完全符合情理,團隊之間保持適度的良性競爭也大有裨益。然而,過於強烈的群體認同感也可能阻礙跨部門的合作。一旦事情出錯,自然而然就會歸咎於其他部門「總是不給力」;預算分配演變成非贏即輸的角力;資訊也極可能被困在各自的「組織氣蜂」(silos)中無法共享。奧克拉荷馬州立大學的讓寧·皮特內爾·波克(Jeanine Pieternel Porck)及其合作者在一篇研究論文中指出,強烈的團隊認同感往往與員工對公司整體戰略理解度的降低存在相關性。 因此,對企業高層而言,挑戰在於如何將團隊內部的緊密纽帶,與對公司整體的凝聚力相調和。一個來自球場外的例子有助於說明該如何達成這一點。很久很久以前,當曼聯(Manchester United)還是英超霸主時,一組研究人員很好奇:成為某一球隊的球迷,是否會影響一個人援助宿敵球隊支持者的意願?蘭卡斯特大學的馬克·萊文(Mark Levine)及其團隊進行了一項實驗,受試者皆為自證身份的曼聯球迷。在實驗中,研究人員先提醒他們對曼聯的忠誠,隨後讓他們目擊一名跑者在面前故意滑倒。結果顯示,如果受傷的陌生人身穿曼聯球衣,受試者伸出援助之手的機率,遠高於對方身穿利物浦球衣或素色上衣的情況。 意想不到的轉折出現在下一步。研究人員對另一組曼聯球迷進行了相同的實驗,但這次,受試者事先被引導將自己定位為「足球這項運動的熱愛者」,而非「特定球會的擁護者」。這一次,當他們看到有人似是受傷時,無論對方穿的是曼聯還是利物浦的球衣,他們提供幫助的機率完全相同。(這並非一個天衣無縫的實驗,也稱不上是個溫馨的故事:無論如何,那個穿著素色上衣的無辜受害者總是得不到援助。但這確實是一個極具啟發性的實驗。) 員工自然會與最親密的團隊夥伴建立同陣營的關係;而主管們則往往需要付出更多努力,來確保大家同樣覺得自己是廣大公司的一份子。這可能意味著要透過專案合作、社交活動或辦公空間的彈性規劃,來促成不同團隊之間的互動;這也絕對意味著必須向各部門成員說明,他們的工作是如何為整個公司的健康發展做出貢獻。人們總是能輕易劃分出「我們與他們」,但要打造出「我們與我們(大家都是自己人)」,則需要投入更多的巧思。 -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

  8. Sep 12

    90-4 中國的職業媽媽在職場上越來越不利+小分享: 台灣,中國, 芬蘭和美國的母親福利

    The pressure to have children collides with a fierce work culture Aug 24th 2026|5 min read   For those unaccustomed to truth in advertising, employers in China can be astonishingly forthright in their help-wanted notices. Huangshi, a city in Hubei, recently sought investment-promotion officers under 35 years old, specifying “men preferred”. A high-speed rail operator in Lanzhou wanted women, but only so long as they were under 25, over 160cm tall and with a “good appearance”. A Suzhou packaging firm, by contrast, stretched to the geriatric reaches of 45 in its search for a sales representative, adding that female candidates should already be married with children—in other words, please no maternity leave.   These are just a few blatant examples of discrimination that women face in the Chinese labour market. More extensive discrimination is largely out of sight. It includes pressure on women to avoid pregnancy, higher pay for male colleagues and fewer opportunities as women’s careers progress.   In the 1950s, when Mao Zedong declared that “women held up half the sky”, in narrowly economic terms China looked egalitarian. Men and women had similar jobs as well as incomes, though both were miserable—and that was if you were lucky enough to escape becoming victims of Mao’s revolution-without-end. Today women in China more than match men in educational terms: 51% of university students are female, up by 14 percentage points since 1995. The picture at work, by contrast, has grown worse. Men on average now earn roughly a third more. In 1990 nearly 80% of women aged between 15 and 64 were in the labour force, one of the highest rates anywhere in the world. Today that has slipped to under 70%, below both Japan and the European Union. China’s business leadership is overwhelmingly male. Women are even rarer at the top of politics. For a quarter-century until 2022, the Politburo, the Communist Party’s top body, boasted a woman or two. Since then there have been none.   Sexism is part of the problem. For businessmen and officials, the banqueting table is often where deals get done. But long boozy dinners (officially forbidden under Xi Jinping) can be offputting to women, or worse. A senior cadre and a property executive in Hangzhou, a wealthy east-central city, were recently accused of assaulting a young female employee after such a dinner. The incident provoked public outrage, including renewed calls to clean up the practice of banquets. A more common experience for women is less aggressive, though still demeaning. “Our bosses wouldn’t say it directly but they hope we act as decoration,” says Ms Dou, who worked in tech. Yet nothing is straightforward. Erica, a woman in her 20s in the events industry, says she has had more friction with female bosses than male ones. “We’re a patriarchal society, so when women break through and get power, they tend to be more controlling,” she says.   The more pervasive problem is less that of outright sexism and more how women’s role, or potential role, as mothers clashes with work. A “motherhood penalty” is common nearly everywhere. But in China the penalty is especially high, owing to a fierce work culture, an outdated retirement system and an intensifying state-led fertility push colliding with entrenched career patterns.   Compared with other countries at its level of development, China has generous maternity leave: mothers can get about half a year off work, on full pay. But the state covers only part of the salary on leave, with employers paying for the bulk. Five women in their 30s and 40s told Chaguan that their bosses expected to be informed should they be trying to get pregnant. “Speaking as a former manager, I myself wasn’t all that willing to hire women under 35,” said Ms Chen, who used to work in media. “What if she comes in and gets pregnant right away?” The government’s recent push for two-child families, aimed at reversing a fast-declining fertility rate, adds to employers’ concerns that married women are liable to take extended breaks from work.   The little brats After pregnancy, women face other hurdles. A common expectation that they will guide their children through school is hardly compatible with the long hours expected in many Chinese jobs. “Men the same age as me are in a better position,” says Ms Dou, in her early 40s. “There’s an assumption that they don’t have as much responsibility at home.” Job ads often state that candidates should be able to tolerate high stress, regularly work overtime and always be reachable. Such requirements do not discriminate specifically against women, but are deterrents to any parent with their hands full with young children—usually the mother.   Nor is there much runway left for a woman returning to work, perhaps in her early 40s. In white-collar jobs the official retirement age is just a few months over 55 for women and 60 for men (by 2040 these will be raised gradually to 58 and 63, respectively). Companies have less incentive to invest in mid-career women who have taken time off for children. “The job market is already biased enough against women,” says Ms Wu, a former web designer who left to have a child. “After 35 it is like frost on top of snow.” She is taking matters into her own hands, retraining as a drone pilot.   Policy tweaks would help, including making maternity and paternity leave more equal (many places give fathers 15 days, if they take any). More state funding for paid leave would ease the financial strain on companies. Men and women should also have the same (higher) retirement ages.   Yet what women are up against is less skewed policy than powerful social norms, especially the weight placed upon mothers. Until that changes, China is undermining its own potential. In educational terms, Chinese women already hold up more than half the sky today. In the world of work, they are getting just about a third of it. ■   催生壓力和狼性加班文化互相衝突 2026 年 8 月 24 日 | 閱讀時間約 5 分鐘 對不習慣徵才廣告吐露真言的人來說,中國雇主的徵才啟事有時坦率得令人吃驚。湖北黃石市近期招募 35 歲以下的招商人員,明確註明「男性優先」;蘭州一家高鐵營運商想招募女性,但要求年齡必須在 25 歲以下、身高 160 公分以上,且「形象氣質佳」;相比之下,蘇州一家包裝企業在尋找銷售代表時,將年齡門檻寬限到堪稱高齡的 45 歲,但附帶條件是女性求職者必須「已婚已育」——換句話說,請別來休產假。 這些不過是女性在中國職場遭遇歧視的冰山一角。更多且更普遍的歧視通常隱藏在螢光幕後,包括逼迫女性避免懷孕、給予男性同事更高的薪資,以及在女性職涯發展的過程中提供較少的晉升機會。 1950 年代,當毛澤東喊出「婦女能頂半邊天」時,單從經濟層面來看,中國似乎相當平權。當時男女從事的職業和收入相去不遠,儘管大家的苦日子都不好過——而這前提還是你夠幸運,沒有成為毛澤東那場「無休止革命」下的犧牲品。如今,中國女性在受教育程度上早已不輸男性:大學生中有 51% 是女性,比 1995 年增加了 14 個百分點。然而,職場上的景況卻每況愈下。平均而言,現在男性的收入比女性高出約三分之一。1990 年,15 至 64 歲的女性中有將近 80% 投入職場,名列全球最高水平之一;如今這一比例已下滑至 70% 以下,比日本和歐盟都还要低。中國企業的高層領導絕大多數是男性,而在政治頂層,女性更是鳳毛麟角。在截至 2022 年長達四分之一個世紀的時間裡,中共最高權力機構政治局至少還保有一至兩位女性席次,但自此之後,便是一片空白。 性別歧視是問題的一部分。對商人和官員來說,餐桌應酬往往是促成交易的場合。但漫長且酗酒的飯局(雖然在習近平主政下官方名義上禁止)常讓女性退避三舍,甚至引發更糟糕的後果。東部富庶城市杭州的一名資深幹部與一名地產高管,最近就被指控在一場飯局後性侵了一名年輕女員工。這起事件引發社會公憤,也再次讓大眾呼籲肅清應酬飯局的陋習。對大多數女性而言,更常見的遭遇雖不至如此具攻擊性,卻同樣令人難堪。曾從事科技業的竇小姐表示:「我們老闆不會明說,但他們希望我們充當門面花瓶。」然而,情況並非單一維度。二十多歲、從事活動企劃的 Erica 表示,相比於男主管,她與女主管之間的摩擦反而更多。「我們是一個父權社會,所以當女性打破天花板獲得權力時,她們往往會展現出更強的控制欲,」她說道。 比起赤裸裸的性別歧視,更根深蒂固的問題在於女性身為(或潛在身為)母親的角色,與工作產生了嚴重衝突。「生育懲罰」在世界各地屢見不鮮,但在中國,由於高壓激烈的加班文化、過時的退休制度,以及國家主導的催生政策與既有職涯模式產生強烈碰撞,使得這種懲罰尤為沉重。 與同等發展水平的其他國家相比,中國提供了相當優渥的產假:媽媽們可以休假約半年,且領取全薪。然而,國家僅負擔產假期間的部分薪資,大頭仍須由雇主支付。五位三四十歲的女性告訴《茶館》專欄,她們的老闆要求如果打算備孕必須提前告知。曾任職於媒體業的陳小姐說:「站在前主管的角度,我自己當時也不太願意招募 35 歲以下的女性。萬一她一進公司就懷孕怎麼辦?」政府近期為了扭轉陡降的出生率而推行「三孩政策」(註:原交稿提及 two-child,意指多胎鼓勵政策),反而進一

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