The ASEAN Wonk Podcast

Dr. Prashanth Parameswaran
  • 4.0 (4)
  • Politics
  • Updated Monthly

In-depth conversations on Southeast Asia and Indo-Pacific geopolitics and geoeconomics with experts covering the same topics you see on the twice-weekly ASEAN Wonk newsletter (www.aseanwonk.com). Hosted by ASEAN Wonk founder Dr. Prashanth Parameswaran. Join us with diverse, leading regional and global voices as we all get smarter, faster about the world’s most dynamic region. www.aseanwonk.com

  1. May 28

    Episode 31: Where Next in Asia Geoeconomics Past Iran Fallout?

    Our guest today is Dr. Kaewkamol “Karen” Pitakdumrongkit, who is the executive director at the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC) that plays a very important role in some of the regional geoeconomic conversations including in APEC. We start our conversation talking through some of the perceptions of current challenges in policymaking, including the Middle East conflict fallout. Be sure to stay tuned as we go through a range of other subjects, including China’s evolving APEC agenda for its chair year this year and what to expect in the future regional economic agenda in a context where Vietnam will be chairing APEC in 2027 as Singapore will be chairing ASEAN. To receive full ASEAN Wonk posts and support our work, consider a paid subscription for $5 a month/$50 a year through the button below. For more on pricing for institutions, groups and discounted categories, visit this page. Note: The transcript that follows the above free clip preview has been lightly edited for clarity and organized into sections for ease of quick browsing. For all ASEAN Wonk Podcast episodes, full video and audio podcasts, along with edited and sectioned transcripts as well as block quotes, will be a premium product for our paying subscribers, but we will include a short free transcript preview and a clip for all readers to maintain accessibility. Paying subscribers can find the rest of the full transcript and the full video podcast right below the paywall. If you have not already, do consider subscribing, and, if you have already done so and like what you see and hear, do consider forwarding this to others as well who may be interested. Thank you for your support as always! STATE OF CURRENT REGIONAL GEOECONOMIC DYNAMICS ASEAN Wonk: So welcome to the podcast, Karen, and let’s start, if we could, on where we are now with respect to the regional geoeconomic policy conversation. You were recently at the senior officials meeting with respect to APEC. Your organization also does a number of surveys on an annual basis with respect to these geoeconomic perceptions. What is your sense in terms of these senior officials meetings and conversations with officials about where the regional dynamics and geoeconomic policy conversations are? It seems like a lot of the focus is around the Iran war and some of the geoeconomic fallout, and very interested in your perceptions about what you’re sensing from policymakers. Dr. Kaewkamol Pitakdumrongkit: Thank you so much Prashanth for having me. Yes I am the executive director of PECC, but just want to make a quick note here that what I’m going to say is my own view: it doesn’t represent PECC’s view of positions. So yes, we just came back from the senior officials meeting in Shanghai. I and my colleagues were there and we had a lot of activities, like organizing some workshops or a general meeting which is our annual conference we do for ourselves and for APEC policymakers. The sentiments during the SOM-2 (senior officials meetings) and related meetings are concerning because we know we are in the midst of rising protectionism as well as energy shocks and also some energy issues – you know, the spillover from conflict in the Middle East. This actually seeped into the discussions during APEC. So we talked a lot about the implications of energy problems as well as geopolitics. But the atmosphere at APEC is very open because APEC is a nonbinding platform. So it’s actually open for discussion and sharing ideas, best practices and concerns. I think I feel that overall, the discussion was stimulating, and people there, APEC officials, are butting heads to try to figure out how to lessen the impact of external factors, external shocks like energy shocks on the region. I think we’re trying to find what would be the collective action that we can put forward to help the region navigate in this challenging time. “The sentiments during the SOM2 and related meetings are concerning because we know we are in the midst of rising protectionism as well as energy shocks…you know, the spillover from conflict in the Middle East.” HOW CHINA IS SHAPING THE AGENDA ASEAN Wonk: China is chairing APEC this year and PECC provides support for APEC and some of these big geoeconomic conversations. Obviously a lot of this is in the shadow of the superpower summitry between the United States and China, and there’s a lot of focus about how the leaders of the United States and China will be meeting multiple times potentially this year: we’ve just seen the recent summit meeting happen between the two countries. Being in the room at these senior officials’ meetings, how do you sense that these meetings are going within China’s APEC agenda, which is much broader than just the US-China relationship? Dr. Kaewkamol Pitakdumrongkit: Yeah. That’s a great question, Prashanth. Yes. APEC, as you know, is the organization with twenty-one member economies: definitely it’s bigger than China and US. China is doing very well on APEC so far. The theme is building an Asia Pacific community to prosper together. And this year, China chose to focus on three priorities. One is openness, two is innovation, and three, cooperation. Openness, the focus now is on how can we show our support for multilateral trading system; how we can work toward a rule-based economic system that make it more predictable, make it more viable for businesses to operate. There is also a lot of discussion on openness about how to strengthen supply chain resilience and connectivity. There are a lot of APEC initiatives that we are seeing headway on like connectivity projects in three pillars – physical, institutional and people-to-people. For example, paperless trade: how can we make sure that electronic certification that could facilitate trade better. That’s about openness. So the second priority is called innovation. So for this one, China focuses on artificial intelligence (AI) applications and also how to promote the interoperability of data standards or other standards across economies. Innovation also talks about how to enhance digital infrastructure as well as workforce digital literacy and AI skills. So we are trying to make inroads as we have a lot of focus on the digital economy. And the last one which just got endorsed by our leaders is called the APEC AI initiative. So it’s about shoring up cooperation within APEC on AI. And last but not least, the third priority is cooperation. So under cooperation, it covers variety of things. It covers sectoral cooperation like on SMEs, human resources, energy, food security, public health, etc. So this one is broad but it’s actually very useful because cooperation focuses on how can you ensure that growth and development in the APEC region is inclusive. So because we have some groups that are falling behind – disadvantaged groups, women, etcetera. So that cooperation will ensure that these groups are benefiting from the growth and development in APEC. NEW GEOECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES AMID CHALLENGES ASEAN Wonk: Some of these priorities you mentioned are important and carry on from chair to chair, like artificial intelligence which was prioritized as well when South Korea chaired last year, or aspirational developments like the Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP) countries have been working towards for a long time. There are also a number of opportunities in areas like trade pacts with RCEP and CPTPP or sectoral agreements, in spite of the challenges we’re seeing as well. As somebody who’s very active in these conversations, how are countries balancing the opportunity side of this relative to challenges? Dr. Kaewkamol Pitakdumrongkit: Definitely. Yes, we talk about challenges…we also talk about opportunity as well: how can we ensure that opportunities are complementary and also how can we work toward more promotional benefits. So in terms of opportunity, yes, we have, for example, under openness, we look at openness about how to support the multilateral trading system fostering the rule-based international economic system. We talk about FTAAP as well…to try to add more value to the conversation that has been going on the trade front. You mentioned TPP and also CPTPP, right? There’s a lot of free trade agreements being signed and being implemented. For example, RCEP…the project that APEC is trying to do is how can we construct or develop FTAAP. I just want to refer back to our state of the region report in 2022, where we had a question asking officials about how do you envision this FTAAP: do you think this could be a standalone negotiation or could we use existing FTAs as building blocks to develop the FTAAP? The overwhelming majority said that we should use existing FTAs like CPTPP or RCEP and perhaps expand them – add more members and that could help us build up to the larger Asia FTA covering Asia Pacific economies. That’s one thing that APEC discussion and also APEC inputs have added value to regional economic development. Also, on innovation, yes, you mentioned about some progress being made so far to China. The there was a plan on some discussion right now to talk about whether we should do something that actually has additional progress. As you know, there was an APEC AI initiative endorsed by the leaders last year. So we are discussing whether we can have some high-level statement like this coming up at the end of the year [at APEC summit engagements in] Shenzhen. Would that be possible? So it’s still in the process of deliberating and discussion. “So we are discussing whether we can have some high-level statement like this coming up at the end of the year [at APEC summit engagements in] Shenzhen. Would that be possible? So it’s still in the process of deliberating and discussion.” But…I think the sentiment is that we need…some message from the high-level people, like leaders’ level, to actually propel the progress of AI so far. And

    16 min
  2. Episode 30: US Asia Strategy Futures in Trump II and Beyond

    Apr 17

    Episode 30: US Asia Strategy Futures in Trump II and Beyond

    ASEAN Wonk: Welcome to the ASEAN Wonk Podcast, where we bring you expert insights and regional perspectives on Southeast Asia and Indo-Pacific geopolitics and geoeconomics. I’m your host Dr. Prashanth Parameswaran. If you haven’t already, do subscribe to the ASEAN Wonk platform at www.aseanwonk.com so you don’t miss our full posts. Our guest today is Dr. Michael Green who worked at the National Security Council on Asia policy and is now the CEO of the US Studies Center at the University of Sydney. We’ll start our conversation talking about contemporary US Asia policy dynamics. Be sure to stay tuned as we also look ahead on other subjects, including what to expect with respect to future US policy in the region and the dynamics we might expect with upcoming midterm elections. To receive full ASEAN Wonk posts and support our work, consider a paid subscription for $5 a month/$50 a year through the button below. For more on pricing for institutions, groups and discounted categories, visit this page. Note: The transcript that follows the above free clip preview has been lightly edited for clarity and organized into sections for ease of quick browsing. For all ASEAN Wonk Podcast episodes, full video and audio podcasts, along with edited and sectioned transcripts as well as block quotes, will be a premium product for our paying subscribers, but we will include a short free transcript preview and a clip for all readers to maintain accessibility. Paying subscribers can find the rest of the full transcript and the full video podcast right below the paywall. If you have not already, do consider subscribing, and, if you have already done so and like what you see and hear, do consider forwarding this to others as well who may be interested. Thank you for your support as always! US ASIA STRATEGY TODAY IN PERSPECTIVE ASEAN Wonk: So welcome to the podcast, Mike, and let’s start if we could on US Asia strategy more generally, with the caveat, of course, that we are in the midst of Iran war fallout and a president who has some of the greatest latitude we’ve seen in terms of policymaking in recent history. You’ve written what I would say is the most extensive book on the subject of US Asia strategy By More Than Providence, and that looks at US Asia strategy even before the founding of the United States all the way up to some of the contemporary dynamics that we’re sort of talking about. With the second administration of US President Donald Trump, there’s a lot of focus on some of the personalistic dynamics. I’m hoping that we can get beyond that and talk a little bit more about some of the structural realities and some of the measures of continuity and change. If you talk to administration officials, they point out that there are still some gains and signs of continuity in terms of security networking with Australia, Japan, and the Philippines, and some of the things that we saw in the first Trump administration like the Development Finance Corporation, some of the rebranded minilaterals like Pax Silica. At the same time, if you look at some of the big broader trends in terms of trade, in terms of values, and in terms of some of the aspects of the policy ecosystem, there’s some really dramatic change there as well. So having long been a professor yourself and also written a book on this subject, how would you grade the administration’s approach to Asia so far? Dr. Michael Green: Well thanks Prashanth. It’s great to be an honorary ASEAN wonk for an hour and to spend time with a CSIS alum. How would I grade them? Gosh. I would send them to the school counselor for examination is the honest answer, but I wouldn’t expel them from school because there are, as you suggest, some real points of continuity. We’re in this strange situation where there has perhaps never been as much consensus on Asia, the importance of Asia, the nature of the strategic challenge from China, and the criticality of alliances. There hasn’t been this much consensus – and this consensus has been around for eight, ten years now – in the whole postwar era, but we haven’t had a president who is as disinterested or almost hostile to that consensus as we have with Donald Trump. So when my book came out, it was 2017, so it was the first year of the Trump administration. And the reviews were all generally very good, but some reviewers said, well, you know, that’s been a fine explanation for the last two hundred and forty years. But now that Donald Trump is president, America doesn’t have a foreign policy or strategy anymore. And, you know, actually, in the first Trump administration, they did. The National Security Strategy put out by the Trump administration was the first to say that our focus has got to be on strategic competition with China and with Russia. Officials like Steve Biegun at state, Matt Pottinger at the NSC, General Mattis, the secretary of defense, and a lot of others really built a kind of balance of power – what my old boss Condoleezza Rice used to call a balance of power that favors freedom – upgrading the Quad, strengthening the alliance with Japan. And the first Trump term gets reasonably high marks in places like Tokyo and the Philippines. Then the Biden administration continued a lot of it. The Quad, for example, which was made a foreign minister’s summit by Secretary Mike Pompeo, the Biden administration made a presidential level summit. They didn’t undo basically anything that the Trump administration done in Asia. But then the second Trump administration turned out to be much more of a departure from that trend. And a lot of it is because President Trump himself clearly believes that he now has the authority and the experience and maybe even the mission to do big things. And what those big things are, it kind of changes from day to day. And so, you know, he’s not strategic at all, he’s extremely tactical. It’s day to day. He is interested in enhancing his ways and means, his reputation, his power, his tools. But what for is never clear, and I don’t buy these arguments that he believes in spheres of influence or that we are in a neo-monarchical [state], I think that’s just basically kind of the vibe or the mood or as he puts it his gut on any given day. So that makes it very hard to sustain strategy, and he’s appointed a lot of people who frankly think that the enemy of America is within. That’s not the best frame of mind to deal with strategic competition from without. So there’s a lot more uncertainty. But underneath it all, as you suggested in your intro, if you look at congressional views including Republicans, if you look at public opinion, if you look at military alliances in Asia, there’s far more continuity than change underneath the surface. And we can talk about how much the surface matters. It matters. But I don’t see us on a new trajectory. I see us in a period of incredible turbulence, but not a fundamental change in the way that the American system is going to be viewing competition in Asia for the coming decades. RECONSIDERING “PIVOT” DYNAMICS AND CONTEMPORARY REALITIES ASEAN Wonk: So another point you referenced earlier Mike is that there’s chatter with respect to this US episode with Iran in terms of “we’ve seen this playbook before” with respect to the war on terrorism and the Bush administration which you were in as well. My issue with that is that the world has changed pretty fundamentally in the last twenty years. We’ve had a war in Ukraine that has reinforced connectivity between different regions, rather than this notion that we were in the Obama administration of a pivot or rebalance to Asia. And in fact, some of the advocates of the pivot, including Kurt Campbell, have actually admitted that these realities are actually much more sophisticated relative to where they were twenty years ago. The US position is also quite different in terms of hydrocarbons from where it was twenty years ago. And the China challenge is a much more fundamental challenge today than it was twenty years ago as well. So how would you sort of think about this notion of the sort of evolution from the pivot and rebalance to where we are at now, where we’re seeing a lot more focus on hemispheric and homeland concerns. When I look back further at U. S. history, whether it’s the Cuban Missile Crisis or the Monroe Doctrine, these things are not exactly new. It seems like a rebalancing of US interests on Asia relative to the rest of the world. Dr. Michael Green: Yeah. None of this is new in a way. I started my book By More Than Providence in 1783 because that’s when Thomas Jefferson sent a letter to the commander of US forces in the frontier, which was somewhere in Pennsylvania at the time, warning that our spies in London had learned that the British were planning an expedition across Canada to find a fast route to the Pacific Northwest and access to the Pacific Ocean. And Jefferson said to Colonel Clark, we need to find a way to get there first, which, of course, was a big part of the Lewis and Clark expedition. It was geopolitical. So geopolitics is in the American DNA even if it’s sloppy and contested and inconsistent. I was actually surprised to find that when I did my research. What was going to be a two-year project became a seven-year project because there’s so much rich strategic debate about the Pacific in Congress, in congressional hearings, among men of letters. And so that’s one of the reasons, frankly, why I think we have to look at the Trump era not as a new unprecedented trajectory in American foreign policy, but a period of turbulence. And how much damage the turbulence does, we can discuss. “So geopolitics is in the American DNA even if it’s sloppy and contested and inconsistent… we have to look at the Trump era not as a new unprecedented trajectory in American foreign policy, but a period of turbulence. And how much damage the tu

    23 min

  3. Mar 12

    Episode 29: Disruption Clouds Southeast Asia Geoeconomic Agenda

    ASEAN Wonk: Welcome to the ASEAN Wonk Podcast, where we bring you expert insights and regional perspectives on Southeast Asia and Indo-Pacific geopolitics and geoeconomics. I’m your host Dr. Prashanth Parameswaran. If you haven’t already, do subscribe to the ASEAN Wonk platform at www.aseanwonk.com so you don’t miss our full posts. Our guest today is Edmund Sim, an international trade lawyer and former official who has advised nearly all of Southeast Asia’s governments on a range of subjects, including navigating regional free trade agreements and the entry of East Timor into ASEAN. We will start our conversation talking through ongoing geoeconomic dynamics, including the state of US trade policy. Be sure to stay tuned as we go through a range of other subjects, including the future inroads we might expect out to 2027 with respect to major powers and also within ASEAN in the regional organization’s geoeconomic agenda. To receive full ASEAN Wonk posts and support our work, consider a paid subscription for $5 a month/$50 a year through the button below. For more on pricing for institutions, groups and discounted categories, visit this page. Note: The transcript that follows the above free clip preview has been lightly edited for clarity and organized into sections for ease of quick browsing. For all ASEAN Wonk Podcast episodes, full video and audio podcasts, along with edited and sectioned transcripts as well as block quotes, will be a premium product for our paying subscribers, but we will include a short free transcript preview and a clip for all readers to maintain accessibility. Paying subscribers can find the rest of the full transcript and the full video podcast right below the paywall. If you have not already, do consider subscribing, and, if you have already done so and like what you see and hear, do consider forwarding this to others as well who may be interested. Thank you for your support as always! FUTURE OUTLOOK ON US TRADE DEALS AND GEOECONOMIC DISRUPTION ASEAN Wonk: So welcome to the podcast Ed and let’s start on some of the Southeast Asia dynamics with respect to US trade deals after the Supreme Court IEEPA ruling last month. Talking to Southeast Asian officials, they had already factored in the potential contingencies with respect to the Trump administration we might see. And as you’re aware, the Trump administration has also begun rolling out parts of what they’ve called a Plan B with various section authorities and so on. We’ve had a number of Southeast Asian countries sign trade agreements already – Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia – and a couple of others, including Vietnam are in the state of talks. As a trade lawyer and former official, what do you think we can expect on US policy in the coming months, and what are the datapoints you’re watching? Edmund Sim: Well thanks for having me Prashanth. I think where we are is in a state of transition, albeit temporary, between what the Trump administration had proposed under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, or IEEPA, and what we have now, which is under a different section of the law. The law in reference to the United States is the Trade Act of 1930. So they’ve resorted to using a section called 122, which deals with balance of payments issues, which historically were a bigger problem before the WTO (World Trade Organization) came into place. It’s under the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). So the president has this authority to impose tariffs of up to ten percent on a comprehensive basis on all imports, which he has done. And he has the authority to do that for 150 days. So we’re in that time period now. The issue and how this relates to the deals that were reached by the various Southeast Asian countries is that ten percent is, of course, less than what countries had negotiated with the Trump administration, ranging from eighteen percent to nineteen percent for most countries. And it also affects countries that had no deal, like Singapore, which was at ten percent. And then now it potentially faces a higher duty because what’s happening is that right now, the duties are ten percent, but they want to reimpose rates that were negotiated with other countries. And so the administration is now working on a way to amend the ten percent in a way so that it applies to certain products from certain countries. And that might involve just pure amendment of this executive order that went into place previously. It may also involve applying a second executive order of up to fifteen percent. And so what you would have is the net effect of the two orders would impose ten percent for some products, for some countries, fifteen percent for others. So the net effect of all of this is to kind of get them to where they were before the Supreme Court ruling came out. But it’s not quite there. So under this authority that he does have under Section 122, he can’t really get the tariffs up all the way to the level that he had under IEEPA. So what that means is that countries that have already deals in place have to make a choice whether those countries press ahead or try to get some sort of renegotiation. If you’re a country that has eighteen percent, nineteen percent and you know fifteen percent is coming, you do face a choice theoretically of trying to delay implementation and just hoping that the fifteen percent would be what’s applicable rather than your eighteen percent or nineteen percent. There are problems with this though. This Section 122 has a time limit. So they have until probably a hundred and fifty days after implementation to apply Section 122. And after, when you get to day 151, the president has to go back to the US Congress to get authorization to continue the tariffs beyond day 150. That’s one consideration, because the fifteen percent or ten percent as it may is a temporary situation. So what that means is that you don’t know what they’re going to do after day 151 if you’re one of the countries that have eighteen to nineteen. So whatever advantage you might have under the lower tariffs, it’s not going to be for that long. Second thing, of course, is that countries that go and try to renegotiate the terms could face potential negative blowback from the Trump administration, I think it’s difficult for some of the countries, particularly countries that were just before the Supreme Court ruling. Countries that had attended the Board of Peace meeting and everyone was supportive and all that, and then you turn around, you ask for a reduced rate. I think that wouldn’t go very well with the Trump administration. “I think it’s difficult for some of the countries, particularly countries that were just before the Supreme Court ruling – countries that had attended the Board of Peace meeting and everyone was supportive and all that, and then you turn around, you ask for a reduced rate. I think that wouldn’t go very well with the Trump administration.” And the third point is that we don’t know at this point exactly what type of permanent solution they’re going to have with regard to the U. S. law authorizing the tariffs. So they’re talking about using other sections of the law to impose the tariffs. So they’re talking about Section 232, which is national security, Section 301 for deals with trade barriers. And the president also mentioned Section 338, which is a very old section of the law, which dates back to over one hundred years. And the key thing about 338 is that it allows the president to post tariffs of up to fifty percent – five zero – against countries which have been deemed by the president to have discriminated against American products. So this has not been used in over one hundred years. It predates the World Trade Organization, the GATT. And so for that reason, it hasn’t been used. But it’s still on the books. And invoking that would mean a major shift away from international trade norms like most favored nation. But the potential is there for fifty percent. So unlike these other tariffs so you have a fifty percent potential authorization. And under the Trade Act of 1930 authorizations, there’s no limit. So 232, he can impose higher rates above fifteen percent. And 301, he can impose rates above fifteen percent. So what all that means is that if you’re a country looking at the immediate implementation of the agreements that you’ve already reached or you’re almost going to reach, do you take what you already have or take a chance of what could happen? And given how the administration has changed the rates and has not been shy about adjusting the rates for purposes other than trade – so for example, the Cambodia-Thailand border dispute and the Trump administration used tariffs as a way to get them to the negotiating table – you have a situation where tariffs can be adjusted at any time, then there’s an understandably great reluctance to revisit those tariff rates. So in the short term, I don’t see any of the countries in Southeast Asia knocking on the door and saying we would like to revise the rates. I think they’re going to stick with those deals. In the medium term, the longer term, the bigger issue besides the tariffs are all the other implementing conditions of these agreements. So for some countries, while all the countries agree to let in more American products at lower rates, that’s going to be problematic in some industrial sectors and agricultural sectors in Southeast Asia. You’re already seeing some pushback on ratification in countries such as Malaysia publicly and then not so publicly in Thailand and other places where there were very strong agrobusiness interests in those countries that don’t necessarily want to see American products come in. And there’s also the issue about signing up to other things such as the [Pax Silica] agreement or commitments to work in the supply chain. And crucially, one

    30 min
  4. Episode 28: Global Middle Power Call and Europe Southeast Asia Futures

    Feb 19

    Episode 28: Global Middle Power Call and Europe Southeast Asia Futures

    INTRODUCTION ASEAN Wonk: Welcome to the ASEAN Wonk Podcast, where we bring you expert insights and regional perspectives on Southeast Asia and Indo-Pacific geopolitics and geoeconomics. I’m your host Dr. Prashanth Parameswaran. If you haven’t already, do subscribe to the ASEAN Wonk platform at www.aseanwonk.com so you don’t miss our full posts. Our guest today is James Crabtree who has held several prior roles including senior adviser to the British prime minister’s strategy unit and director of the IISS think tank in Singapore where he helped run the Shangri-La Dialogue. He’s currently among other things a distinguished visiting fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations. We’ll start our conversation talking through some of the dynamics in Europe, Southeast Asia, and the broader geopolitical and geoeconomic canvas. Be sure to stay tuned as we go through a range of other subjects, including the future agenda for Europe-Southeast Asia policy in the coming months, as well as related topics, including emerging areas of geoeconomic cooperation in Indo-Pacific capitals and shifting views on China. To receive full ASEAN Wonk posts and support our work, consider a paid subscription for $5 a month/$50 a year through the button below. For more on pricing for institutions, groups and discounted categories, visit this page. Note: The transcript that follows the above free clip preview has been lightly edited for clarity and organized into sections for ease of quick browsing. For all ASEAN Wonk Podcast episodes, full video and audio podcasts, along with edited and sectioned transcripts as well as block quotes, will be a premium product for our paying subscribers, but we will include a short free transcript preview and a clip for all readers to maintain accessibility. Paying subscribers can find the rest of the full transcript and the full video podcast right below the paywall. If you have not already, do consider subscribing, and, if you have already done so and like what you see and hear, do consider forwarding this to others as well who may be interested. Thank you for your support as always! EUROPE’S GEOECONOMIC DIVERSIFICATION AND SOUTHEAST ASIA ASEAN Wonk: So welcome to the podcast James. And let’s start, if we can, on the series of geoeconomic deals that we’re seeing coming out of Europe over the past year. We’ve seen just recently deals coming out with India. There’s one with Mercosur. If we go a little bit further back, we’re seeing a number of Southeast Asia negotiations as well, including with Indonesia, which even some officials admitted they didn’t really see coming because it had been going along for quite a while. How do you see this geoeconomic momentum fitting into where Europe sees its role, not just in Southeast Asia, but also the Indo-Pacific and globally? Southeast Asia is Europe’s third largest trade market after the US and China, but to what extent are some of the dynamics new here? James Crabtree: Well so thanks very much for having me. You know, as with almost everything in life at the moment, it comes down to the Trump factor, which is that Europe has a kind of geopolitical crisis on its hands in as much as since the end of the Second World War. It has had a very close relationship with the United States and, to put it mildly, that relationship is a bit rocky now. And so it’s looking for new friends. What India would call a policy of multialignment is now something that Europe is trying to do. It’s trying to hedge and diversify. And so if you look at what does that look like, then Latin America, the Mercosur deal, has been on the cards for an awfully long time, but is now to some greater or lesser degree being signed and will come into force. There was a little bit of a hiccup because of a kind of c**k-up in the European Parliament, but I think the sense is that they’ll get over that and that will come into force. Ursula von der Leyen was recently in the Middle East trying to do a little bit of Middle East diplomacy. And then the big one is India which we’ll talk about in a minute, the EU India free trade agreement which happened recently. And so I think as is true with many other countries – in India, in Southeast Asia and elsewhere – a world in which the United States is less reliable and more coercive is one where traditional U. S. allies and partners have to look around and see what else is out there. And in a sense, it’s no more complicated than that. Europe is looking for new friends both at the kind of geoeconomic level, but also at the geostrategic level and it’s trying to build what it can to make up for what it’s lost in terms of this newly unreliable relationship with Washington. EUROPE AS AN INDEPENDENT POLE IN MULTIPOLAR CALCULATIONS ASEAN Wonk: And just to follow-up on that quickly. We’ve seen some European officials try to make the case that in this current geopolitical and geoeconomic landscape, countries and regions need to be thinking about Europe and the European Union as an independent pole or actor, not the archaic notion of the traditional transatlantic relationship where Europe is thought of as mostly an economic partner, not really a security partner. To what extent do you find this is a credible argument to make today and how do you see countries and actors rethinking how they are seeing Europe as an actor? James Crabtree: I think it’s almost the other way around: I think the partners got there before the Europeans. So the line that you’re quoting that Europe is an independent pole in a multipolar order is not actually a line from a European, it’s a line from Dr. Jaishankar, the Indian external affairs minister as I think you probably know. And in a sense I think that India for instance has looked at Europe for a long time – I mean for at least the last five years – and thought that in the world in which we’re heading form then we need to treat Europe as a as a pole on its own that is separate from the United States and other relationships. And I think in a funny way, it’s almost taken Trump for the Europeans – I mean, maybe not the French – but for many of the rest of the Europeans who are pretty strongly Atlanticist to kind of make a psychological break with the United States to some greater or lesser extent. We don’t know what this will look like in the medium to long term, but for now anyway. And I think here, Europe has a strong story to tell, maybe stronger than it realizes. As in, if you’re sitting in Malaysia or Indonesia or Singapore and you’re thinking about, okay, the US is less reliable: what are our diversification plays? Then you have Northeast Asia, the advanced democracies of Asia, you have India, you have the Middle East, Canada maybe, but really Europe is one of the big opportunities that any country that is looking to hedge and diversify would look to. To be fair, Europe is geopolitically declining relatively speaking, but it is still full of rich technologically advanced nations. Europe is also rearming. It’s spending a lot more in its military. And therefore an argument that I’ve been making for the last two years really is that the story that Europe can tell about itself is very different post Ukraine than before Ukraine. The notion that Europe was this sort of slightly peculiar postmodern trading conglomeration that didn’t have anything to say in terms of hard security, well, it’s not really true anymore. No – this is a continent and a European apparatus that has been at the very forefront of the most important military conflict in the world that has been raising money to fund that conflict that has been trying to manage geopolitical relationships around that conflict. “And therefore an argument that I’ve been making for the last two years really is that the story that Europe can tell about itself is very different post-Ukraine than before Ukraine. The notion that Europe was this sort of slightly peculiar postmodern trading conglomeration that didn’t have anything to say in terms of hard security, well, it’s not really true anymore.” And so if you take Europe – not just Brussels, but within Europe, you have four or five of the world’s most capable middle powers. So the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Poland, Ukraine itself, and then if you add Turkey into the mix as a NATO member, that’s six serious global middle powers. Not major powers in the sense of China, Russia, India, but capable military middle powers. And I think if you add that together, then in a sense that is why India would say that Europe is a pole in a multipolar order. And I think it’s actually been the Europeans that have been slow to tell that story about themselves and only lately have kind of caught up with the way some of the rest of the world has viewed them. EUROPE AND THE GLOBAL MIDDLE POWER CONVERSATION ASEAN Wonk: The other piece of that is the changing geopolitical perspective not just in Europe, but also within European countries as well. It’s difficult to get away from the remarks of Canadian prime Minister Mark Carney at Davos and his notion of a moment of rupture and the need for middle powers to collaborate, and I agree with what you said earlier that parts of the region, including Southeast Asia, have been ahead of this conversation already. But to what extent do you think Europe fits with this middle power conversation? Because as we both know, even with the term middle power, there’s ambivalence in some capitals about using the term and accepting a hierarchy of powers. And within that, are you seeing changing notions within Europe about how to think about its own geopolitical and geoeconomic map and diversifying more globally? James Crabtree: Well I think if you look at the Europe India event that happened recently at the Brussels level then that moment was in a sense a pan-European moment. And so some of these agreements happen at the Brussels leve

    24 min

  5. 12/23/2025

    Episode 27: 2026 US China Flux Between APEC, G20 and Beyond

    Our guest today is Matthew Goodman, who previously worked on preparations for G-20, APEC and the East Asia Summit at the National Security Council and held various roles in government, think tanks, as well as the private sector. We’ll start our conversation talking about a number of geoeconomic developments, including US tariff deals and the regional economic agenda. Be sure to stay tuned as we go through a range of forthcoming developments as well into 2026, including on China’s hosting of APEC in 2026 and the U.S. hosting of G-20. To receive full ASEAN Wonk posts and support our work, consider a paid subscription for $5 a month/$50 a year through the button below. For more on pricing for institutions, groups and discounted categories, visit this page. Note: The transcript that follows the above free clip preview has been lightly edited for clarity and organized into sections for ease of quick browsing. For all ASEAN Wonk Podcast episodes, full video and audio podcasts, along with edited and sectioned transcripts as well as block quotes, will be a premium product for our paying subscribers, but we will include a short free transcript preview and a clip for all readers to maintain accessibility. Paying subscribers can find the rest of the full transcript and the full video podcast right below the paywall. If you have not already, do consider subscribing, and, if you have already done so and like what you see and hear, do consider forwarding this to others as well who may be interested. Thank you for your support as always! 2026 TRADE DEAL FUTURES AND INDO-PACIFIC IMPLICATIONS ASEAN Wonk: Welcome to the podcast, Matt, and let’s start with the elephant in the room which is U.S. tariff policy and the deals we’ve seen. We’ve seen some of the details publicized in terms of frameworks or statements for countries like Malaysia and Cambodia, but we also have ongoing Supreme Court decisions and proceedings that are coming out within the US as well. And the administration I understand has lined up a Plan B of sorts with various section authorities depending on where this goes. What do you think are the various scenarios that policymakers and observers should be thinking about headed into 2026? Matt Goodman: Thanks Prashanth. It’s great to be here and happy to talk about these rapidly moving issues. So the first caveat I’m going to say is that it’s really hard to analyze this stuff, let alone predict it. Because that’s sort of a hallmark of the Trump approach, especially in his second term of being kind of maybe deliberately unpredictable and uncertain in his approach. And we’ll talk about this probably some more without a really coherent strategy. So this is really a question of pattern recognition as opposed to real policy analysis. I think that’s what you have to bring to these kinds of kinds of conversations. And I would say that we now know that President Trump 2.0 is obsessed and focused singularly on issues around trade and tariffs. He’s been doing a frantic set of actions to put tariffs on here or tariffs on there on sectors, on countries, and using that to some extent as leverage to negotiate all these deals. And these deals have some interesting components, which we can talk about. But I think one of the things you touched on is, there’s a lot of uncertainty around them and how real they are and how much they’re actually going be implemented the way they’re written – to the extent they are written because some of them are not written down. And so this is just a pattern of behavior and action that is fast moving, uncertain, and really different from some of the more predictable things we’ve seen in the past in Washington, including Trump 1.0 where it was a little more predictable. ECONOMIC STATECRAFT & EVOLVING INDO-PACIFIC STAKES ASEAN Wonk: Right. And just to follow-up quickly on that in terms of how this fits into the broader notion of U. S. economic statecraft. In some of these agreements, we’re seeing things like purchases of certain U. S. goods, products and services, whether it’s LNG or aircraft. But there are other provisions that are more strategic about digital taxes and policies against U. S. companies, and provisions about the implications if countries negotiate agreements with others. One regional official I spoke to jokingly characterized this as unfriendly shoring, relative to friendshoring, allied shoring and nearshoring that we heard about from previous administrations. I guess the broader question from all of this is how this factors into broader U.S. policy beyond just President Trump, given that there’s work and thinking going into these agreements from the people and bureaucracies around him. Matt Goodman: Yeah. A really good set of questions. First of all, one point I often make is that there’s Donald Trump and then there’s the Trump administration. I mean, those are really, in a way, two different things. There is always the president’s view which has been important in administrations. But in this case, he’s got a unique perspective and unique set of interests and priorities. He has unusual power over his own administration and broadly over Washington. And so when you look at what he’s interested in and doing, you have to somewhat maybe distinguish that from what the Trump administration is doing. And, I think, in descending order, what Donald Trump cares about is the big announcement, the ability to sort of say I’ve done some big deal that I’m sort of a big deal maker, and I’ve made some announcement that I can tweet or post at 2am with capital letters. That’s kind of what you start with. I think to the extent he’s really concerned about policy, he clearly doesn’t like trade imbalances and wants to try to use his superpower of tariffs to bring those down. And then there is this sort of reindustrialization and reshoring and trying to rebuild a kind of manufacturing capability here in the United States that for a variety of reasons has decreased or diminished over his lifetime. And he wants to go back to an era where we were producing more stuff. And so that’s a real significant policy point. What’s not on my list there is some of the things that have now appeared, and this is where I am interested in the differences between Trump himself and his administration. Like in the US-Malaysia trade deal, there’s some new interesting provisions there. Ones that I am particularly interested in are the ones that sort of touch on economic security as it were, where Malaysia has ostensibly agreed to align some of its policies – maybe tariff policies, export policies, other policies with the US. And as you alluded to, to make commitments, frankly, not to do things with China that upset the US or hurt the US – it explicitly says that somehow jeopardize essential US interests, whatever that exactly means. All of that is interesting and new in trade agreements. Generally, it’s a sign that more of those kinds of issues of trying to get alignment on dealing with China is going to be a part of US policy going forward. I mean, it’s been a part of successive administrations on some level, but I think that’s an interesting thing to watch. “All of that is interesting and new in trade agreements. Generally, it’s a sign that more of those kinds of issues of trying to get alignment on dealing with China is going to be a part of US policy going forward.” And then it gets to the question that the point that I made at the beginning of this long response is that Donald Trump doesn’t seem so interested in those issues. I mean, he’s interested in doing more commercial deals and getting the big announcement, maybe in pulling in some investment here to the US. But he doesn’t seem as interested in his economic security issues. So it raises in my mind: is this his team? Has he enabled them to move forward with some of this stuff? Jamieson Greer, the trade representative, negotiated that deal, and he may be more concerned about these sorts of economic security and China related issues. And they probably have some sort of blanket blessing from Trump to go ahead with these kinds of provisions. Not that he cared about the detail, but because he’s in a kind of a push me, pull you sort of situation with China and Xi Jinping. And he wants to show that we’re being tough. And when China’s threatening us on rare earths, that we can do other things to get at them. So at least for now, Trump is endorsing the idea of moving forward with some of these efforts to align allies and partners like Malaysia, which, by the way, the US has had not easy relations with over many years on many issues. So it’s interesting that Malaysia went so far to respond on some of these issues. But I think it’s an interesting question to watch as to whether this is a very different sort of approach from the administration broadly and from what Trump himself is actually really concerned about and prioritize, which gets to: post-Trump, will some of this stuff continue or not? And I think it will is the bottom line. Not every detail, but a lot of this impulse is going to continue post-Trump. EVOLVING REGIONAL ECONOMIC AGENDA AND APEC ASEAN Wonk: Right. I wanted to turn to some of the outcomes we saw out of APEC from South Korea’s host year. We saw an adoption of a declaration, which doesn’t always happen, so we should acknowledge that. We also saw some outcomes in areas like demographics and artificial intelligence, which are important if you’re looking at geoeconomics in a region like Asia long term, where some of the countries, including in Southeast Asia like Thailand, have actually already begun to age. As somebody who has thought about APEC as a practitioner and then as a scholar as well, how would you assess the outcomes from this round of APEC, whether it’s a grade or a scale of one to ten, however you want to assess it? Matt Goodman: Great. Well

    21 min

  6. 11/20/2025

    Episode 26: Trump Deal Blowback Belies Big Malaysia Stakes

    Our guest today is Datuk Siobhan Das, who is the CEO of the American Malaysian Chamber of Commerce (AMCHAM Malaysia) based in Malaysia. We’ll start our conversation talking through some recent developments, including the wider implications of the new U.S.-Malaysia agreement on reciprocal trade and the Malaysia ASEAN chairmanship. Stay tuned as we go through a number of other forthcoming developments, including geoeconomic challenges posed by US-China competition and prospects for Southeast Asia’s economic story. To receive full ASEAN Wonk posts and support our work, consider a paid subscription for $5 a month/$50 a year through the button below. For more on pricing for institutions, groups and discounted categories, visit this page. Note: The transcript that follows the above free clip preview has been lightly edited for clarity and organized into sections for ease of quick browsing. For all ASEAN Wonk Podcast episodes, full video and audio podcasts, along with edited and sectioned transcripts as well as block quotes, will be a premium product for our paying subscribers, but we will include a short free transcript preview and a clip for all readers to maintain accessibility. Paying subscribers can find the rest of the full transcript and the full video podcast right below the paywall. If you have not already, do consider subscribing, and, if you have already done so and like what you see and hear, do consider forwarding this to others as well who may be interested. Thank you for your support as always! NEW TRUMP DEALS IN PERSPECTIVE ASEAN Wonk: So welcome to the podcast Siobhan, and let’s start with the elephant in the room which is the US-Malaysia trade deal. We’ve heard pockets of domestic criticism on sovereignty and so on. My understanding talking to officials is that they went into this with eyes wide open, and they had to weigh these considerations against the fact that this was a U.S. administration that was taking a pretty tough line on these issues. There was also a preference for Malaysia being a first mover relatively speaking, leveraging the ASEAN Summit and the fact that President Trump was going to be in Malaysia. And also getting past this notion that Malaysia was being left behind in some of the big strategic decisions in US policy and being a trusted partner in some of these key sectors. I’m interested to hear your thoughts. And also, more broadly, what does this mean for companies? There’s a lot of talk about challenges, but what does it mean in terms of the opportunities for companies that are looking at this U.S.-Malaysia relationship more broadly? Datuk Siobhan Das: Thank you very much for having me on and for asking AMCHAM to come and talk on this, Prashanth. Great to see you again as well. You know, this is a really interesting time, and you’re right on all the things that you said there. It was a very interesting negotiation. It’s not your typical FTA. It came to being because of the tariffs that the Trump administration was putting on across the globe. It’s not just Malaysia. It’s right across the globe, and everybody is impacted. And I think everybody was trying to figure out what is it that we needed to do to be able to still engage with the United States. The United States is the world’s largest consumer market. It is one of the trading partners for a number of different countries and an important trading partner. And Malaysia is no different. Significant trading partner for Malaysia. I think it’s the number two trading partner, and the US is the number one investor in Malaysia. So this was a critical agreement to be able to come to. And there’s a lot of US businesses that have landed in Malaysia over the last fifty years. We represent a host of those, and we’ve seen that grow over the last fifty years. A very significant number of them are in the semiconductor field. So it was very important for Malaysia to understand what that market was to its economy. And I think you’re absolutely right. I think Malaysia did take a very pragmatic and very practical look at what they needed to do to maintain that market. This is not to the exclusion of any other market, but it’s with the significance that the American market has to its actual driver of its own economy. it had to really think about it and say: okay – what is it that we need to do to preserve the drivers of our economy? The goals that we’ve already set through in the NIMP – the New Industrial Master Plan – and how do we achieve those goals? If we don’t make this deal, you know, how does that set back our own growth? How does it set back what we want to achieve as a country in terms of moving up the value chain, in terms of quality jobs for our people? So I think the country needed to look at how does this agreement shape what our future is. “If we don’t make this deal, you know, how does that set back our own growth? How does it set back what we want to achieve as a country in terms of moving up the value chain, in terms of quality jobs for our people? So I think the country needed to look at how does this agreement shape what our future is.” But, again, this is not to the exclusion of any other country, because I think Malaysia rightfully so has to diversify its markets. It’s matured enough over the years to be a leader and an innovative leader in the region, and it is going out slowly into different markets. And I think that’s great to see, and we’re all excited that a lot of the investments that are coming into Malaysia are actually using Malaysia as a base to leapfrog or enter different markets that Malaysia provides. I think Malaysia has nine FTAs, and that provides a very attractive base for a lot of U.S. companies to come to Malaysia. So I think the opportunity to get this right was really powering behind what the negotiators were looking for to try and find a deal that could balance what they need to move forward with. So I think the approach by MITI (Ministry of Investment and Trade) was correct to look at that balance. NEW UPGRADE AND INTRAREGIONAL COMPETITION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA ASEAN Wonk: One of the other aspects that I think was a little missed amid the focus on the trade aspect was the fact that we also technically had an elevation of the US Malaysia relationship to the level of a comprehensive strategic partnership. That’s the first upgrade that we’ve seen for a Southeast Asian country under the second Trump administration. Skeptics thought the relationship was not doing well in terms of the optics particularly if you look at the start of the Gaza war. So the fact that Malaysia has been able to get to an upgrade is a bit of a missed point. I think you’ve talked about this publicly that the intraregional competition in Southeast Asia for investments has actually been increasing over the past few years, and for Malaysia to get on the map and stay on the map in terms of the United States and the investment landscape, it also needs to do a bit more. Do you think that this upgrade also does help Malaysia position itself a little bit more on the map? Datuk Siobhan Das: I think there’s a lot that’s happened in the last few months that has raised Malaysia’s profile. I think also there’s been a lot of understatement about the role that Malaysia has played. I think we just haven’t given it the recognition that it actually exists. I think this is where the strength is. There is a there there: I think that the both sides were at pains to really understand what was valuable in the relationship. And I think when they actually studied what was there, they came to the conclusion that, yes, there’s still work to be done, but, fundamentally, there is a level of trust and compliance that can be worked on and upgraded. And I think that’s where the relationship is pointing towards. Malaysia has the potential and is already a trusted partner. It’s got the rules and regulations and it has proven ability to play to global rules, to play to the needs of a monitored environment. It has all the foundations there, and it’s playing within those rules. So I think it’s really establishing the trust and we’re making it more visible that there is that relationship. Whether it is – and this is not an area that we get into – but the security relationship between the US Malaysia is quite strong, but the commercial relationship and the strength of that commercial relationship with the commercial law that’s in place, the strength of the IP laws. Yes. Like I said, I’m not going to say that it’s perfect, but there’s work to be done. We can improve the transparency. We can improve our traceability. And I think that’s what the relationships and the acts and agreements that have come to place will support. And I think that’s what people are excited about in the sense that: okay, we have now clarity. Businesses now know, okay: we’re at nineteen percent on certain things, but they’re in various sectors that are important to the relationship. Those sectors have been given a different level of tariffs that can keep it competitive for U.S. business. Because a lot of that Malaysian business that does go back to the United States is important to the U.S. value chain. A lot of the businesses that are based here also supply the rest of the world. So, you know, that one is less of a concern. But nonetheless, once you’re complying to the United States’ needs, you’re going to be compliant to a lot of the international standards as well. But this is nothing new. Malaysia’s already been doing this. It’s already compliant. It’s already shown its ability to be in that global value chain. And it’s not been looked at and regarded as an emerging market or a third world market. The US businesses that are here use and look at operations that are based here as first world. And once they’re qualified, once a Malaysian organization or a company is qualified to wor

    24 min

  7. 10/30/2025

    Episode 25: Border Wars and Small State Lens in Southeast Asia

    Our guest today is Dr. Vannarith Chheang, who is speaking in his personal capacity and has a variety of affiliations, including as chairman of the advisory council for Cambodia’s National Assembly and Angkor Social Innovation Park. He has nearly two decades of experience serving in various roles including as a consultant for the Asian Development Bank and the UN. We’ll start our conversation talking through contemporary developments, including scam centers and the Thailand-Cambodia border war. Stay tuned as we talk through a range of other subjects, including ASEAN; Cambodia’s strategies as a small state amid U.S.-China competition; and what to expect in foreign policy into 2026. To receive full ASEAN Wonk posts and support our work, consider a paid subscription for $5 a month/$50 a year through the button below. For more on pricing for institutions, groups and discounted categories, visit this page. Get full access to ASEAN Wonk at www.aseanwonk.com/subscribe

    18 min

  8. 09/19/2025

    Episode 24: How Trump Could Shape Indo-Pacific Defense Strategy

    Our guest today is Brigadier General David Stilwell, who served as assistant secretary of state for the bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs under the first Trump administration after a series of other roles as well, including as defense attaché to China and as part of the US Air Force where he started his career back in 1980. We'll start our conversation talking through a number of contemporary developments, including the Trump administration's approach to Southeast Asia and country perspectives on not being forced to choose between China and the United States. Be sure to stay tuned as we go through a range of other subjects, including the future trajectory of US China relations and Washington's approach to flashpoints such as Taiwan and the South China Sea. To receive full ASEAN Wonk posts and support our work, consider a paid subscription for $5 a month/$50 a year through the button below. For more on pricing for institutions, groups and discounted categories, visit this page. Note: The transcript that follows the above free clip preview has been lightly edited for clarity and organized into sections for ease of quick browsing. For all ASEAN Wonk Podcast episodes, full video and audio podcasts, along with edited and sectioned transcripts as well as block quotes, will be a premium product for our paying subscribers, but we will include a short free transcript preview and a clip for all readers to maintain accessibility. Paying subscribers can find the rest of the full transcript and the full video podcast right below the paywall. If you have not already, do consider subscribing, and, if you have already done so and like what you see and hear, do consider forwarding this to others as well who may be interested. Thank you for your support as always! TRUMP II VS TRUMP I POLICY CONTEXTS ASEAN Wonk: So welcome to the podcast, General Stilwell. I wanted to start, given your experience serving in the first Trump administration, with where you see continuities and changes in Trump I vs. Trump II. Talking to policymakers in the region, there's a sense that in the second Trump administration we're seeing the obvious headline makers like the hardening of tariff policy, some continuity on issues like scam centers, for example, and there's also a category of maybe a little bit too early to say definitively on where we're heading on issues like China policy as we build up to leader-to-leader interactions there. You travel extensively in the region and we've actually been in a few engagements as well over the past year in Southeast Asia. What's your sense of how things are looking on the Asia policy front in Washington, as well as the regional perceptions and responses to that? General Stilwell: Well, thanks for having me here. And, hopefully, my perspective adds to the conversation and doesn't detract too much. But the focus has been on great powers, big economies like China, and then from there, Northeast Asia, primarily Japan. We can talk about that later, the over under on that. So Southeast Asia, in general, I think has gotten a pretty good treatment on this. The agreement with Vietnam came across fairly quietly without a lot of drama, which says there's interest in shifting markets and development and production centers away from one main aggressive and adversarial center and shifting it to countries that have lower labor costs and have many other advantages that that the PRC has since lost. So I can't speak to all, but I do know that I was fairly happy with how the agreement with Vietnam came out, and we're going to focus primarily on economic sense. Unlike Trump I, where the action areas were the Defense Department and the State Department, it really seems like there's been a shift away from that more toward Commerce, Treasury and USTR. No criticism there. If you're looking at national debt now at $37.5 trillion dollars, you’ve got to do something to get that under control. And if you do that by pumping up the economy, moving industry back to the US, all the things that we're hearing about, that's a reasonable approach. I would just say it can't come at the cost of those other traditional security centers like Defense and State. “Unlike Trump I, where the action areas were the Defense Department and the State Department, it really seems like there's been a shift away from that more toward Commerce, Treasury and USTR.” PLURALISM AND COMPETITION IN US SOUTHEAST ASIA POLICY ASEAN Wonk: The other aspect I wanted to zoom in a bit on is what we've been hearing since actually a few years ago publicly from Southeast Asian officials about not being forced to choose between the United States and China. My own sense has long been that this is more about the choices that these countries actually make for themselves and how they make them, rather than anything that's imposed by Washington or other countries. And sometimes, as we both know, choices are being made more for shorter-term regime interests, which are not necessarily the same as longer term national interests. You’ve spent a lot of time thinking through the issue of choices. I recall when you were Assistant Secretary, you tried to emphasize the fact that under the first Trump administration, just because there was a greater focus on sovereignty didn't mean that there wasn't room for pluralism and notions of multipolarity. At the same time, you fast forward a few years to the present, you know, just a few weeks ago we saw China with its Shanghai Cooperation Organization summitry in Tianjin promote more aggressively its own notion of what a world order should look like, and the Global Governance Initiative was rolled out. How much room do you think there is for this kind of pluralism and coexistence of worldviews as these views are competing increasingly between the United States and China and other capitals are adjusting their own approaches to this as well? General Stilwell: I actually I love the idea of pluralism. We took some heat over that presentation at Brookings when we gave it in 2019. The mighty David Feith wrote that speech. He wrote it at the last minute because he just had this change of heart. And the folks at Brookings were surprised that we went down that path, but think about it. That was my experience everywhere I went is people were very happy when American diplomats did not show up with a non-pluralistic agenda saying, my way or the highway, you're going to do human rights, you're going to do all these things that we demand of you. I grew up as a fighter pilot, and we're a fairly direct bunch. We don't use a lot of diplomatic language. And one of the first things you learn is you've got two ears and one mouth, and you should use them in those proportions. Well, I suggest our diplomats consider that because I oftentimes would follow one of my colleagues into a capital, and they had just gotten wire brushed and the finger wagged in their face about doing things that were culturally the norm for them. So, one, we have to stop preaching at folks. We need to listen to what they have to say. If we want to guide them; if we want to see change in how things are going, if there's human rights practice, we gently guide them into that without trying to force them. And so it starts off with diplomacy. And we should be teaching these things as we raise our diplomats. On that point, though, the Chinese version of this stuff is unipolar. It's unilateral. It's my way or the highway. You will do these things. And then they go after these countries at the SCO summit. I mean, it's rogue’s gallery. It's countries that really have no accountability with their own populations. And my first experience with this was at that Shangri-La Dialogue in 2014. I went with the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff Marty Dempsey, and Chuck Hagel, a Republican congressman who the Obama administration brought in as secretary of defense. What a great choice. The Japanese made a very strong press for watching out what the PRC is doing with debt traps and all that stuff. It was the first time that there was actually a really strong contentious back and forth between the PRC and, in this case, the US. All the others were hanging back behind the US going: okay, you guys take this one, but we don't want to get splashed. Don't make us choose between the two of you. That's why this headline really got my attention: we want a strong economic relationship with the PRC, but we want the US to provide our security. Now think about the math on that. When you're doing trade – economic interactions and those things – it should be a win-win. Everybody's condition increases. Security is not that way. Security is a bill. It's costly. We're going to spend $850 billion this year on the Defense Department, and that's not even enough. So I've been wrestling with that since 2014. I hadn't come up with a good four syllable response to “don't make us choose.” A very good friend and a former colleague and a former boss came back with “Lee Kuan Yew chose.” I like that one, but maybe a little more something a little less. “I hadn't come up with a good four syllable response to “don't make us choose.” A very good friend and a former colleague and a former boss came back with “Lee Kuan Yew chose.” I like that one, but maybe a little more something a little less.” Look at Pakistan. Pakistan went all in with the PRC with this China Pakistan Economic Corridor, and now they're regretting it. And they want to get out of this bad deal. Well, if I was in charge, I would say, I'm not going to make you choose. You decide which way you want to go, but it's a one-way door. Because if you're going to trade on American interests and American taxpayer dollars and use that to sweeten the deal with the PRC, well, don't come running back to us when that deal goes south as the China Pakistan Economic Corridor is. And the last thing on that, we want to talk about finance, it's obscene that Is

    27 min
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About

In-depth conversations on Southeast Asia and Indo-Pacific geopolitics and geoeconomics with experts covering the same topics you see on the twice-weekly ASEAN Wonk newsletter (www.aseanwonk.com). Hosted by ASEAN Wonk founder Dr. Prashanth Parameswaran. Join us with diverse, leading regional and global voices as we all get smarter, faster about the world’s most dynamic region. www.aseanwonk.com

Information

  • Creator
    Dr. Prashanth Parameswaran
  • Years Active
    2024 - 2026
  • Episodes
    31
  • Rating
    Clean
  • Copyright
    © ASEAN Wonk Global
  • Show Website
    The ASEAN Wonk Podcast

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