Supreme Court Oral Arguments

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A podcast feed of the audio recordings of the oral arguments at the U.S. Supreme Court. * Podcast adds new arguments automatically and immediately after they become available on supremecourt.gov * Detailed episode descriptions with facts about the case from oyez.org and links to docket and other information. * Convenient chapters to skip to any exchange between a justice and an advocate (available as soon as oyez.org publishes the transcript). Also available in video form at https://www.youtube.com/@SCOTUSOralArgument

  1. 3D AGO

    [25-365] Trump v. Barbara

    Trump v. Barbara Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 1, 2026. Petitioner: Donald J. Trump, President of the United States.Respondent: Barbara. Advocates: D. John Sauer (for the Petitioners) Cecillia D. Wang (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) On January 20, 2025, President Donald J. Trump issued Executive Order No. 14,160, titled “Protecting the Meaning and Value of American Citizenship,” which declared that individuals born in the United States are not U.S. citizens at birth if their parents lack sufficient legal status. Specifically, the order directs federal agencies not to recognize citizenship claims for children born after February 20, 2025, if: (1) the mother was unlawfully present in the U.S. and the father was neither a U.S. citizen nor a lawful permanent resident (LPR), or (2) the mother’s presence in the U.S. was lawful but temporary and the father was not a U.S. citizen or LPR. The order was issued on the alleged basis that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause does not confer birthright citizenship on such children because they are not “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States in the constitutional sense. Three families challenged the order on behalf of themselves and similarly situated individuals. One class representative is Barbara, a Honduran asylum applicant whose child is due in October 2025. Another is Susan, a Taiwanese citizen in the country on a student visa whose daughter was born in April 2025; her child’s passport application was in progress at the time of the suit. The third is Mark, a Brazilian applicant for permanent residence whose son was born in March 2025 and initially received a U.S. passport. These families filed suit under pseudonyms, alleging that the Executive Order unlawfully strips their children of citizenship guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment and 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a). They seek to preserve access to citizenship-related benefits including Social Security, SNAP, and Medicaid. The U.S. District Court for the District of New Hampshire issued a preliminary injunction and provisionally certified a nationwide class of children affected by the order. The court held that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their constitutional and statutory claims. That decision was appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, and before a ruling from that court, the Supreme Court granted certiorari before judgment. Question Is a presidential executive order that denies U.S. birthright citizenship to children born in the United States because their parents are unlawfully present or in the country on temporary visas consistent with the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a)?

    2h 8m

  2. 4D AGO

    [24-7351] Pitchford v. Cain

    Pitchford v. Cain Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 31, 2026. Petitioner: Terry Pitchford.Respondent: Burl Cain, Commissioner, Mississippi Department of Corrections. Advocates: Joseph J. Perkovich (for the Petitioner) Scott G. Stewart (for the Respondents) Emily M. Ferguson (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Terry Pitchford was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death for his involvement in the 2004 armed robbery and killing of Reuben Britt, a store owner in Grenada County, Mississippi. At the time of the crime, Pitchford was 18 years old. He confessed to participating in the robbery, although the fatal shot was fired by his accomplice. At Pitchford’s 2006 trial in the Grenada County Circuit Court, the jury was selected from a pool that included 36 white and five Black potential jurors. The prosecution used peremptory strikes to remove four of the five Black prospective jurors. Pitchford’s counsel raised a Batson objection, alleging that the strikes were racially discriminatory. The trial court found Pitchford had made a prima facie showing of discrimination and required the prosecution to provide race-neutral reasons for each strike. The prosecutor cited explanations such as the venirepersons’ criminal histories, perceived mental health issues, or similarities to the defendant. The trial judge accepted those explanations and allowed the strikes, ultimately empaneling a jury that included only one Black juror. Pitchford’s counsel sought to preserve Batson-related objections during a bench conference, emphasizing the racial composition of the jury and the county, but did not conduct a further comparative analysis or expressly argue that the prosecution’s stated reasons were pretextual. Pitchford’s conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal by the Mississippi Supreme Court, which held that any pretext arguments had been waived for failure to raise them clearly at trial. A federal district court later granted habeas relief, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, ruling the Mississippi Supreme Court had reasonably applied Batson and its waiver rule. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari, limited to the question of whether the Mississippi Supreme Court unreasonably determined, under AEDPA, that Pitchford waived his right to rebut the prosecution’s race-neutral justifications for the challenged juror strikes. Question Did the Mississippi Supreme Court unreasonably decide—under the standards set by federal habeas law—that Terry Pitchford gave up his right to argue that the prosecutor’s explanations for striking four Black jurors were false or racially biased?

    1h 50m

  3. 5D AGO

    [25-5146] Abouammo v. United States

    Abouammo v. United States Justia · Docket · oyez.org Petitioner: Ahmad Abouammo.Respondent: United States of America. Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 2013, Twitter hired Ahmad Abouammo, a U.S. citizen, as a Media Partnerships Manager responsible for high-profile users in the Middle East and North Africa. Through this role, he became involved with Bader Binasaker, a close aide to Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. Beginning in 2014, Abouammo used his access to Twitter’s proprietary tools to gather nonpublic information—including email addresses, phone numbers, and IP data—about Saudi dissident Twitter users, particularly accounts critical of the Saudi royal family. He transmitted this information to Binasaker—circumstantially inferred through encrypted messaging services—and was rewarded with lavish gifts, including a luxury Hublot watch, and over $300,000 in wire transfers to a Lebanese bank account held in his father’s name. Communication between the two included expressions of intent to “delete evil,” suggesting the sensitive nature of their collaboration. After leaving Twitter in 2015, Abouammo continued to facilitate communication between Saudi representatives and Twitter, allegedly under the guise of social media consulting. In October 2018, FBI agents approached him as part of an investigation into unauthorized access of Twitter accounts connected to Saudi espionage. During the interview at his Seattle home, Abouammo denied wrongdoing and claimed he was paid for legitimate consulting. While the agents waited in his home, Abouammo fabricated an invoice to substantiate this claim and emailed it to them. The actions connected to the allegedly falsified document—including the questioning, fabrication, and transmission—all took place in Seattle. The agents who received the document, though physically present in Seattle at the time, worked out of the FBI field office in San Francisco. A grand jury in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California indicted Abouammo for falsifying a record with intent to obstruct a federal investigation, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1519, among other charges. Abouammo moved to dismiss the falsification count for improper venue, arguing that all relevant conduct occurred in Seattle. The district court denied the motion, holding venue proper in the Northern District because the statute required an intent to obstruct an investigation based there. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that venue is proper in a district where the obstructed investigation occurred, even if none of the defendant’s physical conduct took place there. Question Is venue proper in a district where no offense conduct took place, so long as the statute’s intent element “contemplates” effects that could occur there?

    1h 18m

  4. 5D AGO

    [25-83] Jules v. Andre Balazs Properties

    Jules v. Andre Balazs Properties Justia · Docket · oyez.org Petitioner: Adrian Jules.Respondent: Andre Balazs Properties. Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Adrian Jules worked at the Chateau Marmont hotel in Los Angeles until he was fired in March 2020. In December 2020, he sued multiple individuals and affiliated corporate entities in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, alleging discrimination and other claims under both federal and state law. He invoked federal-question jurisdiction under Title VII and the Americans with Disabilities Act, as well as diversity jurisdiction. The defendants moved to compel arbitration based on an agreement Jules signed with Chateau Marmont, which was not initially named as a party. The district court stayed the litigation pending arbitration but did not formally compel arbitration, as the agreement required arbitration to occur in California, outside that court’s district. Jules proceeded to arbitrate his claims against Chateau alone. The arbitrator ultimately ruled against him on all claims and sanctioned him and his attorney for misconduct during the arbitration. After the award, Jules returned to the district court, seeking to vacate it, while Chateau and other defendants sought to confirm it—even though some of them were not parties to the arbitration proceeding. Jules argued that under the Supreme Court’s decision in Badgerow v. Walters, the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to confirm the award because the post-arbitration petitions, on their face, did not establish federal jurisdiction. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York confirmed the award, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, holding that because the court had jurisdiction over the original, stayed lawsuit, it retained jurisdiction over subsequent applications to confirm or vacate the arbitration award. That ruling deepened a split among the courts of appeals, prompting the U.S. Supreme Court to grant certiorari. Question Does a federal court that initially exercises jurisdiction and stays a case pending arbitration maintain jurisdiction over a post-arbitration Section 9 or 10 application where jurisdiction would otherwise be lacking?

    55 min

  5. MAR 25

    [24-935] Flowers Foods, Inc. v. Brock

    Flower Foods, Inc. v. Brock Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 25, 2026. Petitioner: Flower Foods, Inc., et al.Respondent: Angelo Brock. Advocates: Traci L. Lovitt (for the Petitioners) Jennifer D. Bennett (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Petitioners—the defendants, collectively known as “Flowers”—produce and sell packaged baked goods throughout the United States. Flowers utilizes a “direct-store-delivery” system, contracting with individuals it classifies as independent distributors who purchase the rights to distribute its products within specific geographic territories. In 2016, Angelo Brock, operating as Brock, Inc., signed a “Distributor Agreement” with Flowers Baking Co. of Denver, LLC (“Flowers Denver”) to distribute products in parts of Colorado. This agreement, along with a “Personal Guaranty” Brock signed, included a mandatory Arbitration Agreement stipulating that disputes must be resolved under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). Under this arrangement, Brock, Inc. placed orders for products, most of which were produced by Flowers bakeries located out of state, specifically to fill those orders. Flowers shipped the goods to a warehouse in Denver. Brock picked up the products at the warehouse, loaded them onto his own vehicle, and delivered them to his customers—various retail stores located only within Colorado. Brock himself did not cross state lines while making these deliveries. The business relationship soured, and Brock filed a lawsuit alleging Flowers misclassified its distributors as independent contractors to systematically underpay them, asserting violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act and Colorado labor law. Brock filed his putative class and collective action in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado. Flowers moved to compel arbitration based on the parties’ agreement, but the district court denied the motion, concluding that Brock falls within the FAA’s § 1 exemption for transportation workers engaged in interstate commerce. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed that decision. Question Are workers who deliver locally goods that travel in interstate commerce—but who do not transport the goods across borders nor interact with vehicles that cross borders—“transportation workers” “engaged in foreign or interstate commerce” for purposes of the exemption in Section 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act?

    1h 18m

  6. MAR 24

    [25-5] Noem, Sec. of Homeland v. Al Otro Lado

    Noem v. Al Otro Lado Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 24, 2026. Petitioner: Kristi Noem, Secretary of Homeland Security.Respondent: Al Otro Lado, a California Corporation. Advocates: Vivek Suri (for the Petitioners) Kelsi B. Corkran (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Beginning in 2016, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) implemented a “metering” policy at ports of entry along the United States-Mexico border to manage asserted capacity constraints. CBP officers stationed at the physical boundary line turned away asylum seekers lacking valid travel documents, preventing them from stepping onto U.S. soil to undergo mandatory inspection and processing. These officials instructed migrants to return to Mexico and wait for future processing opportunities, often without providing specific appointment times, forcing numerous asylum seekers to endure prolonged delays in Mexican border towns where they faced significant safety risks. While these asylum seekers waited, the federal government promulgated the “Asylum Transit Rule” in 2019, which generally rendered noncitizens ineligible for asylum if they traveled through a third country without first seeking protection there. This regulatory change prejudiced individuals previously turned away under the metering policy because, had CBP processed them upon their initial arrival, the Transit Rule would not have applied to their claims. Al Otro Lado, a legal aid organization, joined thirteen individual asylum seekers to file a class-action lawsuit challenging the metering policy and seeking to prevent the government from applying the Transit Rule to those who attempted to enter before its enactment. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California declared the metering policy unlawful under the Administrative Procedure Act and permanently enjoined the government from applying the Asylum Transit Rule to class members . The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s conclusion that the policy unlawfully withheld mandatory agency action, but narrowed the injunction to prevent the district court from forcing the government to unilaterally reopen past asylum denials. Question Does a noncitizen who is stopped on the Mexican side of the U.S.-Mexico border “arrive[] in the United States” within the meaning of Immigration and Nationality Act?

    1h 21m

  7. MAR 24

    [25-6] Keathley v. Buddy Ayers Construction, Inc.

    Keathley v. Buddy Ayers Construction, Incorporated Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 24, 2026. Petitioner: Thomas Keathley.Respondent: Buddy Ayers Construction, Incorporated. Advocates: Gregory G. Garre (for the Petitioner) Frederick Liu (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting vacatur) William M. Jay (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Thomas Keathley filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas in December 2019. In August 2021, while his bankruptcy case was ongoing, Keathley was in a motor vehicle collision with David Fowler, a truck driver employed by Buddy Ayers Construction, Inc. (BAC). Keathley hired a personal injury attorney the next day and subsequently filed a personal injury lawsuit against BAC in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi in December 2021, alleging negligence and vicarious liability. Keathley, however, failed to disclose this new personal injury lawsuit as a potential asset to the bankruptcy court. He submitted multiple amended bankruptcy plans in March 2022 and June 2022, none of which mentioned the pending lawsuit. The bankruptcy court confirmed Keathley’s modified plan in July 2022, unaware of the personal injury claim. Keathley only amended his bankruptcy schedule to include the lawsuit after BAC moved to dismiss the personal injury case. BAC moved for summary judgment in the personal injury suit, arguing that the doctrine of judicial estoppel barred Keathley’s claim because he failed to disclose it during his bankruptcy proceeding. The district court granted BAC’s motion, dismissing the lawsuit, and subsequently denied Keathley's motion for reconsideration. Keathley then appealed both of those decisions to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which affirmed the district court’s decisions. Question May the doctrine of judicial estoppel be invoked to bar a plaintiff who fails to disclose a civil claim in bankruptcy filings from pursuing that claim simply because there is a potential motive for nondisclosure, regardless of whether there is evidence that the plaintiff in fact acted in bad faith?

    1h 9m

  8. MAR 23

    [24-1260] Watson v. Republican National Committee

    Watson v. Republican National Committee Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 23, 2026. Petitioner: Michael Watson, Mississippi Secretary of State.Respondent: Republican National Committee, et al. Advocates: Scott G. Stewart (for the Petitioner) Paul D. Clement (for the Respondents) D. John Sauer (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Federal statutes designate the Tuesday after the first Monday in November as the uniform day for electing members of Congress and appointing presidential electors. While Mississippi requires voters to cast absentee ballots by this federal deadline, the state legislature amended its election code in 2020 to permit the counting of mail-in ballots received up to five business days after Election Day, provided they are postmarked by that Tuesday. This “postmark rule” allows validly cast votes delayed by mail service to be included in the final tally, a practice currently utilized by approximately thirty states. In 2024, the Republican National Committee, the Mississippi Republican Party, the Libertarian Party of Mississippi, and individual voters filed suit against Mississippi Secretary of State Michael Watson and county election officials. The plaintiffs argued that the federal statutes establishing a singular “election” day preempt Mississippi’s five-day receipt window, contending that an election is not legally concluded until officials actually receive the ballots. They sought to invalidate the state statute and enjoin officials from counting any absentee ballots received after federal Election Day. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the state officials, ruling that the state law did not conflict with federal statutes. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that federal law preempts the Mississippi statute because ballots must be both cast and received by Election Day. Question Do the federal election-day statutes preempt a state law that allows ballots that are cast by federal election day to be received by election officials after that day?

    2h 8m
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A podcast feed of the audio recordings of the oral arguments at the U.S. Supreme Court. * Podcast adds new arguments automatically and immediately after they become available on supremecourt.gov * Detailed episode descriptions with facts about the case from oyez.org and links to docket and other information. * Convenient chapters to skip to any exchange between a justice and an advocate (available as soon as oyez.org publishes the transcript). Also available in video form at https://www.youtube.com/@SCOTUSOralArgument

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