Supreme Court Oral Arguments

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A podcast feed of the audio recordings of the oral arguments at the U.S. Supreme Court. * Podcast adds new arguments automatically and immediately after they become available on supremecourt.gov * Detailed episode descriptions with facts about the case from oyez.org and links to docket and other information. * Convenient chapters to skip to any exchange between a justice and an advocate (available as soon as oyez.org publishes the transcript). Also available in video form at https://www.youtube.com/@SCOTUSOralArgument

  1. 6D AGO

    [24-1238] Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC

    Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 4, 2026. Petitioner: Shawn Montgomery.Respondent: Caribe Transport II, LLC. Advocates: Paul D. Clement (for the Petitioner) Theodore J. Boutrous Jr. (for the Respondents) Sopan Joshi (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Shawn Montgomery was severely injured when his tractor-trailer, stopped on the shoulder of an Illinois highway, was struck by another truck. The other driver, Yosniel Varela-Mojena, was employed by the motor carrier Caribe Transport II, LLC (“Caribe”). C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc. (“Robinson”), a freight broker, had arranged for Caribe to haul the shipment. Robinson and Caribe operated under an agreement stating that Caribe was an independent contractor and retained exclusive control over its personnel and the manner of its performance. Montgomery sued the driver and Caribe, and also sued the broker, Robinson. His claims against Robinson alleged that the broker was vicariously liable for the driver’s negligence, arguing Caribe was Robinson’s agent. Montgomery also claimed Robinson had negligently hired the driver and the carrier. The district court granted judgment to Robinson on all claims. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that Caribe was an independent contractor, which defeated the vicarious liability claim, and that the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act preempted the state-law negligent hiring claim. Question Does 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c) preempt a state common-law claim against a broker for negligently selecting a motor carrier or driver?

    1h 40m

  2. MAR 3

    [24-1063] Hunter v. United States

    Hunter v. United States Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 3, 2026. Petitioner: Munson P. Hunter.Respondent: United States of America. Advocates: Lisa S. Blatt (for the Petitioner) Zoe A. Jacoby (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Munson P. Hunter, III pleaded guilty to committing wire fraud affecting a financial institution and to aiding and abetting. A federal district court sentenced him to 51 months in prison followed by three years of supervised release. A specific condition of that supervised release requires Hunter to take any mental health medication prescribed by his physician. Hunter challenged his sentence at the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, arguing the medication condition infringed on his due process liberty interests and that the written judgment improperly included the “aiding and abetting” reference. The Fifth Circuit dismissed the appeal regarding the medication condition, finding it was barred by an appeal waiver in Hunter's plea agreement, and affirmed the judgment, noting that the “aiding and abetting” charge was indeed part of the count to which Hunter pleaded guilty. Question 1. Does an appeal waiver bar all claims except for ineffective assistance of counsel or a sentence exceeding the statutory maximum?  2. Does such a waiver become ineffective if the sentencing judge later tells the defendant they can appeal, and the government fails to object?

    1h 35m

  3. MAR 2

    [24-1234] United States v. Hemani

    United States v. Hemani Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 2, 2026. Petitioner: United States of America.Respondent: Ali Danial Hemani. Advocates: Sarah M. Harris (for the Petitioner) Erin E. Murphy (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) A grand jury indicted Ali Danial Hemani in February 2023 for violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3), a federal law prohibiting firearm possession by an “unlawful user of…a controlled substance.” The indictment alleged that in August 2022, Hemani knowingly possessed a Glock 19 9mm pistol while being an unlawful user of controlled substances. The government specified that Hemani allegedly used marijuana, promethazine, and cocaine. The pistol was located in the closet of Hemani’s parents’ home. Crucially, the prosecution did not allege that Hemani was intoxicated or using a controlled substance at the precise time he possessed the firearm. The government’s case rested on his status as a regular drug user, not on simultaneous use and possession. Hemani filed a motion to dismiss the indictment, arguing the law was unconstitutional as applied to him. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas granted the motion and dismissed the indictment. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal, concluding that a binding regional precedent (United States v. Connelly) rendered the law’s application to Hemani unconstitutional. Question Does a federal law that prohibits the possession of firearms by a person who “is an unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance” violate the respondent’s Second Amendment right to bear arms?

    1h 55m

  4. FEB 25

    [25-95] Pung v. Isabella County

    Pung v. Isabella County Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Feb 25, 2026. Petitioner: Michael Pung, Personal Representative of the Estate of Timothy Scott Pung.Respondent: sabella County, Michigan. Advocates: Philip L. Ellison (for the Petitioner) Frederick Liu (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting neither party) Matthew T. Nelson (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) This case involves a dispute over the foreclosure and sale of the Pung property in Isabella County, Michigan, following the death of its owner, Timothy Scott Pung, in 2004. The property had a Principal Residence Exemption (PRE) from local school taxes. In 2010, the township tax assessor, Patricia DePriest, retroactively denied the PRE for the years 2007-2009, asserting a new owner must file an affidavit. Although the Michigan Tax Tribunal overturned this decision in 2012, holding the PRE remained valid for the estate, DePriest subsequently revoked the PRE for the 2012 tax year based on the same unfiled-affidavit rationale. This denial created an unpaid tax bill of $2,241.93. The County Treasurer, Steven Pickens, initiated foreclosure proceedings for this delinquency. After a final judgment of foreclosure, the property sold at a public auction for $76,008. Isabella County and Pickens retained the entire $76,008 from the sale, refusing to return the surplus proceeds above the tax debt to Michael Pung, the estate's representative. Michael Pung sued, alleging this retention of the surplus violated the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause and the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause. The district court granted Pung summary judgment on the Takings Clause claim, ruling he was entitled to the surplus proceeds (the sale price minus the tax debt), but not to the greater loss in equity based on the property’s fair market value. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment on all claims, including the amount of compensation awarded.   Question 1. When the government takes property for tax debt, does the Fifth Amendment require compensation based on the property’s true fair market value, or only on the lower amount it sold for at a tax foreclosure auction? 2. Does the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause prohibit the government from seizing and keeping a property worth far more than the small tax debt owed on it?

    1h 45m

  5. FEB 24

    [24-783] Enbridge Energy, LP v. Nessel

    Enbridge Energy, LP v. Nessel Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Feb 24, 2026. Petitioner: Enbridge Energy, LP.Respondent: Dana Nessel, Attorney General of Michigan. Advocates: John J. Bursch (for the Petitioners) Ann M. Sherman (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Enbridge Energy, LP, owns and operates Line 5, an oil pipeline that transports petroleum products through Wisconsin and Michigan before terminating in Ontario, Canada. Since 1953, Line 5 has run across the bottomlands of the Straits of Mackinac under an easement granted by the State of Michigan, which owns the submerged lands. In recent years, concerns over Line 5’s safety and environmental impact led to increased scrutiny and legal challenges regarding the pipeline’s continued operation, including questions about Michigan’s regulatory authority and the potential preemption of state law by federal pipeline laws and international treaties. On June 27, 2019, Michigan Attorney General Dana Nessel filed a lawsuit in Michigan state court, seeking to enjoin Enbridge from operating Line 5 in the Straits. The Attorney General alleged violations of the public-trust doctrine, common-law public nuisance, and the Michigan Environmental Protection Act. Both parties filed dispositive motions, with Enbridge asserting, in part, that federal law preempted Michigan’s claims. Separate but closely related litigation followed when Governor Gretchen Whitmer issued an easement-revocation notice in November 2020 and filed her own state-court suit against Enbridge. After engaging in nearly two years of state-court proceedings in the Attorney General’s case, Enbridge removed the case to the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan in December 2021, arguing federal-question jurisdiction. The district court rejected the Attorney General’s motion to remand, holding that removal was proper either under statutory timing rules or equitable exceptions. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding Enbridge’s removal was untimely and that statutory deadlines for removal are mandatory and immune to equitable exceptions, and ordered the case remanded to Michigan state court. Question Do district courts have the authority to excuse the thirty-day procedural time limit for removal in 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1)?

    1h 3m

  6. FEB 23

    [24-699] Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Corporación Cimex, S.A.

    Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Corporación Cimex, S.A. (Cuba) Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Feb 23, 2026. Petitioner: Exxon Mobil Corporation.Respondent: Corporación Cimex, S.A. (Cuba), et al. Advocates: Morgan L. Ratner (for the Petitioner) Curtis E. Gannon (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner) Jules L. Lobel (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) This case involves Exxon Mobil Corporation’s claim to property confiscated by the Cuban government decades ago. Exxon, through its predecessor Standard Oil Company, owned several subsidiaries in Cuba, including Esso Standard Oil, S.A. (Essosa), which operated oil and gas assets like a refinery, product terminals, and over 100 service stations. In 1960, following Fidel Castro’s rise to power, the Cuban government confiscated these assets without providing compensation. The assets were subsequently transferred to Cuban state-owned enterprises, including Unión Cuba-Petróleo (CUPET), the state oil company, and Corporación CIMEX S.A. (Cuba) (CIMEX), a conglomerate. In 1969, the U.S. Foreign Claims Settlement Commission (FCSC) certified Standard Oil's loss at over $71 million, plus interest, due to the confiscation. In 1996, Congress passed the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act, also known as the Helms-Burton Act, which created a private right of action in Title III for U.S. nationals to sue any “person” who “traffics in” their confiscated property, explicitly defining “person” to include an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state. Although every President suspended this right of action until May 2, 2019, President Donald Trump’s administration then allowed the suspension to lapse, and Exxon filed its lawsuit that same day. Exxon’s complaint names the Cuban instrumentalities CIMEX, CUPET, and Corporación CIMEX S.A. (Panama) as defendants, alleging they continue to traffic in the confiscated property through commercial activities such as refining oil and operating service stations that process remittances and sell imported goods. The Cuban defendants moved to dismiss the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, asserting immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). The district court held that the Helms-Burton Act did not independently abrogate foreign sovereign immunity and that the FSIA’s expropriation exception did not apply, but found that the commercial-activity exception was met for CIMEX. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit agreed that the Helms-Burton Act did not displace the FSIA and that the expropriation exception was inapplicable, but vacated the ruling on the commercial-activity exception and remanded for further jurisdictional discovery. Question Does the Helms-Burton Act abrogate foreign sovereign immunity in cases against Cuban instrumentalities, even if the parties do not satisfy an exception under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act?

    1h 32m

  7. FEB 23

    [24-983] Havana Docks Corp. v. Royal Caribbean Cruises

    Havana Docks Corporation v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd. Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Feb 23, 2026. Petitioner: Havana Docks Corporation.Respondent: Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., et al. Advocates: Richard D. Klingler (for the Petitioner) Aimee W. Brown (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner) Paul D. Clement (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) The dispute centers on property in the Port of Havana now known as the Havana Cruise Port Terminal. In the early 20th century, the Cuban Government granted a 50-year concession to a predecessor of Havana Docks Corporation (Havana Docks) to build and operate piers and terminal facilities at the port. This concession, a usufructuary right, was extended to 99 years in 1920, with a scheduled expiration date in 2004. Havana Docks, a company organized under the laws of Delaware and determined to be a U.S. national, acquired the concession in 1928. In 1960, shortly after Fidel Castro came to power, the Cuban Government confiscated the concession, expropriating Havana Docks’ property and assets at the Port of Havana without compensation. Subsequently, Havana Docks filed a claim with the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, which certified a loss of over $9 million stemming from the confiscation. After Title III of the Helms-Burton Act became fully effective in May 2019, Havana Docks sued several cruise lines, including Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., Norwegian Cruise Line Holdings, Ltd., Carnival Corporation, and MSC Cruises S.A. Co., for “trafficking” in the confiscated port property when their ships used the Havana Cruise Port Terminal from 2016 to 2019. The district court initially issued judgments totaling over $100 million against the four cruise lines. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding that Havana Docks is a U.S. national under the Helms-Burton Act. However, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the judgments related to the 2016-2019 conduct, holding that Havana Docks’ limited property interest, the 99-year concession, would have expired in 2004, meaning the cruise lines did not traffic in the confiscated property during that period. The court remanded the case for further proceedings on Havana Docks’ separate claims against Carnival for alleged trafficking between 1996 and 2001. Question Is the legal right to sue under Title III of the LIBERTAD Act tied to the confiscated property claim or the hypothetical, unexpired duration of the original property interest?

    1h 33m

  8. JAN 21

    [25A312] Trump v. Cook

    Trump v. Cook Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 21, 2026. Petitioner: Donald J. Trump, President of the United States, et al.Respondent: Lisa D. Cook, Member of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Advocates: D. John Sauer (for the Applicants) Paul D. Clement (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) None Question None

    1h 58m
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A podcast feed of the audio recordings of the oral arguments at the U.S. Supreme Court. * Podcast adds new arguments automatically and immediately after they become available on supremecourt.gov * Detailed episode descriptions with facts about the case from oyez.org and links to docket and other information. * Convenient chapters to skip to any exchange between a justice and an advocate (available as soon as oyez.org publishes the transcript). Also available in video form at https://www.youtube.com/@SCOTUSOralArgument

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