The ASEAN Wonk Podcast

Dr. Prashanth Parameswaran

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In-depth conversations on Southeast Asia and Indo-Pacific geopolitics and geoeconomics with experts covering the same topics you see on the twice-weekly ASEAN Wonk newsletter (www.aseanwonk.com). Hosted by ASEAN Wonk founder Dr. Prashanth Parameswaran. Join us with diverse, leading regional and global voices as we all get smarter, faster about the world’s most dynamic region. www.aseanwonk.com

1D AGO

Episode 28: Global Middle Power Call and Europe Southeast Asia Futures

INTRODUCTION ASEAN Wonk: Welcome to the ASEAN Wonk Podcast, where we bring you expert insights and regional perspectives on Southeast Asia and Indo-Pacific geopolitics and geoeconomics. I’m your host Dr. Prashanth Parameswaran. If you haven’t already, do subscribe to the ASEAN Wonk platform at www.aseanwonk.com so you don’t miss our full posts. Our guest today is James Crabtree who has held several prior roles including senior adviser to the British prime minister’s strategy unit and director of the IISS think tank in Singapore where he helped run the Shangri-La Dialogue. He’s currently among other things a distinguished visiting fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations. We’ll start our conversation talking through some of the dynamics in Europe, Southeast Asia, and the broader geopolitical and geoeconomic canvas. Be sure to stay tuned as we go through a range of other subjects, including the future agenda for Europe-Southeast Asia policy in the coming months, as well as related topics, including emerging areas of geoeconomic cooperation in Indo-Pacific capitals and shifting views on China. To receive full ASEAN Wonk posts and support our work, consider a paid subscription for $5 a month/$50 a year through the button below. For more on pricing for institutions, groups and discounted categories, visit this page. Note: The transcript that follows the above free clip preview has been lightly edited for clarity and organized into sections for ease of quick browsing. For all ASEAN Wonk Podcast episodes, full video and audio podcasts, along with edited and sectioned transcripts as well as block quotes, will be a premium product for our paying subscribers, but we will include a short free transcript preview and a clip for all readers to maintain accessibility. Paying subscribers can find the rest of the full transcript and the full video podcast right below the paywall. If you have not already, do consider subscribing, and, if you have already done so and like what you see and hear, do consider forwarding this to others as well who may be interested. Thank you for your support as always! EUROPE’S GEOECONOMIC DIVERSIFICATION AND SOUTHEAST ASIA ASEAN Wonk: So welcome to the podcast James. And let’s start, if we can, on the series of geoeconomic deals that we’re seeing coming out of Europe over the past year. We’ve seen just recently deals coming out with India. There’s one with Mercosur. If we go a little bit further back, we’re seeing a number of Southeast Asia negotiations as well, including with Indonesia, which even some officials admitted they didn’t really see coming because it had been going along for quite a while. How do you see this geoeconomic momentum fitting into where Europe sees its role, not just in Southeast Asia, but also the Indo-Pacific and globally? Southeast Asia is Europe’s third largest trade market after the US and China, but to what extent are some of the dynamics new here? James Crabtree: Well so thanks very much for having me. You know, as with almost everything in life at the moment, it comes down to the Trump factor, which is that Europe has a kind of geopolitical crisis on its hands in as much as since the end of the Second World War. It has had a very close relationship with the United States and, to put it mildly, that relationship is a bit rocky now. And so it’s looking for new friends. What India would call a policy of multialignment is now something that Europe is trying to do. It’s trying to hedge and diversify. And so if you look at what does that look like, then Latin America, the Mercosur deal, has been on the cards for an awfully long time, but is now to some greater or lesser degree being signed and will come into force. There was a little bit of a hiccup because of a kind of c**k-up in the European Parliament, but I think the sense is that they’ll get over that and that will come into force. Ursula von der Leyen was recently in the Middle East trying to do a little bit of Middle East diplomacy. And then the big one is India which we’ll talk about in a minute, the EU India free trade agreement which happened recently. And so I think as is true with many other countries – in India, in Southeast Asia and elsewhere – a world in which the United States is less reliable and more coercive is one where traditional U. S. allies and partners have to look around and see what else is out there. And in a sense, it’s no more complicated than that. Europe is looking for new friends both at the kind of geoeconomic level, but also at the geostrategic level and it’s trying to build what it can to make up for what it’s lost in terms of this newly unreliable relationship with Washington. EUROPE AS AN INDEPENDENT POLE IN MULTIPOLAR CALCULATIONS ASEAN Wonk: And just to follow-up on that quickly. We’ve seen some European officials try to make the case that in this current geopolitical and geoeconomic landscape, countries and regions need to be thinking about Europe and the European Union as an independent pole or actor, not the archaic notion of the traditional transatlantic relationship where Europe is thought of as mostly an economic partner, not really a security partner. To what extent do you find this is a credible argument to make today and how do you see countries and actors rethinking how they are seeing Europe as an actor? James Crabtree: I think it’s almost the other way around: I think the partners got there before the Europeans. So the line that you’re quoting that Europe is an independent pole in a multipolar order is not actually a line from a European, it’s a line from Dr. Jaishankar, the Indian external affairs minister as I think you probably know. And in a sense I think that India for instance has looked at Europe for a long time – I mean for at least the last five years – and thought that in the world in which we’re heading form then we need to treat Europe as a as a pole on its own that is separate from the United States and other relationships. And I think in a funny way, it’s almost taken Trump for the Europeans – I mean, maybe not the French – but for many of the rest of the Europeans who are pretty strongly Atlanticist to kind of make a psychological break with the United States to some greater or lesser extent. We don’t know what this will look like in the medium to long term, but for now anyway. And I think here, Europe has a strong story to tell, maybe stronger than it realizes. As in, if you’re sitting in Malaysia or Indonesia or Singapore and you’re thinking about, okay, the US is less reliable: what are our diversification plays? Then you have Northeast Asia, the advanced democracies of Asia, you have India, you have the Middle East, Canada maybe, but really Europe is one of the big opportunities that any country that is looking to hedge and diversify would look to. To be fair, Europe is geopolitically declining relatively speaking, but it is still full of rich technologically advanced nations. Europe is also rearming. It’s spending a lot more in its military. And therefore an argument that I’ve been making for the last two years really is that the story that Europe can tell about itself is very different post Ukraine than before Ukraine. The notion that Europe was this sort of slightly peculiar postmodern trading conglomeration that didn’t have anything to say in terms of hard security, well, it’s not really true anymore. No – this is a continent and a European apparatus that has been at the very forefront of the most important military conflict in the world that has been raising money to fund that conflict that has been trying to manage geopolitical relationships around that conflict. “And therefore an argument that I’ve been making for the last two years really is that the story that Europe can tell about itself is very different post-Ukraine than before Ukraine. The notion that Europe was this sort of slightly peculiar postmodern trading conglomeration that didn’t have anything to say in terms of hard security, well, it’s not really true anymore.” And so if you take Europe – not just Brussels, but within Europe, you have four or five of the world’s most capable middle powers. So the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Poland, Ukraine itself, and then if you add Turkey into the mix as a NATO member, that’s six serious global middle powers. Not major powers in the sense of China, Russia, India, but capable military middle powers. And I think if you add that together, then in a sense that is why India would say that Europe is a pole in a multipolar order. And I think it’s actually been the Europeans that have been slow to tell that story about themselves and only lately have kind of caught up with the way some of the rest of the world has viewed them. EUROPE AND THE GLOBAL MIDDLE POWER CONVERSATION ASEAN Wonk: The other piece of that is the changing geopolitical perspective not just in Europe, but also within European countries as well. It’s difficult to get away from the remarks of Canadian prime Minister Mark Carney at Davos and his notion of a moment of rupture and the need for middle powers to collaborate, and I agree with what you said earlier that parts of the region, including Southeast Asia, have been ahead of this conversation already. But to what extent do you think Europe fits with this middle power conversation? Because as we both know, even with the term middle power, there’s ambivalence in some capitals about using the term and accepting a hierarchy of powers. And within that, are you seeing changing notions within Europe about how to think about its own geopolitical and geoeconomic map and diversifying more globally? James Crabtree: Well I think if you look at the Europe India event that happened recently at the Brussels level then that moment was in a sense a pan-European moment. And so some of these agreements happen at the Brussels leve

24 min
12/23/2025

Episode 27: 2026 US China Flux Between APEC, G20 and Beyond

Our guest today is Matthew Goodman, who previously worked on preparations for G-20, APEC and the East Asia Summit at the National Security Council and held various roles in government, think tanks, as well as the private sector. We’ll start our conversation talking about a number of geoeconomic developments, including US tariff deals and the regional economic agenda. Be sure to stay tuned as we go through a range of forthcoming developments as well into 2026, including on China’s hosting of APEC in 2026 and the U.S. hosting of G-20. To receive full ASEAN Wonk posts and support our work, consider a paid subscription for $5 a month/$50 a year through the button below. For more on pricing for institutions, groups and discounted categories, visit this page. Note: The transcript that follows the above free clip preview has been lightly edited for clarity and organized into sections for ease of quick browsing. For all ASEAN Wonk Podcast episodes, full video and audio podcasts, along with edited and sectioned transcripts as well as block quotes, will be a premium product for our paying subscribers, but we will include a short free transcript preview and a clip for all readers to maintain accessibility. Paying subscribers can find the rest of the full transcript and the full video podcast right below the paywall. If you have not already, do consider subscribing, and, if you have already done so and like what you see and hear, do consider forwarding this to others as well who may be interested. Thank you for your support as always! 2026 TRADE DEAL FUTURES AND INDO-PACIFIC IMPLICATIONS ASEAN Wonk: Welcome to the podcast, Matt, and let’s start with the elephant in the room which is U.S. tariff policy and the deals we’ve seen. We’ve seen some of the details publicized in terms of frameworks or statements for countries like Malaysia and Cambodia, but we also have ongoing Supreme Court decisions and proceedings that are coming out within the US as well. And the administration I understand has lined up a Plan B of sorts with various section authorities depending on where this goes. What do you think are the various scenarios that policymakers and observers should be thinking about headed into 2026? Matt Goodman: Thanks Prashanth. It’s great to be here and happy to talk about these rapidly moving issues. So the first caveat I’m going to say is that it’s really hard to analyze this stuff, let alone predict it. Because that’s sort of a hallmark of the Trump approach, especially in his second term of being kind of maybe deliberately unpredictable and uncertain in his approach. And we’ll talk about this probably some more without a really coherent strategy. So this is really a question of pattern recognition as opposed to real policy analysis. I think that’s what you have to bring to these kinds of kinds of conversations. And I would say that we now know that President Trump 2.0 is obsessed and focused singularly on issues around trade and tariffs. He’s been doing a frantic set of actions to put tariffs on here or tariffs on there on sectors, on countries, and using that to some extent as leverage to negotiate all these deals. And these deals have some interesting components, which we can talk about. But I think one of the things you touched on is, there’s a lot of uncertainty around them and how real they are and how much they’re actually going be implemented the way they’re written – to the extent they are written because some of them are not written down. And so this is just a pattern of behavior and action that is fast moving, uncertain, and really different from some of the more predictable things we’ve seen in the past in Washington, including Trump 1.0 where it was a little more predictable. ECONOMIC STATECRAFT & EVOLVING INDO-PACIFIC STAKES ASEAN Wonk: Right. And just to follow-up quickly on that in terms of how this fits into the broader notion of U. S. economic statecraft. In some of these agreements, we’re seeing things like purchases of certain U. S. goods, products and services, whether it’s LNG or aircraft. But there are other provisions that are more strategic about digital taxes and policies against U. S. companies, and provisions about the implications if countries negotiate agreements with others. One regional official I spoke to jokingly characterized this as unfriendly shoring, relative to friendshoring, allied shoring and nearshoring that we heard about from previous administrations. I guess the broader question from all of this is how this factors into broader U.S. policy beyond just President Trump, given that there’s work and thinking going into these agreements from the people and bureaucracies around him. Matt Goodman: Yeah. A really good set of questions. First of all, one point I often make is that there’s Donald Trump and then there’s the Trump administration. I mean, those are really, in a way, two different things. There is always the president’s view which has been important in administrations. But in this case, he’s got a unique perspective and unique set of interests and priorities. He has unusual power over his own administration and broadly over Washington. And so when you look at what he’s interested in and doing, you have to somewhat maybe distinguish that from what the Trump administration is doing. And, I think, in descending order, what Donald Trump cares about is the big announcement, the ability to sort of say I’ve done some big deal that I’m sort of a big deal maker, and I’ve made some announcement that I can tweet or post at 2am with capital letters. That’s kind of what you start with. I think to the extent he’s really concerned about policy, he clearly doesn’t like trade imbalances and wants to try to use his superpower of tariffs to bring those down. And then there is this sort of reindustrialization and reshoring and trying to rebuild a kind of manufacturing capability here in the United States that for a variety of reasons has decreased or diminished over his lifetime. And he wants to go back to an era where we were producing more stuff. And so that’s a real significant policy point. What’s not on my list there is some of the things that have now appeared, and this is where I am interested in the differences between Trump himself and his administration. Like in the US-Malaysia trade deal, there’s some new interesting provisions there. Ones that I am particularly interested in are the ones that sort of touch on economic security as it were, where Malaysia has ostensibly agreed to align some of its policies – maybe tariff policies, export policies, other policies with the US. And as you alluded to, to make commitments, frankly, not to do things with China that upset the US or hurt the US – it explicitly says that somehow jeopardize essential US interests, whatever that exactly means. All of that is interesting and new in trade agreements. Generally, it’s a sign that more of those kinds of issues of trying to get alignment on dealing with China is going to be a part of US policy going forward. I mean, it’s been a part of successive administrations on some level, but I think that’s an interesting thing to watch. “All of that is interesting and new in trade agreements. Generally, it’s a sign that more of those kinds of issues of trying to get alignment on dealing with China is going to be a part of US policy going forward.” And then it gets to the question that the point that I made at the beginning of this long response is that Donald Trump doesn’t seem so interested in those issues. I mean, he’s interested in doing more commercial deals and getting the big announcement, maybe in pulling in some investment here to the US. But he doesn’t seem as interested in his economic security issues. So it raises in my mind: is this his team? Has he enabled them to move forward with some of this stuff? Jamieson Greer, the trade representative, negotiated that deal, and he may be more concerned about these sorts of economic security and China related issues. And they probably have some sort of blanket blessing from Trump to go ahead with these kinds of provisions. Not that he cared about the detail, but because he’s in a kind of a push me, pull you sort of situation with China and Xi Jinping. And he wants to show that we’re being tough. And when China’s threatening us on rare earths, that we can do other things to get at them. So at least for now, Trump is endorsing the idea of moving forward with some of these efforts to align allies and partners like Malaysia, which, by the way, the US has had not easy relations with over many years on many issues. So it’s interesting that Malaysia went so far to respond on some of these issues. But I think it’s an interesting question to watch as to whether this is a very different sort of approach from the administration broadly and from what Trump himself is actually really concerned about and prioritize, which gets to: post-Trump, will some of this stuff continue or not? And I think it will is the bottom line. Not every detail, but a lot of this impulse is going to continue post-Trump. EVOLVING REGIONAL ECONOMIC AGENDA AND APEC ASEAN Wonk: Right. I wanted to turn to some of the outcomes we saw out of APEC from South Korea’s host year. We saw an adoption of a declaration, which doesn’t always happen, so we should acknowledge that. We also saw some outcomes in areas like demographics and artificial intelligence, which are important if you’re looking at geoeconomics in a region like Asia long term, where some of the countries, including in Southeast Asia like Thailand, have actually already begun to age. As somebody who has thought about APEC as a practitioner and then as a scholar as well, how would you assess the outcomes from this round of APEC, whether it’s a grade or a scale of one to ten, however you want to assess it? Matt Goodman: Great. Well

21 min
11/20/2025

Episode 26: Trump Deal Blowback Belies Big Malaysia Stakes

Our guest today is Datuk Siobhan Das, who is the CEO of the American Malaysian Chamber of Commerce (AMCHAM Malaysia) based in Malaysia. We’ll start our conversation talking through some recent developments, including the wider implications of the new U.S.-Malaysia agreement on reciprocal trade and the Malaysia ASEAN chairmanship. Stay tuned as we go through a number of other forthcoming developments, including geoeconomic challenges posed by US-China competition and prospects for Southeast Asia’s economic story. To receive full ASEAN Wonk posts and support our work, consider a paid subscription for $5 a month/$50 a year through the button below. For more on pricing for institutions, groups and discounted categories, visit this page. Note: The transcript that follows the above free clip preview has been lightly edited for clarity and organized into sections for ease of quick browsing. For all ASEAN Wonk Podcast episodes, full video and audio podcasts, along with edited and sectioned transcripts as well as block quotes, will be a premium product for our paying subscribers, but we will include a short free transcript preview and a clip for all readers to maintain accessibility. Paying subscribers can find the rest of the full transcript and the full video podcast right below the paywall. If you have not already, do consider subscribing, and, if you have already done so and like what you see and hear, do consider forwarding this to others as well who may be interested. Thank you for your support as always! NEW TRUMP DEALS IN PERSPECTIVE ASEAN Wonk: So welcome to the podcast Siobhan, and let’s start with the elephant in the room which is the US-Malaysia trade deal. We’ve heard pockets of domestic criticism on sovereignty and so on. My understanding talking to officials is that they went into this with eyes wide open, and they had to weigh these considerations against the fact that this was a U.S. administration that was taking a pretty tough line on these issues. There was also a preference for Malaysia being a first mover relatively speaking, leveraging the ASEAN Summit and the fact that President Trump was going to be in Malaysia. And also getting past this notion that Malaysia was being left behind in some of the big strategic decisions in US policy and being a trusted partner in some of these key sectors. I’m interested to hear your thoughts. And also, more broadly, what does this mean for companies? There’s a lot of talk about challenges, but what does it mean in terms of the opportunities for companies that are looking at this U.S.-Malaysia relationship more broadly? Datuk Siobhan Das: Thank you very much for having me on and for asking AMCHAM to come and talk on this, Prashanth. Great to see you again as well. You know, this is a really interesting time, and you’re right on all the things that you said there. It was a very interesting negotiation. It’s not your typical FTA. It came to being because of the tariffs that the Trump administration was putting on across the globe. It’s not just Malaysia. It’s right across the globe, and everybody is impacted. And I think everybody was trying to figure out what is it that we needed to do to be able to still engage with the United States. The United States is the world’s largest consumer market. It is one of the trading partners for a number of different countries and an important trading partner. And Malaysia is no different. Significant trading partner for Malaysia. I think it’s the number two trading partner, and the US is the number one investor in Malaysia. So this was a critical agreement to be able to come to. And there’s a lot of US businesses that have landed in Malaysia over the last fifty years. We represent a host of those, and we’ve seen that grow over the last fifty years. A very significant number of them are in the semiconductor field. So it was very important for Malaysia to understand what that market was to its economy. And I think you’re absolutely right. I think Malaysia did take a very pragmatic and very practical look at what they needed to do to maintain that market. This is not to the exclusion of any other market, but it’s with the significance that the American market has to its actual driver of its own economy. it had to really think about it and say: okay – what is it that we need to do to preserve the drivers of our economy? The goals that we’ve already set through in the NIMP – the New Industrial Master Plan – and how do we achieve those goals? If we don’t make this deal, you know, how does that set back our own growth? How does it set back what we want to achieve as a country in terms of moving up the value chain, in terms of quality jobs for our people? So I think the country needed to look at how does this agreement shape what our future is. “If we don’t make this deal, you know, how does that set back our own growth? How does it set back what we want to achieve as a country in terms of moving up the value chain, in terms of quality jobs for our people? So I think the country needed to look at how does this agreement shape what our future is.” But, again, this is not to the exclusion of any other country, because I think Malaysia rightfully so has to diversify its markets. It’s matured enough over the years to be a leader and an innovative leader in the region, and it is going out slowly into different markets. And I think that’s great to see, and we’re all excited that a lot of the investments that are coming into Malaysia are actually using Malaysia as a base to leapfrog or enter different markets that Malaysia provides. I think Malaysia has nine FTAs, and that provides a very attractive base for a lot of U.S. companies to come to Malaysia. So I think the opportunity to get this right was really powering behind what the negotiators were looking for to try and find a deal that could balance what they need to move forward with. So I think the approach by MITI (Ministry of Investment and Trade) was correct to look at that balance. NEW UPGRADE AND INTRAREGIONAL COMPETITION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA ASEAN Wonk: One of the other aspects that I think was a little missed amid the focus on the trade aspect was the fact that we also technically had an elevation of the US Malaysia relationship to the level of a comprehensive strategic partnership. That’s the first upgrade that we’ve seen for a Southeast Asian country under the second Trump administration. Skeptics thought the relationship was not doing well in terms of the optics particularly if you look at the start of the Gaza war. So the fact that Malaysia has been able to get to an upgrade is a bit of a missed point. I think you’ve talked about this publicly that the intraregional competition in Southeast Asia for investments has actually been increasing over the past few years, and for Malaysia to get on the map and stay on the map in terms of the United States and the investment landscape, it also needs to do a bit more. Do you think that this upgrade also does help Malaysia position itself a little bit more on the map? Datuk Siobhan Das: I think there’s a lot that’s happened in the last few months that has raised Malaysia’s profile. I think also there’s been a lot of understatement about the role that Malaysia has played. I think we just haven’t given it the recognition that it actually exists. I think this is where the strength is. There is a there there: I think that the both sides were at pains to really understand what was valuable in the relationship. And I think when they actually studied what was there, they came to the conclusion that, yes, there’s still work to be done, but, fundamentally, there is a level of trust and compliance that can be worked on and upgraded. And I think that’s where the relationship is pointing towards. Malaysia has the potential and is already a trusted partner. It’s got the rules and regulations and it has proven ability to play to global rules, to play to the needs of a monitored environment. It has all the foundations there, and it’s playing within those rules. So I think it’s really establishing the trust and we’re making it more visible that there is that relationship. Whether it is – and this is not an area that we get into – but the security relationship between the US Malaysia is quite strong, but the commercial relationship and the strength of that commercial relationship with the commercial law that’s in place, the strength of the IP laws. Yes. Like I said, I’m not going to say that it’s perfect, but there’s work to be done. We can improve the transparency. We can improve our traceability. And I think that’s what the relationships and the acts and agreements that have come to place will support. And I think that’s what people are excited about in the sense that: okay, we have now clarity. Businesses now know, okay: we’re at nineteen percent on certain things, but they’re in various sectors that are important to the relationship. Those sectors have been given a different level of tariffs that can keep it competitive for U.S. business. Because a lot of that Malaysian business that does go back to the United States is important to the U.S. value chain. A lot of the businesses that are based here also supply the rest of the world. So, you know, that one is less of a concern. But nonetheless, once you’re complying to the United States’ needs, you’re going to be compliant to a lot of the international standards as well. But this is nothing new. Malaysia’s already been doing this. It’s already compliant. It’s already shown its ability to be in that global value chain. And it’s not been looked at and regarded as an emerging market or a third world market. The US businesses that are here use and look at operations that are based here as first world. And once they’re qualified, once a Malaysian organization or a company is qualified to wor

24 min
10/30/2025

Episode 25: Border Wars and Small State Lens in Southeast Asia

Our guest today is Dr. Vannarith Chheang, who is speaking in his personal capacity and has a variety of affiliations, including as chairman of the advisory council for Cambodia’s National Assembly and Angkor Social Innovation Park. He has nearly two decades of experience serving in various roles including as a consultant for the Asian Development Bank and the UN. We’ll start our conversation talking through contemporary developments, including scam centers and the Thailand-Cambodia border war. Stay tuned as we talk through a range of other subjects, including ASEAN; Cambodia’s strategies as a small state amid U.S.-China competition; and what to expect in foreign policy into 2026. To receive full ASEAN Wonk posts and support our work, consider a paid subscription for $5 a month/$50 a year through the button below. For more on pricing for institutions, groups and discounted categories, visit this page. Get full access to ASEAN Wonk at www.aseanwonk.com/subscribe

18 min
09/19/2025

Episode 24: How Trump Could Shape Indo-Pacific Defense Strategy

Our guest today is Brigadier General David Stilwell, who served as assistant secretary of state for the bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs under the first Trump administration after a series of other roles as well, including as defense attaché to China and as part of the US Air Force where he started his career back in 1980. We'll start our conversation talking through a number of contemporary developments, including the Trump administration's approach to Southeast Asia and country perspectives on not being forced to choose between China and the United States. Be sure to stay tuned as we go through a range of other subjects, including the future trajectory of US China relations and Washington's approach to flashpoints such as Taiwan and the South China Sea. To receive full ASEAN Wonk posts and support our work, consider a paid subscription for $5 a month/$50 a year through the button below. For more on pricing for institutions, groups and discounted categories, visit this page. Note: The transcript that follows the above free clip preview has been lightly edited for clarity and organized into sections for ease of quick browsing. For all ASEAN Wonk Podcast episodes, full video and audio podcasts, along with edited and sectioned transcripts as well as block quotes, will be a premium product for our paying subscribers, but we will include a short free transcript preview and a clip for all readers to maintain accessibility. Paying subscribers can find the rest of the full transcript and the full video podcast right below the paywall. If you have not already, do consider subscribing, and, if you have already done so and like what you see and hear, do consider forwarding this to others as well who may be interested. Thank you for your support as always! TRUMP II VS TRUMP I POLICY CONTEXTS ASEAN Wonk: So welcome to the podcast, General Stilwell. I wanted to start, given your experience serving in the first Trump administration, with where you see continuities and changes in Trump I vs. Trump II. Talking to policymakers in the region, there's a sense that in the second Trump administration we're seeing the obvious headline makers like the hardening of tariff policy, some continuity on issues like scam centers, for example, and there's also a category of maybe a little bit too early to say definitively on where we're heading on issues like China policy as we build up to leader-to-leader interactions there. You travel extensively in the region and we've actually been in a few engagements as well over the past year in Southeast Asia. What's your sense of how things are looking on the Asia policy front in Washington, as well as the regional perceptions and responses to that? General Stilwell: Well, thanks for having me here. And, hopefully, my perspective adds to the conversation and doesn't detract too much. But the focus has been on great powers, big economies like China, and then from there, Northeast Asia, primarily Japan. We can talk about that later, the over under on that. So Southeast Asia, in general, I think has gotten a pretty good treatment on this. The agreement with Vietnam came across fairly quietly without a lot of drama, which says there's interest in shifting markets and development and production centers away from one main aggressive and adversarial center and shifting it to countries that have lower labor costs and have many other advantages that that the PRC has since lost. So I can't speak to all, but I do know that I was fairly happy with how the agreement with Vietnam came out, and we're going to focus primarily on economic sense. Unlike Trump I, where the action areas were the Defense Department and the State Department, it really seems like there's been a shift away from that more toward Commerce, Treasury and USTR. No criticism there. If you're looking at national debt now at $37.5 trillion dollars, you’ve got to do something to get that under control. And if you do that by pumping up the economy, moving industry back to the US, all the things that we're hearing about, that's a reasonable approach. I would just say it can't come at the cost of those other traditional security centers like Defense and State. “Unlike Trump I, where the action areas were the Defense Department and the State Department, it really seems like there's been a shift away from that more toward Commerce, Treasury and USTR.” PLURALISM AND COMPETITION IN US SOUTHEAST ASIA POLICY ASEAN Wonk: The other aspect I wanted to zoom in a bit on is what we've been hearing since actually a few years ago publicly from Southeast Asian officials about not being forced to choose between the United States and China. My own sense has long been that this is more about the choices that these countries actually make for themselves and how they make them, rather than anything that's imposed by Washington or other countries. And sometimes, as we both know, choices are being made more for shorter-term regime interests, which are not necessarily the same as longer term national interests. You’ve spent a lot of time thinking through the issue of choices. I recall when you were Assistant Secretary, you tried to emphasize the fact that under the first Trump administration, just because there was a greater focus on sovereignty didn't mean that there wasn't room for pluralism and notions of multipolarity. At the same time, you fast forward a few years to the present, you know, just a few weeks ago we saw China with its Shanghai Cooperation Organization summitry in Tianjin promote more aggressively its own notion of what a world order should look like, and the Global Governance Initiative was rolled out. How much room do you think there is for this kind of pluralism and coexistence of worldviews as these views are competing increasingly between the United States and China and other capitals are adjusting their own approaches to this as well? General Stilwell: I actually I love the idea of pluralism. We took some heat over that presentation at Brookings when we gave it in 2019. The mighty David Feith wrote that speech. He wrote it at the last minute because he just had this change of heart. And the folks at Brookings were surprised that we went down that path, but think about it. That was my experience everywhere I went is people were very happy when American diplomats did not show up with a non-pluralistic agenda saying, my way or the highway, you're going to do human rights, you're going to do all these things that we demand of you. I grew up as a fighter pilot, and we're a fairly direct bunch. We don't use a lot of diplomatic language. And one of the first things you learn is you've got two ears and one mouth, and you should use them in those proportions. Well, I suggest our diplomats consider that because I oftentimes would follow one of my colleagues into a capital, and they had just gotten wire brushed and the finger wagged in their face about doing things that were culturally the norm for them. So, one, we have to stop preaching at folks. We need to listen to what they have to say. If we want to guide them; if we want to see change in how things are going, if there's human rights practice, we gently guide them into that without trying to force them. And so it starts off with diplomacy. And we should be teaching these things as we raise our diplomats. On that point, though, the Chinese version of this stuff is unipolar. It's unilateral. It's my way or the highway. You will do these things. And then they go after these countries at the SCO summit. I mean, it's rogue’s gallery. It's countries that really have no accountability with their own populations. And my first experience with this was at that Shangri-La Dialogue in 2014. I went with the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff Marty Dempsey, and Chuck Hagel, a Republican congressman who the Obama administration brought in as secretary of defense. What a great choice. The Japanese made a very strong press for watching out what the PRC is doing with debt traps and all that stuff. It was the first time that there was actually a really strong contentious back and forth between the PRC and, in this case, the US. All the others were hanging back behind the US going: okay, you guys take this one, but we don't want to get splashed. Don't make us choose between the two of you. That's why this headline really got my attention: we want a strong economic relationship with the PRC, but we want the US to provide our security. Now think about the math on that. When you're doing trade – economic interactions and those things – it should be a win-win. Everybody's condition increases. Security is not that way. Security is a bill. It's costly. We're going to spend $850 billion this year on the Defense Department, and that's not even enough. So I've been wrestling with that since 2014. I hadn't come up with a good four syllable response to “don't make us choose.” A very good friend and a former colleague and a former boss came back with “Lee Kuan Yew chose.” I like that one, but maybe a little more something a little less. “I hadn't come up with a good four syllable response to “don't make us choose.” A very good friend and a former colleague and a former boss came back with “Lee Kuan Yew chose.” I like that one, but maybe a little more something a little less.” Look at Pakistan. Pakistan went all in with the PRC with this China Pakistan Economic Corridor, and now they're regretting it. And they want to get out of this bad deal. Well, if I was in charge, I would say, I'm not going to make you choose. You decide which way you want to go, but it's a one-way door. Because if you're going to trade on American interests and American taxpayer dollars and use that to sweeten the deal with the PRC, well, don't come running back to us when that deal goes south as the China Pakistan Economic Corridor is. And the last thing on that, we want to talk about finance, it's obscene that Is

27 min
07/24/2025

Episode 23: New ASEAN Vision Needs Back to Basics Geopolitics

Our guest today is Dr. Pushpanathan Sundram, who previously served as a former ASEAN deputy secretary general and has over thirty years of experience working across regional issues. We will start talking about ASEAN's newly-released vision out to 2045 and evolving initiatives out to the next round of regional summitry later this year. Be sure to tune in as we go through a range of other subjects, including geopolitical flashpoint management in Southeast Asia as well as geoeconomic priorities amid developments like tariff wars, BRICS enlargement and ASEAN-GCC-China summitry. To receive full ASEAN Wonk posts and support our work, consider a paid subscription for $5 a month/$50 a year through the button below. For more on pricing for institutions, groups and discounted categories, visit this page. Note: The transcript that follows the above free clip preview has been lightly edited for clarity and organized into sections for ease of quick browsing. For all ASEAN Wonk Podcast episodes, full video and audio podcasts, along with edited and sectioned transcripts as well as block quotes, will be a premium product for our paying subscribers, but we will include a short free transcript preview and a clip for all readers to maintain accessibility. Paying subscribers can find the rest of the full transcript and the full video podcast right below the paywall. If you have not already, do consider subscribing, and, if you have already done so and like what you see and hear, do consider forwarding this to others as well who may be interested. Thank you for your support as always! INSIDER’S PERSPECTIVE ON NEW ASEAN VISION 2045 ASEAN Wonk: So welcome to the podcast Nathan, and I wanted to start, if we could, on ASEAN's new vision 2045, which was publicly released in late May alongside events tied to the summit. As you well know, this is something that's been in the works for a few years already even though it's just been publicly released. As somebody who has been working with ASEAN from the inside, including as deputy secretary general, you've seen the trajectory of this organization up to date. How would you grade or assess this new Vision 2045 that was released within ASEAN's broader trajectory? Dr. Pushpanathan Sundram: Thank you, Prashanth, for the invitation to this podcast. I'm pleased to talk about something that's very close to me, ASEAN. The ASEAN Vision 2045, I would say, is an ambitious plan for twenty years, but it's backed by structure. I was involved in drafting the first ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint. We have put in a lot of things there, but we realized that ASEAN will need time to actually implement. So this time, they are really looking at it in a more in-depth perspective in terms of looking at the vision plus the structures needed. In fact, for the economic community itself, they have five-year plans, strategic plans. They've come out with strategic plans for all the communities under this Vision 2045. So the political security community, economic community, social cultural community, and the master plan on the connectivity aspect of it. So we look at the AEC and connectivity strategic plan as they call it now. They don't call it a blueprint strategic plan anymore. They are five years. The others are ten years. So each of the plans have a number of goals and measures. I counted around total all the four strategic plans will have about five hundred measures or so. So it's quite a detailed plan. The thing is if you look at an ASEAN plan itself, what is important to realize is that sometimes it's aspirational. Sometimes it's very broad. But I think what it needs is the depth. So even if you look at the various plans, right, the 2025 plan, the secretary general actually mentioned that the political security blueprint has now achieved 99.6 percent, economic blueprint around 97 percent, and then the sociocultural about 99 percent, and the master plan on ASEAN connectivity 83.9 percent. These figures look very good actually. But if you really look at it, I would say, yes, they may have implemented it from the broad sense of all the measures. But when you really go into the depth of it, that is where the problem is. Because if you don't really tackle the depth, then you will not see much change. So I think that's where the crux of the matter is when you look at the blueprints. “The thing is if you look at an ASEAN plan itself, what is important to realize is that sometimes it's aspirational. Sometimes it's very broad. But I think what it needs is the depth.” Now let me just give you some examples. For example, ASEAN has done very well on the tariff side, reducing tariffs. So, 99 percent of all tariffs are now down. But if you look at the non-tariff barriers, it continues to be a challenge, I mean, especially, say, in the agricultural sector, there are still high tariffs. Now on the political side, the crisis response to Myanmar or the Rohingya crisis was slow and constrained by consensus. And then the human rights declaration remains nonbinding, and there is, I would say, lack of effective enforcement mechanisms. So if you really look at the 2045 plan, it’s very good, but the weakness will be in the enforcement and timely action. So this is an area that I hope ASEAN will look at when they develop the structure to implement this twenty years plan. EVOLVING APPROACH TO REGIONAL STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT AND PROGRESS ASEAN Wonk: Right. This is the first ASEAN twenty-year vision – the previous vision was ten years. But as you said, they have these strategic plans on different timelines, so they can be updated from time to time. How does this relate to the fast-changing world that we are facing in right now? It does seem like there's an attempt to balance responsiveness with the broader vision so that ASEAN is able to stay on track for the long term. What are your thoughts on this given that this is something that ASEAN has been grappling with since the time you were there? Dr. Pushpanathan Sundram: Yeah. So we had previously what we called Vision 2020, if you recall. So that was also a very long vision. And then in between, we had the AEC blueprint and the various blueprints and so on. So I remember my time, the blueprint was seven years implementation, 2009 to 2015. And then we had a ten-year plan. Now we have a twenty-year plan. One, it shows that ASEAN will need more time actually to implement. Actually, if you really want to implement it in-depth, I think it will take time. So it's good that on the economic community as well as the connectivity aspects, they have a shorter term five-year plan because things are changing so fast, and there's so much economic uncertainty. So having these five-year plans, strategic plans, I think the economic one is going to be 2026 to 2030 or so. So that's going to be very important, actually. So every five years, they relook at what's happening because I think ASEAN cannot work in isolation by itself. It has to really look at what's going on out there. So I think that's important to have that kind of short plan, and then they make adjustments. So under the new 2045 plan, they have these implementation mechanisms like the annual progress reports, the midterm review in 2030, and the final assessment in 2045. Then they will create some dashboard, and I think external evaluation teams will look at it and track and verify it. So I think they're putting in those mechanisms so they can track the progress. ADJUSTING TO GLOBAL GEOPOLITICAL CONTESTATION ASEAN Wonk: I agree with the point you made earlier about ASEAN needing to adjust to a fast-changing world, and Malaysia Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim mentioned at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore that the region has to hold its own ground amid a series of challenges including tariff wars and U.S.-China competition via what he called active non-alignment. He has referenced some of the measures being taken, including the first-ever ASEAN-China-GCC summit and a new ASEAN geoeconomics task force. What is your sense of how Southeast Asia and ASEAN are holding the ground in this changing world? Dr. Pushpanathan Sundram: Yeah. I think ASEAN will be facing a lot of challenges. As you know, ASEAN centrality is going to be still very important for all of us. So I think ASEAN will have to adopt a strategy where it's working with the world in a sense. Like the U.S. tariffs. ASEAN as a whole has decided not to retaliate but to cooperate and work with the US. So I think that’s a good strategy in the sense that we want to see how we can further progress in terms of the tariff negotiation. So each country will do its part. The aim is to work out an amicable solution bilaterally with each of the ASEAN countries and the US. At the same time, I think this is an opportunity for ASEAN to really look internally. So, one of the things that is going to be very important is this upgrade of the ASEAN trade in goods agreement, ATIGA. ASEAN has learned from the COVID pandemic situation that intra-ASEAN trade is so important. So during the COVID pandemic, the intra-ASEAN trade was a buffer. So I think they recognize this. “Like the US tariffs…I think this is an opportunity for ASEAN to really look internally…” So ASEAN is now concluding the protocol, expected to conclude, I think, by end of the next summit possibly early 2026. The focus is going to be on tariff simplification, non-tariff barrier reduction, rules of origin, streamlining, and so on. So I think that's going to be important. That will enhance intra-ASEAN trade, which is still hovering around, say, 22 to 25 percent. It's not growing. So one of the reasons it’s not growing is because of non-tariff barriers, then the streamlining of the custom procedures and so on. So I think that will be very important, the ATIGA upgrade. Then I think you're also aware about the Digital Economic Framework Agreement (DEFA) that ASEAN is looking at. From what I understand, the final negotiations are

19 min
06/26/2025

Episode 22: Will Iran Derail Trump Asia Defense Strategy?

Our guest today is Dr. Ely Ratner who served as assistant secretary of defense for Indo-Pacific security affairs under the Biden administration. We will start our conversation talking through contemporary developments in U.S. security relationships in the Indo-Pacific. Be sure to stay tuned as we go through a range of other subjects, including the the new administration’s coming U.S. defense strategy, datapoints to watch in 2026, Taiwan and the South China Sea. To receive full ASEAN Wonk posts and support our work, consider a paid subscription for $5 a month/$50 a year through the button below. For more on pricing for institutions, groups and discounted categories, visit this page. Note: The transcript that follows the above free clip preview has been lightly edited for clarity and organized into sections for ease of quick browsing. For all ASEAN Wonk Podcast episodes, full video and audio podcasts, along with edited and sectioned transcripts as well as block quotes, will be a premium product for our paying subscribers, but we will include a short free transcript preview and a clip for all readers to maintain accessibility. Paying subscribers can find the rest of the full transcript and the full video podcast right below the paywall. If you have not already, do consider subscribing, and, if you have already done so and like what you see and hear, do consider forwarding this to others as well who may be interested. Thank you for your support as always! GRADING TRUMP ADMINISTRATION’S EARLY INDO-PACIFIC DEFENSE APPROACH ASEAN Wonk: Welcome to the podcast, Ely, and I wanted to start with your take on where U.S. defense policy is under the second Trump administration. We just saw Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth out at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore. And to be fair, if you look more at what he did rather than what he said, you could make the case for a lot of continuity with the building out of the security latticework that we saw under the Biden administration. But as one Southeast Asian official said to me, the key challenge seems to be to what extent is this new administration going to be able to build out the so-called lattice work even as it does seem like – from some of the headlines and some of the experiences of some of the countries in the region – the aperture of U.S. engagement seems to be narrowing or changing when it comes to other non-defense aspects of U.S. policy, whether it's through tariffs or U.S. assistance and focus and so on and so forth. So as a practitioner yourself and somebody who has thought about U.S. defense policy both in and out of government for a long time, how would you go about grading the new administration's approach with respect to defense policy in the Indo-Pacific? Dr. Ely Ratner: Well, Prashanth, thanks for the opportunity to be here. It's great to talk with you today. I think your prompt laid down a number of the issues in early assessment, which is in terms of activities, in terms of messaging, I think we have seen a decent degree of continuity. Secretary Hegseth’s first trip out to the region to the Philippines and then Japan, both in terms of the types of deliverables that were announced as well as the messaging around U.S. commitment to the region, U.S. commitment to allies and partners that did represent a good amount of continuity. Where we have seen some particularities related to the Trump administration, we have seen a much stronger push toward allies and partners to spend more on defense and to do more and contribute more. I think some of that had started under the Biden administration. And frankly, I think up to a point, that's actually quite a good direction to take our alliances and partnerships. So that has been much more forward as a central priority. And then, yes, of course, as you mentioned, the changing nature of U.S. foreign assistance in the region as well as the economics on tariffs have created, I think, political headwinds, diplomatic headwinds. And the question is to what degree are those going to interfere with the ability – both the political space and the ability – of countries in the region to continue forward on deepening defense and security partnerships. So I think we are at a little bit of a inflection point here where – yes, you are seeing continuity; you're seeing good messaging – we also haven't necessarily seen the full fruition or development of a clear regional strategy from the new administration. There's a national defense strategy, which by all reporting is underway and may be released as early as the end of the summer, and that'll give a good indication on the defense front where the administration wants to head. And that appears to be quite focused on the on the China challenge, also focused on the U.S. homeland, and that has a certain degree of implications for how the administration approaches the region, how the administration approaches allies and partners from a defense perspective. But, obviously, as you said, it's a broader aperture of economic and diplomatic initiatives as well that affects all of that. So I think mostly continuity so far with some potential disjunctures based on some of the external factors. “There's a national defense strategy, which by all reporting is underway and may be released as early as the end of the summer, and that'll give a good indication on the defense front where the administration wants to head.” EVOLUTION OF LATTICEWORK AND REGIONAL SECURITY PARTNERSHIPS ASEAN Wonk: Right. I wanted to ask a broader question about the security latticework or network of US alliances and partnerships. Because as you're aware, this is something that's been in process really since the end of the Cold War – this idea of transitioning from wheels to webs; hub and spokes to more networked forms of alliances and partnerships. I'm wondering for Southeast Asia where you see U.S. engagement having proceeded there? Because I do sense that even though there's a lot of focus in the headlines around the Philippines, for example, there was an effort by the Biden administration to really broaden out how to think about defense – not just integrated deterrence, but also looking at opportunities like East Timor for example, and Indonesia with Super Garuda exercises. Where do you see key partnerships and direction of travel regarding Southeast Asia’s place within the broader U.S. Indo-Pacific defense architecture in the past ten, fifteen years? Dr. Ely Ratner: Yeah. It's a great question. Look, maybe I'll answer it in a couple different ways. I mean, in the first sense, I think what you're describing of an aspiration to try to mature the regional architecture beyond just the hub and spoke model or beyond just a set of U.S. bilateral alliances has been around as long as you and I have been in the business. You can go back ten, fifteen years, and there are think tanks writing about the Asia power web or this networking. But up until pretty recently, I think it had been mostly fits and starts and aspiration, maybe dialogue at best. I think what we saw during the Biden administration was a real transition from the latticework or the networking being theory or at best dialogue to moving toward no kidding activities that can have a real impact on operational cooperation, and, at the higher end, combat credible deterrence. So we saw that with AUKUS, obviously; in the “Squad” arrangement with the Philippines, Australia, and Japan; and the US, Japan, South Korea arrangement; to a degree, the Indo-Pacific Quad with India; and continued U.S. engagement with ASEAN, including plans for another U.S.-ASEAN exercise upcoming in the coming years. You know, sometimes as new opportunities and institutions emerge, particularly in Southeast Asia, there is concern that it is crowding out attention toward ASEAN or somehow diminishing how we think about ASEAN centrality as the role of ASEAN as sort of the lone convener of the region together. I guess I understand those concerns, but we all consider these – both in the way we spoke about them, but in practice – as complementary and overlapping. That the idea was not that one institution would move in and push aside all the others, but that the combination of them – different partners addressing sort of fit for purpose, different issues – that that was the right way to think about the overall regional architecture, and I continue to believe that. I have written a piece in Foreign Affairs arguing that when it comes to combat credible deterrence, it will be important to move beyond just some of the ad hoc arrangements into a more formal collective defense arrangement, starting with the United States, Japan, Australia and the Philippines. That's really of the belief that, look, the latticework as it currently exists serves a lot of important functions. I think it strengthens the region. It's a good thing. It's the right thing to be doing. But in terms of real military cooperation – we can talk about sort of how it affects economics and diplomacy and foreign assistance and other issues – but when it comes to no kidding, militaries operating together in a way that strengthens deterrence, the ad hoc and informal nature of a number of these latticework institutions leaves them maybe where the whole isn't really more than the sum of the parts when it comes to command and control and exercises and operations and planning. And that you do need a more formal mechanism to get to a future where the power of the alliances together is really leveraging all of the capabilities. Because as much as we are working together in these different constellations and we can work together to do exercises and it sends an important signal regionally about the degree to which we're cooperating and we're aligned, it's not always trending toward, again, no kidding ability to operate during crises and contingencies. So I think a part of the latticework needs to formalize. That d

22 min
06/13/2025

Episode 21: AUKUS, ASEAN and Australia Southeast Asia Futures

Our guest today is Andrew Goledzinowski who previously served as a senior career Australian diplomat with several posts within Southeast Asia, including as ambassador to Vietnam, high commissioner to Malaysia, as well as the first assistant secretary at the Southeast Asia Regional Division. We will start our conversation talking about recent developments in Australia's ties with Southeast Asia. Be sure to tune in as we go through a range of other subjects, including the shifting geoeconomic landscape in the region and Australia's strategy on Southeast Asia as well as the Indo- Pacific and where that might be headed. To receive full ASEAN Wonk posts and support our work, consider a paid subscription for $5 a month/$50 a year through the button below. For more on pricing for institutions, groups and discounted categories, visit this page. Note: The transcript that follows the above free clip preview has been lightly edited for clarity and organized into sections for ease of quick browsing. For all ASEAN Wonk Podcast episodes, full video and audio podcasts, along with edited and sectioned transcripts as well as block quotes, will be a premium product for our paying subscribers, but we will include a short free transcript preview and a clip for all readers to maintain accessibility. Paying subscribers can find the rest of the full transcript and the full video podcast right below the paywall. If you have not already, do consider subscribing, and, if you have already done so and like what you see and hear, do consider forwarding this to others as well who may be interested. Thank you for your support as always! GRADING AUSTRALIA SOUTHEAST ASIA ENGAGEMENT TODAY So welcome to the podcast Ambassador and let’s get started. We've seen Australia record some notable wins in its engagement with Southeast Asia. There was a second special summit held last year, upgrades with countries including Vietnam, which you were involved in as well. At the same time, of course, just like with any other country, there are no doubt some limitations as well and challenges within Australia's wider approach. For example, on economic ties, there was a government commissioned report on investment in Southeast Asia that noted that Southeast Asia is just over three percent of Australia's investment stocks abroad, and there needs to be a lot more work to be done in that domain. I guess we can start with how you assess or grade Australia's Southeast Asia strategy? And you can use any sort of scale you want, whether it's a letter grade or a scale of one to ten. Ambassador Andrew Goledzinowski: Gosh, that's a good question, Prashanth. I haven't been asked that one before. Well, look, from my point of view, our relations with Southeast Asia are as good as they ever have been. So from that point of view, I guess the relative trajectory and performance is very good. And you would have to say that the student is improving. But in absolute terms, it's not good enough, to be honest. I think I would give Australia a solid B. And the reason is that it's increasingly obvious that our future lies in the region, and our engagement has been successful but insufficient, I would say. And there are a lot of datapoints that suggest this. I mean, politically, we're doing very well. You referenced the second special summit. And, you know, the fact that we can convene these, that the leaders come, that they all recognize that Australia is an important player in the region, is valuable, is worth engaging. Those are all positives. And I would say the sort of the less tangible atmospherics – the vibe, if you like – is also very good. The relationship is respectful. There are no major irritants, and all that is positive. But as I say, it's not really enough. You referenced the fact that three percent of our overseas investments are in Southeast Asia. That is a damning data point, I think. For a country that is as open as Australia is, we're a trading nation. We rely very much on open communication and commerce. We have been sort of skipping over Southeast Asia for far too long. And there are some good reasons for that. Our institutions that invest are generally the big ones. It's our pension funds, which are ginormous: they have something like four trillion dollars in assets under management. Our big publicly-listed companies – the big four banks, for example –and the others, they tend to be very conservative investors. They prefer to invest in Australia or in North America, and they are not looking for big returns. They would prefer to be safe rather than get rich fast. And that holds us back a little bit. Because in Southeast Asia, you have to be prepared to take a little bit of risk. And most importantly, you have to be prepared to get involved. You know, we tend to sort of do things from over here and then eventually make an investment decision and then move over into Southeast Asia in a cautious way. But as I sometimes say, investing in Southeast Asia is a bit like crossing the road in Hanoi. And if you've been to Hanoi, you know that you can't plan it from the curb. You have to step out into the traffic and have confidence that you will navigate your way across. And invariably, you do. But it does require that first step, and we in Australia tend to be just a little bit chary of that. “[A]s I sometimes say, investing in Southeast Asia is a bit like crossing the road in Hanoi. And if you've been to Hanoi, you know that you can't plan it from the curb. You have to step out into the traffic and have confidence that you will navigate your way across. And invariably, you do. But it does require that first step…” DIRECTION OF TRAVEL IN BILATERAL AND SECTORAL ENGAGEMENT ASEAN Wonk: Right. That's a great analogy on the sort of leap of faith amidst the motorcycles in Hanoi. You mentioned this notion of the vibe or the atmospherics or the narrative, which I actually think is a really important point. And for Australia, there have been a whole host of announcements in the past couple of years – a new green and digital shipping corridor with Singapore, work that was done with Vietnam to upgrade the relationship, and you just saw the Australian prime minister in Indonesia just after being elected in his first foreign trip talk about some of the economic opportunities with the Prabowo government. Given your perspective of having served in several of these different countries and also looking at the region regionally, what would you say about some of the notable movements on direction of travel, whether it's with respect to countries or sectors for Australia strategy in Southeast Asia? Ambassador Andrew Goledzinowski: Well, I would say government is leading the way. You've referenced some of the initiatives. You've referenced that the prime minister himself has chosen to focus on Southeast Asia. The thing is, you know, it can't just be the government. We need the business sector. We need civil society. We need universities and others to also engage. And I think that's going to happen. It's beginning to happen. Of course, it's been happening for many years at one level. But as I said, I think it's inadequate given our geographic circumstances and the historical times we live in. Inevitably, we need to focus more on Southeast Asia. Now we've been a bit distracted with the Pacific for good reasons. The Pacific is our backyard. It's the region where we feel that we can make the biggest impact. And the sort of strategic competition that has been developing in that part of the world has engaged us very strongly. So a lot of political capital, a lot of resources, money, but also people. The number of people that DFAT now has in our office of the Pacific compared to when I was working in the Pacific is quite extraordinary. And that comes at an expense, right? Because it's almost a zero-sum game. The more effort and attention you pay to one region, the less you have for the rest. I think that'll rebalance over time. And I've always believed that our fundamental strategic interests as well as our economic interests do lie in Southeast Asia. And so the direction of travel, as you put it, I'm starting to see some small, not shifts, but accelerations. So in the university sector, a number of universities are now talking about either establishing or reviving or refreshing their Southeast Asian think tanks – the centers that they have focusing on Southeast Asia. I'm beginning to see more interest from the superannuation community. When I was in Vietnam just middle of last year, we hosted a big delegation of superannuation players who also went to Indonesia and elsewhere. It was kind of a very preliminary testing of the waters because their mandates are very restrictive. And Vietnam isn't yet even considered an emerging economy in terms of its ratings as an investment destination. But they're starting to show interest, and I think that will continue to accelerate. The other way also is positive. Southeast Asia kind of knows us better than we know them, and partly because we have a huge alumni community there. I mean, Malaysia, we were just talking about, it's somewhere north of four hundred thousand people have studied in Australia or studied at Australian universities in Malaysia. That creates an enormous body of goodwill and interest in Australia. You know, I'm hoping that our more restrictive student policies now in Australia don't impinge negatively on that because it's that kind of people-to-people knowledge, confidence, and familiarity which then does enable other things like investment to happen. VALUE PROPOSITION AND STRATEGIC NARRATIVE ASEAN Wonk: You talked there about a very important component, which is the multistakeholder and multidimensional nature of Australia's engagement. And I think we've seen that even in some of the special summit engagements: Australia clearly messaging this about being not just about things like maritime security, for example, which

25 min

4

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4 Ratings

In-depth conversations on Southeast Asia and Indo-Pacific geopolitics and geoeconomics with experts covering the same topics you see on the twice-weekly ASEAN Wonk newsletter (www.aseanwonk.com). Hosted by ASEAN Wonk founder Dr. Prashanth Parameswaran. Join us with diverse, leading regional and global voices as we all get smarter, faster about the world’s most dynamic region. www.aseanwonk.com

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