Incorrigible Myths Podcast

Gifts of Pure Consciousness

Examining how fragile egos and maladaptive coping strategies shape behaviour, relationships, and long-term consequences. incorrigiblemyths.substack.com

  1. 1d ago

    Convergence

    Season 4, Episode 6. Monday, August 31, 2026 [5:00 AM PST] A war in Iran should have very little to do with a scientist leaving an American university for Canada. A tariff on a Canadian automobile should have little obvious connection to the Strait of Hormuz. A government bond auction should seem even further removed from a research laboratory in Vancouver, while a ten-year-old argument about Canadian national identity should belong comfortably to another political era. Yet this is precisely where the present moment becomes interesting. Military commitments consume resources. Energy disruption changes prices. Prices influence inflation. Inflation constrains central banks and households. Tariffs redirect investment. Trade conflict changes corporate calculations. Research policy changes where scientists build laboratories and train students. Alliance disputes alter defence planning. Each decision enters a system already responding to several others. The central problem of this investigation is therefore not whether the United States remains powerful. It plainly does. The harder question is what happens when several expressions of power begin drawing simultaneously from the same finite reserves of military, economic, diplomatic, scientific and institutional capacity. How many fronts can a superpower manage before the fronts begin managing each other? You are listening to Incorrigible Myths, an independent public-interest publication built around current affairs, human behaviour and pattern recognition through long-form analysis. This publication steps outside the daily headline cycle to examine recurring forces beneath political events, including power, status, incentives, institutions, narrative, psychology, emotional regulation, economic consequence and human behaviour. The purpose is not to manufacture certainty from complexity, but to connect credible evidence carefully enough that patterns obscured by individual headlines become easier to recognize. Incorrigible Myths is published in Canada as independent public-interest commentary and analysis, and the views expressed here are my own, grounded wherever possible in documents, credible reporting, public data and research that readers can examine for themselves. That work exists within the democratic freedoms recognized by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, including freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression protected by Section 2(b). Those freedoms are valuable partly because a democratic society requires citizens to be able to examine governments, challenge arguments, question prevailing narratives and reconsider their own conclusions when the evidence changes. I have lived in Canada since Christmas 2018. Over those years, I have come to appreciate how deeply a country’s character is shaped by the people who live within it. Canada is not perfect, and no serious analysis should pretend otherwise, but daily life here has taught me the value of peace, civility, humility and social trust. Peace is not something I routinely have to ask for. It is built into the ordinary texture of life, in how people speak to one another, how disagreement is carried, how public spaces feel and how strength is usually expressed without needing to become aggression. Having also lived in the United States, and still having close friends there, I remain conscious of the differences in political tension, social anxiety and the pressures people experience in everyday life. That contrast informs my perspective, but it does not determine my conclusions. What I value most about Canada is the combination of politeness and resilience, kindness without passivity, and the belief that a country can remain open, peaceful and respectful while still standing firmly when challenged. A note for Spotify and Apple Podcasts listeners: the written version of this investigation contains the source documents, reporting, screenshots, charts and hyperlinks referenced throughout the episode. The narration is designed to stand on its own, but readers who want to examine the underlying evidence can find it alongside the written article. 1. Two Ancient Questions About Modern Power: Nearly two thousand years ago, Seneca and Epictetus approached human behaviour from different directions, yet both confronted problems that remain surprisingly recognizable. Seneca was deeply interested in anger, judgment and the danger of allowing an immediate emotional response to govern what happens next. Epictetus began from a different distinction: some things are within our control, while others are not. His argument concerned individual life rather than foreign policy, but the distinction becomes remarkably useful when applied carefully to governments. The opening of the Enchiridion of Epictetus begins with precisely that division between what depends upon us and what does not. A president can impose a tariff but cannot command the country receiving it to respond as intended. A military can strike a target but cannot determine every military, economic and diplomatic consequence produced afterward. A government can alter university funding, immigration rules or research priorities, but it cannot order scientists to build their careers within its borders. Political power provides the ability to initiate events. It does not provide ownership of every consequence those events create. That is the philosophical foundation of CONVERGENCE. Seneca helps us examine the quality of a decision: whether the response was proportionate, strategic and disciplined, or whether the immediate need to demonstrate strength overwhelmed longer-term calculation. Epictetus helps us examine what happens afterward: which consequences remain controllable, which depend on other actors and which emerge from systems too complicated for any individual leader to command. That distinction becomes increasingly useful when several decisions begin interacting at once. 2. Six Months Changes the Meaning of War: The Iran war has entered a stage in which battlefield capability can no longer be the only measurement. During the opening phase of a conflict, attention naturally gravitates toward what was struck, what survived, which weapons were deployed and which side demonstrated military superiority. A prolonged conflict introduces another variable: endurance. Recent reporting has increasingly focused on the strain that extended operations can place on American military resources. Reporting supplied for this investigation also described senior US military leaders warning Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth that prolonging the conflict could affect America’s ability to respond to threats elsewhere. That reporting requires precision. It does not establish that the US military is incapable of continuing operations against Iran, nor does it demonstrate imminent defeat or withdrawal. It raises a more conventional strategic problem: opportunity cost. Military assets remain physical things. Aircraft require maintenance. Ships require crews. Air-defence systems contain finite inventories. Personnel require rotation. Intelligence capabilities are allocated. Munitions have to be manufactured and replenished. The United States simultaneously maintains strategic commitments in Europe, the Indo-Pacific, the Western Hemisphere and at home. Recent Reuters reporting on the Pentagon’s review of US deployments in Europe illustrates the larger problem. Europe did not disappear when Iran became urgent. China did not disappear. Russia did not disappear. Homeland defence did not disappear. A military can remain overwhelmingly powerful while experiencing increasing competition among the missions assigned to it. That is our first convergence. 3. Larak Island Pulls Hormuz Back into the Centre: The weekend made the problem more immediate. US forces struck Iranian missile launchers on Larak Island, while Iran subsequently said it had attacked US bases in Jordan. Trump then claimed that Iran’s strategically important Kharg Island oil terminal was being destroyed. Reuters reported the presidential statement while noting that the claim could not immediately be independently confirmed. The distinction is essential. During war, a statement by a president establishes that the statement was made. It does not automatically establish that the event described occurred precisely as stated. That discipline becomes even more important when the alleged target is economically significant. Kharg Island has long played a central role in Iranian oil exports, while Larak sits within the geography surrounding one of the world’s most consequential energy corridors. The military story therefore becomes an energy story almost immediately, and once that happens, the war stops belonging exclusively to the countries fighting it. 4. Hormuz Converts Missiles Into Prices: The Strait of Hormuz has historically carried roughly one-fifth of global petroleum flows, making disruption there capable of influencing energy markets far beyond the Middle East. Following the renewed confrontation, Reuters reported Brent crude moving above $90 a barrel as markets reassessed the possibility of further disruption. That movement illustrates convergence more effectively than political rhetoric. A missile launcher sits on an island in the Persian Gulf. The United States strikes it. Iran responds. Shipping companies reassess risk. Insurers reconsider exposure. Energy traders revise assumptions about supply. Oil prices respond to the perceived probability of disruption. If higher prices persist, transportation becomes more expensive, manufacturing costs can rise, airlines pay more for fuel and businesses face higher operating expenses. Inflation becomes harder to contain, which can complicate decisions by central banks. Interest rates then move the consequences again, affecting mortgages, corporate borrowing and the amount governments must pay to refinance debt. Eventually, a military confrontation thousands of k

  2. 2d ago

    Trust

    Season 4, Episode 5 August 29, 2026 | 9:30 PM Pacific Diogenes Laërtius records Socrates looking at the abundance of goods offered for sale and remarking, “How many things I can do without!” The passage appears in Book II of Diogenes Laërtius’ Lives of Eminent Philosophers. The modern wording that has stayed with me today is even simpler: how many things there are in the world that I do not need. More than two thousand years later, countries confront their own version of that problem. Geography creates dependencies, prosperity deepens them, infrastructure hardens them into physical reality, and eventually an arrangement that began because it was efficient can become so familiar that imagining alternatives starts to feel irrational. Canada understands this unusually well because generations of economic development produced one of the deepest relationships between any two national economies on Earth with the United States. Factories were designed around a continental market, pipelines ran south, automotive components crossed the border repeatedly before becoming finished vehicles, and businesses came to treat relatively predictable access to the US market almost as part of the geography itself. That relationship remains enormously valuable. The United States is still Canada’s largest economic partner, one of the world’s most productive economies, and home to extraordinary technological, financial, industrial, agricultural and energy capabilities. Geography did not disappear because politics became difficult, nor would Canada become stronger by pretending that North American integration produced nothing worth preserving. The calculation surrounding dependence, however, has changed. When the rules governing one relationship become less predictable, predictability elsewhere becomes more valuable. When a market once assumed to be almost permanently accessible becomes vulnerable to abrupt political intervention, additional markets begin carrying strategic value beyond the sales they generate. When concentration allows somebody else to transform interdependence into leverage, diversification starts looking less like inefficiency and more like insurance. That brings us to tonight’s word: TRUST. You are listening to Incorrigible Myths, an independent public-interest publication built around current affairs, human behaviour and pattern recognition through long-form analysis. Incorrigible Myths steps outside the daily headline cycle to examine recurring forces beneath political events, including power, status, incentives, institutions, narrative, psychology, emotional regulation, economic consequence and human behaviour. Incorrigible Myths is published in Canada as independent public-interest commentary and analysis, and the views expressed here are my own, grounded wherever possible in documents, credible reporting, public data and research that readers can examine for themselves. Among the fundamental freedoms recognized by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Section 2(b) protects freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the press and other media of communication. The purpose of this publication is to exercise those freedoms responsibly by examining evidence and ideas rather than instructing readers what they are required to believe. If you are listening on Spotify or Apple Podcasts, the written version of this investigation is available on Incorrigible Myths, where the research, source documents, screenshots, charts and hyperlinks referenced throughout this episode can be examined directly. The argument is written to remain understandable without looking at a screen, but the underlying material is there for listeners who want to study the evidence themselves. I also begin from a unique vantage point. I was born in India, later lived in the United States for several years, and now write from Canada as an Independent Writer and Geopolitical Analyst. That history does not provide special authority, but it does make borders, currencies, immigration systems, labour markets and international relationships feel considerably less abstract. Eventually geopolitics reaches grocery aisles, mortgages, jobs, factories, families and decisions about where people believe their futures can safely be built. Trust sounds philosophical until somebody has to make one of those decisions. 1. The Marketplace, the Cave and the Problem of Perception: Socrates gives us one part of the method required to examine this moment. The useful Socratic habit is not simply questioning another person’s assumptions; it is remaining capable of questioning our own, including asking what evidence would force us to revise an interpretation we would prefer to keep. Countries can become trapped by familiar assumptions just as easily as individuals can, especially when a relationship has worked for so long that dependency begins masquerading as permanence. Plato approached the same problem through the Allegory of the Cave, where people exposed to representations for long enough can begin confusing those representations with the reality underneath them. Politics creates modern shadows particularly efficiently because speeches, slogans, tariff announcements, polling numbers, threats and declarations of victory become visible immediately, while the structural adaptations occurring underneath them can take months or years to reveal themselves. Economic analysis has its own shadows. A strong GDP quarter becomes one if it is presented as proof that every Canadian economic weakness has disappeared. A prime ministerial speech becomes another if political aspirations are treated as completed outcomes. Tariffs become shadows when the performance of economic strength attracts more attention than the investment, diversification and supply-chain changes they eventually provoke. The central inquiry behind TRUST is therefore narrower than a patriotic claim that Canada is doing well. We need to understand what trust actually looks like when translated into an economy, and whether reliability can acquire economic value when the world surrounding it becomes less predictable. The evidence has to carry that argument. 2. Start With 3.3 Percent, Then Look Underneath It: Canada received an unexpectedly strong economic number on August 28. According to Reuters’ report on Canada’s second-quarter GDP, the economy expanded at an annualized 3.3 percent in the second quarter of 2026, its fastest pace since 2023, after roughly six months of very little growth. The second-quarter result also exceeded the Bank of Canada’s earlier estimate of 2.5 percent. The composition deserves more attention than the headline. Exports increased 3.6 percent, their strongest quarterly rise in more than three years. Final domestic demand rose 1 percent, household consumption increased 0.8 percent, and business investment expanded 2.3 percent following a prolonged contraction. The figures suggest that the rebound was broader than one isolated statistical category. None of this establishes that trust caused Canada’s growth. Economies are far too complicated for that claim, and the surrounding evidence argues for restraint. The preliminary estimate for July suggested little growth, renewed tariffs could weaken investment and employment, and economists remain cautious about assuming that a 3.3 percent annualized quarter can simply be projected forward. Canada still faces expensive housing, weak productivity growth, substantial household debt, infrastructure constraints and considerable reliance on its largest trading partner. TRUST would become branding rather than analysis if one GDP release were allowed to erase those realities. A more defensible observation survives all of those qualifications: economic activity continued adapting while Canada’s external trading environment became considerably less predictable. That distinction leads naturally to investment because economic growth records what has already happened, whereas investment contains an expectation about what may still happen next. 3. Growth Looks Backward, while investment Contains an Expectation: Every significant investment contains a forecast, whether anyone writes that forecast down or not. A company purchasing machinery, expanding a factory or financing infrastructure commits resources today against assumptions about regulation, labour, demand, logistics, financing and political conditions that may exist years from now. The 2.3 percent rebound in Canadian business investment therefore deserves attention beyond its contribution to quarterly GDP. On August 29, Reuters reported on a tentative agreement between General Motors and Unifor involving approximately C$1.1 billion in Canadian automotive investment. The package includes C$144 million to add next-generation heavy-duty GMC Sierra production in Oshawa, C$215 million for a new transmission line in St. Catharines beginning in 2029, and a previously announced C$691 million investment supporting V8 engine production. The agreement covers approximately 4,600 union members in Ontario and still requires ratification. The timing gives the investment analytical value because Canada’s automotive industry is simultaneously operating under serious trade uncertainty. Canadian vehicles face 25 percent US tariffs, while President Donald Trump has threatened to increase tariffs on Canadian automotive products to 50 percent in 2027. Canada has made preservation of its auto assembly and parts industry a central condition of any future agreement. It would be careless to translate GM’s decision into a referendum on Canadian virtue. Industrial investment follows existing factories, trained workers, supplier relationships, government policies, sunk capital, expected demand and the enormous cost of moving production. Those factors, however, reveal something important about the economics of trust. A mature manufacturing ecosystem is partly phy

  3. 3d ago

    Predictable

    Friday, August 28, 2026, 9:30 PM Pacific Time. Season 4, Episode 4. On March 23, less than a month into the US-Israeli war with Iran, Reuters published an oil-market analysis containing a phrase that would have sounded almost unserious in another era of American power. In Reuters’ analysis, “Crude oil’s Catch-22: Pricing for Trump TACO trade makes it less likely”, traders were described as still pricing for Donald Trump to “deliver the TACO,” the Wall Street acronym for Trump Always Chickens Out. Brent crude had risen 54 percent from its February 27 close, the Strait of Hormuz had been severely disrupted, and oil markets were trying to calculate the consequences of an expanding war. Yet an expectation developed during Trump’s earlier trade confrontations had already migrated into the financial modelling of military escalation. 5 months later, the pattern had moved beyond markets. On August 27, Reuters reported that Tehran was betting Trump would stop short of the most consequential version of his latest economic pressure campaign: aggressively enforcing secondary sanctions against major countries helping keep Iran’s economy functioning, particularly China and India. Iran could be catastrophically wrong. Washington maintains that Tehran is being progressively strangled economically, and the United States retains enormous military and financial power. The revealing development is that Iranian strategy now appears to include an estimate of Trump’s escalation threshold at all. Photo Credit: ESA / modified Copernicus Sentinel data 2020, CC BY-SA 3.0 IGO. Then, on August 28, another layer appeared. Reuters reported that Qatar was pressing Iran toward more normal navigation through the Strait of Hormuz while sanctions and economic pressure continued. Almost simultaneously, Reuters reported that Gulf governments were accelerating investment in pipelines, ports and alternative transport routes intended to reduce their future dependence on Hormuz altogether. The sequence raises a larger question than whether Trump sometimes retreats: what happens when a political strategy built partly around uncertainty is repeated often enough that markets, adversaries, allies and institutions begin learning the conditions under which the uncertainty changes direction? You are listening to Incorrigible Myths, an independent public-interest publication built around current affairs, human behaviour and pattern recognition through long-form analysis. The purpose is to step outside the daily headline cycle long enough to examine the forces underneath it: power, incentives, institutions, economic consequence, political narrative, psychology, status, human behaviour and the patterns that become easier to see once individual events are placed beside one another. Incorrigible Myths is published in Canada as independent public-interest commentary and analysis, and the views expressed here are my own, grounded wherever possible in documents, credible reporting, public data and research that readers can examine for themselves. This publication operates within the democratic freedoms recognized by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, including the freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression protected under Section 2(b). Its purpose is not to instruct readers what they must believe, but to provide enough evidence and analytical structure for them to examine the argument themselves. A note for Spotify and Apple Podcasts listeners: the written Incorrigible Myths version contains the source reporting, research, documents and hyperlinks referenced throughout this investigation. Where the evidence becomes dense, the underlying material can be examined directly in the written version. I should also locate my own vantage point. I was born in India, later lived in the United States for several years, and now write from Canada as an Independent Writer and Geopolitical Analyst. That does not give me privileged access to truth, but it does make borders, migration, American power, Canadian dependence and the behaviour of large political systems subjects I have experienced from more than one side. Socrates left us with a demanding intellectual habit: examine the assumptions beneath what appears obvious, ask what evidence could change our minds, and remain capable of revising conclusions when reality contradicts them. Plato’s Allegory of the Cave added another warning. Human beings can become so accustomed to representations that the shadows eventually acquire the authority of reality. Politics provides an almost perfect laboratory for that problem because a performance of strength can become confused with strength itself, a threat can become confused with usable leverage, and repeated volatility can continue looking spontaneous even while the constraints surrounding it grow increasingly familiar. So the question throughout PREDICTABLE is deliberately Socratic: what evidence would make us change our minds about what we think we are seeing? 1. Why Unpredictability Can Create Power: There is nothing inherently irrational about keeping an opponent uncertain about how far one is prepared to go. Negotiation contains an informational problem. If one side knows exactly where the other’s limit sits, it can bargain toward that limit. Strategic ambiguity protects the boundary because the opponent must consider not only the most likely outcome, but also the potentially catastrophic cost of guessing incorrectly. Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger pursued an especially stark version of this logic during the Vietnam War. Documents assembled by the National Security Archive on Nixon’s so-called Madman Theory describe efforts to persuade adversaries that Nixon might behave with sufficient extremity that conventional assumptions about restraint could not safely be trusted. Trump is not Nixon, and historical comparison becomes careless when different presidents, governments and geopolitical circumstances are collapsed into equivalence. The useful comparison concerns the mechanism: strategic unpredictability can create leverage when the other side cannot confidently identify where escalation ends. Reuters has documented how Trump and his defenders describe unpredictability as part of his bargaining method. In Reuters’ April analysis of Trump’s reversal during the Iran war, supporters characterized his threats as a way of keeping opponents off balance and creating room for eventual de-escalation. That can work, but the strategy contains a weakness that becomes easier to see after repeated use. Its power depends partly upon the other side remaining uncertain about the boundary, and repetition gives everybody else more opportunities to search for it. 2. Repeated Games Produce Memory: Imagine a negotiator announces a final deadline. The other party has never dealt with this person before and cannot know whether “final” genuinely means final. Waiting carries meaningful risk, so uncertainty strengthens the threat. Now imagine that the same parties encounter one another repeatedly. During one dispute, the deadline is extended; during another, an extreme opening demand is reduced after financial pressure appears; during a third, public threats intensify while private negotiations continue; during a fourth, implementation proceeds but stops before reaching the threatened maximum. The next deadline may still be dangerous, but it no longer arrives without history. Repeated-game reasoning is useful because every encounter changes the next encounter. Governments remember how much pain the other side tolerated, companies remember which exemptions appeared, markets remember which deadlines moved, diplomats remember which pressure produced negotiations, and adversaries remember where escalation stopped. Political science adds another layer through the concept of audience costs. In James Fearon’s influential research on domestic audiences and international crises, highly visible threats can create domestic political costs for leaders who subsequently retreat. Public escalation may strengthen credibility by making withdrawal more expensive, but it can also trap a leader between the external consequences of continuing and the internal pressure to preserve an image of resolve. That framework is useful without requiring a clinical diagnosis of Donald Trump or anybody else. I use psychological concepts in Incorrigible Myths as interpretive lenses rather than remote clinical diagnoses of public figures. Observable behaviour should carry the argument. Political leaders perform before several audiences simultaneously: foreign governments, supporters, legislators, donors, businesses, media ecosystems and voters. When strength becomes central to the public presentation of a confrontation, changing course often has to be narrated as victory, strategic adjustment or proof that the original pressure worked. There is also a reinforcement problem. If maximal escalation repeatedly produces attention, concessions or partial victories, the person using the strategy can learn that escalation works. Yet every successful use teaches the recipient something too. The strategy trains both sides. 3. Liberation Day Creates the Dataset: The tariff confrontations of 2025 gave the world an unusually dense sequence of observations. Trump’s April 2 “Liberation Day” announcement triggered one of the sharpest financial-market reactions of his second presidency. Reuters reported that close to five trillion dollars in market value disappeared from S&P 500 companies across two trading sessions, while recession fears increased and volatility surged. Then came April 9. After days of turmoil across equities, bonds and currencies, Trump announced a 90-day pause on many of the higher reciprocal tariffs while continuing to escalate against China. Reuters reported that the S&P 500 rose 9.5 percent in a single session and the Nasdaq gained 12.2 percent as investors rapidly repriced

  4. 4d ago

    Liability

    This is not the time to know less, it’s the time to understand more. Thursday, August 27, 2026, 9:30 PM Pacific Time. Every adult eventually learns that reality does not negotiate with self-image. We miscalculate, lose arguments, overestimate our leverage, misunderstand people, make decisions that fail and occasionally discover that someone we expected to accommodate us has simply decided to say no. Growing up does not eliminate the discomfort created by those moments; it gradually teaches us how to survive them without requiring the surrounding world to be punished for delivering them. That capacity becomes considerably more consequential when the person experiencing the frustration possesses extraordinary power, because private mechanisms used to restore confidence, control or emotional equilibrium can suddenly acquire tariffs, armies, institutions, markets and entire countries through which to express themselves. Thanks for reading Incorrigible Myths! This post is public so feel free to share it. The danger begins when managing the feeling of losing control becomes more important than examining why control was lost. Psychologists study part of this process under the broad heading of emotion regulation, meaning the ways people influence what they feel, how strongly they feel it and what they subsequently do with those emotions. James Gross’s influential research distinguishes, among other strategies, between reconsidering the meaning of an uncomfortable event and simply attempting to suppress the emotional response after it has already taken hold. Reappraisal, which allows new information to modify our interpretation of what happened, has generally been associated with more adaptive outcomes. The underlying research on emotion regulation is linked in the substack version, and listeners on Spotify or Apple Podcasts can open that link if they would like to examine the research in greater depth. In ordinary life, regulation eventually allows us to ask questions that the ego would often prefer to avoid. Did I miscalculate? Is the strategy actually working? What part of this belongs to me? Has the other person changed, or have I misunderstood my leverage? From the standpoint of the current crisis, the equivalent question becomes: Can I alter course without interpreting Canada’s adaptation as humiliation, and can I reconsider the strategy without experiencing reconsideration itself as defeat? Those questions are uncomfortable, but they are also corrective because they allow reality to update us. The alternative is more dangerous. Instead of permitting reality to modify the internal story, the surrounding environment increasingly has to be modified to protect the story. Someone must be blamed, another opponent must be defeated, attention must be recaptured, strength must be demonstrated again, or resistance itself must be converted into proof that even greater pressure is required. For most people, a pattern like that can damage relationships, careers, families or businesses. When the person operating inside that pattern controls the enormous economic, diplomatic and military machinery of the United States, the maintenance of one person’s emotional equilibrium can become part of everybody else’s geopolitical environment. That is the argument behind LIABILITY. You are listening to Incorrigible Myths, an independent public-interest publication built around current affairs, human behaviour and pattern recognition through long-form analysis. The purpose here is not to clinically diagnose a president from a distance, reduce geopolitics to personality, or pretend that tariffs, wars and institutional conflicts can be explained by psychology alone. The purpose is to examine observable behaviour and ask whether recurring political decisions become easier to understand when we consider the emotional functions those decisions may also be serving. Incorrigible Myths is published in Canada as independent public-interest commentary and analysis, protected by the freedoms of thought, belief, opinion and expression recognized under Section 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. I begin many of these long-form analyses with Socrates and Plato for a reason, and over time I have come to think of it almost as a small prayer before entering the noise. Socrates reminds me that examining another person’s behaviour is considerably easier than examining the assumptions through which we interpret it, while Plato reminds me that the most visible performance in front of us may still be only the shadow of a deeper mechanism operating behind it. Socrates believed that a meaningful life requires us to question what we are told and examine how we think. Plato approached the same problem through the allegory of the cave, where people exposed only to shadows for long enough eventually began to mistake those shadows for reality. Political coverage often stops at the shadow. Trump repeatedly threatens, insults an ally, announces another tariff, declares victory, invents another enemy or escalates a confrontation, and the public conversation immediately divides into familiar categories: strong or weak, brilliant or stupid, strategy or chaos, victory or humiliation. Those categories can describe what the behaviour looks like without explaining what keeps producing it. These pages are a reference point for understanding the behavioural mechanisms I will examine throughout LIABILITY, and for asking a more useful question than simply wondering why Trump cannot stop being Trump. The analysis in this piece is informed by sustained study of human behaviour, personality dynamics and the work of researchers and writers including Professor Sam Vaknin, whose research-based literature, Malignant Self-Love provides a useful vocabulary for examining external reinforcement, compensatory behaviour, outward attribution of blame and self-defeating patterns. I use those ideas as an interpretive lens, then test them against observable behaviour, documented consequences and mainstream psychological research. Incorrigible Myths is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. That distinction allows us to ask a far more useful question than whether Trump is simply irrational. This episode is deliberately dense because the subject is dense. I have included just three marked pages from Sam Vaknin’s Malignant Self-Love, underlining and pointing to a handful of concepts that help explain why certain patterns can become remarkably resistant to correction: the construction of the False Self, confabulated narrative, dependence on external reinforcement, threats to self-worth, and the difficulty of allowing reality to revise the internal story. These pages are not presented as a diagnosis of Donald Trump. They are a reference point for understanding the behavioural mechanisms I will examine throughout LIABILITY, and for asking a more useful question than simply wondering why Trump cannot stop being Trump. I suspect this presidency will be studied with extraordinary intensity by historians, political scientists and psychologists long after the current headlines have disappeared, because the person occupying the most consequential political office in the world is simultaneously giving us an unusually visible case study in power, personality, incentives and institutional response. In some sense, I am simply organizing the material while we are still living through it. The purpose is not merely to understand one man; it is to understand the conditions that produce, reward and protect this style of leadership so that future societies become better at recognizing it. If this era teaches us anything, it should be that societies need to become better at recognizing the difference between power that is understood and power that is constantly being performed. That is why the contrast with Mark Carney is worth studying. Carney does not need to dominate every exchange to demonstrate leverage; he appears to understand that power is often most effective when it is measured, informed and patient. The difference is not simply personality. It is the difference between understanding power and needing constantly to display it. Future history books should not merely document what Trump did. They should help explain why so many people mistook performance for strength, and how the next generation can become educated enough to recognize the difference before the consequences become this expensive. What if the behaviour is serving a function? What if escalation can restore the feeling of strength even when escalation weakens the strategic position? What if outrage can provide reinforcement even when the attention is overwhelmingly negative? What if blaming an external opponent protects an internal narrative while making self-correction harder? What if a decision can therefore succeed at regulating the individual while simultaneously damaging the interests of the country responsible for carrying it out? We do not need access to Trump’s private thoughts to investigate those possibilities. We have his public decisions, the language surrounding them, the reactions they produce and the measurable consequences that follow. From Iran since February to Canada in August, enough of those consequences have accumulated that the pattern deserves examination. Because the most alarming possibility is not that the behaviour makes no sense. It is that the behaviour may begin making considerably more sense once we understand what it appears to be regulating. Thanks for reading Incorrigible Myths! This post is public so feel free to share it. 1. The Maintenance Manual: There are many ways human beings respond when reality refuses to cooperate with expectation, but two broad directions are particularly useful for understanding what follows. The first is internal regulation. A person experiences disappointment,

  5. 5d ago

    Distraction

    Wednesday, August 26, 2026, 9:30 PM Pacific Time. This is not the time to know less, it’s the time to understand more. A distraction does not have to be false. It only has to consume enough of your attention that something more consequential becomes harder to see. You are listening to Incorrigible Myths, an independent public-interest publication built around current affairs, human behaviour and pattern recognition through long-form analysis. The purpose here is not to dismiss every headline as manipulation, nor to suggest that wars, immigration, trafficking, tariffs or geopolitical confrontations are somehow imaginary. The purpose is to examine what happens when a political system becomes so saturated with spectacle that citizens are repeatedly asked to process one emergency before they have understood the consequences of the previous one. Incorrigible Myths is published in Canada as independent public-interest commentary and analysis, protected by the freedoms of thought, belief, opinion and expression recognized under Section 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. I begin many of these long-form analyses with Socrates and Plato for a reason, and over time I have come to think of it almost as a small prayer: a deliberate reminder that confusion is not new, certainty is not the same as knowledge, and the human tendency to mistake what is immediately visible for what is actually true existed long before television panels, social-media feeds and algorithmic outrage. Socrates believed that a meaningful life requires us to question what we are told and examine how we think. Plato approached the same problem through the allegory of the cave, where people exposed only to shadows for long enough eventually began to mistake those shadows for reality. Modern politics has faster graphics, better cameras, louder microphones and distribution systems capable of placing the same emotional provocation in front of tens of millions of people within minutes. The vulnerability Plato described, however, remains recognizable. If attention is repeatedly directed toward the most dramatic object in the room, people can become extremely familiar with the shadow while learning remarkably little about the machinery producing it. For Spotify and Apple listeners, the written Substack version includes the image that goes with this section. It is worth opening because the visual captures the entire problem of DISTRACTION in one frame: what we see, what we mistake for reality, and what remains outside our field of attention. Two months ago, on June 19, I described the United States as operating under an American Chaos Subscription Plan, where the billionaire class burns the furniture for warmth, the conman sells the smoke back to you as patriotism, and the average American is expected to applaud while coughing into a sleeve they can increasingly struggle to afford. At the time, I was partly being sarcastic. After two more months of watching one political emergency replace another, I am less certain the metaphor was exaggerated. I may simply have been concentrating too much on the chaos itself and not enough on the commodity being consumed by it: the product is chaos, and attention is the subscription fee. If you have not read or listened to The American Chaos Subscription Plan, I will leave a link to that earlier analysis at the end of this piece quote unquote DISTRACTION. By then, the connection between what was visible in June and what has unfolded since should be much clearer. I should also tell you where I am standing because it shapes what I notice. I was born in India, lived in the United States for several years, and now write from Canada. Living in America long enough changed the way I understood it. The mythology of unlimited opportunity gradually had to coexist with something harder to reconcile: extraordinary national wealth alongside persistent household insecurity, technological brilliance alongside medical debt, enormous corporate power alongside families still calculating whether they can afford childcare, housing, education or an unexpected diagnosis. None of that makes America uniquely terrible, nor does it make every crisis currently dominating American politics artificial. Losing ground in the Iran war is real. The scandal-soaked Epsten files are real. Immigration is a legitimate policy question. Canada and the United States are engaged in a genuine and increasingly costly trade confrontation. The more useful question for August 26 is therefore not whether these events deserve attention, but what happens to democratic scrutiny when attention is consumed almost entirely by confrontation, outrage and spectacle, while repeated decisions driven by short-term political incentives continue reshaping healthcare, education, taxation, research, debt and household economic security underneath them. 1. Distraction: Distraction sounds trivial because we usually associate it with phones, unfinished work or the inability to concentrate. In politics, however, distraction can become structurally important because public attention is finite while the number of actors competing to capture it is effectively unlimited. Politicians want attention because attention can become votes. Television networks want it because attention becomes audiences and advertising revenue. Social-media companies want it because engagement can be monitized. Political movements want it because emotional commitment helps produce loyalty, turnout and fundraising, while wealthy donors and corporations want attention directed toward issues that affect regulation, taxation and access to government. None of those actors needs to participate in a coordinated conspiracy for the system to become saturated with distraction because their incentives can reinforce one another independently. A geopolitical threat is immediately understandable, a presidential insult can be consumed in seconds, and an enemy requires almost no technical knowledge to recognize, while understanding Medicaid financing, NIH appropriations, tariff incidence or the distributional effects of a tax bill demands considerably more time. The competition is uneven from the beginning, which is why distraction does not require the headline to be false. It only requires the headline to consume enough attention that something else becomes harder to see. 2. There is Always Another Emergency: Consider the sequence Americans have been asked to process: Epstein, immigration raids, Iran, tariffs, Canada, Greenland, Panama, executive actions, presidential threats and almost continuous confrontation, each demanding immediate interpretation as victory, humiliation, betrayal or catastrophe. The individual stories are not imaginary; their accumulation is the larger phenomenon. On August 24, a Reuters/Ipsos poll found American support for military action against Iran had fallen to 31 percent, down from 37 percent in March. Donald Trump’s approval stood at 33 percent, while 83 percent of respondents expected the war to continue for an extended period. Reuters had already reported a month earlier that only about one-third of Americans supported the conflict and that many remained uncertain about the administration’s objectives. At nearly the same time, another confrontation was accelerating much closer to home. Washington imposed steep tariffs on Canadian goods, negotiations deteriorated, and Trump threatened 50 percent tariffs on Canadian vehicles and automotive parts beginning January 1, 2027. Canada responded with retaliation of its own. The language surrounding the dispute has repeatedly emphasized punishment, strength and humiliation, which is almost perfectly adapted to political television because it produces an opponent, a confrontation and a visible display of dominance. Beneath that performance, however, sits one of the world’s most integrated economic relationships, involving energy, vehicles, agriculture, minerals, manufacturing, tourism and millions of ordinary households whose budgets cannot distinguish between political theatre and the higher price eventually arriving at the checkout. 3. Distraction is Not Fabrication: A serious argument requires a boundary here. There is no evidence establishing that billionaires secretly gathered somewhere and manufactured Epstein, Iran, immigration enforcement and a Canada-US trade war to prevent Americans from reading Congressional Budget Office reports. Temporal overlap does not establish intent, and political spectacle should not automatically be mistaken for deliberate diversion. The more defensible argument concerns allocation rather than invention. A real war can still consume attention that might otherwise be directed toward domestic policy. A legitimate immigration debate can still become emotionally amplified beyond the legislative details that determine how the system operates. A real trafficking scandal can dominate political conversation while broader trafficking enforcement receives less attention, while a genuine trade dispute can be framed primarily through dominance and humiliation rather than through the household costs and long-term adaptations it creates. The events remain real while the distribution of attention around them becomes politically consequential. That distinction also protects the reader from another form of manipulation: the temptation to believe that everything must have one secret explanation. Complex systems rarely need one. Sometimes incentives are enough. 4. The Billionaire Architecture: The claim that billionaires simply “run America” is rhetorically satisfying and analytically lazy. Wealth does not automatically prove control, and political influence does not establish omnipotence. What can be measured is the scale at which money enters American politics. Reuters reported in August that cryptocurrency, artificial-intelligence and online-betting interests had collectively directed more than $294 million int

  6. 6d ago

    Reciprocity

    Tuesday, August 25, 2026, 9:30 PM Pacific Time. This is not the time to know less, it is the time to understand more. The Canada-US dispute is no longer only about what crosses the border; increasingly, it is about how much influence access to that border should purchase over the decisions a country reserves for itself. You are listening to Incorrigible Myths, an independent public-interest publication built around current affairs, human behaviour and pattern recognition through long-form analysis. The purpose here is not to decide which country deserves the louder applause after another week of tariffs, threats and abandoned negotiations, but to examine the assumptions underneath the confrontation closely enough that the argument becomes easier to understand without having to inherit either government’s version of it. Incorrigible Myths is published in Canada as independent public-interest commentary and analysis, protected by the freedoms of thought, belief, opinion and expression recognized under Section 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. I begin many of these long-form analysis pieces with Socrates and Plato for a reason, and I have come to think of it almost as a small prayer: a moment to remember two minds who left humanity extraordinary lessons centuries ago, long before any of us arrived to inherit them. My hope is that, with time, their ideas become familiar enough to stay with us beyond these pages, and that we approach their wisdom with enough grace, humility and curiosity to recognize how easily distraction, certainty and our own ignorance can keep us from engaging with what they were trying to teach us. Socrates believed that a meaningful life requires us to question what we are told and examine how we think. Plato approached the same problem through the allegory of the cave, where people exposed only to shadows for long enough eventually began to mistake those shadows for reality. Modern politics has better graphics, faster distribution and vastly larger audiences, but the vulnerability remains remarkably familiar: repeat a sufficiently large number often enough, detach it from the machinery that produced it, and eventually the number begins doing the argument by itself. A 250 percent dairy tariff sounds self-explanatory, just as a US$48 billion trade deficit can appear to provide an uncomplicated verdict about who benefits from a trading relationship. Neither number is necessarily false, but neither can explain very much until we examine the economic architecture that produced it and the conditions under which it actually applies. That distinction has become particularly important after trade negotiations between Canada and the United States collapsed last week. Canada has now announced C$27.6 billion in retaliatory tariffs on American products, Washington has imposed another 50 percent tariff on a similar value of Canadian goods, and President Donald Trump has threatened to raise tariffs on Canadian automobiles, trucks and parts to 50 percent beginning January 1, 2027. The temptation is to start the story there because retaliation is dramatic and therefore easy to photograph, but the more consequential story may be what happened immediately before it. Reuters reported the August 25 Canadian countermeasures and accompanying support package. The question for August 25 is therefore not simply why Canada retaliated, but what Canada was being asked to concede, what the United States believes those concessions would correct, and where the ordinary bargaining of international trade begins to collide with the political autonomy of a sovereign country. 1. Reciprocity: Reciprocity sounds simple because most of us encounter the underlying behaviour long before we encounter the word itself. Someone cooperates with us and cooperation becomes easier to return; someone repeatedly imposes costs on us and, eventually, the calculation changes. Relationships, whether between people, companies or governments, are partly constructed from these accumulated expectations about what the other participant is likely to do next. International trade depends heavily on those expectations because major investment decisions are made years before their consequences become visible. A refinery is configured around particular grades of crude oil; an automobile plant is organized around a network of suppliers whose components may cross a border several times before a finished vehicle reaches a dealership; an electricity grid is linked to another jurisdiction because planners assume those connections will remain economically useful; and farmers, builders and manufacturers choose suppliers partly on the expectation that the commercial rules surrounding those relationships will remain sufficiently predictable to justify long-lived investments. For decades, the Canada-US economic relationship accumulated precisely that kind of institutional memory. It was never frictionless, and recurring disputes over dairy, lumber, procurement, energy and automobiles periodically tested the relationship, while neither country ever approached trade as an exercise in philanthropy. Yet the broad direction was toward deeper integration, first through the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement, then NAFTA, and finally the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement, or USMCA, which entered into force in 2020. The more consequential change in 2026 is therefore not simply the tariff rate attached to a particular product, but the emerging belief that economic dependence itself can be converted into bargaining leverage. Once governments begin operating from that premise, reciprocity does not disappear; it starts travelling in a different direction. 2. What Was Canada Being Asked to Agree To? The first discipline is to separate what has been documented from what has merely been alleged. Independent commentators have described the final American proposal in sweeping terms, including claims that Washington sought extensive authority over Canadian infrastructure, minerals, procurement and foreign investment, but claims of that magnitude should not be repeated as established fact without documentary evidence. The public record remains incomplete, and trade negotiations routinely contain proposals that governments do not publish while talks remain active. What is documented is already substantial. The United States entered these negotiations with legitimate and longstanding complaints about Canadian market access, and its own 2026 National Trade Estimate Report identifies Canadian supply management, dairy tariff-rate quotas, federal and provincial procurement preferences, restrictions affecting American companies, digital regulation, intellectual-property rules and a proposed sovereign-cloud procurement policy among the barriers Washington believes disadvantage US businesses. The report also identifies Quebec’s rules requiring streaming services and device manufacturers to promote French-language content as a potential trade concern. Washington’s position, therefore, is not invented from nothing. Canada protects politically sensitive sectors, its dairy system limits unrestricted foreign competition, several Canadian governments have adopted procurement preferences intended to favour domestic suppliers, provincial decisions removed American alcohol from shelves during the trade confrontation, and Ottawa has considered requirements intended to keep sensitive government data in Canada. These are policies the United States is entitled to challenge through negotiation, dispute settlement and the political mechanisms available under existing trade agreements.The US Trade Representative made its narrower case explicitly in July when it said President Trump was invoking Section 338 of the Tariff Act of 1930 in response to what Washington characterized as discriminatory Canadian treatment of American vehicles, alcoholic beverages and dairy. Section 338 allows the president, under specified circumstances, to impose duties of up to 50 percent to counter foreign discrimination against US commerce. The USTR statement outlining the Section 338 action against Canada can be read here. Those are recognizable trade disputes, but the character of the negotiations appears to have changed as their scope widened. According to Reuters’ reporting after the talks collapsed, Prime Minister Mark Carney said the United States introduced last-minute terms that he considered economically unacceptable and that included curtailing Canada’s ability to forge new trade agreements. Reuters also reported that some proposals touched Canadian culture, language and sovereignty, while noting that Carney initially did not provide the full details. Three sources familiar with the discussions separately told Reuters that another sticking point involved Canada’s effort to extend favourable tariff treatment contemplated for light-duty vehicles to medium- and heavy-duty trucks. On August 25, another part of the dispute became clearer when Reuters reported that Washington had demanded that Canada roll back new legal requirements affecting the prioritization of French-language content on streaming services in Quebec. President Trump disputed Carney’s characterization and said he had no objection to Canadians speaking French, but the regulatory disagreement itself is independently documented in USTR’s own trade-barrier report. The distinctions among these demands are essential to understanding the dispute. A government asking for better dairy access is negotiating market access; a government objecting to discriminatory procurement is disputing how public contracts are awarded; and a government challenging digital regulation is entering a more complicated, but still recognizable, area of contemporary trade policy. A proposal that would restrict which future trade agreements another country may pursue, however, potentially affects that country’s strategic room to manoeuvre beyond the bila

  7. Aug 25

    Decisions

    Monday, August 24, 2026, 9:30 PM Pacific Time You’re listening to Incorrigible Myths, an independent public-interest publication built around current affairs, human behaviour, and pattern recognition through long-form analysis. Through this publication, the aim is to move past the headline and look more closely at what is driving the decision underneath it: status, power, money, political pressure, institutional incentives, grievance, the fear of looking weak, and the very human tendency to mistake a dramatic show of control for actual strategic strength. Incorrigible Myths is published in Canada as independent public-interest commentary and analysis, protected by the freedoms of thought, belief, opinion and expression recognized under Section 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. I begin many of these long-form analysis pieces with Socrates and Plato for a reason, and I have come to think of it almost as a small prayer: a moment to remember two minds who left humanity extraordinary lessons centuries ago, long before any of us arrived to inherit them. My hope is that, with time, their ideas become familiar enough to stay with us beyond these pages, and that we approach their wisdom with enough grace, humility and curiosity to recognize how easily distraction, certainty and our own ignorance can keep us from engaging with what they were trying to teach us. Socrates believed that a meaningful life requires us to question what we are told and examine how we think. Plato approached the same problem through the allegory of the cave, where people exposed only to shadows for long enough eventually began to mistake those shadows for reality. Thanks for reading Incorrigible Myths! This post is public so feel free to share it. Thousands of years later, that warning remains especially useful in politics, where the appearance of strength can become more persuasive than the consequences of the decision itself. Volume can be mistaken for conviction, threats for leverage, retaliation for strategy and domination for leadership, even when the move being celebrated today may be gradually weakening the position from which tomorrow’s decision will have to be made. That is the question running through DECISIONS: not simply whether a leader appears to have won the moment, but what drove the choice, what incentives shaped it, what response it produced, and what behaviour it makes more likely next. Because every political decision does more than produce an immediate outcome. It changes the next move. Note For Spotify & Apple Podcast Listeners: The reporting, research, public data and primary sources referenced throughout this analysis are linked in the written edition of DECISIONS on Incorrigible Myths. The audio is designed to stand on its own, while the written version allows you to examine the evidence behind the analysis and follow the sources for yourself. Let’s begin. For the next 30 minutes, give this your full attention. Geopolitics can be difficult to stay with because it often arrives wrapped in percentages, debt figures, trade balances, sanctions, military terminology and economic language that feels far removed from ordinary life. Our minds were never designed to absorb an endless stream of information at this speed, especially when much of it seems disconnected from the routines of work, family, groceries, rent, commuting and simply trying to get through the day. But the distance is becoming harder to maintain. Decisions made inside governments, markets and institutions eventually travel downstream into prices, jobs, interest rates, immigration, energy, security and the general sense of stability people carry into their daily lives. Even when we try to tune the system out, our phones keep delivering fragments of it until the noise itself begins shaping what we fear, what we believe and what we stop questioning. The political decisions being made today will shape the world the next generation grows up in, so understanding today’s chaos is really about understanding the future your kids are going to inherit. Since the Iran war began, I have found myself returning repeatedly to one word beneath my writing: Whistleblower. I do not use it because I possess classified intelligence, privileged access to government deliberations or some hidden archive unavailable to everyone else; I use it because there are moments when publicly available facts, political behaviour, institutional reactions and economic consequences begin forming a pattern that becomes increasingly difficult to ignore once the pieces are placed beside one another. That distinction has become important to me because much of what concerns me is not hidden at all. It appears in government statements, Reuters dispatches, economic data, court records, presidential speeches, market reactions and the decisions governments make after those statements are delivered. The information exists in public, yet it often arrives fragmented across different news cycles, which can make the larger pattern harder to see than any individual fact. My concern since Iran has therefore become less about one military decision than about the architecture of decision-making itself, particularly when extraordinary institutional power is concentrated around Trump being Trump, whose public behaviour has become so predictably theatrical that cataloguing every contradiction would require its own federal archive. At this point, the performance is doing most of the writing for us: the grievance, the chest-thumping, the threats, the insistence on being seen as the biggest man in every room, followed by the familiar scramble to explain why the outcome somehow still counts as winning. So I am making myself one small editorial promise for the rest of this piece: I am retiring his name for the next few thousand words. Canada has heard it enough, the world has watched the performance long enough, and the pattern no longer needs an introduction because it keeps introducing itself. What interests me now is the pattern rather than the personality label, because the behaviour is already visible enough: an obsession with winning, dominance, grievance, personal loyalty, retaliation, and the avoidance of perceived weakness, all of which raise a more consequential question about what happens when the need to preserve an image of strength begins influencing decisions with national and international consequences. I cannot know the private architecture of another person’s mind, and political analysis becomes unreliable when it pretends otherwise. What can be examined are recurring behaviours, including sensitivity to humiliation, the personalization of disagreement, the presentation of compromise as weakness, the persistent need to frame outcomes as victories, and the tendency to translate political disputes into contests in which one participant must visibly dominate another. Those patterns become especially consequential when the person displaying them controls the executive machinery of the world’s most powerful state. 1. When Power Begins Protecting the Story: One psychological framework that has influenced how I think about this problem comes from Professor Sam Vaknin’s work on narcissistic defenses, grandiosity, the False Self and what he has described as forms of narcissistic immunity. I use that work as an interpretive lens rather than a clinical diagnosis of Donald Trump or any other public figure, because no responsible analysis can establish a psychiatric condition from political behaviour observed at a distance. And even if an entire room of experts could somehow sit him down, explain the pattern in perfect language and place the consequences neatly in front of him, there is little reason to imagine that revelation alone would suddenly reorganize the behaviour we are watching. Self-reflection is not a switch that can be flipped by better evidence, especially when the political environment surrounding a leader has spent years rewarding certainty, escalation and the performance of invulnerability. That is where the word incorrigible becomes useful. Something incorrigible is not simply stubborn; it is resistant to correction, difficult to bend, reform or redirect, even when reality keeps supplying reasons to change course. It is less like a door waiting for the right key and more like a concrete bollard planted in the middle of the road, forcing everyone else to redesign the traffic pattern around it. There is some satire in that image because the behaviour can eventually become strangely familiar. Think of the neighbourhood dog that barks at every passing bicycle, delivery van and falling leaf until the barking stops communicating danger and becomes part of the background noise. The neighbours eventually stop organizing themselves around the dog and start organizing themselves around one another. That may be the more interesting political question anyway. What happens when the performance becomes so repetitive that the audience stops reacting to the performer and begins adapting to the pattern? The conceptual question is nevertheless useful. If an individual becomes heavily invested in an identity organized around exceptional strength, superiority or invulnerability, information that contradicts that identity may no longer arrive simply as information. Defeat can feel like humiliation, limits can become personal affronts, compromise can resemble submission, and a decision intended to solve an external problem can gradually become entangled with the need to preserve the internal narrative of the person making it. That creates a potentially dangerous feedback loop: The pattern can feed itself. An image of strength collides with a reality that contradicts it, the contradiction feels intolerable, and the next decision becomes increasingly focused on restoring control rather than solving the original problem. The restoration rarely lasts, because reality eventually pushes ba

  8. Aug 23

    Affability

    Saturday, August 22, 2026, 9:30 PM Pacific Time You’re listening to Incorrigible Myths, an independent public-interest publication built around current affairs, human behaviour, and pattern recognition through long-form analysis. Through this publication, the aim is to create some distance from the constant churn of headlines and examine the forces underneath them: the pursuit of status, the seductions of power, greed presented as necessity, corruption protected by narrative, empathy that bends around power and personality, resentment that hardens into identity, and the remarkable human capacity to normalize contradictions when they are repeated often enough. Incorrigible Myths is published in Canada as independent public-interest commentary and analysis, protected by the freedoms of thought, belief, opinion and expression recognized under Section 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Socrates believed that a meaningful life requires us to question what we are told and examine how we think. Plato approached the same problem through the allegory of the cave, where people exposed only to shadows for long enough eventually began to mistake those shadows for reality. Thousands of years later, that warning remains useful because political culture is especially good at producing shadows of its own. Strength is repeatedly presented as volume, dominance, unpredictability, intimidation and the willingness to humiliate an opponent, until those performances become so familiar that we can begin mistaking the performance for the underlying quality. A leader who threatens loudly may therefore appear stronger than one who speaks carefully, even when the more restrained leader has prepared more thoroughly, possesses greater strategic room and is considerably more willing to absorb the consequences of saying no. Thousands of years later, that warning remains useful because political culture is especially good at producing shadows of its own. Strength is repeatedly presented as volume, dominance, unpredictability, intimidation and the willingness to humiliate an opponent, until those performances become so familiar that we can begin mistaking the performance for the underlying quality. A leader who threatens loudly may therefore appear stronger than one who speaks carefully, even when the more restrained leader has prepared more thoroughly, possesses greater strategic room and is considerably more willing to absorb the consequences of saying no. Today’s word is affability, which usually refers to the quality of being friendly, approachable, pleasant and easy to talk to, although that definition becomes much more interesting once the conversation stops being pleasant. Warmth is easy when everybody agrees with you; the harder test arrives when interests collide, deadlines tighten, money is at risk, dignity feels threatened, and the person across the table is asking for something you believe you should not give. That is why this is not really an article about whether Mark Carney is “nice.” It is an investigation into something much more consequential: whether civility, restraint, predictability and self-possession can coexist with hard boundaries, economic retaliation and the willingness to walk away, and whether we have become so accustomed to aggression as the visual language of power that a less theatrical form of authority now looks unusual simply because it does not advertise itself in the same register. The question sitting underneath everything that happened between Ottawa and Washington this week is therefore larger than tariffs, trade agreements or the political personalities temporarily occupying either side of the border. What if strength does not have to be ugly? 1. The Rooms That Changed My Definition of Strength: I should begin by telling you where I am standing, because it shapes what I notice. I was born in India, later lived in the United States for several years, and now work from Canada as an independent writer and geopolitical analyst. Living across those environments has given me no special authority to declare that one culture has solved human behaviour better than another, but comparison does something useful: it makes patterns that once felt normal begin to look like choices. Over time, particularly through reading about psychology, behaviour and nervous-system regulation, I have become less impressed by the person who can dominate a room and more interested in the person who can remain cognitively present when everyone around them is becoming reactive. The distinction is important because volume can masquerade as conviction, unpredictability as strength, intimidation as confidence, and submission as peace when the person yielding simply does not believe they can afford to say no. I have watched versions of these mechanisms in rooms much smaller than countries, and I have become increasingly interested in what happens when people can remain approachable without becoming compliant, can maintain a boundary without turning it into revenge, and can disagree without requiring the other person to be humiliated before the disagreement feels resolved. I do not claim to have mastered any of that myself. I am interested because I am still learning to recognize it. The loudest person in the room is not necessarily the strongest person in the room, and increasingly I find myself wondering whether much of modern political culture has forgotten the difference. 2. Before Affability Had a Name: On April 19, months before the Canada-US confrontation reached its current breaking point, I was reading commentary about Carney and sent a message to the brilliant Aussie writer/American history Professor behind IFLA, whose work I had been following. My message was casual, “Thought about you while going through this,” while admiring Mark Carney’s composure, resolve, and the way he carries himself under pressure. I was not conducting an investigation that evening, and I certainly was not predicting what would happen four months later. Looking at the exchange now, what interests me is something more modest: I had apparently started responding to a behavioural contrast before I had a useful word for it. What caught my attention was not conventional charisma and certainly not agreement with everything Carney or his government might do. It was the relative absence of theatricality around decisions that were becoming increasingly confrontational. That curiosity stayed with me, which is one reason the events of August 21 and 22 became more interesting than another trade-war headline. April 19, 2026. Months before the current rupture, I was already paying attention to the contrast in Carney’s approach. There is also a useful confession contained in that screenshot. I like aspects of this leadership style, and the message sitting on my phone makes that obvious. That preference is precisely why the economic claims, historical analogies and strategic assumptions surrounding Carney deserve more scrutiny rather than less. Admiration is not evidence. 3. From The American Chaos Subscription Plan to This Moment: On June 19, I approached the same behavioural problem from almost the opposite direction in The American Chaos Subscription Plan, where I wrote about political systems organized increasingly around grievance, emotional activation, spectacle and the repeated production of enemies. The point of that essay was never that ordinary Americans were stupid or uniquely responsible for the system surrounding them. Quite the opposite. I argued that millions of people are exhausted, financially squeezed, overwhelmed by information, exposed to political polarization and outrage-driven media environments, and repeatedly offered emotionally satisfying villains in place of difficult solutions. One line from that article has stayed with me: we need more regulated human beings, not more emotionally reactive ones. AFFABILITY approaches the same question from the other side. If one form of politics continuously raises the emotional temperature, what does power look like when somebody deliberately refuses to organize every disagreement around humiliation, grievance or domination? What happens when a political leader concludes that negotiations have failed but does not need the failure itself to become a performance of personal rage? On August 21 and 22, Canada suddenly had an unusually consequential case study. 4. The Night the Negotiations Broke: The remarkable thing about the final hours is how close the two countries appeared to an agreement immediately beforehand. On August 18, President Donald Trump announced that the United States would temporarily postpone a threatened 50 per cent tariff on a set of Canadian goods, saying that a deal had effectively been reached. Carney’s response was noticeably more qualified: he said there had been “substantial progress” but that important work remained. Reuters subsequently reported that negotiators were discussing a package that could have lowered American tariffs on Canadian-built vehicles from 25 to 15 per cent and cut steel and aluminum tariffs from 50 to 25 per cent, while Canada considered concessions involving retaliatory duties and the return of US alcohol to provincial shelves. Reuters: Canada and the US moved close to an agreement By Thursday, Canadian Trade Minister Dominic LeBlanc was publicly describing the agreement as “very close.” Negotiations continued in Washington, and the remaining differences appeared narrow enough that the political expectation shifted from whether there would be a deal to what the final terms would contain. Then the structure changed. According to Carney, the United States introduced late demands that Canada considered economically unacceptable and incompatible with the independence it had been trying to preserve. Washington tells the story differently: US Trade Representative Jamieson Greer argued that Canada retreated from element

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Examining how fragile egos and maladaptive coping strategies shape behaviour, relationships, and long-term consequences. incorrigiblemyths.substack.com